In response to the need for a rapid coordinated Canadian response to crises in the world caused by conflict, natural disasters, and failed and fragile states, the Government of Canada (GoC) established, in May2005, the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) along with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with a budget of $100 million per year for five years (2005-2010).
The GPSF was created to fulfill an institutional and funding gap within the GoC by providing dedicated resources for activities that are necessary for a timely response with respect to countries at risk of crisis, but are not properly the responsibility of the Department of National Defence (DND), and are outside the core purposes of Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Program primarily administered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
Since May 2005, the bulk of GPSF programming support has been targeted at initiatives in three priority countries: Sudan, Afghanistan and Haiti. Of these, Sudan has been the largest recipient of GPSF funding to date.
The GPSF is managed by the START Secretariat within the International Security Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), with support from the START Advisory Board. The Sudan Task Force, which is part of the Bilateral Relations Branch, leads Canada's bilateral relationship and provides policy and strategic context to all Canadian engagement in Sudan.
In February 2007, DFAIT commissioned a formative evaluation of the GPSF in Sudan. The purpose of the evaluation was to provide DFAIT with the information required to fulfill Treasury Board requirements to report on the performance of the GPSF which will feed into the forthcoming formative evaluation of the same. The evaluation examined the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the GPSF support to Sudan. It is intended to focus on ways to improve future practice. The evaluation process was guided by an Evaluation Advisory Committee formed of key stakeholders including DFAIT, CIDA, DND and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) representatives. The evaluation covers the period from the GPSF's inception up to May 2007.
Evaluation findings in this report are based on over 150 interviews, a review of internal documents and worldwide literature, and a mission to Europe, Ethiopia, and Sudan where the evaluation team visited Khartoum and Juba. It includes three case studies of initiatives supported by the GPSF.
There were certain limitations to the evaluation including the lack of defined intended results for the GPSF in Sudan, the lack of a conflict analysis and theoretical framework for measuring civil protection and peacebuilding results, the early stage of both START and some of GPSF programs and travel restrictions that prevented a visit to Darfur. Information from the GPSF Sudan evaluation will be used to inform the scope and focus of the upcoming formative evaluation of the GPSF as a whole.
This is a formative evaluation intended to focus on ways to improve future practice. The GPSF is a new fund with an evolving management structure and mandate. Its engagement in Sudan adopted programs approved earlier, and it was established during a period of great crisis in Sudan. Many of START's early actions were responsive within this context and should not be judged with the same standards expected of a long-established program.
The complexity of the situation in Sudan cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the Sudanese, international, and Canadian contexts as they relate to Sudan. Sudan is a large and complex country whose problems and internal dynamics relate to multiple interests within and beyond its borders. Sudan borders nine other African countries, many of which also are experiencing conflicts. Internationally, Sudan has been a priority for both the UN and the G8, and the crisis in Darfur is one of great concern to the Canadian public. There is no quick fix; the resolution of Sudan's difficulties will require a holistic global response over a prolonged period of time.
Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the conflict continues unabated. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended decades of civil war and created the SPLM-dominated Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). It provides for a Government of National Unity, a National Armed Forces, a Bill of Rights and an election planned for 2009 with a referendum on self-determination of the South in 2011.
The United Nations (UN) has taken an active interest in the situation in Sudan as has the G8, and both of these international bodies have supported the deployment of an African Union (AU) observer force in Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Both the international community and its African partners consider the AU to be a key organization for addressing regional conflicts in Africa, though as a new and emerging organization, its capabilities are limited. Western donors have developed a coordinated approach in support of AMIS and implementation of the CPA, with Canada as a significant contributor. On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council authorized a UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping mission, known as UNAMID, of up to 26,000 military, police and civilians. The deployment has the stated support of the Government of Sudan and should begin deploying over the coming months.
Both the GPSF and START are relatively new, and both are evolving. Since the GPSF was created, there have been ongoing refinements and changes in its mandate, organizational structure, programs and operational procedures. Moreover, for much of the period covered by this formative evaluation, the GPSF operated under the terms and conditions (T Cs) of the then pre-existing Human Security Program (HSP). These T Cs restricted the kind of programming the GPSF could engage in, the type of support that it could provide and the level and duration of the GPSF funding. More specifically, these restrictions limited the funds available for programming, made it difficult to support multilateral organizations, and provide multi-year commitments. They also obliged DFAIT to program GPSF support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) whose spending authority was not so encumbered. Approval of the GPSF T Cs further contributed to delays in disbursements to projects spanning 2006/07. Finally, the GPSF operated under the burden of Governor General Special Warrants, which meant that START could not make commitments unless it could provide assurance that 100 percent of the GPSF funds requested would be disbursed. These operational constraints remained in effect until September 2006, at which time the GPSF finally secured its own T Cs.
Canada has been supporting the peace process in Sudan since 1999, and has provided various types of humanitarian and nation-building assistance preceding this date. The Darfur crisis increased the demand on Canadian resources so that by 2007 almost two years after the GPSF was established, over $132 million had been committed to 31 projects related to Sudan. The AU has benefited from $120 million in GPSF programming, with smaller amounts contributed to multilateral institutions, international bodies, and NGOs. Except for the aircraft and fuel components of GPSF's support to AMIS which was managed by CIDA until March 31, 2007, limited GSPF funding has gone to one other government department (OGDs), namely the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and some Sudanese organizations.
The context for civilian protection and peacebuilding is highly complex in Sudan, with political, ideological and operational challenges within the country and among the bilateral governments and multilateral institutions that have become involved. The GPSF is relevant and needed for Canada to respond adequately to crises such as Sudan. It fills some important gaps outside the mandates of Canadian government departments by providing dedicated resources and an institutional mechanism to deliver assistance rapidly to conflict and post conflict situations. The GPSF has performed responsively to the crisis in Sudan, so far allocating $132 million to 31 projects; however, the cumulative impact of such projects is indeterminate at this stage since many are relatively recent.
Moreover, the lack of a performance and results measurement framework specific to Sudan makes it difficult to comment on the effectiveness and success of the GPSF investments in the country. The existing Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework and Risk-Based Audit Framework ( RMAF/RBAF) outcomes and indicators for the GPSF as a whole are too general, incomplete, overly focused on Canadian institutions and/or publics, and not particularly useful for evaluating the GPSF programming in Sudan. There was insufficient information with which to judge the GPSF's effectiveness using the RMAF. The forthcoming formative evaluation of the GPSF will give further consideration to this matter.
Despite these limitations in a priori criteria for measuring success, examination of specific programming initiatives relative to their stated objectives indicates that the reviewed initiatives have had reasonable success. Canada is one of the major contributors to AMIS, thereby sustaining its operational capability and fulfilling Canada's intended national and international commitments towards the situation in Sudan. Individual Canadians have exercised dedicated and in many cases critical leadership in a variety of fora that have helped deliver Canadian contributions to AMIS, but the AU is a young multinational organization facing many capacity challenges that impact directly on the effectiveness of its conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations. Addressing these institutional capacity deficits will be critical to the success of future conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations.
Projects funded by the GPSF related to civilian disarmament and the rule of law in south Sudan are relevant and supportive of the priorities of key national and international stakeholders. Although START has followed many of the principles for effective programming in conflict and post-conflict settings, as articulated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the effectiveness of GPSF investments in south Sudan is placed at risk by the absence of a coherent strategy of engagement for these sub-sectors. Moreover, the lack of adequate presence of key Canadian players in Sudan limits Canada's ability to participate in key fora for donor coordination that could complement our whole-of-government response.
Despite references in the GPSF logic model to a whole-of-government (WoG) approach, there is no clearly articulated and commonly accepted vision for WoG among START stakeholders. The absence of a clear and commonly accepted conceptual framework for WoG renders it difficult to plan, implement and evaluate.
While the divisions within START have developed engagement strategies for their respective areas of competence, responsibility and accountability for strategic planning and synergistic programming of GPSF as a whole in Sudan remains unclear. Although START is nominally charged with this responsibility, the development and management of a strategic framework for Canada's WoG response to the crisis in Sudan appears to have been assumed by the Sudan Task Force, which resides outside the START in the Department's Bilateral Relations Branch.
The management requirements for crisis intervention differ from those applicable to programming in more stable environments. The terms and conditions accompanying Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) approval of GPSF funding have, for the period under review, constrained planning for all but short-term projects. While the objectives of many GPSF funded projects in Sudan have ambitious long-term objectives, these cannot be easily met by GPSF given the relatively short-term support that GPSF is currently authorized to provide. Nor is the short term time horizons for GPSF engagement consistent with one of the key principles for good international engagement in fragile states, as defined by the OECD, which calls for long term commitment. Although the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with CIDA clarifies how GPSF short term support complements and productively intersects with Canada's longer term development assistance, transition mechanisms have yet to be developed.
Further to the findings of this evaluation, and informed by contemporary literature, DFAIT should clarify the intended meaning and operational modalities for the whole-of-government concept as applied to crises and fragile states, to GPSF and to START.
DFAIT should clarify a strategy for GPSF support to Sudan, with particular attention to Canada's niche. The strategy should identify Canada's priorities and objectives for Sudan, the means to achieve those objectives, the resources required, the partners to be engaged, and the framework to be used for monitoring and reporting on performance towards realizing stated objectives.
DFAIT should consider complementing operational support to future African Union peacekeeping missions with a comprehensive capacity development plan. The capacity development plan should take note of contributions of other donors and incorporate information on intended contributions of OGDs.
DFAIT should clarify, and formally document, roles and responsibilities with respect to the development, implementation, monitoring and reporting on country whole-of- government engagement strategies.
The START Secretariat should determine the different needs and management requirements (e.g. nature and distribution of human resources, programing modalities, terms and conditions, reporting requirements) for programming in response to immediate crises and for capacity building as distinct from other types of GPSF programing.
State failure and the civil strife that accompanies the breakdown of social order has always presented humanitarian and developmental challenges to the international community. It also presents a challenge to regional and global peace and security. In response to these challenges, Canada recognized that a new approach was called for that would combine humanitarian and developmental aid with assistance in support of human security (military and police capacity), justice reform, and good governance.
It was further recognized that to give effect to this more comprehensive strategy to address the unique challenges posed by contemporary international crises would require the participation and support of Other Government Departments (OGD) in a "whole of government" approach. To this end, the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) was identified by the Government of Canada (GOC) in April 2005 and granted a total budget of $100 million per year for five years (2005-2010). In October 2005, the GPSF became partially operational under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but with a reduced budget, and under the Human Security Program (HSP) Terms and Conditions (T Cs). In September 2006, with the Treasury Board approval of its T Cs, the GPSF became fully operational.
In February 2007, DFAIT commissioned a formative two-phased evaluation of the GPSF in Sudan. The first phase was aimed at determining the key foci and methodology for the evaluation and culminated in an evaluation work plan (March 2007). The evaluation covers the period of GPSF programming in Sudan from April 2005 to April 2007 in reference to the GPSF Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF)/Risk-Based Audit Framework (RBAF) dated December 2005.(1) Readers should note that DFAIT will be commissioning a formative evaluation of the GPSF as a whole in the latter part of 2007. Information from the GPSF Sudan evaluation will be used to inform the GPSF formative review as appropriate.
This report presents the main findings and recommendations of the assessment of GPSF interventions in Sudan. The remainder of this chapter provides background information on the GPSF and an overview of the evaluation methodology.
The objectives of the GPSF are cast slightly differently depending on the source document relied on. For example, one source document states that the objectives of the GPSF are to "support urgent contributions to crisis operations, meet Canada's G8 Sea Island commitments to help build global peace support capacity, and to provide resources to advance Canada's human security objectives." The GPSF's Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework and Risk-Based Audit Framework (RMAF/RBAF) cast the objectives another way, stating that the "objective of the GPSF is to ensure timely, coordinated responses to international crises requiring effective whole-of-government action through the planning and delivery of coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile state situations implicating Canadian interests." The START Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) Manual (2006) more or less echoes the objectives as framed in the GPSF RMAF/RBAF, but with one other objective: "to manage, in a whole of government context, the GPSF and its three sub-programs."
While all these expressions of the objectives of the GPSF are mutually supportive, there are subtle differences which have implications for the evaluation. For example, the first articulation of the objectives of the GPSF cited above makes no reference to WoG while WoG figures prominently in the GPSF RMAF/RBAF. The former also makes explicit reference to Canada Human Security Agenda, while the latter does not. For the purpose of this evaluation, the objectives for the GPSF articulated in the RMAF/RBAF, which are replicated in the GPSF SOPs, are taken as the objectives of the Fund.
The GPSF RMAF/RBAF(2) defines eight intermediate and three final outcomes as well as one ultimate outcome as shown below. The RMAF/RBAF also defines over 50 related immediate outcomes outputs and activities, most of which have little bearing on GPSF programming in Sudan, and therefore are not replicated here.
GPSF Ultimate Outcomes
- Improved Canadian contribution to peace and security and the safety and well being of beneficiaries in targeted areas
GPSF Final Outcomes
- More rapid, integrated, and better coordinated Canadian response to international requirements for short and medium term crisis prevention, stabilization, peace-building and reconstruction
- Improved Canadian contribution to the mitigation of natural disasters and complex emergencies, and restoration of security and indigenous governance capacity
- Expanded global and regional capacity for peace support operations
GPSF Intermediate Outcomes
- Improved Canadian whole-of-government coherence
- Improved timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Canadian response to crises and humanitarian issues
- Increased Canadian influence and catalytic leadership
- Increased sustainability of the capacity of funded organizations
- Increased knowledge and mainstreaming of HSP issues internationally
- Enhanced prospects for reconstruction and stabilization
- More effective and stable post-conflict institutions
- Increased public understanding and support for Canada's role in international crisis response
The GPSF includes three programs, each with its own distinct objectives as described below.
Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP): The objective of GPOP is to implement Canada's G8 Sea Island pledge(3) of $50 million for developing global capacity for peace support operations. Through GPOP, START supports the development of global capacity for peace support operations through medium-term capacity building initiatives in the area of institutional decision making, planning, and early warning functions as well as in military and police operational capacity.
Global Peace and Security Program (GPSP): The objective of GPSP is to support timely, coherent and effective responses to peace and security challenges of fragile states, including conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives. The GPSP priority is to stabilize large-scale crisis situation and restore security for local populations while maintaining an analytical capacity to provide expert advice on conflict prevention and early warning.
Human Security Program (HSP): (known as the Glyn Berry Program since June, 2007). During the period relevant to this evaluation, the objective of the HSP was to advance Canadian foreign policy priorities under the human security agenda, namely the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, public safety, peace operations, and governance and accountability.
The GPSF is administered and managed by START. The mandate and organizational structure of START is described below. The organizational structure of START(4) and its reporting structure within DFAIT are provided in Exhibit 1.1.
START is composed of an inter-departmental Advisory Board and the START Secretariat. Its mandate is to:
The START Secretariat has overall responsibility for the management of the GPSF. It was established in September 2005 and brought together and reinforced existing departmental capabilities drawn from other DFAIT Divisions for managing peace and security fund program funds; developing and delivering country-specific conflict prevention and peace-building plans and initiatives; coordinating peace support operations and coordinating humanitarian policy and crisis responses. A Director General, who reports directly to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), International Security in DFAIT, leads the Secretariat.
The Secretariat consists of an Executive Office (IRD) (led by a Senior Director) and four policy and programming groups which are responsible for the identification, approval, monitoring, management and evaluation of individual GPSF projects (each of which is led by a Director). The Secretariat had a total of 65 staff based in Ottawa at the time of writing.
Executive Office (IRD): IRD is responsible for the strategic and policy management of START and overall program management of the GPSF. IRD provides programming and project management expertise to thematic groups and serves as available surge capacity for ongoing programming. The financial staff housed within IRD verifies budgets as submitted in applications and provides financial wrap up of individual sub-programs to the START Secretariat. IRD also guides and manages START's relationships with key partner institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN). IRD has 15 staff.
Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Group (IRC): IRC is responsible for providing policy and operational leadership within START in the development of coherent, whole-of-government approaches to conflict prevention and peace building (governance, state-capacity building, democratic development and human rights) in the context of fragile states and those already in crisis, as well as building a new, robust Canadian capacity to mediate conflicts within or between states. It provides ongoing early warning conflict and crisis risk assessments for senior government officials. IRC has 15 staff.
Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group (IRH): IRH is responsible for developing, implementing and coordinating government-wide policy on international humanitarian affairs and development of Canadian responses to humanitarian crises, in both conflict (i.e. complex emergencies) and natural disasters. IRH has 9 staff.
Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group (IRP): IRP is responsible for peace operations policy and best practices, security sector reform and engagement, and management of Canada's international police peacekeeping engagement. It is also responsible for planning and implementing Canadian engagement in integrated peace operations. It expands and contracts as necessary, contributing to Bureau-wide Task Forces and Working Groups. IRP has 16 staff.
Mine Action and Small Arms Group (ILX): ILX is responsible for managing DFAIT's program to support the promotion, universalization and full implementation of the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines and for providing guidance to the overall intergovernmental program. It is also responsible for coordinating Canada's efforts to curb the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and our diplomatic engagement under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). ILX has 10 staff.
START has established two committees (the director general level Program Planning Committee and the operational level Project Management and Development Group) to assist in the GPSF management as described below.
Program Planning Committee (PPC): Chaired by the START DG or Senior Director, the PPC meets as required to review concept papers related to program policy and/or specific projects (usually projects valued at $500,000 or more, projects that respond to GoC commitments and projects that raise the profile of the GoC). It is tasked with providing overall direction in the planning of these initiatives. The Committee includes relevant geographic and thematic DGs from within DFAIT and the START Directors as appropriate and relevant START program officials make presentations.
Project Development and Management Group (PDM): The START Senior Director chairs this group. As a consultative body, the PDM endeavours to meet every week to review incoming proposals, make recommendations for funding consideration and raise technical issues on the GPSF programming at large. The main purpose of the PDM is to provide a technical review of all the GPSF proposals. The PDM includes representatives from each of the units within START, functional and geographic bureaux as well as contracting, RMAF/RBAF, legal, and financial expertise as appropriate.
The START Advisory Board is an interdepartmental, information-sharing body chaired by the Director General (DG) of the Secretariat. It is comprised of senior officials (mostly Director Generals from across government) that includes DFAIT, CIDA, DND and other relevant federal departments, agencies, and crown corporations with responsibilities and capacities related to stabilization, reconstruction, peace-building, and international crisis management (including Public Safety Canada (PSEP-C), the Privy Council Office (PCO)/FDP, the Department of Justice Canda, and others as required).
The Advisory Board provides the Secretariat (IRD in particular) with information on other government programs and priorities; an opportunity to coordinate Canada's response to natural disasters and complex emergencies; and the opportunity to share advice and experience amongst represented departments and agencies. It is a foreign policy mechanism to align the GoC's geographic and thematic priorities for fragile states and to provide coherence in the allocation of resources to programs beyond those of the GPSF. Its specific responsibilities are for:
Some other divisions in DFAIT also support the START Secretariat. In the case of GPSF support to Sudan, these include the Sudan Task Force (FSDN), Financial Services (SMFH), Program Analysis (SMPA), Program Services Unit (IXS), Justice Legal Services Division (JUS), Environmental Policies and Sustainable Development Strategies Division (GDS), Contracting (SPPG) and Area Management Office - Gloabl and Security Policy (IAM). Two of the key units are the Sudan Task Force and (FSDN) and the Corporate Services Unit (IXS).
The Sudan Task Force is responsible for coordinating the implementation of Canada's whole-of-government strategy in support of peace in Sudan. This includes representing Canada in international discussions on Sudan, bilateral relations with the Government of Sudan, developing and providing policy advice to government across the range of Canadian engagements in Sudan (including diplomatic, peace support, peace building, humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives) as well as implementing the Canadian communications strategy and engaging with Canadian civil society.
IXS is responsible for the provision of financial; legal; contracting; risk and results-based management; information management; and, program advisory services for the International Security Branch (IFM) programming bureaux including the START Secretariat, the Global Partnership Program, and the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program. The Division is charged with promoting branch-wide approaches to program delivery that are consistent with relevant Treasury Board policy and Government of Canada requirements. IXS also carries-out planning, reporting and other corporate functions for the IFM Branch.
Two other key Canadian government departments (CIDA and DND) work closely with DFAIT on Sudan issues within the GPSF.
CIDA's mandate is to promote sustainable development and provide humanitarian assistance to reduce poverty in the poorest countries measured through progress on the development goals of economic well being, social development, environment sustainability, and governance (including freedom and democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice and accountable public institutions). CIDA has the operational lead for Canadian humanitarian assistance to natural and man-made disasters. CIDA works primarily through longer-term social and economic development and institution building. Development policy and programming as part of coherent Canadian foreign policy is the responsibility of CIDA.
In the context of the GPSF, CIDA and DFAIT have agreed that:
A detailed breakdown of DFAIT/CIDA mandates, roles and responsibilities and operating principles in regards to Crisis Response and Fragile States is set out in Treasury Board documents.
The DND's mission is to defend Canada, Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security. DND has identified the principal international security concerns related to fragile states as intra- and inter-state conflicts, international terrorism and the potential threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction. Recent DND policy statements include promises to re-equip and expand the Canadian Forces to permit Canada to play a more significant role in international security and peace support operations. DND continues to facilitate interdepartmental co-operation through its expanded role in interdepartmental committees and through more effective liaison at all levels including mechanisms such as the START Advisory Board.
The stated purpose of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the new Canadian whole-of-government approach to conflict prevention, peace operations, civilian protection and post-crisis stabilization as demonstrated by the GoC's response to the crisis in Sudan.
The objectives of the formative evaluation are:
This evaluation examined the GPSF response and support to the crisis in Sudan.A such, this evaluation focuses on two DFAIT units charged with leading these whole-of-government approaches. One is Canada's whole-of-government approach to crisis response and fragile states (managed by START from the International Security Branch), while the other is Canada's whole-of-government strategy in support of peace in Sudan (managed by the Sudan Task Force, FSDN, housed in DFAIT's Bilateral Relations Branch). The scope of this evaluation concentrates on the intersection of these two-whole-of government approaches. Consequently, the overall GPSF program is examined through the lens of the GPSF activities in Sudan only; separately-funded CIDA and DND activities in Sudan are not examined.
This is a formative evaluation intended to focus on ways to improve future practice. The GPSF is a new fund with an evolving management structure and mandate. Its engagement in Sudan adopted programs approved earlier, and it was established during a period of great crisis in Sudan. Many of START's early actions were responsive within this context and should not be judged with the same standards expected of a long-established program.
To guide data collection for the evaluation, an evaluation framework was developed, which had the following key foci.
GPSF Sudan Evaluation Foci
- GPSF Sudan Context
- GPSF Design Appropriateness
- GPSF Programming, Management and Delivery in Sudan
- GPSF Program Efficiency and Cost effectiveness
- Relevance of GPSF Programming in Sudan
- GPSF Sudan Programming Success (Effectiveness)
- Lessons Learned and Recommendations.
There were three main sources of data: people, documents, and site visits. Some of these data were used in support of three case studies.
People: Over 150 persons were interviewed for this evaluation. In Canada, this included senior representatives of DFAIT's International Security and Bilateral Relations branches, START directors, managers and officers and FSDN representatives; representatives of a large number of Canadian OGDs including CIDA, DND, the department of Justice Canada and the PCO; as well as some Canadian civil society organizations. Interviews in other countries included representatives of Canadian foreign missions abroad, the African Union, multilateral agencies, other donors, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and the Small Arms Survey (SAS).
Documentation: A large number of reports, files and other documents were reviewed for this evaluation. A list of key references is found at the end of this report.
Site visits: Between April 23 and May 13, 2007, the evaluation team visited four countries (Germany, Switzerland, Ethiopia, and Sudan) to collect data for the evaluation. The site visit to Sudan included visits to Khartoum and Juba.
Project Case Studies: The team conducted an in-depth review of five projects in order to produce three case studies as shown below. The AMIS project was selected on the basis that it represents the largest GPSF investment to date. The other four projects were based on advice by the START Secretariat offered during the evaluation workplan phase that suggested we review projects that would be indicative of future types of GPSF investments.
GPSF Case Studies
- GPSF support to AMIS
- UNDP Rule of Law Project (SGBV and Access to Justice)
- Thematic Case Study of Small Arms, incorporating projects of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Training in SALW for south Sudan, and the Small Arms Survey.
While the GPSF RMAF/RBAF includes a logic model that defines planned GPSF outputs, outcomes and impacts, there is no results and performance measurement framework specific to Sudan. In the absence of such a framework for GPSF in Sudan, the general GPSF logic model was used. As it is overly general to apply to a particular country, it may not do justice to the results of the GPSF investments in Sudan.
Absence of theoretical framework to measure success of Civil Protection and Peace Building (CPPB) initiatives
CPPB has only begun to be understood as a distinct branch of evaluation science. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a highly relevant document while the evaluation was underway: An Approach to DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (CPPB). Since the purpose and processes of CPPB differ from other types of programming, an evaluation of such initiatives benefits from holistic analysis rather than merely prescriptive applications of conventional program evaluation methods. To the extent possible, the literature, including the recent OECD publication, informed the assessments of relevance, effectiveness and success in the evaluation.
The literature on CPPB indicates the imperative of a conflict analysis, as distinct from a context analysis, (see OECD, 2007, Pp. 12-13) in order for evaluations to be able to identify the key driving factors of the conflict and thereby be able to assess program relevance and effectiveness. Such an analysis of Sudan was not available to the evaluators, and creating one was beyond the scope of this evaluation. In the same vein, there was no documentation on the theory of change guiding Canada's programming, so it is not possible to assess programming relative to these baseline tools. One implication of these limitations is the difficulty of assessing whether programming contributed to what the literature refers to as non-occurrence of new conflict.
Both the GPSF and START are relatively new, and both are evolving. Since START was created, there have been some refinements and changes in its mandate, organizational structure and programs. Similarly, some GPSF guiding procedures changed prior to and during the course of the evaluation. Every effort was made to ensure that this report cites the most up-to-date sources; however, the task was made difficult at times by the prevalence of multiple versions of undated documents, the number of documents whose official status was indeterminate, as well as inconsistencies in some factual information found among documents (e.g. the GPSF results are not defined consistently in the RMAF, creating some ambiguity regarding a few of the results).
While the evaluation considers some aspects of whole-of-government and necessarily relates to Canada's overall involvement with Sudan, the evaluation of project interventions is limited to those projects funded through the GPSF. Furthermore, some programming, notably support to AMIS, began before GPSF was established, making it difficult to separate out the distinct contributions of GPSF. Furthermore, significant programming by DND and CIDA is excluded; thus, the evaluation provides only a partial assessment of Canada's whole-of-government response.
For much of the time covered by this formative evaluation, the GPSF operated under the T Cs of the HSP; the impact of this on programming is discussed earlier in this chapter. Although an RMAF for the GPSF had been developed in 2005, the RMAF for HSP remained in effect and in use up until October 2006.(5) This presented a challenge to the evaluation team as it was faced with two very different frameworks for assessing performance and results for the same program. As the Treasury Board Secretariat has called on DFAIT to report on the performance of the GPSF under the T Cs granted to it on September 18, 2006, a decision was made by the Project Authority, in consultation with START and other stakeholders, to rely on the performance and evaluation frameworks outlined in the GPSF RMAF, notwithstanding that programming and reporting occurred during the study period under a different programming and reporting regime.
The team did not plan to visit the Darfur region of Sudan due to travel restrictions. Thus, data related to the humanitarian situation and to the work of AMIS were from secondary sources such as situation reports, NGOs working there, Canadians working with the AU, and AU Headquarters staff.
This report includes four chapters beyond this introduction. Chapter two summarizes the context affecting the GPSF in Sudan. Chapter three assesses the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of GPSF programming in Sudan. Chapter four reviews three GPSF investments in Sudan. Chapter five provides overall conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned. A list of references is provided at the end of the report.
Although Sudan is geographically remote and difficult to access, from the perspective of this evaluation, it is the centre of a worldwide web of national, regional, and international connections and interconnections. Sudan relates to regional and worldwide bodies such as the Arab League, European Union (EU), and the UN, as well as to its neighbouring states, to many individual countries in Europe and North America, and to its principal oil partner, China. Interests, ranging from humanitarian concerns to commercial trade drive the connections with Sudan of each nation, regional or multilateral body. Sudan itself is not monolithic - it has many political, geographical, and ethnic divisions that also need to be understood. All of these contextual realities are complex, but one needs at least a basic introduction to the principal themes and to the overall complexity in order to appreciate the problems that the GPSF is trying to address in Sudan.
This chapter considers the context in Sudan as well as the international and Canadian contexts that relate to the situation there. This is not an exhaustive review, and is intended merely to set the stage for Canada's role in Sudan. For a more thorough treatment of the subject, the reader is invited to consult such sources as: Short History of Sudan (Fadlalla Mohamed, 2004); Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya (Warburg, 2003); Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (Flint and de Waal, 2006).
Sudan is a large and complex country whose problems and internal dynamics relate to multiple interests within and beyond its borders. There is no quick fix; the resolution of Sudan's difficulties will require a holistic global response over a prolonged period of time.
Sudan is Africa's largest country and borders nine neighbouring states. Chronic conflict has affected the region's political and economic stability. The civil wars in Sudan over the past half-century have resulted in the largest Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) population in the world, four million, and an estimated two million dead as a result of those conflicts. In Darfur, four million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. For additional information on this subject, readers should consult Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004, A Macro Comparative Perspective (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2006). Sudan's conflicts and related displacement of people have affected its neighbours, notably Chad with its 200,000 Sudanese refugees, Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt, making Sudan's internal conflicts a threat to the whole region.
Within Sudan, many ethnic groups with differing traditions, religions, and other interests serve to fragment the country politically. Groups may cooperate with neighbours habitually or according to particular issues, but they may also engage in violent conflict. Competition for resources underlies many conflicts, ranging from new found oil wealth, largely in the South, to a scarcity of water(6) and productive land in many parts of the country. The situation is exacerbated by the different life styles and competing interests of farmers and herders living seasonally in common areas and by the effects of global warming that are reducing these scarce commodities. Marginalized people, in many cases women who deal with resources such as water and firewood, are particularly affected.
Interventions intended to address the problems are subject to the complex dynamics of a fragmented society that has a long history of settling differences through armed conflict. Interest groups with more power and influence, including more powerful weapons, typically prevail. International assistance alters the power balance among these interest groups, benefiting some, disadvantaging others while also creating new interest groups. Proponents of Canadian programs need to understand the complexity of Sudan in order to unravel and appreciate the interests of those affected or excluded. In a context where some interests oppose change, even carefully targeted interventions may not achieve their higher-order goals. It will take concerted global interventions over a long time to produce the momentum required to address underlying systemic issues in a sustainable manner.
In early 2003 conflict erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan, ultimately leading to the displacement of over two million people and one of the worst current humanitarian crises in the world. The crisis has provoked intense public interest and a major international response.
The causes of the conflict in Darfur include the lack of power- and wealth-sharing as well as local conflicts over land between sedentary and nomadic peoples. The situation is further exacerbated by a proxy war that Chad and Sudan are fighting by hosting and supporting the other's rebel groups (See ICG, Darfur: Revitalizing the peace process, Africa Report No 125, 2007). This combination of factors caused the situation to deteriorate, with increasing displacement of people and killing so that by early October 2004, Darfur was considered one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Several credible experts, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, emphasized the importance of prompt action in order to curb the armed attacks on civilians and other human rights violations.
With support of the international community, the AU took the lead in addressing the conflict by sponsoring peace talks and by deploying a military monitoring mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on June 9, 2004. However, the AMIS I force was small, consisting of 60 military observers and support elements. This force proved to be inadequate to provide protection over a vast territory, so AMIS has been subsequently enhanced (See AMIS Case Study, Section 4.2).
Due to the severe humanitarian crisis, public and donor interest in Darfur has increased. Public opinion polls repeatedly rank Darfur as the most important international humanitarian issue to Canadians and other publics in the Western world. This type of public support has helped to keep Sudan high on the priority list of international bodies around the world, such as the UN and AU, and has involved many African and Western governments in supporting resolution of the conflict, including Canada.
After almost 50 years of war, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005, producing a cease-fire and fragile peace in south Sudan and creating a Government of National Unity. Tight time frames for implementation of key elements of the CPA in south Sudan prior to the national election in 2009 and planned referendum on the status of south Sudan in 2011 makes it imperative for international efforts to move quickly to realize demonstrable peace dividends.
Conflict ravished south Sudan from 1956-1972 and from 1983-2005. Between 1983 and 2002 alone, more than two million people are estimated to have died, almost all from disease and malnutrition, making south Sudan one of the most underdeveloped places in the world.(7) However, signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 formally brought an end to hostilities between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Not just a cease-fire agreement, the CPA provides a blue print for national renewal.
The interim constitution creates an elaborate system of authorities charged with overseeing and implementing various aspects of the CPA, including, among others, a National Human Rights Commission, a Civil Service Commission, a National Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) Commission, and a National Electoral Commission, to name a few. While the CPA contemplates the possibility of secession by the south, and expressly provides a mechanism to permit this to occur through the instrument of a referendum, the interim constitution was clearly designed by the signatories to serve as an enabler for national reconciliation and renewal -- in effect, an opportunity for the GoS to transform itself and start constructing an inclusive framework of national identify in which all Sudanese would find a sense of belonging as equal citizens.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- Formal recognition of south Sudan as an autonomous region with a government that enjoys powers resembling a sovereign state, including the power to enter into bilateral relations with foreign countries and international trade and development partners;
- The devolution of government functions and powers -- and fiscal revenue decentralization -- to allow people at appropriate levels to manage their own affairs;
- The creation of a Bill of Rights, which obliges all levels of government to respect, uphold and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- An arrangement for revenue sharing whereby the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) would receive 50 percent of the oil revenues generated from oil fields within its jurisdiction;
- Granting the peoples of south Sudan the right to exercise self-determination through a referendum to be held in 2011; and
- The creation of a new National Armed Forces consisting of the Sudan armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as separate, regular, non-partisan armed forces with a duty to defend the constitutional order.
While the signing of the CPA has brought a degree of peace to south Sudan, thereby creating the conditions for sustained development, the Government of south Sudan (GoSS) is in the nascent phase of constituting itself. The challenges before it are enormous; social infrastructure is practically non-existent and south Sudan remains heavily armed. Many communities have never witnessed international development assistance in any form, and needs are immense, so even the interface with outside development agencies is something that has to be learned. The effectiveness of integration has been questioned, and in the absence of a secure environment, huge numbers of civilians remain armed.
The SPLM/A has tremendous challenges in contributing to the Government of National Unity, as it has limited representation and little presence in the national civil service. The international community is committed to a united Sudan but progress is slow in fulfilling the terms of the CPA. As well, Darfur is diverting resources from the south to the crisis in western Sudan. Given the differences in religion, values and resources between the north and the south, unless people in the south witness concrete 'peace dividends' the planned referendum may well favour separation and a high likelihood of renewed conflict, perhaps even a return to civil war. Although there is a CPA in place, the overall security situation is fragile. Donors, like Canada, must be mindful of the possibility of a breakdown in the peace.
In western Sudan, and despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006, peace remains elusive. The continuation of violence exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and threatens the comprehensive implementation of the CPA. As a consequence, the basis for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction is largely absent.
The DPA was an agreement between the GoS and one of at least three rebel factions in the western region of Sudan. According to the International Crisis Group, the agreement has not brought the desired peace to the region because it did not adequately deal with key issues, too few of the insurgents signed it, and there has been little buy-in from Darfur society, which was not sufficiently represented in the negotiations.
According to the UN and the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), from August to December, 2006, the GoS's offensive against non-signatories of the DPA coupled with the fragmentation of rebel groups has resulted in large civilian casualties, additional displacements, attacks on 30 NGO compounds with the evacuation of over 400 humanitarian workers and over 80 vehicles hijacked and missing. Furthermore, armed militias are reported to have turned their weapons against each other as disputes over land and pasture have become increasingly heated. According to people interviewed in Sudan, as of May 2007, one quarter of IDPs are no longer accessible to humanitarian workers.
The fragile security situation in western Sudan seriously complicates international humanitarian efforts and all but precludes reconstruction work. Bureaucracy and non-governmental capacity, as well as the difficult physical environment of Sudan, further complicates working in the country. These constraints, experienced by all members of the international community who are actively engaged on the ground, including Canada, must be taken into account when assessing performance and progress towards achieving stated objectives.
The UN Security Council has labelled Darfur 'a threat to peace and international security' and has taken active interest in the conflict in Sudan, passing a series of resolutions intended to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. The UN has also passed a series of resolutions condemning the Government of Sudan's handling of the conflict and failure to control militias destabilizing the region. As a consequence, many international donor nations, including Canada, have demonstrated a reluctance to engage the Government of Sudan directly, thereby reducing options for influencing the course of the conflict.
The UN Security Council has labelled Darfur 'a threat to peace and international security' and has taken active interest in the conflict in Sudan. The first of many resolutions on Sudan under Chapter VII was approved in June 2004, calling for disarmament of the Janjaweed militias in Darfur. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages it to pursue regional arrangements and agencies in support of peace and security, so it was natural for the UN to support AMIS. In addition to its support of the AMIS I mission, on September 18, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1564 welcoming and supporting the intention of the AU to enhance and augment its monitoring mission. Resolution 1590, adopted in March 2005, established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor and verify implementation of the CPA including Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) aspects, as well as urging multi- and bi-lateral donors to prepare for the rapid delivery of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic development of Sudan. Resolution 1591 established a sanctions committee and Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Meanwhile, donor nations were preparing for the Darfur crisis. Resolution 1590 endorsed Norway's offer to host a donor's conference in Oslo, which took place in April 2005. That conference gathered pledges from donors, and began to sort out the areas that individual donors would support. Two months later, building on the Kananaskis G8 meeting, the Sea Island Summit of June 2005 announced an action plan for expanding global capability for peace support operations, including transportation and logistics support. In Africa, these actions were to be implemented in close cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organizations, in line with the principle of African ownership.
As a consequence of the international community's disapproval of the GoS's handling of the conflict in western Sudan, many donor nations reluctant to be seen dealing directly with the GoS have scaled back their level of engagement with the GoS, both commercially and diplomatically. Moreover, donor nations have tended to program around the GoS in various ways, such as programming from Addis Ababa or Nairobi, or by giving funds to non-governmental or multilateral organizations. While aligned with the prevailing view of the international community, the approach carries with it certain costs in terms of influence, which in turn affects the environment within which programming occurs.
The African Union is a relatively new and emerging regional organization, which has difficulty meeting the operational demands placed on it. Nevertheless, it is accepted by Africans and viewed by the international community as a key organization for addressing regional conflicts in Africa. As a consequence, donors acknowledge the importance of supporting organizational development of the AU as an indirect way of helping to resolve the conflict in Sudan.
The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 to replace the Organization of African Unity. It is loosely modelled on the European Union and intended to promote African economic, social, and political integration, and a commitment to democratic principles leading to a better life for the peoples of Africa. The enabling instruments express member states' determination to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and to ensure good governance and the rule of law in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. While maintaining the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, the enabling instruments also make provisions establishing, in essence, the principle of non-indifference to the internal affairs of Member States. Thus, they specifically provide for the right of the AU to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. They also provide for the right of Member States to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security. Ultimately, the AU aims to promote and ensure peace, security and stability on the continent.
It would take any such international organization many years to develop all the capabilities it requires to achieve such an ambitious mandate serving 53 states and many international partners (e.g. The UN has been developing these capabilities for over 60 years). The AU became engaged through AMIS after a mere two years of existence. Thus, it is not surprising that the AU is not yet able to carry out all the tasks its supporters expect, and to do them in ways that satisfy international standards for financial accounting and audit. The AU's ability to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan, even at a marginal level, has advantages to the G8, including the acceptability of such a force to the Government of Sudan, lower unit costs than other international forces, and elimination of the need to send large numbers of Western troops. However, it also brings certain risks, including involvement of an organization without the required capabilities and cost sharing among a relatively small number of donor nations. Notwithstanding these risks, states both in Africa and elsewhere see the importance of the AU and the need to support it through its initial period of organizational capacity development.
The international community developed a coordinated donor response to the crisis in Darfur and to the needs outlined in the CPA, including their respective priorities and responsibilities for supporting AMIS.
Although the CPA was not signed until January 2005, the international donor community had begun to prepare for the challenges of peace between the north and south of Sudan as early as 2003 when the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), through the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), called for the UN and the World Bank to co-lead a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for Sudan. The primary objective of the JAM was to provide an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs within the first two years of the peace, followed by an outline framework for reconstruction and recovery over a six-year period. Initial start-up funds for the JAM were provided by Norway, and later supplemented with support from the World Bank and UNDP. A Core Coordinating Group comprised of representatives from the GoS and SPLM, as well as representatives of the UN system, the World Bank, the IPF and IGAD, managed the JAM.
The report, entitled A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, was finalized and circulated in March 2005, one month prior to the Donors Conference on Sudan held in Oslo, Norway in April 2005. The report called for targeted interventions in support of the following: decentralization, civil service reform, and public finances (Institutional Reform and Capacity Building); the rule of law and security sector reform, peace-building and reconciliation, human rights, accountability, and the media (Governance); macro-economic, monetary and fiscal policy development and budget allocations (Economic Policy); agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, and private sector development (Productive Sectors); health, education, and rural water and sanitation (Basic Social Services); transport and civil works, communications, urban water and sanitation and energy (Infrastructure); demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration, internally displaced persons, community driven development and employment generation, and mine action (Livelihood and Social Protection); and data collection and analysis, monitoring and evaluation (Information).
Concurrent with the development of the JAM was the UN's own Work Plan for UN and Partners. The 2005 Work Plan drew on the findings of the JAM, which were available in the fall of 2004. The Work Plan appealed for US $1.5 billion to implement an urgent suite of interventions in support of humanitarian, recovery and development activities, which were to be implemented over a 12-month period. The 2006 UN Work Plan, while retaining a heavy emphasis on humanitarian assistance, revealed a shift in allocation of resources in support of longer-term development processes central to Sudan's future. More specifically, the UN Work Plan for 2006 established priorities for investment.
- Supporting the development of governmental and community institutional capacity;
- Supporting the expansion of the delivery of basic social services;
- Assisting with the a comprehensive response to the threat of HIV/AIDS;
- Supporting conflict management and reconciliation;
- Supporting comprehensive livelihoods programs;
- Supporting spontaneous and organized voluntary return/reintegration of displaced people;
- Supporting the implementation of a national DDR program;
- Providing humanitarian assistance for vulnerable people; and
- Supporting the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law.
The JAM and the UN Work Plan, both of which enjoy the support of the GoS and the GoSS, establish the priority sectors for donor support and the policy framework within which to assess DFAIT's contribution to its post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Sudan.
Canada has been supporting the peace process in Sudan since 1999. Canadian support to Sudan since 2004 has been driven by the desire of the Canadian Government to address both Canadian and G8 foreign policy priorities for humanitarian concerns in Africa.
Diplomatic relationships between Canada and Sudan began in 1961 when Canada's Ambassador to Egypt was also accredited to Sudan and the Sudanese Ambassador Resident in Washington D.C. was accredited to Ottawa. Canada's direct bilateral humanitarian and developmental activities in Sudan, initiated in the early 1960s, tapered off during the 1980s and 1990s due to the country's human rights record. Only humanitarian relief activities and support to the peace process continued during this period.
PM Special Advisory Team Mandate (May 2005)
The mandate of the PM SAT is to lead the implementation of the Action Plan for Canada in Darfur. The action plan will focus on three areas: Peace-building support to the AU mission in Sudan; humanitarian assistance to Darfur; and diplomatic support for the AU led efforts to achieve peace. The SAT will oversee Canada's policy on all aspects of its relations with Sudan. It will also oversee Canada's response to the impact of the Darfur conflict on eastern Chad.
In 1999, Canada began to provide direct assistance for the Sudan peace process. Initiatives included participation in the International Partners Forum (IPF) of the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); supporting the IGAD Secretariat for peace talks; supporting civil society initiatives of Canadian and Sudanese NGOs; and inviting Sudan's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail, and the leader of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement, John Garang, to Canada for discussions on the peace process.(8) Senator Lois Wilson was appointed as Canada's Special Envoy to the Sudan Peace Process and was supported by the Sudan Desk and the Deputy Director and Director of the Eastern and Southern Africa Division within the Africa Bureau. In 2000, Canada established a presence in Khartoum.
Sudan Task Force Mandate (May 2005)
The primary role of an interdepartmental Sudan Task Force based in Foreign Affairs Canada was to support the SAT. It manages all aspects of Canada's relations with Sudan including the upgrade of the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum. Missions abroad also support the SAT. The Sudan Task Force is led by the Director General of the FAC START bureau, working in close partnership with the FAC Director General for Africa and is managed by a full-time dedicated director. It includes senior representatives of CIDA and DND.
Diplomatic Support for Sudan
Canada will reinforce its diplomatic presence in Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan as appropriate to maintain a strong Canadian engagement in the consolidation of peace across Sudan. At the appropriate moment, a resident Ambassador in Khartoum would be appointed. DFAIT would retain its Sudan Task Force, headed by a senior official to ensure on-going and effective engagement in international for a on Sudanese issues.
Internal GoC Correspondence (August 18, 2006)
In 2002, Senator Mobina Jaffer replaced Senator Lois Wilson. Canada indicated continued support for IGAD's work, which had been mandated by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to lead efforts to end the civil war in Sudan. Senator Jaffer was tasked with representing Canada at the IGAD Partners Forum, monitoring the human rights situation in Sudan, and maintaining a dialogue with Canadian civil society on the Sudanese peace process. A Task Force was established in the Bilateral Relations Branch of DFAIT in 2004 and briefed the Prime Minister prior to his visit to Sudan and prepared him for the Sea Island Summit of the G8, which took place in June 2004.
The Prime Minister of the day addressed the Darfur crisis along two lines of approach; first, he exhorted the international community to act; secondly, he championed African ownership of the crisis while recognizing their real need for outside resources. On September 20, 2004, three months after the election of his minority government, at the UN General Assembly, the Prime Minister announced $20 million in assistance for an expanded AU mission, AMIS II.
In May 2005, the Prime Minister appointed a Prime Minister's Special Advisory Team (PM SAT) comprised of Ambassador Bob Fowler, Senator Romeo Dallaire and Senator Mobina Jaffer. With the support of the Sudan Task Force, the PM SAT advised the Prime Minister on Sudan.
Initial involvement in the Darfur crisis in 2004 came at a time when Canada had limited government architecture and resources in place to address such a crisis. Despite the lack of mechanisms, responsible government departments and personnel, as well as the PM SAT engaged actively to respond quickly. Many made super-human efforts to seize opportunities, solve problems and mobilize support.
Responsibilities of the Director, Sudan Task Force
The mandate of the Sudan Task Force was not revised following dissolution of the PM SAT. However, the Director of the Task Force is responsible for coordinating the implementation of Canada's whole-of-government strategy in support of peace in Sudan. This includes representing Canada in international discussions on Sudan, bilateral relations with the Government of Sudan, developing and providing policy advice to government across the range of Canadian engagements in Sudan (including diplomatic, peace support, peace building, humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives) as well as implementing the Canadian communications strategy and engaging with Canadian civil society.
Given the strengthened security-related component of this initiative in support of AMIS, the Sudan Task Force was transferred from DFAIT's Bilateral Relations Branch to the International Security Branch and housed in the START Secretariat. Following the federal election in Canada in January 2006, the PM SAT was dissolved. DFAIT maintained its dedicated Sudan Task Force, headed by a senior official, to ensure ongoing and effective engagement in international fora on Sudanese issues. In September, the Sudan Task Force was transferred from the START Secretariat back to the Bilateral Relations Branch in recognition that peace-building in Sudan will require a long-term and coordinated effort by the Sudanese with help from the international community.
Canada's initial response to Sudan was driven by the humanitarian concerns of Canadians and by the GoC's interest in making a clear statement to honour G8 commitments. Canada supported partnerships and international processes to respond rather than set goals for resolution of the situation. The public imperative of doing something placed the emphasis on humanitarian assistance, firm advocacy in support of the protection of civilians and supporting the AU and AMIS. These were essentially enabling objectives, which avoided the need for up front decisions on overall goals or a desired end state. Furthermore, most were initially short-term measures with little apparent consideration for their long-term implications. Canada can be proud of its early response at a time when many other donors hesitated, though the rapid reaction has had consequences. Canada, as well as other donors, found itself engaged in a mission with an ever-expanding mandate with predictable increasing demands on resources.
Canadian interest in African Crises
Crises in Africa are important to Canadians, and have become more important following the Rwanda genocide. The immediacy of the problem in Sudan fuelled by public pressure created the need for Canada to move quickly and 'do something' in Sudan.
Since 2005, the GOC has advocated a whole-of-government approach for dealing with complex international crises. However, the boundaries and operational modalities for this approach have not been clearly defined.
Governments have periodically required a means of rapid response and coordination across departments. Coordination among government departments is crucial for dealing with crises such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.
All nations have difficulty in effecting coordinated planning and control across departmental boundaries. The United States (US) has a National Security Council, which is provided with an extensive high-level staff run by the National Security Advisor, and which has the mandate to co-ordinate all national security issues. It meets almost daily at the 'deputy level,' less frequently with Cabinet Secretaries present, and when necessary with the President and all his Cabinet. This is theoretically attractive, but the results are often less than ideal (See Bob Woodward, Bush at War, 2002).
The United Kingdom (UK) also has a special arrangement to get critical information to a 'War Cabinet,' a process used by Winston Churchill in the Second World War, and by Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands War. In essence, an inner 'War Cabinet' is formed with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies, the Minister of Defence, the Chancellor, and Minister of the Home Office, and any other Cabinet members deemed necessary, and they, together with selected civil servants, manage the crisis. This is a sort of a virtual National Security Council, embedded in the existing governmental structure.
The DAC Security System Reform and Governance guidelines of 2005 provide a contemporary look at three whole-of-government approaches, including overarching policy frameworks, inter-ministerial committees and pooled funding mechanisms. They advocate the integration of security sector reform and development assistance using multi-sectoral strategic frameworks. The UK uses two pools, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool whose purpose is to improve the UK's conflict prevention policy and effectiveness through joint analysis, long-term strategies and improved coordination with international partners. The Netherlands has created a Stability Fund with similar goals, combining both ODA and non-ODA funds. Thus, contemporary practice tends to combine resources and control them using an overall whole-of-government strategy and some sort of inter-departmental mechanism to implement it.
The GoC has adopted the 'lead department' approach. When a crisis arose, a lead department was appointed, and through ad hoc interdepartmental committees, managed the crisis. In the past several years, this has morphed into the whole-of-government approach, which Canada and several other Western governments have advocated. The whole-of-government approach coordinates the roles of multiple departments required to be involved in certain cross-cutting issues.
Experts have different views on whole-of-government. On one end of the spectrum, whole-of-government implies a concerted strategy involving every relevant department together with some leadership to ensure adherence to the strategy. At the other end of the spectrum, whole-of-government implies loose coordination and information exchange so that departments know what the others are doing, but without any central leadership. The tradition in Canada tends towards the latter conception. Its limitation is that it risks foregoing the opportunities afforded by a common vision and the synergies generated by complementary programming.
In principle, at least three approaches to inter-departmental coordination are possible in the current Canadian government structure.
There is currently no multi-sectoral/departmental strategic framework for Canadian protracted crisis programming, including programming in Sudan. In the absence of this, it is an open question as to what standards should be used to evaluate the extent Canada's experience in Sudan has fulfilled expectations for a whole-of-government response there.
Whole-of-Government Support in Sudan
- The GPSF logic model makes multiple references to a whole-of-government approach.
- Canada's initial contributions to the Darfur crisis preceded establishment of the GPSF and were directed primarily through CIDA with a direct financial allocation for the purpose, and through DND and its resources. Subsequent to its establishment, the GPSF supported some programming components while the departmental funds of OGDs such as CIDA and DND supported programming related to the mandates of those departments.
This chapter has several purposes. The first is to profile the GPSF in Sudan, including objectives of the GPSF support, roles and responsibilities of key Canadian government departments in regards to the GPSF in Sudan, and current GPSF projects and investments. The chapter also assesses the relevance of GPSF programming in Sudan; the efficiency of GPSF programming by examining how GPSF investments have been designed, planned, managed and monitored by DFAIT (and particularly START); and concludes with an assessment of GPSF effectiveness in Sudan in reference to the GPSF logic model.
Objectives and outcomes are not defined formally for the GPSF in Sudan. Stakeholders report that four separate Memoranda to Cabinet prepared between 2005 and 2007 outline GoC's overall objectives for Sudan, however, these documents are of limited value for evaluation purposes. In the first instance, they are Cabinet Confidences, and therefore protected from public inspection. Furthermore, while identifying priorities for engagement, and the resources committed to the same, they do not generally include specific time lines, targets, and performance measures.
The Bilateral Relations Branch within DFAIT has developed a "Country Strategy" for Sudan. The Country Strategy cites three strategic objectives, but these are general in nature (see below) and do not specify desired outcomes or regional goals. Moreover, the activities in support of these objectives described in the Country Strategy largely pertain to the role of the mission. At least one Canadian government department (CIDA) is in the process of developing a guiding framework (Country Programming Development Framework) for Sudan. In August 2007, the Sudan Task Force, at the request of the PCO, hosted an inter-departmental brainstorming session aimed at defining an inter-departmental strategy for Sudan. This is a positive step.
Canada's Mission to Sudan: Strategic Objectives
- Support international efforts towards lasting peace and stability throughout Sudan (DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP);
- Build upon strategic partnerships on peace and security issues with key international and regional bodies, e.g. UNMIS, AMIS, AU, IGAD, civil society (DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP);
- Promote governance issues within the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Government of South Sudan, notably in the fields of human rights, federalism and support to the rule of law (DFAIT, CIDA, the Department of Justice Canada).
At June 2007, 31 projects received GPSF support in Sudan, representing a total commitment of almost $132 million. Notable characteristics of funded projects to date are as follows:
GPSF Implementation Partners
- Multilateral organizations (such as UNDP, IDLO or UNFPA),
- International bodies based in Canada, Europe and the United States (such as the International Criminal Court and the International Development Research Centre)
- Canadian NGOs (including the Canadian Red Cross, CANADEM, World Vision Canada and the Forum of Federations)
- Canadian government departments and agencies (RCMP and the Department of Justice)
All projects were funded through the GPSP or the HSP and managed by IRC, IRP and IRD (IRG). The sole exception to this was the management of the AMIS aircraft and aviation fuel support projects by CIDA up to the 31st of March 2007. CIDA administered these projects on DFAIT's behalf until DFAIT acquired the necessary authorities to assume the responsibility. DFAIT/IRP took over management of these projects from the beginning of Fiscal Year 2007/2008.
In addition to funded projects and initiatives, the GPSF, through the SAT and in conjunction with the Sudan Task Force, has supported a number of diplomatic initiatives in a variety of fora intended to advance the peace in Sudan. Diplomatic missions in Europe, Africa and North America undertaken by members of the SAT in the spring and summer of 2005 were instrumental in rallying international support for AMIS and the AU-led Peace talks in Abuja to resolve the conflict in Darfur, which resulted in the signing of the "Declaration of Principles in July, 2005."
The Sudan Task Force has followed in the steps of the SAT, fielding diplomatic missions to major international stakeholders, including Russia and China, with the aim of garnering support for the AU-UN Hybrid Mission and for the peace process in general. The Sudan Task Force has also initiated direct contact with rebel leaders involved in the Darfur conflict, again with the aim of soliciting their participation in the peace process, respect for humanitarian law and human rights, facilitating access for humanitarian assistance and the demobilization of child soldiers.
The Sudan Task Force has also played an instrumental role in bringing major donors involved in Sudan together to discuss responses to issues of common concern through the forum of the Core Contact Group, which was a creation of the Sudan Task Force. The Core Contact Group, comprised currently of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), the Netherlands, Norway, and others, including the UN, is chaired by the US and convenes weekly via teleconference. The Core Contact Group members also come together for face-to-face meetings conducted every two months. Over the study period, the Core Contact Group has convened meetings in Oslo, Washington, New York, Paris, and more recently in Tripoli.
As a member of the Core Contact Group, the Task Force has lobbied forcefully in support of greater dialogue between United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), donor countries and the AU with the view to removing obstacles to the hybrid deployment; support the AU/UN sponsored peace process; promoting a regional response to the crisis, including Chad, and north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR); support to AMIS; supporting the cease-fire in the context of a renewal of AU leadership; and promoting a renewed attention to environmental cum governance challenges associated with establishing a sustainable peace. These priorities were recently echoed in the joint declaration by the President of France and the Prime-Minister of the UK, referred to as the Sarkozy-Brown Initiative.
Within DFAIT, two Branches are most involved in GPSF in Sudan: the International Security Branch (through the START Secretariat); and the Bilateral Relations Branch (through the Sudan Task Force).
Overall roles and responsibilities for the START Advisory Board, Secretariat and Committees are provided in section 1.4.2. The role and responsibilities of the principal divisions within DFAIT directly and indirectly shaping GPSF investments in Sudan are described below.
The mandate of IRC is to provide policy guidance and program management expertise in the sphere of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in conflict-affected environments such as Sudan. IRC is tasked with providing a policy and strategic framework that ensures a targeted and effective peacebuilding program in Sudan. Following policy development, IRC is mandated to identify/develop projects and to manage funds provided through the Global Peace and Security Fund.
IRC is responsible for providing strategic analysis and policy guidance on areas for potential peacebuilding support from the Global Peace and Security Fund. This guidance includes periodic concept/strategy papers on thematic/geographic priorities and briefings to colleagues in the Sudan Task Force, the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum and START.
All final decisions to develop and advance proposals through the formal GPSF approval process are made by IRC following extensive consultations and due consideration of recommendations from the Sudan Task Force and the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum. IRC is responsible for the full project management cycle (as per START Treasury Board Terms and Conditions).
The mandate of IRP is to provide peace operations policy and best practices guidance relating to security sector reform and Canada's international police peacekeeping engagements. IRP is responsible for planning, implementing and managing Canadian engagements in integrated peace operations and, in addition, contributes to Bureau-wide task forces and working groups as necessary. It also manages the Global Peace Operations Program to respond to Canada's G8 Sea Island commitment to enhance the capacity of regional organizations, as well as countries, particularly in Africa, to conduct peace operations.
In the Bilateral Relations Branch, there are three key responsible organizational units: the Sudan Task Force, the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum, and the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa.
The mandate of the Sudan Task Force is to lead Canada's bilateral relationship and provide policy and strategic context to all Canadian engagement in Sudan. With respect to peacebuilding, the Sudan Task Force is tasked with providing strategic input into priorities and programs that best advance Canadian policies in Sudan. It also provides guidance to START on the overall policy framework for Canadian engagement in Sudan. This guidance includes recommendations on potential thematic and geographic areas for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programs.
The Canadian Embassy in Khartoum is mandated with leading Canadian bilateral relationships in-country and providing in-depth reporting and expertise on political developments relevant to Canada's policy priorities. The Canadian Embassy in Khartoum provides reporting and insight into political developments and identified conflict prevention and peacebuilding needs thematically and geographically. It plays an important role in identifying potential partners and projects for recommendation to IRC. The Canadian Embassy in Khartoum is also responsible for in-country liaison with partners in Sudan during project development and implementation.
The Canadian Embassy in Ethiopia serves as the principal interlocutor between the GoC and the African Union, whose head quarters is located in Ethiopia's capital city, Addis Ababa. In addition to its liaison role with the African Union, the Embassy in Addis provides assistance to Canadian OGD personnel engaged in the provision of the support to the African Union in general and AMIS in particular.
DFAIT received the necessary funding for the GPSF support of AMIS in May 2005. However, it did not have sufficient authority to implement the Project. Since the Minister of International Cooperation had the necessary program authority, an MOU was signed by DFAIT and CIDA outlining the arrangement between the two departments to implement the project in support of AMIS. From July 2005 to April 1, 2007, CIDA managed support to AMIS on behalf of DFAIT.
MOUs between DFAIT and CIDA
- July 2005: DFAIT signed an MOU with CIDA tasking it with a project to provide technical expertise and material support (fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and fuel) for the African Union Mission in Sudan in 2005/06 and 2006/07.
- February 2007: DFAIT signed an MOU with CIDA, which outlined the transition of the Project in support of AMIS from CIDA to DFAIT effectively April 1, 2007. It includes provision for CIDA to provide advice and support to DFAIT between April and June 2007 and report on its stewardship by June 30, 2007 to ensure a smooth transition between CIDA and DFAIT. With respect to technical aspects of the provision of A1 jet fuel, CIDA will provide technical expertise to DFAIT on a cost-recovery basis until September 2007
Of the roughly $132 million of GPSF resources committed as of May 2005, approximately $125.7 million had been disbursed by March of 2007. A summary of total GPSF expenditures on projects in Sudan for the period May 2005 to March 2007 is provided in Exhibit 3.1.
|Expense Category||Funding Score||2005/06||2006/07||Totals|
|GPSP Peacebuilding||Vote 10 HSP T631||$2,465,401||$2,465,401|
|Vote 10 T725||$4,680,539||$4,680,593|
|HSP Vote 1||$124,121||$124,121|
|GPSP||Support to AMIS||$45,126,016||$68,933,67||$114,059,6|
The GPSF is a relevant mechanism given the need for timely and coordinated responses across Government, stated Canadian priorities and international commitments, and the crisis situation in Sudan.
In keeping with Canadian core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world, Canada has a long history and demonstrated commitment to helping fragile states and countries in crisis. As a member of the international community, Canada has become increasingly concerned with the challenges posed by an escalating number of fragile states prone to instability, crisis and state failure. Recognizing the limitations of traditional approaches to address the security, stabilization and reconstruction needs of such countries, Canada created the GPSF, a mechanism to improve the Canadian government's response to countries in, or at risk of, crisis.
This fund is highly relevant given the need for timely response, the desired coherence across the various departments that might be engaged in response to crises, and the actions of other international leaders. The fund is relevant given acknowledged limitations in other Canadian government mechanisms for responding to crises (be they natural or human-made) in a timely way. Furthermore, alternative mechanisms exist in relative isolation, which is a limitation should a coordinated and coherent response be required. Moreover, Canada's decision to establish a mechanism is congruent with the actions of others in the international community including the UK, the US, Netherlands, the EU and the UN. The establishment of the GPSF supports Canada's international commitments including those made at the Sea Island Summit in 2004.
The GPSF Objectives
- Support urgent contributions to crisis operations.
- Meet Canada's G8 Sea Island commitments to help build global peace.
- Support capacity, and to provide resources to advance Canada's human security objectives.
While Canada's initial response to the Darfur crisis preceded creation of the GPSF, the GPSF would have facilitated the initial response, and has been a useful mechanism to support needed programming outside the mandates of other departments, subsequently. Sudan has been severely affected by decades of political and economic instability and civil wars resulting in an estimated two million deaths and the largest IDP population in the world. Resolving the conflicts in Sudan is of high priority to the Canadian public and government. Sudan has evolving short- and medium-term needs requiring immediate support in areas including diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, stabilization and reconstruction. The GPSF design accommodates these needs in timely and responsive ways, as evidenced by examples below.
- In 2004, Canada provided helicopters and fuel to support the AU Mission in Sudan. While the response was achieved in record-breaking time, it represented a major exception to normal programming and could have been facilitated had GPSF been operable at the time.
- GPSF has supported the Abuja Peace Talks and enabled women to participate, thereby helping to ensure that gender issues were appropriately addressed.
- GPSF has funded important medium term initiatives such as governance and DDR as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as support for the Rule of Law in south Sudan.
- GPSF has supported the coordination of Canadian government departments to respond in tandem to the situation in Sudan.
This section examines the efficiency with which DFAIT has organized, planned, managed and measured the performance of the GPSF supported initiatives in Sudan.
Established DFAIT organizational structures emphasize operational decision-making, project selection and information sharing related to funded GPSF initiatives in Sudan. Responsibility for other functions, including strategic management and accountability for results in the GPSF in general, and in Sudan in particular, is less clear.
In theory, organizational structures are established and roles defined in order to clarify the respective responsibilities and reporting relationships of different players in a project, program or an organization. Typically, this includes strategic leadership, governance, management, programming, coordination, performance monitoring and other such roles.
In regards to the GPSF in Sudan, both START and the Sudan Task Force have explicit roles as a consequence of their whole-of-government mandates for the GPSF and Sudan respectively.
As currently structured and defined, roles and responsibilities for communication and operational decisions related to the GPSF expenditures and projects are as follows:
However, beyond these areas, there are ambiguities relating to strategic management and performance measurement with respect to the GPSF in Sudan. For example, strategic country/regional priorities for Canadian engagement for conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives are supposed to be established annually through the work of an Assessment Working Group (AWG) and the Fragile States Group (FRG) and monitored by the START Advisory Board. More specifically, the START Advisory Board is charged with:
The Evaluation Team was unable to find evidence that the START Advisory Board has performed any of these roles with respect to Sudan. Informants interviewed indicated that the responsibility for developing Canada's whole of government strategy for Sudan has been assumed by the Sudan Task Force, with input from departmental and inter-departmental stakeholders - a subject examined in greater depth in the following section. This responsibility, however, has not been formally documented. Nor has the responsibilities of the Sudan Task Force with respect to monitoring and reporting on progress towards achieving stated whole-of-government goals been documented.
In the case of the GPSF in Sudan, it is essential for DFAIT to review, clarify and formally revise the governance, management, operational and advisory roles and responsibilities for START (and its various units), the Sudan Task Force, the Advisory Board and others as required in regards to Canadian operations and interventions in Sudan. This will require it to review and clarify the purposes, expectations, management arrangements and accountability channels of Canadian whole-of-government approaches being used for the GPSF and Sudan. The reporting and communications/coordination relationships among all START bodies should be summarized in one organization chart.
While DFAIT has defined priorities and goals with respect to the its engagement in Sudan, important elements of what would commonly be associated with a country strategy remain underdeveloped.
As noted earlier, the task of developing an integrated country strategy appears to have fallen on the shoulders of the Sudan Task Force. The Sudan Task Force, in response to a request from the Privy Council Office (PCO), hosted a workshop aimed at clarifying Canada's objectives and strategy of engagement for Sudan in August 2007. This is an important and positive initiative that should provide the basis for better strategic planning and monitoring of GPSF investments in Sudan at the country level.
As regards the START Secretariat, divisions actively engaged in programming in Sudan have developed, in consultation with OGDs, concept papers which outline objectives, priorities, activities, and partners as they relate to their respective spheres of engagement, but they have been developed largely independent of an overall strategic framework for a whole-of-government response to the crisis in Sudan.
Ultimately, DFAIT has to determine what the strategy should look like, what it will be used for, how it will dovetail with strategies in place or being developed by OGDs engaged in Sudan, and what body(ies) will be responsible for its development and use. The strategy should indicate a programming niche and investment strategy for GPSF and OGDs, with clear goals/outcomes/indicators/risks and designated areas where Canada will take international leadership. It should also clarify key risks, assumptions and mitigating strategies.
Moreover, as the lead department responsible for GPSF, DFAIT also needs to determine how the GPSF support for Sudan should be made operational. Currently the GPSF RMAF/RBAF provides a generic strategy for fragile states, which START can presumably use for overall GPSF planning and evaluation purposes.(9) However, it is not particularly helpful for planning, monitoring or evaluating the GPSF success in any one specific country or region.
START should explore the identification of new planning alternatives that would clarify the expected results of GPSF efforts and projects in any one country in the context of the proposed whole-of-government strategy for Sudan. This could be an explicit, results-oriented framework for the countries it supports that is developed in association with the relevant, responsible task force (e.g. the Sudan Task Force). CIDA has recently developed a Log Frame for its programming in Sudan, and DFAIT could benefit from developing something similar for Sudan.
The GPSF has been project and activity focused, reflecting the operational modalities of its three program streams rather than strategic in responding to country-specific priorities.
A review of documents suggests a strong focus on individual GPSF activities and initiatives. For example:
These factors considered, along with the T Cs the GPSF was obliged to operate under, it is not surprising to find that the GPSF has been managed over the past two years more in terms of individual initiatives than in terms of a more holistic, synergistic, strategic, country approach.
A review of the GPSF Sudan projects funded to date suggests that investments have been made in many areas. There are only a couple of areas where Canada has focused its investments, namely in support of AMIS, DDR and Rule of Law.
START program officers acknowledge that in the first year of START's existence, most attention was placed on identifying and getting some projects going; less attention was paid to other, more strategic considerations. In 2005/06, IRC identified five priorities for the GPSP in Sudan (see below); however, these priorities are no longer considered valid by IRC due to political circumstances in Darfur. In 2006/2007, IRC identified the priorities as being the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, general support to Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation, democratic capacity building in Darfur, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and targeted multilateral engagement. The strategic policy priorities for FY07-08 have been identified as advancing the renewed peace process for Darfur; stabilizing the security sector and facilitating disarmament in southern Sudan; and strengthening Rule of Law institutions in Southern Sudan.
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Priorities in Sudan (2005/06)
- Governance and participation
- Justice and reconciliation
- Economic and social well being
- Support to the peace process
Given competition among different fragile states/regions for limited GPSF resources, DFAIT should seriously consider adopting a more focused approach to GPSF investments in Sudan. This would include identifying priority areas and marshalling efforts to maximize synergies by linking GPSF investments with those of OGDs where appropriate and other institutions engaged in the country. Such an approach would enhance impact and sustainability, as well as increase Canadian visibility.
Joint DFAIT CIDA planning
START reports that a joint DFAIT-CIDA mission in May 2007 identified potential approaches to transition from GPSF stabilization programs to longer-term development programming.
GPSF's stated objectives and results include
The GPSF design imbeds several very different planning and management contexts, with different implications for how it selects, plans, manages funded activities and reports on such initiatives.
A review of established GPSF procedures suggests that they are better suited to post-crisis needs than to either immediate crises or capacity building needs as illustrated below.
GPSF Reporting Requirements
There is no requirement to report on the long-term sustainability of results, handover or exit strategies in reviewed reporting templates. This would be particularly important in the context of the post crisis stabilization and peace-building initiatives.
The START Secretariat is in the process of revising its Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs) manual. It should consider revising existing procedures to accommodate the needs of the different types of projects it funds (e.g. immediate crisis, post-crisis and capacity building).
DFAIT and OGDs have used formal and informal consultative mechanisms to support the timely operationalization of the GPSF in Sudan, which increased the timeliness of Canadian response.
Weekly inter-departmental meetings led and managed by the Sudan Task Force are widely viewed by interviewed DFAIT and OGDs as an effective tool for information sharing, and at times, problem solving, in relation to Sudan in general and the GPSF investments in particular. Given the vital importance of information sharing in a dynamic context such as Sudan, it is important and reassuring that such an effective mechanism is in place. The Sudan Task Force also participates in bi-weekly telephone meetings among the key international donors involved in Sudan, and represents Canada at various international fora.
Informants from DFAIT and OGDs report frequent informal consultations in relation to the GPSF in Sudan. These include phone calls, emails and informal meetings. Many of those interviewed noted the critical importance of personal relationships which made things work, despite numerous obstacles encountered in the course of implementing the GPSF over the past couple of years. Individuals took risks, demonstrated flexibility and trust, and worked overtime to compensate for tight-deadlines, inadequate numbers of staff, and challenging political contexts.
Complementary policy and programming expertise
Effective GPSF management requires effective coordination between the policy makers with in-depth knowledge of the country, and those with policy and technical subject expertise relevant to the conflict. In regards to the GPSF in Sudan, the programming expertise housed in START is nicely complemented by the policy expertise of the Sudan Task Force. Many of those interviewed for the study underlined the value of this matrix-like approach.
Reliance on formal structures alone would have made it extremely difficult for the timely operationalization of GPSF given the various contextual challenges at the time of start-up. That said there always needs to be a proper balance between formal and informal mechanisms, since informal mechanisms are overly reliant on individual personalities rather than established procedures. While experienced personnel with good contacts are often essential in achieving rapid responses, the management structure must be sufficiently robust to support effective and efficient program management in ways that respect program accountability requirements.
Despite attempts to develop tools and procedures for integrating gender equality and environmental considerations in GPSF programming in Sudan, these issues have not been effectively or comprehensively mainstreamed, nor have potential health issues been addressed.
In operating a program such as the GPSF, there are always various environmental, gender and even health issues (such as HIV/AIDS) to be considered at the design, delivery and monitoring stages. The RMAF/RBAF makes specific mention of environmental and gender considerations.
In terms of environmental considerations, START has used various procedures during the planning stage to assess the potential impacts of a GPSF investment on the environment. However, it is not clear that the GPSF programs have been systematically monitoring ongoing projects in regards to their de facto effects on the environment. For example, in the support provided to AMIS, there are several environmental concerns related to competition among the troops and local communities for scarce water resources, as well as issues related to fuel storage for AMIS. At the present time, START lacks the human or financial resources in place to carry out or finance such assessments if required. However, START could explore other options (such as contracting out this responsibility to others where warranted) to ensure that such concerns are addressed appropriately in reasonably cost-effective ways.
START reports that IRD is working with GDS to integrate environmental assessments into its project management; however, it notes that it is beyond the capacity and capability of START officers to monitor environmental effects without the appropriate tools and resources.
In terms of gender considerations, the GPSF has some tools and procedures in place. The GPSF Program Officers held a meeting in December 2006 to discuss how gender could be better mainstreamed at the project design stage. Major suggestions included: the need to provide GPSF officers with greater guidance in project proposal templates in regards to gender considerations; revisions to the SOPs manual to include an Annex on Gender which would include examples of how different types of projects can incorporate gender; contracting a gender expert to review all proposals from a gender perspective; and, gender training for officers. These internal generated suggestions were shared with the Director of START. START reports that these issues continue to be addressed by IRD, GHH and the working group. As in the case of environmental assessments, the GPSF lacks the human and financial resources to carry out or finance such follow up assessments. Again, START could explore the possibility of contracting out where warranted to complement its internal human resources in this area.
Finally, there are several concerns related to health which should be considered in the GPSF programming (e.g. HIV/AIDS among the soldier population). Some other departments (e.g. CIDA) have established formal procedures to screen and monitor for such health concerns. While DFAIT does not normally consider such issues, and again, may lack the human and financial resources for doing so, the potential risks associated with these investments warrant consideration. It would not be realistic to expect that START would have this type expertise in-house; contracting out permits it to access needed support if and when it is required.
Established GPSF program and project review mechanisms support information sharing among START Program Officers. They are starting to facilitate synergistic programming among some Canadian government departments in Sudan, a positive new direction.
Project design and planning is led by START Program Officers. Concept papers are prepared for all GPSF programming envelopes and large projects are shared with PPC members for review and guidance. Reviewed minutes suggest that the following types of actions are undertaken in meetings: Concept papers are reviewed and decided upon; projects over $500,000 are reviewed and decided upon; strategic questions related to GPSF are raised (e.g. boundaries between CIDA and START were discussed in one meeting), and information is shared among participants (e.g. context affecting the GPSF). PPC meetings occur regularly, and there is high attendance by START Program Officers (between 10-23 persons in attendance) with occasional participation by other DFAIT representatives as required (e.g. Task Force representatives).
The PDM is responsible for providing a technical review of incoming proposals and making recommendations to IRD in regards to funding considerations. PDM meetings are also very well attended by START Officers (often as many as 20 people attend) with some attendance by other DFAIT representatives as required. Meetings occur frequently (usually weekly). Many of those who participate in PPC meetings also attend PDM meetings. Reviewed minutes suggest that the following types of actions are undertaken in meetings: detailed feedback on individual projects (e.g. related to reporting requirements, budgets, risks and risk mitigating strategies and sometime gender considerations) funding formulae and corporate issues related to the GPSF management issues. The number of projects reviewed in any one meeting can vary considerably in number (from 2 to 10 projects) and in value (from as little as $15,000 to over $2 million).
The large number of START officers in such meetings suggests considerable interest on their part on the overall activities of the GPSF. However, the efficiency of such mechanisms, which consume considerable time spent by START officers in such meetings, particularly for very small projects has been questioned. START is encouraged to consider developing more streamlined procedures, such as different structures and levels of review according to project value.
START Approval and Signing Authorities
- The START DG has project approval authority for $2 million for projects and signing authority of $5 million for contributions and grants.
- The START Senior Director has project approval authority for $500,000 and signing authority for contributions and grants of $2 million.
While START Program Officers are required to, and do, consult the Sudan Task Force on individual GPSF initiatives through the Program Planning Committee, until recently, consultation focused more on sharing perspectives on proposed initiatives rather than actively encouraging or supporting synergies between DFAIT and OGDs. However, this appears to be changing as evidenced by a joint DFAIT-CIDA planning mission to Sudan in May 2007. This is a positive change and should be encouraged and supported.
GPSF effectiveness in Sudan is constrained by insufficient numbers of staff in Sudan, insufficient distinction in competencies required for different types of GPSF programming, and continued reliance on contract staff.
As a result of a review of the GPSF programming in Sudan, there are a few staffing issues that require review. One relates to the allocation of personnel between DFAIT Headquarters and in Africa. At present, all START officers are based in Ottawa. As a consequence, there are no staff on the ground to assess needs, manage, monitor and provide other types of support to the GPSF partners in Sudan. These deficits have contributed to delays in processing of payments and ad hoc monitoring. Moreover, a lack of adequate presence of key Canadian players in Sudan limits Canada's ability to participate in key fora for donor coordination in Sudan.
A second matter relates to the different types of competencies required among staff for the different types of initiatives supported by the GPSF in Sudan. For example, the skills required to support immediate crises are considerably different from those required to support capacity-building initiatives. Moreover, crises require staff to be positioned near the crisis. Greater attention needs to be placed on the different kinds of competencies required for each type of initiative (immediate crisis, post-crisis stabilization and capacity building) in the recruitment process.
Finally, while START is actively recruiting staff, reliance on contract staff will continue to affect implementation of programs in Sudan.
To date, the GPSF reporting and monitoring in Sudan has focused on individual initiatives rather than program, country or corporate performance in meeting planned GPSF objectives and results.
In keeping with the emphasis on activities on projects and initiatives in the RMAF/RMAF, the GPSF reporting requirements also focus on individual initiatives. Monitoring of individual initiatives has been ad hoc due to priorities given to planning, rather than performance monitoring, compounded by staffing constraints noted in the previous section.
The GPSF planning documents exclude any specific requirement for country level reports. Although no program or country level reports have been prepared to date for Sudan, START indicated that there are plans to prepare program level reports in the future. Thus, START does not have comprehensive, up-to-date integrated information on the GPSF's overall performance in Sudan.
The GPSF RMAF/RBAF makes reference to the need for annual reports at the program and corporate (START Secretariat) levels. To date, START has not prepared either type of report that summarizes annual or cumulative progress in regards to GPSF based on the approved logic model. However, the Evaluation Team was advised that a deck summarizing such progress is being developed. START has also contracted the services of consultants to develop logic models and performance measurement frameworks for GPSF's three sub-programs. START may have some difficulties in reporting given limitations with the logic model identified in Section 3.5 below.
- In November 2006, START produced an annual report entitled Year in Review Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response September 2005-2006. This report appears to have been prepared for communication purposes; it is not a report on the GPSF progress in realizing planned outcomes stated in the GPSF RMAF/RBAF.
Other Reports on GPSF Progress
- START has instead reported on GPSF progress in other ways. IRD has reported up to the ADM on results, followed up by a DECK. In addition, START reports up at the departmental level to the Report on Plans and Priorities as well as the Departmental Performance Report. START's results have been rolled up into these reports.
START needs to review reporting requirements and responsibilities for the GPSF. It should begin by clarifying the audiences (e.g., Advisory Board, START Secretariat, Program, Division, and Country levels) and their needs and expectations for reports. It should then clarify how project reports feed into the reporting needs of senior management. Other development agencies develop Performance Measurement Frameworks to guide such performance monitoring and reporting activities. START might wish to do the same.
The established basis for measuring GPSF success (the GPSF logic model) is not particularly useful for evaluating GPSF programming in Sudan.
It is important to have a clear basis for judging the success (or effectiveness) of an intervention or a program; typically a program's objectives and expected results are used for this purpose. The effectiveness of the program is based on the extent to which the initiative is meeting planned objectives and results. It is also important for programs to have systematic ways of measuring and assessing the extent to which these objectives and results are being realized. Performance measurement systems are established for this purpose.
In the case of GPSF, the logic model includes over 50 planned results at the output, immediate outcome, intermediate outcome, final outcome and ultimate outcome levels.
The current GPSF logframe is not helpful as a basis for judging GPSF success in Sudan for various reasons including the following:
In addition, the log frame has a number of other more generic limitations which limit its utility as a basis for judging GPSF performance. Some of the notable limitations include the following:
Key or Priority Performance Issues and Indicators
- Following Treasury Board RMAF guidelines (2005), the RMAF instead includes a list of a subset of 15 of the above list of activities and outcomes (referred to as Key or Priority Performance Issues and Indicators) which is to be used to as the basis for START to report annually in performance reports and is to be captured in periodic evaluations.
- One notable limitation with this list is that several of the indicators refer to international norms and standards. However, in most cases in the field of peace, security and nation building, there are few if any international standards.
The current log frame for the GPSF is not a suitable basis for judgment. Nor is there a performance measurement system in place to assess GPSF success in Sudan. Success is examined instead in terms of funded projects and initiatives.
A pyramid of inter-connected supplementary logic models that fall under the umbrella of one strategic, high-level and condensed GPSF logframe might be a better option. These supplementary logic models could focus on GPSF priority areas and/or programs and be clearly linked to the overall GPSF logframe. They could be designed to accommodate success measurement in the context of targeted GPSF countries or regions, rather than the current focus on individual initiatives. They would need to be complemented by an appropriate performance measurement system that tracked and reported on results at the different levels (overall GPSF, program, priority area, country and/or other) as deemed appropriate.
The upcoming formative evaluation of the GPSF will examine the appropriateness of the GPSF program logic. Given the above noted limitations, the GPSF stakeholders should re-consider the appropriateness of the current Log Frame for judging the success of the GPSF in the future.
Information to judge GPSF programming in Sudan according to prescribed criteria and processes outlined in the RMAF was generally not available.
As noted above, there are several features of the GPSF framework which make it unsuitable for judging GPSF in general and in Sudan in particular. As shown in Exhibit 3.2, there is limited information available to make any judgments on this basis.
|Key Performance Issue||Key Indicators||Observations|
Developing Policies, Plans Procedures
|Extent to which quality plans, policies, procedures and agreements are in place||Standard Operations Procedures, project selection criteria, performance and results reporting templates, and intra and inter-departmental agreements have been developed by START. The process of operationalizing these instruments, however, remains incomplete. The START Secretariat continues to refine these instruments and is in the process of introducing a new financial/program management information system as well as developing logical models for the three GPSF sub-programs.|
Scanning the environment
|Extent to which the environmental scanning and assessment processes are operational||The Sudan Task Force has established what are widely regarded as very effective mechanisms (including regular inter-departmental meetings among Canadian government departments and inter-capital meetings among other countries and organizations working in Sudan) to communicate and coordinate with other key stakeholders around the world in regards to Sudan.|
This is complemented by a series of other contextual monitoring activities conducted by the Mission in Khartoum, the geographic branch, and major GPSF programming divisions.
Planning and mobilizing responses
|# of mobilization projects where there is evidence of effective mobilization in crisis response situations (in accordance with GPS Fund standards and norms)||Standards and norms were not defined at the time of this evaluation.|
Notwithstanding the above, and that GPSF contributions to AMIS were initially administered by CIDA, the support was timely.
Assessing, Managing and Funding projects
|% of projects undertaken where high quality assessment, decisions and implementation processes have been observed, in accordance with GPSF standards and norms.||Standard Operating Procedures, which include project assessment criteria, have been developed by the START Secretariat and were operational at the time the evaluation was conducted. Most of the projects reviewed for this evaluation, however, used pre-existing HSP templates. The SOPs are currently under review.|
Increased Canadian readiness and capacity to respond in a coordinated manner
|% of projects in which Canadian readiness and capacity to respond was within established norms and standards.||Standards and norms were not defined at the time of this evaluation|
However, the T Cs of the GPSF permit the rapid disbursement of funds in response to crises
|Evidence that Canadian readiness and response capabilities have been established and are being maintained||Over the past two years, the capacity of the START team has grown to respond to the evolving needs in Sudan. The START team continues to fine-tune and adjust its programming approach in order to accommodate evolving needs.|
However, existing governance structures, while avoiding OGDs working at cross- purposes, has had limited success in achieving the synergies expected of the whole of government approach.
More rapid, better coordinated Canadian response
|% of projects in which the observed Canadian response is well coordinated and meets reasonable response time norms and standards||Standards and norms were not defined at the time of this evaluation.|
In terms of GPSF support to AMIS, the response times were excellent for the first 5 helicopters, satisfactory for subsequent helicopters, slow for fixed-wing aircraft and satisfactory for fuel until management was transferred to the AU.
In the case of Civilian Disarmament and Rule of Law, the project planning phase for GPSF initiatives (identification, approval, disbursement) is considerably shorter than the planning phase for developmental assistance. However, there is little evidence of targeted and coordinated programming in the stated domains in Sudan.
Increased capacity of funded organizations
|% of organizations supported in where there has been increase in capacity in comparison to an established baseline||While providing critical support to specific initiatives, there is little evidence to date that the GPSF has significantly contributed to organizational capacity within Sudan.|
Improved Canadian whole-of-government response
|% of DFAIT initiatives that result in observed, coordinated Canadian response comparable to other countries and consistent with requirements||There is evidence that existing structures have succeeded in avoiding OGDs working at cross-purposes. There is limited evidence to demonstrate that the resources of OGDs are being fully exploited to achieve desired synergies.|
Increased sustainability of capacity of funded organizations
|% or organizations that are exhibiting improved capacity versus a baseline assessment||While GPSF support to organizations has, in some instances, attracted other donor support, it is too early to judge whether capacity within organizations is sustainable.|
Expanded global and regional capacity for peace support operations
|# of regional peace support operations demonstrating capacity improvements over a baseline measure||No baseline data to assess progress towards this outcome.|
|# of projects supported by DFAIT that have met capacity building objectives||Capacity building objectives have not been formally documented.|
Increased Canadian Public awareness of Crises and the Canadian role in the response
|% of a sample of the Canadian population surveyed and % of key donors that are aware of Canadian role in emergencies and transition situations||No public awareness survey was conducted as part of this evaluation, though both the START Secretariat and the Sudan Task Force have websites where information on GPSF contributions to Sudan can be accessed. While donors interviewed for this evaluation were certainly aware of Canada's contribution to Sudan, there appeared to be little knowledge of the GPSF.|
Increased Canadian Influence and Catalytic Leadership
|% of donors and foreign government officials in affected countries indicating positive Canadian influence and leadership||There is evidence that DFAIT has played a catalytic role in garnering international donor support for AMIS as well as support for efforts to promote dialogue between the warring parties; there is little evidence of such a role outside these domains.|
Greater peace and security in areas where there has been a Canadian supported intervention
|% of geographic areas supported by Canada where positive peace and human security situation trends are observed versus a baseline||Information not available to make a judgment|
Improvement in Canadian contributions to peace security and mitigation of disasters
|% of project interventions where donors and foreign government officials in affected countries have observed discernible positive impacts of Canadian contributions to peace and security and disaster mitigation||There is anecdotal evidence of donor appreciation for Canada's contribution to AMIS.|
Strengthened global and regional peace support operations
|% of donors and foreign government officials in affected countries that believe that the Canadian contribution has helped strengthen peace support operations||There is anecdotal evidence of donor appreciation for Canada's contribution to peace support operations.|
GPSF projects reviewed in Sudan indicates reasonable success in achieving immediate outcomes.
The following chapter provides detailed assessments of three types of support provided by Canada through GPSF. These include:
The case studies suggest that all of the reviewed investments have had reasonable success in their respective domains. More specifically:
GPSF programming in Sudan respects most of the principles for effective project programming in conflict and post-conflict settings as defined by the OECD. The major areas of deviation relate to the short-term duration of interventions and the short fall in developing a whole-of-government strategy.
Returning to the recommended OECD DAC principles for engagement, Canada has followed most of them (see below). The main areas of deviation relate to the absence of a programing strategy informed by conflict analysis, the short-term duration of GPSF interventions, the marginalization of the GoS, and a short-fall in the development of an integrated whole-of-government strategy to guide inter-departmental programming in Sudan.
OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States
- Take context as the starting point
- Move from reaction to prevention
- Focus on state building
- Align with local priorities and/or systems
- Recognize the political - security-development nexus
- Promote policy coherence and whole of government approach
- Agree on practical coordination mechanism between international donors
- Do no harm
- Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context
- Act fast
- Stay engaged long enough to succeed
- Avoid pockets of exclusion
Although the Evaluation Team was unable to find any document resembling a "conflict analysis" as understood in the literature, programing by divisions within START is informed by situational analysis reflected in various concept papers. In regards to the short-term duration of interventions, this remains part of GPSF's design and underlying programing authority.
As indicated earlier in this report, the international community's disapproval with the GoS's handling of the various conflicts within the country has resulted in donor nations, Canada included, minimizing their direct engagement of the GoS, which arguably could be construed as a form of exclusion within the meaning of the OECD principles.
Mention has also been made in this report on the absence of an integrated and commonly accepted whole-of-government strategy for Canada's engagement in Sudan. Such a strategy would clarify expectations for realistic outcomes enabling all players to coordinate their interventions and potentially benefit more from inter-departmental synergy.
A review of the latest evaluation literature related to peace keeping/building raises two fundamental questions for evaluators in this field:
These are the two fundamental questions of the case studies included in this chapter.
The challenges of the peacekeeping question plague every researcher who has no access to control groups or international benchmarks. One conventional alternative in such situations is employment of a time-series design where the "treatment" (in this case introduction of AMIS) is introduced and data are carefully collected and periodically monitored to infer the effect of the treatment when it is introduced (and sometimes when it is withdrawn). However, in Darfur the data are scant or non-existent and the GoS may not permit access to certain geographical areas, so regular systematic monitoring may not be possible. Thus, the evaluator faces the rhetorical question of what it would have been like in Darfur without AMIS? Evaluation science related to CPPB suggests that the question can be best addressed using a conflict analysis and a theory of change on which intervention is based. The use of standard indicators is not recommended, so tools such as the RMAF may not be helpful. We have gone through the exercise of examining the RMAF in Section 3 and concur. With respect to the question on post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding, it can take several years for DDR and civilian disarmament to reach the stage where it is possible to assess its effectiveness. In both types of cases, one can at least examine how projects were implemented. While successful implementation does not guarantee positive results, it is hard to conceive of positive results when the process of implementation is poor.
This is approached through retrospective case studies. They are useful for description, though it is generally not possible to make robust conclusions about cause-effect relationships. Case studies permit consideration of issues relevant to the evaluation terms of reference, specifically the questions given below, which are the organizing framework for the case studies.
Case Study Organizing Framework
- What was the specific context/challenge of these cases?
- What support did GPSF provide?
- To what degree was the GPSF design appropriate and the assistance relevant?
- Was programming delivered efficiently, and as planned?
- To what degree was the support effective/successful in establishing the conditions for success?
- To what extent was a whole-of-government response evident?
It is generally agreed that programming activities in CPPB are defined by the palette outlined in the Utstein Report (See Smith, 2004). Security is a fundamental dimension and it is comprised of de-mining, small arms and light weapons reduction, DDR, security sector reform, community policing, peacekeeping, nonviolent observation and nonviolent accompaniment. In consultation with the Evaluation Advisory Committee, three case studies that encompass two types of projects supported by the GPSF in Sudan were identified. One case study examines the GPSF's support to AMIS, Canada's largest cumulative investment, and is described in Section 4.2. Support to AMIS directly supports its efforts in peacekeeping, nonviolent observation and nonviolent accompaniment, key aspects of the Utstein palette. The other cases focus on peace building and post-conflict stabilization in south Sudan by examining DDR/Civilian Disarmament and support to the Rule of Law, found in Section 4.3. DDR and civilian disarmament also address key components of the security dimension of the Utstein palette, while the rule of law case relates to the political structures and policies dimension of the palette.
This chapter is divided into two major parts. Section 4.2 considers support to peacekeeping; specifically the case study of AMIS. Section 4.3 examines the two case studies on post-conflict stabilization and re-construction. Each case study follows the framework described above.
The crisis in Darfur in mid-2004 was the first significant operation undertaken by the newly created Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Support for AMIS was embraced by the international community and evolved in response to the volatile situation in Darfur.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union was activated in December 2003. During a session of the AU Assembly on May 28, 2004, a Ceasefire Commission was established for Darfur and a decision was taken to deploy military observers, with offers from Rwanda and Nigeria to provide them. There was early optimism, and the GoS agreed to issue visas to humanitarian workers within 48 hours, and to suspend restrictions on travel in Darfur for three months. Despite these promises the conflict continued. With support of the international community, the AU took the lead in addressing the conflict by sponsoring peace talks and deploying a cease-fire monitoring mission, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on June 9, 2004. The initial mandate of the force specified verification of the cease-fire and protection of civilians. The force was based on an AU Concept of Operations and involved 60 observers with a total strength of 360 troops. This force is called AMIS I.
This initial AMIS force was clearly insufficient, so on July 27, the PSC asked for a plan to transform the force into a full-fledged peacekeeping mission. This new Concept of Operations foresaw up to 450 observers protected by eight companies of infantry and working from eight bases. In September 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1564, which gave Sudan an ultimatum of accepting an expanded AU force, or facing sanctions on their oil industry. At the PSC meeting on October 20, 2004, it decided to enhance the force and extend the mandate (which is renewable) for one year. The new force was to consist of 3,320 personnel of whom 2,341 would be military, including 450 observers and 815 civilian police. It was decided that Nigerian and Rwandan AU troops would be deployed by October 30, setting the stage for support from Western nations, including Canada. This represented a major change in mandate for the force, from an observer mission to one involved in peace support operations, but the AU had no specific mandate or guidance on the conduct of such operations (other than the UN example). The force was deployed in eight sectors, and the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was created to assist with planning, procurement of equipment, logistics, administration, and liaison with international partners. This force is termed AMIS II.
The AU was also engaged in attempts at peace building and initiated peace talks in Abuja in the fall of 2004. While the SLM boycotted the talks, on November 9, 2004 the government of Sudan and the two leading rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), signed two peace agreements. The first agreement established a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled areas of Darfur, a measure designed to end the Sudanese military's bombing of rebel villages in the region. The second accord granted international humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to Darfur.
Steps were also taken to have the AU Commission report regularly on the effectiveness of the mission. The first AU-led assessment mission visited Sudan in March 2005, and reported that atrocities persisted and that the humanitarian situation was unacceptable. Further, the assessment mission concluded that the situation would not show any improvement as long as the force was incapable of performing the task assigned to it. The mission recommended that AMIS should be further strengthened in two phases (called AMIS II E), beginning in May 2005 and ultimately reaching 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police by August 2005 (actually achieved in October). In April 2005, the PSC agreed to these recommendations. Nigeria sent a battalion of 680 in mid-July with troops from Rwanda, Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa following. The force now consisted of about seven battalions with support troops.
As AMIS II E deployed, the Khartoum AMIS HQ was upgraded, DTIF gained effectiveness, and infrastructure was constructed in Darfur. However, the security situation was at best an uneasy calm, with continued vehicle snatching, ambushing, kidnapping of civilians and internationals, blocking of roads, and looting of livestock. This resulted, in the fall of 2005, in a reduction in the IDP's access to humanitarian support, though reports indicate that in areas where AMIS II E was deployed, the security situation had improved.
In March of 2006 the PSC extended the mandate of AMIS until September 30, 2006. On May 5, 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed, and on May 16, 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1679 provided for a transition from AMIS to a UN mission. The DPA was a flawed agreement, in that many rebel groups did not sign it, and other interests, such as the concerns of women, were ignored.
On June 23, 2006 the PSC Military Staff Committee endorsed the new Concept of Operations calling for a shift of AMIS from observer mission to a more robust peacekeeping operation. In August 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1706 extending the mandate of UNMIS to Darfur with 10,000 personnel tasked with monitoring the CPA and Darfur. However, in Darfur the GoS and the rebels continued to engage in war and counter-attacks, and many civilians continued to be killed or displaced. The international community remained divided over the option of converting to a UN-led mission, and some continued to base their trust in AMIS. In September 2006, the PSC agreed to extend AMIS until December 31, 2006, while the 66th meeting of November 2006 endorsed a plan for a further three-phase enhancement plan for AMIS, a light support package, heavy support package and a hybrid UN/AMIS force.
Canadian support for AMIS was initially controlled through the G8 conference staff (START/GPSF was not yet established), although the responsibility migrated into normal staffing in DFAIT, DND and CIDA. Support was based on five principles.
Canadian Principles for Supporting AMIS
- Reinforce the principles of African leadership and ownership while responding to immediate AU needs for an expanded AMIS II;
- Complement the activities of other donors, and fill gaps;
- Be consistent with the existing AU logistics and administrative picture (e.g. avoid a piecemeal approach to delivery of equipment and services, simplify technical support);
- Accommodate medium term capacity building, and link to the longer term G8 Sea Island commitment to improve African capacity to conduct peace support operations; and
- Enhance the profile of Canada's role in supporting AU leadership, and provide tangible evidence of our commitment to the responsibility to protect.
In mid-April 2007 it was reported that the Khartoum government agreed to the deployment of the Heavy Support Package which will increase the force to about 3,000 military police officers along with six attack helicopters and other aviation and logistics assets (total strength approximately 12,000). It is not clear whether Sudan will drop its resistance to a proposed 21,000-member joint African Union-United Nations Force (Hybrid Force). Some donor countries expressed scepticism about the accord, noting Khartoum had reneged on previous agreements. Furthermore, the hybridization of UN and AU is largely uncharted territory, with significant uncertainty over command and control.
The African Union took proactive steps to mobilize a peacekeeping force for Sudan and has succeeded in obtaining needed support from some international donors, with Canada assuming a major role. However, overall resources continue to be limited and AMIS is new, so not surprisingly AMIS does not yet have the capabilities required for effective peacekeeping in Darfur.
The African Union took the necessary leadership to create and mobilize an observer force at a time when there were no obvious alternatives. Some African nations offered troops while Western donors mobilized to provide such components as bases, vehicles, telecommunications, and transport. The initial AMIS observer force was small, so it was possible to secure experienced troops, and the necessary logistics and support were manageable. However, the force of 360 grew by twenty times in little more than a year, and at the same time, some troops rotated back home. Even a mature army such as Canada's would have difficulty expanding its footprint so rapidly, and it is not surprising that all aspects of the AMIS operation were greatly strained. More troop contributing countries became involved while more support was expected from Western donors.
The understandable lack of capacity at all levels within AMIS has been a recurrent factor limiting AMIS's effectiveness. It was and is extremely difficult to develop a modern peacekeeping organization comprised of thousands of people from various countries, speaking different languages, in the time that was available. To create and deploy a military organization in a remote region of Africa, with no land transport and scant local resources, is a complex challenge. Administrative inexperience within key staffs combined with insufficient resources mean that troops have gone for months without being paid and their equipment and supplies arriving late or not at all. In addition, it is alleged that some of the warring parties are actively working to undermine the effectiveness of the force.
Virtually everyone interviewed had views on AMIS and its shortcomings and they were largely consistent. In October 2006, a 'lessons learned' workshop comprised of 61 participants, representing the UN, humanitarian agencies, and international partners was held in Ghana. It reflected the views of a wide range of stakeholders, many of them African, and it benefited from a conceptual framework that was helpful in codifying AMIS's identified weaknesses. The main weaknesses of AMIS identified by the workshop, and corroborated by interviews, are summarized as follows:
Most fundamentally, changing and escalating mandates have affected the AMIS operation. It began as a military observer mission with a simple observe-and-report mandate, became a more complex peace support mission without an agreed mandate. Current plans for a Heavy Support Package and especially the Hybrid Mission (a mixed AU and UN force), further limit clarity and make the lack of an effective (and agreed) mandate a major negative factor. Another negative development is the creation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the deployment of soldiers there. Resources are starting to be diverted from AMIS to AMISOM.
This ambiguous environment raises questions regarding the type(s) of support Western donors need to provide in order to obtain the greatest impact from each contribution.
Canadian support to the crisis in Darfur was based on the principle of supporting Africans through the AU to deal with the conflict. Support became a mix of enablers to peacekeeping, support for peace building and capacity development in AMIS. Canada's relatively moderate initial investment in support of the African Union soon escalated to match the growth of the AMIS force.
Canadian support to AMIS was planned to complement the contributions of other international donors. The initial impetus for the effort arose from the G8 meetings, but there was no real international strategic reconnaissance or strategic analysis of the task, which is understandable given that START/GPSF had not been established at this time. The AU conducted a rudimentary 'needs assessment', developed a Concept of Operations and appealed to donors to fund its components. This process concentrated on the capabilities that were perceived to be required, rather than analyses of risks, objectives or desired results.
Some of the G8 Nations (US, UK, Canada) and the EU set up a bi-weekly telephone call during which the major decisions on support of the operation were taken. The US took on constructing the bases, Britain in providing ground fuel and food and medical supplies for AMIS, and Canada in providing air transport and helicopter support, while the EU provided communications and HQ support. Top officials from DND visited Sudan and confirmed the assessment that helicopter services and APCs were required. The plan for Canada's contribution was approved by the PCO, CIDA, DFAIT and DND in mid-October 2004. Responsible departments managed the various components largely independently, but exchanged information through interdepartmental committees. As the AMIS mission took shape, donors revised their commitments, the context changed, and Canada's contribution in support of AMIS evolved.
Canada's contribution eventually included components from DND and others through the GPSF, some of which were channelled through CIDA and its contractors. DND provided 105 APCs, helmets and fragmentation vests and some military technical assistance in DITF and AMIS in Sudan. DFAIT supported the Darfur Mission Start-Up and management, the services of helicopters (initially 5, but increasing to 15, then 18, then 25) and two fixed-wing aircraft, aircraft fuel, and a variety of technical assistance for the Abuja Peace Talks, civilian police, a lessons learned workshop on AMIS, and development of an Information Analysis Cell at DITF. Review of the various components suggests that three types of assistance dominated: Peacekeeping through AMIS, peacebuilding through support to the peace talks, and capacity development through technical assistance. These efforts constituted an evolving package that grew in response to developments in Sudan. By supporting Africans to help Africans Canada followed the AU agenda and thus was faced with an open-ended commitment to AMIS.
AMIS was the only viable military response to the crisis in Darfur, and it was sensible for Canada to contribute support. Canadian support to AMIS complemented support from other donors and was relevant to the emergency need at the time Canada offered support.
The context in Darfur in 2004 was critical so the international community seized on the offer by the AU to deploy a force with international support. Canada moved quickly and decisively to do its part in supporting the AU and AMIS to deal with the crisis in Darfur and indeed assumed an instrumental role, through its commitments, in garnering international donor support for the mission, including the Civilian Police component thereof. It warrants note that in an interview with the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, Mr. Annan applauded Canada's contribution to AMIS.
The design of Canadian support to AMIS responded to an overall needs assessment provided by the AU, with the operational requirements partitioned among donors. Responsiveness to the humanitarian crisis drove the agenda, which perhaps could have benefited from a more thorough analysis of what it would mean to support AMIS, given that AMIS did not have the capabilities required for effective peacekeeping in Darfur. However, the original support to AMIS preceded the establishment of the GPSF, and once the GPSF was established, it essentially extended the funding related to the prior decision. The bulk of Canadian assistance was in the nature of material and logistics support in the field. This enabled AMIS to deploy, but was just one component of a major peacekeeping operation. No matter how well Canada and other donors did in delivering their support, limitations on the absorptive capacity of AMIS compromised overall effectiveness. Moreover, there was insufficient donor commitment to address some of the AU's more systemic capacity deficits.
GPSF-supplied helicopters were relevant to the need at the time. They were used for monitoring and delivery of essential supplies, logistics support, operational support and medical evacuation. They provided the vital transportation link between the Darfur hub in El Fasher and the seven sectors where troops were stationed and were certainly needed. As one interviewee remarked: "The helicopters are absolutely vital to the operation, and if helicopters are cut or reduced the mission will fail." Another noted that the helicopters were vital to the AMIS operations, and without them most contingents of troops would literally starve.
The fixed wing aircraft were to provide more efficient transport for bulk shipments to El Fasher and the other seven sectors. One significant issue with respect to the relevance of the particular aircraft provided was that the AU chose an IL 76 as one of the replacement airplanes, and it required more runway capacity than existed in some parts of Darfur, thus this equipment did not fit the local requirements. Advice from Canadian military advisors corrected this potential problem.
GPSF capacity development support to the AU is relevant. However the design of GPSF contributions could benefit from a more thorough needs assessment and capacity development plan.
Beyond operational support to AMIS, the GPSF support also included capacity development elements. The GPSF supported technical assistance for the civilian police and the development of an Information Analysis Cell in DITF, while DND provided advisors for other functions. These contributions have responded to important capacity gaps. However, in the absence of a longer term plan for capacity development, they may be at risk of becoming little more than isolated contributions that are insufficient to enhance needed capacities in a sustainable way.
As will be discussed later in this report, systemic capacity deficits in the AU directly impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, highlighting the need for operational support to be complemented by capacity building initiatives, albeit along different tracks. An internal review commissioned by START recommends that the START Secretariat examine ways to provide a more in-depth review of large, complex projects. There are limits on the depth of analysis possible in response to emergencies. However, longer-term components such as capacity development and post-conflict stabilization can certainly benefit from thorough needs assessment and program planning.
Government of Canada departments and the Canadian Commercial Corporation performed admirably in ensuring that various goods and services in support of AMIS were delivered in a timely way where needed, thus validating the efficacy of inter-departmental and commercial sector partnering; however, timeliness came a cost and the delivery of support was often encumbered by bureaucratic impediments in Sudan and capacity deficits in the African Union.
Implementation of the AU/AMIS support in fall of 2004 was the first major crisis of its type that Canada tackled under what was soon to become the GPSF. Crisis response has a different tempo than normal programing, and there is not a lot of time to debate alternatives, adjust rules and regulations, or develop formal procedures tailored to the situation. The need is to get things done in whatever ways are possible. This was the context when Canada responded to the need for support of AMIS. The hope was that a fund like the GPSF supported by an entity like START could create some ongoing capacity for such crisis response.
In interviewing a range of people at DFAIT, the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), DND, and CIDA, one cannot help but be impressed with the extraordinary efforts made to deliver the AMIS component successfully and in the spirit of effective whole-of-government rapid response. Many individuals not only worked hard within and beyond regular working hours, but they stretched themselves by challenging mandates and procedures, and they ended up getting the job done. Without these individual efforts AMIS would not have been able to deploy in Darfur.
Provision of goods and services to AMIS took place roughly as planned, and became the backbone for the entire mission. However, it experienced operational difficulties that added to delivery time of both the GPSF and DND components.(12) The whole operation was affected by the absence of a Canadian plan for both the various GPSF components and, more importantly, overall Canadian whole-of-government contributions that articulated the cumulative objectives and desired end state, together with risks, mitigation strategies and means of monitoring how it was going as the context changed.
One of the realities of support to AMIS was that the initial commitment in 2004 demanded operational elements immediately to respond to ongoing problems. START/GPSF had not yet been established, so CIDA was asked and agreed to manage a $20 million contract for the helicopter and fixed-wing leasing components. Based on the link to humanitarian support of IDPs in Darfur, CIDA providing airlift capacity to AMIS was considered to be within CIDA's mandate. CIDA felt that while it could manage the request, it could not respond sufficiently quickly through its normal tendering procedures. The need for a rapid response caused CIDA to seek another agency more able to respond rapidly. Three choices considered were Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), Joint Military Command and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC). CCC was selected as it had extensive experience in defense and international aerospace domains, had aviation experience in Africa, could respond within the required timeframe and had worked previously with CIDA in Africa. With support from CIDA, CCC went to tender and contracted a private company, Skylink, to provide helicopter services.
There were many obstacles to overcome. In principle, as one of the people involved reported, "CIDA had to deliver five helicopters by October 26 at 6:00 pm during a federal government strike." Through extraordinary effort by the individuals involved, the target was achieved and the helicopters were contracted as promised. However, subsequent expansion of the project created new problems and exacerbated certain issues with the CCC contract. The initial $20 million was at the limit of the CIDA Minister's authority, so CIDA had to return repeatedly to Cabinet to get approval of the many extensions to the contract.
Once the helicopters arrived in Sudan, they had to support the transport of troops, food and equipment largely from El Fashir to various sites in Darfur. The contract with Skylink required that 90 percent of the aircraft be both serviceable and available for use. While there have been many challenges to achieving this level of performance, the contractor has successfully done so. Without this helicopter support, AMIS operations would be impossible.
Managing in response to crises creates many problems
The basis of payment of the CCC contract involved a dry-lease whereby fuel was not part of the original goods and services to be provided. The AU, however, did not have the required procurement capability to administer large contracts, nor did they have a specific allocation for helicopter fuel. This resulted in some helicopters not flying their monthly quota of hours. The problem was subsequently addressed by CIDA providing technical support to the AU to contract the service to a private company: Mathews Petroleum.
The method adopted for supplying helicopters involved CIDA contracting CCC who in turn contracted Skylink, which dealt with its suppliers. Such multi-layered supply chains carries with it both risks and costs. The CCC contract alone involves its normal 5% charge, which after multiple contract extensions now exceeds $5 million.
The intention was to have fixed-wing aircraft follow when the helicopters reached full strength, but several problems emerged as AMIS troops increased to over 7,000. CCC contracted using similar documentation to that used for helicopters, but instead of specifying a daily tonnage requirement, the contract specified the number and type of aircraft. With the help of Canadian military advisors, AMIS specified two AN 32 airplanes. Subsequently GoS refused issuance of permits to these aircraft as these airplanes were not already based in Sudan and were more than 20 years old. AMIS identified two replacement airplanes, an IL 76 and an AN 74. The tendering process was initiated by CCC but subsequently modified at the suggestion of the Canadian military advisors who determined that the IL 76 could land only in El Fasher and Nyala. The final contract was for two AN 74s, which were deemed by AMIS and the Canadian military advisors to be best suited for the job, as well as being capable of landing at the required sites. The whole process took a lot of time. Indeed, despite the emergency nature of the crisis, it took from summer 2005 until March 2006 to get the first two aircraft operational. Furthermore, during this period the more costly helicopters were used in an attempt to maintain the necessary supplies.
Initially, CIDA contracted for Jet A1 fuel. When it became clear that this would become more than a temporary need, it was decided to transfer the responsibility to the AU. CIDA worked with the AU to build its capacity to tender to obtain a suitable Jet A1 fuel supplier, fulfilling the intention of building the capacity of this regional body.
Because of the challenges of providing Jet A1 fuel in the unstable context of Darfur, it soon became clear that the AU was not able to manage Jet A1 fuel procurement without help. CIDA managed the issue by providing a fuel management team comprising a fuel manager, a fuel quality specialist and an infrastructure specialist. These specialists were contracted by CIDA and in place for the commencement of the Jet A1 fuel contract. Even with those efforts, the provider threatened to cut the supply of fuel because of late payments from the AU. More serious problems developed after the hijacking of 26 trucks in August 2006. Because of the lack of convoy protection, steps were then taken to deliver Jet A1 fuel by air. The lack of CIDA presence in Khartoum complicated problem-solving and required such matters to be covered by people commuting from Canada approximately every six weeks.
Up to March 31, 2007, CIDA had been handling the airlift and fuel projects as DFAIT had not yet received program authority. As of April 1, 2007, CIDA transferred its project involvement to START. In is unknown whether the GPSF intends to support the AU with airlift and Jet A1 fuel, and it is not yet clear whether such support will be extended to the Hybrid Force if and when it becomes operational. While the revised MOU between CIDA and DFAIT attempts to provide for a suitable transition, START will need to exercise vigilance to ensure that problems and risks in future to the Jet A1 fuel supply do not adversely impact on operations.
Through several START/GPSF contracts with CANADEM, technical experts were sent in support of the civilian police function in Sudan as well as to support the development of an information analysis cell in DITF.
The first deployment occurred in February 2006 and consisted of a Senior Police Advisor to the DITF. The Senior Advisor was tasked with providing on-going strategic advice for the integration of a Civilian Police (CivPol) component into AMIS. The second wave of deployments occurred in March 2006 and involved three police trainers charged with providing instruction on human rights and policing, as well as a crime statistician tasked with establishing a crime statistics gathering and recording system. A third wave of deployment occurred in May 2006 and consisted of two police trainers who were subsequently posted to Nyala.
Following DND deployments in support of the Information Analysis Cell (IAC) of the DITF, DFAIT, through CANADEM, deployed two information experts charged with training counterparts in the use of infomatic and geomatic technology for the production of maps, reports and other material. The aim of this project was to enhance situational awareness of AMIS Area of Operations and strengthen AU capacity to operate the IAC.
While the evaluation did not assess the effectiveness of these contributions, there appear to be some issues related to the design of this component. For example, the Information Analysis Cell at DITF in which one Canadian is providing technical assistance for a period of months hoped to train up to 16 Africans over a six-month period. To date, it has proven difficult to recruit sufficient numbers of candidates. A more appropriate design would begin with an organizational development plan for DITF, and then plan and implement a strategy to achieve overall organizational capabilities. However, given the need to have African leadership and an African response, politically, alternatives may not have been possible.
The GPSF's involvement in the Darfur crisis has complemented the support from DND, helping to fulfill Canada's international commitments and affirming our support for the people of Darfur. Support to AMIS has been complemented by diplomatic efforts, lead by the Sudan Task Force, though it is difficult to judge the impact of this combined effort at this juncture.
A successful peace support operation is a complex endeavour, requiring suitable enabling conditions and myriad logistics components all implemented successfully and working together effectively under competent leadership. Canada has done a good job in living up to its commitments to AMIS and the international community. However, the resulting force is unable to fulfill its task, and capacity development within AMIS has been disappointing. Diplomatic efforts to bring the warring factions together to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict are ongoing. In the absence of a clearly articulated strategy for change, based on conflict analysis, it is difficult to judge whether these combined efforts have been the right ones to resolve the conflict in Darfur.
As regards the effectiveness of AMIS, recent reports at meetings of the DITF Committee indicate that AMIS forces are remaining in compounds and are not performing the functions assigned to them. In the first months of 2007, AMIS has been accused by rebel forces of being in league with the GoS, and the AU has been viewed by the rebels not just as an enemy, but as a resource to be plundered, evidenced by the spate of recent thefts, kidnappings and hijackings. Troops have not been paid in four months, living conditions are rudimentary, and even food rations have been a problem. According to people interviewed, troop morale is low. Civpol patrols are frozen and six police stations have been looted and destroyed. There have been reports of Canadian supplied helicopter being shot at, and on April 1, 2007, five AMIS soldiers were killed.
Because the data from existing sources, such as "Sitreps", AU reports, and reports from international organizations, may not be entirely accurate due to lack of access on the team's part to Darfur, it is difficult to judge definitively whether the situation in Darfur is fundamentally any different from what has existed over the past several years. The reports of continuing violence, increasing displacement of people and attacks on humanitarian agencies indicate that the situation on the ground remains precarious. The conflict over resources continues.
In conclusion, Canada lived up to its commitments to the AU with respect to provision of aircraft services for AMIS. The GPSF also made small contributions to the development of capacity within DITF at the AU, while DND provided equipment for AMIS outside of GPSF funding. So far, the GPSF has invested $132 million since 2004 of which $120 million is in support of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur.
It is not clear at this juncture what Canadian leaders see as the long-term strategy for support of the AU. Is Canadian involvement limited to AMIS? Or, does Canada intend to support the AU as it develops additional forces to deal with crises in such countries as Somalia? If the latter, START may need to consider when the long-term AU development agenda goes beyond the GPSF's short-term emphasis.
The AMIS case study indicates that affected Canadian departments are willing to share information about common agendas related to Sudan. However, the effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach is undermined by the lack a common understanding of the intent and actual modalities of the whole-of-government process among involved departments.
The stated objective of the GPSF initiative is to "ensure timely, co-ordinated responses to international crises (natural and man-made) requiring 'whole-of-government' action to plan and deliver effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection and stabilization initiatives in failed and fragile states implicating Canadian interests." While there is no agreed international definition of whole-of-government, and none within the Government of Canada, we assume that whole-of-government needs to include some type of inter-departmental strategy for a country or issue, and a mechanism to coordinate strategy implementation across departments.
Canada's support to AMIS (pre- and post creation of the GPSF), and to the AU itself, was informed by AU identified priorities for assistance. It was also informed by consultations with other international donors in the interest of providing the AU with a coherent and coordinated support package. There was, however, no conflict analysis nor overall Canadian change strategy for Sudan, making it difficult to ensure national institutional program coherence.
With respect to program implementation, FSDN and the Inter-departmental committee provided the means for coordination at strategic and operational levels. However, the various components provided by different departments, and indeed the separate components funded by the GPSF, were largely planned and implemented as independent projects. In implementing their components, some departments coordinated with others, while others acted alone, and the degree of coordination varied according to whom was involved at any particular time. In general, many of the people involved have considerable knowledge about Sudan and how to program there. Most have willingly shared information, supported one another, and tried to support positive performance of Canada's programing in Sudan.
There are many obstacles to effective collaboration at levels beyond information sharing. One of the greatest obstacles to effective collaboration is mandate-related -- different departments have different legal authorities and corresponding accountability regimes. DND is no more accountable to the Minister of DFAIT than DFAIT is to the Minister of Defence. Different cultures of the involved departments also present obstacles. Some are operational; others are policy-oriented. Some rotate personnel on cycles ranging from six months in the case of DND to normally two years for DFAIT and CIDA. Some departments have a history of working together; others run independently. Departmental fiscal regimes, heavy workloads and lack of incentives and rewards for collaboration complicate cooperation and add further complexity to implementation of a whole-of-government approach.
Data collected for the evaluation revealed a number of issues related to whole-of-government, including:
In the case of AMIS, some officials expressed pride that different roles were successfully partitioned among different departments and that this is illustrative of effective whole-of-government programming. While the costly duplication of effort was avoided, the promise of a unified and synergistic approach to realizing Canada's overall objectives has yet to be achieved.
The timely implementation of DDR and civilian disarmament is critical to the peace and a precondition for short-term stabilization and longer-term reconstruction.
The CPA commits both parties to the agreement to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) ex-combatants. Disarmament of ex-combatants is the focus of the first "D" in DDR and essentially involves the collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives from the same. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of ex-combatants either through their massing into camps and containment sites or through the processing of individual combatants into temporary centres where they receive transitional assistance in the form of food, shelter, clothing and medical treatment. The reintegration component of DDR focuses on equipping ex-combatants with the means of securing employment, either in the regular army, police, civil service, or the private sector - the essential precondition for reintegration into civilian life.
Under the CPA, other armed groups (OAGs) -- i.e., armed groups not party to the agreement -- are to be either integrated into the regular armed forces, the civil service or reintegrated into civil society. While the GoSS under the leadership of Salva Kiir, persuaded the largest and most threatening OAG, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) to join the SPLA with the signing of the Juba Declaration (January 2006), many smaller OAGs continue to operate outside the framework of either the CPA or the Juba Declaration. Disarming these groups is important to sustaining the peace.
During, and subsequent to the civil war, numerous small arms and light weapons (SALW) fell into the hands of civilians. Although the exact number of arms in circulation is not known, it is speculated that approximately three quarters of Sudan's estimated 2.0 to 3.4 million firearms are outside the remit of either formal state security structures or the country's many armed groups. The prevalence of SALW within communities not only seriously threatens human security, but also the authority of the fledgling GoSS, and with that, the prospects for social and economic renewal.
While DDR is expressly addressed in the CPA, there is only indirect reference to civilian disarmament under section 22.214.171.124. This section empowers the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee (CJMT) to monitor and verify disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed. Because a considerable number of southern residents are armed, but not necessarily eligible for the benefits of a DDR program, there is an urgent need to develop effective programs to promote civilian arms control and security related activities.
To date, the GoSS has not yet set out a civilian disarmament plan, although discussions are underway for cooperative disarmament through the Community Security and Arms Control Program (CSACP). The development of such a plan continues to be frustrated by gaps in information on the scale and distribution of small arms, and the patterns and frequency of arms misuse.
In the absence of some of the basic institutions supporting the rule of law -- trusted and reliable police, impartial courts, equitable laws, and a functioning correctional system -- civilians have assumed the burden of ensuring their own security, particularly in the rural areas. Satisfying the above requirements are essential preconditions for effective civilian disarmament.
The challenge is daunting. Of the 55 prisons in south Sudan, less than a third are operational, none of which remotely meet international standards. The judiciary remains extremely underdeveloped -- only about 22 trained judges for the whole south which has a population of around 15 million -- with little or no reach in the rural areas. Outside of the major state capitals, civilian police presence is virtually non-existent -- roughly one police officer per 1,000 inhabitants. The vast majority of police officers in south Sudan are former members of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) who have little experience in peacetime policing.
Demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants, plus controlling the traffic in and use of SALW, pose serious challenges. Failure to respond to these challenges not only threatens human security, but also the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 and the referendum on sovereignty scheduled for 2011.
Canadian support to DDR to date has focused on community-based voluntary civilian disarmament with an emphasis on information-gathering and training.
Canada has played an active role in supporting multilateral initiatives designed to combat the illicit traffic in SALW and promote civilian disarmament worldwide. Canada, for example, provided support for meetings leading to the March 2000 Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great lakes Region and Horn of Africa. DFAIT acts as the principal point of contact for issues relating to the implementation of the UN Program for Action. It has also provided financial support, through the Human Security Program, for policy oriented research and for pilot projects that pursue 'people-centered' measures to address small arms proliferation and misuse. As well, many OGDs, including CIDA, DND, the RCMP and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) are involved multilaterally.
The GPSF supports several initiatives directly related to civilian disarmament, with a focus on SALW. These include the Sudan Small Arms Baseline Assessment implemented by the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva; Training in SALW for south Sudan undertaken by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC); and the Community Security and Arms Control Program of the UNDP DDR Unit, which focuses on gender-sensitive, community driven approaches to security and arms control through civilian policing and voluntary disarmament.
In addition, the GPSF supports a number of related projects in the security and rule of law domains. These include GPSF support to; the Rule of Law Project (UNDP); the Human Rights Training Project (Child Rights Watch); the Preventative Action in Sudan Project (Canadian Red Cross); the Enhancing Peace and Community Stability Project (PACT); Human Rights Protection through Customary Law Project (World Vision Canada); and, the Adapting Restorative Justice Principles to Review, Develop or Reform Customary Law Project (UNFPA). All these projects potentially complement and support civilian disarmament efforts by creating the environment within which successful civilian disarmament can occur.
The GPSF also supports a project in the communications domain - Laying the Foundations for Community-Oriented Radio (Oxfam Canada) - which has the potential to support efforts in civilian disarmament. Given the high rate of illiteracy in the south, particularly in the rural areas, non-literary instruments, such as radio, have assumed a strategic value in promoting the merits of voluntary disarmament.
The GPSF has supported several DDR initiatives required by the CPA, including pilot projects on voluntary disarmament. In general, these are consistent with and supportive of the priorities of key national and international stakeholders.
DDR has a central role in the transition from conflict to post conflict environments, and is perceived as critical to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The CPA, which is supported by the international community, expressly supports DDR. Moreover, DDR is widely perceived as being a key enabling factor for national elections in 2009 and the referendum on sovereignty in 2011. The Government of National Unity has endorsed the UN Interim DDR Program and has committed resources in support of it.
The UN Security Council, through resolution 1590 provided the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with a mandate to oversee and support DDR efforts in the south, with particular attention to the needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction. Although primarily occupied with conventional DDR, with a clear focus on ex-combatants, the UN Interim DDR Program makes express provision for the implementation of several voluntary community based disarmament pilot projects, such as support for Community Police Services and the Community Security and Arms Control Program. The latter is designed to encourage and empower communities to collect arms, register them and guard them in community armories, under a special waiver or amnesty from legal prosecution.
The GPSF's support to addressing the humanitarian and development impacts pf the proliferation and mis-use of SALW is consistent with its diplomatic support of the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms. It is also consistent with and supportive of the UN Interim DDR Program. The GoSS now too appears to favour a more "soft" approach to civilian disarmament, evidenced by its retreat from pursuing a policy of forced disarmament following a disastrous campaign launched in the state of Jonglei, which provoked a violent response resulting in many deaths and an ignominious withdrawal of troops from the area.
In sum, DDR is critical to the peace and a precondition for immediate stabilization and longer-ter~m reconstruction. The GPSF is thus supporting an important element of this process. The GPSF support to DDR efforts in Sudan, with a particular focus on community based, voluntary civilian disarmament, is consistent with the "people-centred" approach to civilian disarmament that the Government of Canada has advocated in various international fora. It is also consistent with and in support of the priorities of major national and international stakeholders.
Effective civilian disarmament is dependant on sound information on the scale and distribution of SALWs, reasons for their continued possession, and the capacities within communities to administer voluntary disarmament projects. This in turn requires the mobilization of resources in support of community awareness and training. The GPSF support to information gathering and community training addresses these operational imperatives.
There is a universal consensus among stakeholders that effective community based voluntary civilian disarmament is dependent on solid information on the scale and distribution of SALW, the reasons for the continued possession of SALW, and the capacities within communities to administer voluntary disarmament programs. In this regard, the information provided by the Small Arms Survey team is consistent with and supportive of DDR efforts within south Sudan and beyond.
Furthermore, the Small Arms Survey is unique among other data collection programs in Sudan in so far as it pursues an integrated approach, combining quantitative data on arms flows and stocks with data on conflict profiles and rates of victimization. The Small Arms Survey has become, in one informant's view, a data 'clearing house' for all SALW related activities and best practices.
The GPSF support to the BICC Training in SALW project is consistent with and supportive of the "soft approach" to civilian disarmament adopted by the UNDP, with its focus on voluntary, community based disarmament, local ownership of the process, and capacity building through training. The BICC project was integrated with and in support of the UNDP Community Security and Arms Control Program, thus presenting a solid example of programming coherence between two GPSF financed projects. The UN DDR Unit expressly applauded the work of BICC in hosting several 'grassroots workshops' last fall to bring awareness to communities on the importance of controlling the proliferation and misuse of SALW.
Despite the Small Arms Survey Team having forged formal agreements with the UNDP and UNMIS, it remains unclear the extent to which the survey activities of the former are coordinated with the information gathering activities of the latter international bodies. In the absence of a forum within which to share information and coordinate survey activities, the risk of information gaps or overlap is magnified, thereby leading to diseconomies.
Notwithstanding the value of the work performed by both the Small Arms Survey team and the BICC, there are continuing challenges to completing the process. Coverage is still minimal; there remain important gaps in information, and the sequencing of complementary activities in the areas of justice and security sector reform necessary for successful civilian disarmament continues to be problematic. However, Canada is supporting an important theme multilaterally, and the GPSF is making an important contribution in civilian disarmament in south Sudan.
DDR involves both top-down and bottom-up programing. While the former is advancing very slowly, the bottom-up initiatives supported by the GPSF, despite problematic delays in timely funding and coordination challenges have been successfully implemented.
The UN Interim DDR Program contains two essential thrusts: a formal (top down) process of DDR that focuses on the immediate needs of specific identifiable groups -- namely GoSS, SPLA, and non-allied OAGs, child soldiers, women fighters, the elderly and the disabled -- and a more novel (bottom up) process that focuses on voluntary, community based, civilian disarmament. The GPSF has supported the latter.
At the top level of the system, while key DDR governance institutions have been established -- the National Council on DDR Coordination Council (NCDDRC), the North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC), along with State DDR Commissions -- they have operated largely independent of each other (North and South Commissions met for the first time in December, 2006, over a year after each was constituted) and have demonstrated wide divergence of progress towards stated objectives. The SSDDRC in particular suffers from a lack of leadership and chronic capacity shortages.
Key milestones of UN Interim DDR Program have not been achieved on schedule. Numbers on the potential candidates for DDR among the four groups identified - women, children, the disabled, and the elderly - have only recently been compiled. Registration and verification of those identified remains on going. Reintegration procedures at the time of the evaluation visit were still in the drafting stage and a reintegration program had not yet been developed. One informant within the UN DDR Unit when asked to rank the success of the Interim DDR Program on a scale from 1 to 10 responded with a "4."
More encouraging was the progress cited in reference to the Community Security and Arms Control Program, which the GPSF has expressly supported. Notwithstanding the delays in start-up owing to protracted negotiations with the UNDP over the terms and conditions of the contribution agreement, the Community Security and Arms Control Program was successfully implemented. Threat mapping and assessment produced valuable information relevant to programming and for on-going monitoring and evaluation by providing much needed baseline data. Civilian disarmament projects stewarded by the UN DDR Unit in Jonglei were implemented on schedule, yielding concrete results in the form of SALW collection. It is unknown, however, what proportion of SALW were delivered in relation to the total stockpile within targeted communities, highlighting an information deficit that needs to be filled.
Implementation of Phase 1 of the Small Arms Survey got off to a rocky start when funds committed by DFAIT failed to come through, again owing to uncertain authority following a TB review of the GPSF, thus forcing the Small Arms Survey to seek bridge financing from the UK to start the project. Further delays in the disbursal of funds for the same reason as stated above disrupted project implementation, resulting in the lay-off of staff. This highlights the importance of predictable and timely disbursals of funds for effective project implementation.
Project implementation within agreed to time frames was further frustrated by difficulties identifying and establishing agreements with capable partners within Sudan to execute surveys. Added to this constraint was the continued deterioration in the security situation in many parts of the country, along with the ongoing bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the GoS, which rendered access to survey populations difficult. These exogenous constraints highlight the need for funding and reporting flexibility in environments that are hostile to project implementation. Notwithstanding these impediments, the Small Arms Survey is expected to deliver on its commitments.
Implementation of BICC's project was similarly affected by uncertainties over funding attendant to the end of fiscal year TB review of the GPSF. When planning of the training program started the BICC soon realized that it needed to conduct its own preliminary survey of targeted communities in order to properly design its training program; an unplanned cost that was borne by BICC. This unforeseen project investment also set back project implementation, highlighting the importance of information for programing in this sector.
BICC encountered challenges not unlike those experienced by the Small Arms Survey in identifying and establishing agreement with competent local implementing partners - there is apparently no central registry of NGOs in south Sudan from which one can make such a selection. Unpredictable security conditions in the areas of project implementation, difficulties in securing travel permits, and the weather, all conspired to delay project implementation, again highlighting the need for funding and reporting flexibility in hostile and volatile environments. Notwithstanding these constraints, SALW training workshops were delivered in the fall of 2006.
Macro level DDR is behind schedule; however, the GPSF's bottom-up support for community-based security and arms control has begun to yield measurable benefits. The effectiveness of Canadian contributions is dependant on complementary necessary conditions including security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. These conditions are not yet present with some risk to a successful outcome.
While some progress on formal DDR has been reported in the form of the identification and registration of candidates eligible for DDR, the program is well behind schedule. The reintegration component of DDR largely remains in the planning phase, with ex-combatants currently being referred to NGOs for assistance, most of which are ill equipped at this juncture to deal with the volume.
Coordination between the UN DPKO, which is responsible for the DD components of DDR, and the UNDP, which is responsible for the R component, remains problematic. There is a growing build up of DDR candidates without as yet the necessary infrastructure to support their reintegration. A major failure in coordination and sequencing the DDR's three components could undermine the credibility of key implementing institutions and contribute to instability.
In contrast to formal DDR, preliminary outcomes from the Community Security and Arms Control Program appear to validate the effectiveness of the voluntary, community- based approach to disarmament. As pilot projects, however, their impact is highly localized. Immediate outcomes, while positive, remain fragile - threatened by a lack of complementary investments in the areas of justice and security sector reform.
Informants across the board remarked that voluntary disarmament would not take hold until the fundamental reasons for arms possession are addressed, and this means providing security both within and between communities along with mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. Indeed, some informants are of the view that justice and security sector reform constitutes preconditions for effective disarmament, again highlighting the need for an integrated approach to this activity.
Although the work of the Small Arms Survey is highly respected, and applauded by the UN DDR Unit, the extent to which the information produced by the Survey Team informs actual DDR programming remains unclear, especially given evidence that actors involved in DDR are conducting their own surveys. While affirming the importance of this activity to programing in the area of civilian disarmament, it also highlights the need for greater cooperation among actors involved in this area of study. There is apparently no forum within which surveyors can share information and coordinate their activities such as to optimize coverage and avoid duplication.
While the work performed by the BICC in SALW training was appreciated by recipients and applauded by the UN DDR Unit, BICC's own impact assessment of its training workshops, conducted three months after implementation, revealed that only 53 percent of beneficiaries had applied the skills learned during the course, and that 89 percent of beneficiaries had not proceeded to develop a community action plan as had been hoped. This, however, is not surprising given the lack of infrastructure at the local level to support voluntary disarmament, again demonstrating the need for further investment in this area.
At a more macro level, however, the BICC workshops led to the Ministry of Education in Jonglei State adopting a course on child soldiers and arms control as part of its curriculum, as has the Ministry of Education in Borr. Public awareness of the threat to human security, particularly to children, women, and the aged, posed by the uncontrolled traffic in and use of SALW is critical to effective civilian disarmament. That the education arms of the state appear, at least in the cases cited above, to be cognizant of this fact is encouraging.
While there are synergies, as discussed below, between Canada's interventions in support of civilian disarmament and its intervention in other sectors, there does not appear to be evidence of a coherent strategy guiding these investments, much less coordination of the same. Apart from the discrete projects currently funded by DFAIT, other developmental funds from Canada appear to be largely in support of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), which makes investment decisions that may or may not coincide with sectors of priority to Canada.
There is no Canadian mechanism in place to facilitate the transition of Canadian support for disarmament to the longer-term development requirements of reintegration.
The absence of an overall strategy for Canadian support to all aspects of DDR, including long-term development, creates the possibility that GPSF support will be dead-ended. Among the projects supported by Canada, both directly in support of civilian disarmament and ancillary to civilian disarmament, there does not appear to be any mechanism whereby responsibility for project implementation will be transferred to another body. This is evidenced by the request from recipients for multi-year funding. It is important for the GPSF to articulate the allowable duration of funding - not a simple issue in a context where funding is imperative and slippage endemic - and to engage potential partners at the planning stage.
Failure to develop an overall Canadian strategy for support to DDR, civilian disarmament, and the control of SALW, could miss crucial opportunities to harness all potentially available Canadian government expertise in Sudan.
As noted, successful DDR requires the integration of myriad components, including support to the security and justice domains. The needs are huge, so relevant programing is easy to identify, albeit hard to integrate with necessary complementary programming. Furthermore, there may be Canadian actors who are not engaged, but could be. While DND, the RCMP, and the CCRA all, to varying degrees, have expertise and experience in SALW control and civilian disarmament, there is little evidence that these assets have been brought to bear to address the SALW and civilian disarmament challenges in south Sudan. A Canadian strategy, or framework, that identifies both the needs in Sudan and the potential Canadian resources that could be brought to bear to address those needs could help to safeguard GPSF investments in the area of civilian disarmament and the control of SALW, and in so doing enhance impact.
Fifty years of civil war have militarized Sudan and undermined respect for the rule of law. Rule of law institutions in south Sudan are severely underdeveloped and in many cases non-existent.
Decades of civil war have militarized Sudan and debilitated civil society. The legislative, judiciary and law enforcement institutions suffer severe capacity deficits both in terms of infrastructure and human resources. Physical infrastructure of the courts system in south Sudan is practically non-existent. The judiciary in south Sudan has few of the essential resources necessary to administer justice, such as courts, filing systems, libraries, law books, and agreed judicial procedures. As noted earlier, there are approximately 22 trained judges to serve a population estimated in the neighbourhood of around 15 million people.
In the absence of an effective judicial system outside the principal towns, most southern communities still rely on customary law and traditional forms of justice, administered by tribal chiefs, often under a tree. While customary law is effective in many ways, elements of customary law, such as the Nilotic system of dowry, often clash with modern legal norms regarding women and children's rights.
Law enforcement capacity is similarly underdeveloped. Police presence in the rural areas is almost non-existent, and where there are police most are ex-SPLA soldiers with little or no training in basic police procedures. Military and security forces remain the principal agents of law and order throughout much of south Sudan. In the absence of an effective court or corrections system, justice is dispensed on the spot, often in complete disregard to human rights and other legal norms.
The institutional and operational deficits in the rule of law sector are compounded by a surfeit of small arms and light weapons, continued low intensity conflicts between communities, and a lack of public confidence in an impartial justice system. In this environment, communities view their arms as the only means of protection in the absence of a rule of law.
The influx of returnees and ex-combatants into communities, coupled with the lack of absorptive capacity in the areas of return, pose a clear and present threat to human security and sustainable reintegration. Establishing mechanisms to provide security, resolve disputes and redress grievances in a peaceful manner is of paramount importance. Failure to address these deficits through security and justice sector reform threaten the peace and the prospects for economic and social renewal.
GPSF has supported a range of rule of law projects related to awareness-raising, promoting adherence to international legal standards, and harmonization of international and customary law.
The GPSF supports the UNDP Rule of Law Project Phase 1, which is also supported by the Danish, Dutch and UK. Components of the Program include: Access to Justice and Confidence Building in the Transitional Areas (Abye, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) and the former GoS held towns in the South (Juba, Malakal and Wau) through establishment of legal aid (Justice and Confidence Centres); capacity building and mentoring of paralegal groups; establishment of police stations; and training of police officers. The Program also aims at addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) through supporting access to the justice system for victims of SGBV; building capacity of security and police, including female police forces, and the provision of economic and social assistance to victims of SGBV. START is currently contemplating support for Phase II of the Project pending receipt of a proposal expected in the summer of 2007.
In addition, GPSF supports several other projects broadly within the rule of law domain, including the Human Rights Training Project (Child Watch); Preventative Action in Sudan (Canadian Red Cross); Human Rights Protection through Customary Law (World Vision Canada), Analysis and Investigation in Darfur (International Criminal Court); the Darfur Impunity and Reform of the Sudanese Judicial System (International Commission of Jurists); the Enhancing Peace and Community Stability Project (PACT); and, the Adapting Restorative Justice Principles to Review, Develop or Reform Customary Law Project (UNFPA). Additional projects are contemplated involving such themes as security system reform, traditional justice, human rights commission and a legal library and resource centre.
GPSF support to initiatives in the area of rule of law is broadly consistent with and supportive of the priorities of the GoSS and the international donor community.
The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), undertaken by a consortium of Sudanese and international stakeholders, identified the security and justice sectors -- the rule of law sector -- as a priority for immediate post-conflict investment. More specifically, the JAM identified the following immediate objectives:
UN Security Council Resolution 1590 mandates UNMIS, and its Judicial System Advisory Unit, to coordinate with bilateral and multi-lateral assistance programs to support the implementation of the CPA with a focus on supporting the independence of the judiciary, developing a national legal framework that enshrines basic international standards, protecting human rights and combating impunity through institution building, and re-establishing and strengthening the prison system.
The Judicial System Advisory Unit provides legal policy advice to senior UN management and supports the CPA through monitoring adherence to rule of law provisions of the CPA, Interim National Constitution, the Interim Constitution for south Sudan, as well as through the provision of technical assistance in support of new commissions, including the Commission to Protect the Rights of non-Muslims, the Judicial Service Commission, the revised Joint National Transition Team and the National Constitutional Commission.
In line with the priorities established in the CPA and the JAM, the UNDP Rule of Law Program focuses on creating conditions conducive for human security by placing the rights and freedoms of individuals, communities and vulnerable groups at the centre of its interventions. Although national in scope, the UNDP Rule of Law Program focuses on the human security needs of the 'transitional areas' (Abye, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) and the former GoS held towns in the South (Juba, Malakal and Wau).
The suite of GPSF projects in the rule of law domain is consistent with and supportive of several key pillars of Canadian foreign Policy -- the promotion of human security and the promotion of Canadian values (democracy, human rights, rule of law). It is also consistent with and supportive of a range of related international conventions to which Canada is a signatory. As noted in the preceding section, GPSF support to the rule of law in Sudan generally accords with the priorities of major national and international stakeholders.
The CPA calls for a country-wide rule of law program of reform. The tendency of GPSF projects to focus primarily on only one party to the CPA, namely GoSS, potentially undermines the prospect of national renewal and unity as envisaged in the CPA. GPSF support to the sector also displays a lack of strategic focus where opportunities to exploit Canadian expertise and know-how in deficit areas have not been fully explored.
Notwithstanding that the GPSF support to the rule of law is in accordance with national and international priorities, the support provided is primarily focussed on only one party to the CPA; namely the GoSS. Arguably, support to the promotion of rule of law practices in the north is of equal, if not greater, importance to efforts being pursued in the south, since the success of the CPA will, to a large extent, be dependent on the GoS's adoption of rule of law principles and practices. The lack of donor support, including from Canada, to implementing those aspects of the CPA within the jurisdiction of the GoS, may place the whole enterprise of national renewal at risk. Support to the Constitutional Court, as well as the Electoral Commission, were cited by informants as significant gaps that needs to be addressed by the international donor community.
There are exceptions to the aforementioned remark. The GPSF support to the Canadian Red Cross, particularly in the areas of human rights awareness and the reporting of human rights violations, is national in scope and assists in promoting adherence to international legal norms by holding parties to the CPA to account. The GPSF support to the ICJ, while prompted by human rights violations in Darfur, is also an intervention of national reach in so far as the project assesses Sudanese state legal and institutional capacities for prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity against international standards.
GPSF support to the ICC's analysis and investigation of war crimes in Darfur while consistent with and supportive of international law and the principle of "non-impunity", which the GoC has championed, remains nonetheless a controversial intervention in the context of a fragile peace process. Indeed, some are of the view that interventions of this kind, by threatening public figures with prosecution, may strengthen the resolve of elements with the GoS to resist reform, thereby jeopardizing the peace and the prospects for national renewal. The issue cannot be resolved within the context of this evaluation, but is only highlighted as a subject of policy significance.
The influx of returnees, especially in the transition areas along the north/south border, has created conflict both within and among communities, rendering imperative the need to establish systems for peaceful conflict resolution. At present 80 percent of cases are handled through customary law. This reality, coupled with a recognition that the establishment of formal state judicial mechanisms for conflict resolution is a long term project, has prompted the UNDP to reassess its priorities, with a renewed emphasis on working with customary law. To this end, the GPSF has supported projects which are engaged in mapping customary law jurisdictions with the view to supporting effective programming in this area. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice of south Sudan has started working on establishing a policy on customary law.
In this regard, the GPSF support to the Human Rights Protection on Customary Law (World Vision), and the Adapting Restorative Justice Principles to Review, Develop or Reform Customary Law Project (UNFPA), is consistent with and supportive of this new area of focus in rule of law programming in south Sudan. Indeed, the UNDP applauded the work conducted by World Vision and called for greater donor support in this area of programming.
While generally consistent with and supportive of the priorities of national and international stakeholders, and notwithstanding its niche programing in support of customary law reform, GPSF support to the rule of law sector displays a lack of strategic focus. Although capacity deficits exist across the board, funding gaps in support of the legislature, judicial infrastructure and in the provision legal services (e.g., legal aid) were reported to be particularly acute- gaps where Canadian expertise may be brought to bear. Moreover, and notwithstanding significant GPSF support to the corrections system through the UNDP, significant capacity deficits remain in this sub-sector. This does not imply that START should necessarily reallocate resources in support of these sub-sectors, but they are areas of intervention which warrant exploration to determine how best Canadian resources can be mobilized to address the challenges of this sector.
Finally, the GPSF support to the rule of law sector notionally complements its support to DDR, civilian disarmament and SALW. The extent to which this occurs in practice, however, depends on the co-location of these interventions, and on proper sequencing of interventions in support of the various components of the rule of law -- judiciary, law enforcement, and corrections. Neglect of any one of these elements within a specific locale can exacerbate tensions and foster distrust of reform, highlighting the critical importance of proper sequencing and coordination of interventions.
Peace-keeping and post conflict stabilization and reconstruction often require project interventions and disbursement of funds within a matter of weeks. Lack of timely decision-making and rapid disbursements as well as flexibility and coordination in crisis environments reduce opportunities to make strategic interventions and may undermine Canada's credibility.
As with all GPSF contributions to international organizations the timely disbursement of funds to UNDP was delayed by protracted negotiations with UNDP over the terms and conditions of its contribution arrangement. The timely disbursement of committed funds was also disrupted by uncertainties with funding authority attendant to the end of fiscal year review of the GPSF by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
Implementation of the UNDP Rule of Law Program (Phase II) was placed in jeopardy by the perceived failure of GPSF funds to come through as scheduled, though further investigation revealed that part of the problem was the failure of UNDP's New York Headquarters to communicate that the funds had been received. This perceived delay affected training support to the judiciary most, which was cash managed by the UNDP. This meant reallocating funds earmarked for other activities in order to cover the costs associated with support to the judiciary.
Such delays in disbursement which occurred in this instance were due to changes in procedures and templates at HQ following the new terms and conditions for the GPSF which came into effect in September 2006. While the GPSF is not blamed for the delay in this case, the incident illustrates the importance of timely disbursements, which is not always possible given the GPSF's constraints.
Implementation of ICJ's project was, allegedly, encumbered by delays in funding linked to the way the project was labelled (ICJ included the word Sudan in their bank transfer information which caused the transfer to be returned due to sanctions). Moreover, ICJ found GPSF reporting requirements rigid. Conducting work of the kind undertaken by the ICJ in a hostile environment calls for, in ICJ's view, a more flexible funding arrangement.
Support to programing related to customary law promises to yield significant dividends, but effectiveness and success is undermined by the absence of a coherent strategy to engage this sub-sector. Moreover, over-emphasis on certain components of the rule of law at the expense of others and lack of attention to legal reform in the north may undermine overall effectiveness in the long term.
The renewed focus on working with customary law within the UNDP strategy for the sector reflects an appreciation that the establishment of the rule of law in the rural areas is a long term project, and that the integration of customary law practices into a formal legal system is critical to the success of that enterprise. The challenge is particularly daunting as international legal norms are often at odds with customary law. Introducing international legal norms into customary law practice must be selective and graduated. The GoSS's emphasis on statutory law, and its enforcement, without due consideration to customary practices, may alienate significant sections of the population and encourage resistance to reform. In this regard, the Ministry of Justice's plan to develop a policy on customary law is encouraging.
The GoSS and donor support to the law enforcement components of rule of law, at the expense of judiciary, may similarly alienate the population and encourage resistance to accepting the rule of law. In one informant's view investments in these sub-sectors is fostering a perception of the donor community contributing to the creation of a "police state." While the law enforcement and correction services are sorely in need of support, and thus worthy of donor investment, the remark again highlights the critical importance of balance.
Notwithstanding the existence of a Rule of Law Steering Committee headed by UNDP, stakeholders report a lack of coordination among those involved in justice and security sector reform. Given the importance of proper sequencing in this area, this deficit threatens to undermine the effectiveness of specific interventions and ultimately jeopardize the peace.
Moreover, the reluctance of the international donor community, Canada included, to vigorously support the rule of law in the north may undermine the successful implementation of the CPA and jeopardize the prospects for national renewal. There was a near universal consensus among informants that more robust efforts on the diplomatic front were required to hold the GoS to account and institute much needed reforms as provided in the CPA.
Failure to develop a Canadian strategy in support of the rule of law in Sudan may result in programing gaps, duplication of effort, and missed opportunities to harness all potentially available Canadian government expertise in Sudan, which could ultimately undermine overall effectiveness and success.
Given the enormous deficits in the rule of law domain, identifying relevant areas for support is easy. Success, however, as remarked in the preceding paragraphs, is significantly dependent on capitalizing on synergies between interventions in support of the various complementary components of the rule of law. Harnessing those synergies, and achieving critical mass, calls for careful planning and coordination.
At a macro level, it is a challenge beyond the capabilities of any particular donor, but a single donor can seek assurance that its core investments are supported by investments in complementary sub-sectors of the rule of law. Such programing coherence as may exist between projects supported by the GPSF and that of other donors appears to be coincidental, and not the function of conscious planning - a deficit which places the GPSF's investments in the sector at risk.
At present, the GPSF supported projects in the rule of law domain, though all relevant, demonstrate, both in thematic and geographic terms, a lack of strategic focus. With the possible exception of customary law, which appears to have materialized by chance, START has not taken a leadership role in any particular sub-sector of the rule of law. This dispersal of effort diminishes Canada's visibility among the actors involved in the sector and potentially undermines effectiveness and impact.
Disruptions and delays in securing funding authority, which have plagued the GPSF from its inception, have tended to impose pressure on START to commit funds quickly - often with the time frame of several months. This undermines, if not precludes, proper strategic planning. This is evident in the rule of law domain, as it is in other sectors of the GPSF investment.
The absence of a strategic plan for the GPSF involvement in the rule of law also places the program at risk of missing opportunities to engage Canadian OGDs, whose resources could be brought to bear on addressing some of the more acute deficits in this sector - a subject elaborated on in the following paragraphs.
GoC expertise and resources have not as of yet been fully exploited to address the challenges of the rule of law sector in Sudan. Moreover, a lack of consistent Canadian Government (DFAIT and OGDs) representation on key decision-making bodies undermines prospects for effective coordination of Canada's development assistance with GPSF initiatives in the rule of law and for coordination of GPSF short-term initiatives with CIDA's long-term development assistance to the sector.
Apart from projects supported by CIDA independent of the GPSF, a scoping mission by the RCMP and enlisting the services of the International Legal Programs Section (ILPS) in the Department of Justice Canada on a project that has not yet started, there does not appear to be any other major Canadian OGD involvement in the rule of law sector in Sudan. Opportunities to engage the expertise of OGDs, such as Corrections Canada and Elections Canada, appear to have not been fully explored.
The GoC provides substantial funding to the MDTF, which has made significant investments in the rule of law sector. Consistent Canadian representation on the MDTF, as well as the Joint Donor Team (JDT), is of critical importance if Canada is to advance its policy agenda in south Sudan in general, and in the rule of law sector in particular. Participation in these decision making bodies is also critical to ensure that GPSF investments in the sector are aligned with national and international priorities. Participation in these fora is also critical for ensuring the sustainability of GPSF investments - that they are not dead-ended - by identifying partners capable of assuming carriage of the project when GPSF funding time-lines expire.
At present OGD coordination is effected through, at a general level, the Sudan Task Force and, at a more project specific level, through a practice of consultation whereby the views of relevant OGDs are solicited as part of the project screening process. Relevant OGD participation in the project selection and design phase is not only important to ensure complementary of OGD investments in the same sector, but also to identify and engage OGDs as prospective inheritors of GPSF initiated projects. A transition or "hand-over" strategy is an important element of OGD coordination. Although START has explored transition options, a transition mechanism has yet to be decided upon, with the attendant risk to investment sustainability and impact.
Canada has been supporting the peace process in Sudan since 1999, and has provided various types of humanitarian and nation-building assistance preceding this date. The Darfur crisis increased the demand on Canadian resources so that by 2007, almost two years after the GPSF was established, over $132 million had been committed to 31 projects related to Sudan. The African Union (AU) has received $120 million, making it the largest recipient, with smaller amounts contributed to multilateral institutions, international bodies, and NGOs, but except for one large component managed by CIDA, limited GSPF funding has gone to other government departments (OGDs) and Sudanese organizations.
The context for civilian protection and peacebuilding is highly complex in Sudan, with political, ideological and operational challenges within Sudan and among the bilateral governments and multilateral institutions that have become involved. The GPSF is relevant and needed for Canada to respond adequately to crises such as Sudan. It can fill some important gaps outside the mandates of Canadian government departments by providing dedicated resources and a mechanism to deliver those resources rapidly in response to crises. The GPSF has performed responsively to the crisis in Sudan, so far allocating $132 million to 31 projects; however, the impact of such projects is unknown at this stage since many are relatively recent.
A lack of clear and measurable goals and objectives based on an analysis of the Sudan's varied conflicts makes it difficult to comment on the effectiveness of the GPSF in Sudan. The RMAF/RBAF outcomes and indicators are overly general, incomplete, overly focused on Canadian institutions and/or publics, and not particularly appropriate for evaluating the GPSF programming in Sudan. There was insufficient information with which to judge the GPSF's effectiveness using the RMAF. The forthcoming formative evaluation of the GPSF will give further consideration to this matter.
Despite these limitations in a priori criteria for measuring success, examination of specific programing initiatives relative to their stated objectives indicates that the reviewed initiatives had reasonable success in achieving their stated objectives. Canada is one of the major contributors to AMIS, thereby sustaining its operational capability and fulfilling Canada's intended national and international commitments towards the situation in Sudan. Individual Canadians have exercised dedicated and in many cases critical leadership in a variety of fora that have helped deliver Canadian contributions to AMIS, but AMIS still lacks resources and capabilities. Canada needs to consider its long-term plan for capacity development of the AU with respect to conflict prevention and peace-keeping.
Projects funded by the GPSF related to civilian disarmament and the rule of law in south Sudan are relevant and supportive of the priorities of key national and international stakeholders. Canada has followed many of the principles for effective programming in conflict and post-conflict settings with the exception of developing a specific whole-of-government intervention strategy for the sector. While it is still too early to assess impact, effectiveness and success are placed at risk by the absence of a coherent strategy to engage this sub-sector.
Despite references in the GPSF logic model to a whole-of-government approach, there is no clearly articulated and commonly understood vision for whole-of-government among START stakeholders specifying Canadian expectations for the concept, making whole-of-government difficult to plan, implement and evaluate for GPSF. As a consequence, there is no overriding whole-of-government country strategy for Sudan indicating a programing niche, investment strategy, and concrete plan for the GPSF and OGDs, with clear goals/outcomes/indicators/ risks or adequate tools for performance management and measurement.
The configuration of structures governing the GPSF is not well defined, understood, and accepted by all. There is ambiguous responsibility and accountability for strategic and synergistic programing for GPSF in Sudan. A lack of adequate presence of key Canadian players in Sudan limits Canada's ability to participate in key fora for donor coordination that could complement our whole-of-government response.
The management requirements for crisis intervention differ from those applicable to programming in more stable environments. The terms and conditions accompanying TB approval of GPSF funding have constrained planning of all but short-term projects. The relatively short-term support provided by the GPSF is not well-suited to the enormity of the long-term capacity building challenges in Sudan. The memorandum of understanding with CIDA clarifies how this short-term support complements and productively intersects with Canada's longer term development assistance, though such clarification has not taken place with other departments.
Further to the findings of this evaluation, and informed by contemporary literature, DFAIT should clarify the intended meaning and operational modalities for the whole-of-government concept as applied to crises and fragile states, to GPSF and to START.
DFAIT should clarify a strategy for GPSF support to Sudan, with particular attention to Canada's niche. The strategy should identify Canada's goals and objectives for Sudan, the means to achieve those goals, the resources required, the partners to be engaged, and the framework to be used for monitoring and reporting on performance towards realizing stated objectives.
DFAIT should consider complementing operational support to future African Union peacekeeping missions with a comprehensive capacity development plan. The plan should take note of contributions of other donors and incorporate information on intended contributions of OGDs.
DFAIT should clarify, and formally document, roles and responsibilities with respect to the development, implementation, monitoring and reporting on country whole- of-government engagement strategies.
The START Secretariat should determine the different needs and management requirements (e.g. nature and distribution of human of resources, programing modalities, terms and conditions, reporting requirements) for programing in response to immediate crises and for capacity building as distinct from other types of GPSF programing.
Vaguely articulated goals, including lack of specification of the desired end state, can lead to escalating donor commitments. Each task/ intervention needs a specific objective or goal within an over-arching framework.
While the policy in support of the Darfur humanitarian crisis made vague reference to resolution of the conflict, the policy objectives were largely in support of processes rather than targeted at defined outcomes with measurable indicators and indicative dates. Thus, it was by no means clear how success was being defined, nor when it was expected to be achieved. The risk of an uncertain end date was very real - and while not explicitly stated, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the conflict may require international involvement for a prolonged period of time. Visioning the end game is a fundamental component of successful peace and security interventions. A 'fund' that supports submissions is only strategic to the extent that there is an explicit vision and guidelines for projects in support of that vision.
Crises are best addressed by experienced organizations with known capabilities. Attempting to build the capacity of emerging organizations such as the AU, while giving them responsibility to respond to a crisis requires effective risk monitoring and mitigating strategies.
Developing organizational capacity is a long-term proposition, and Canada, through CIDA and its partners have been doing it for over 40 years in Africa. It is an essential cornerstone of development, but is not something that can be done hurriedly. Organizations specialized in being the first-responders to crises, have long organizational traditions and mature capabilities for response. They have credible performance under difficult circumstances. At the best of times, organizations with emerging capabilities are challenged to deliver even under stable conditions, and cannot be expected to perform well in responding to crises. To mix the long-term agenda of organizational development with the need for an immediate response to a crisis requires strong risk monitoring and mitigating strategies.
Successful resolution of crises depends on necessary and sufficient enabling conditions coupled with effective provision of required support. Strategic analysis of the required mix of enabling conditions and the scope and type of intervention may avoid donors getting involved in interventions whose size and direction are insufficient to resolve the crisis.
Hindsight is far easier than predicting how crises will evolve. However, considered planning, scenario building and analysis can help avoid situations where enabling conditions are problematic, or where the problem exceeds the resources and willingness to do what is required to resolve it. Furthermore, cooperation with other international donors in such analysis also can provide insights about their agendas and willingness to commit.
There are three main methods of inter-departmental coordination: departmental responsibility with cross-department information exchange, dedicated inter-departmental staff reporting to a department or central agency, and an integrated planning and control operation (war cabinet). Crisis management typically works better with the latter two models.
As situational leadership theory suggests, crises require directive leadership that may not be optimal in other situations. Loose fora for coordination and information-exchange can build ownership and are useful in many circumstances, but they are less well suited to situations where quick decision-making can mean the difference between success and failure, between people living and people dying. Managing in crises works best when there is designated responsibility and authority.
To be effective, leadership and accountability for inter-departmental responsibilities needs to be clearly prescribed and understood by all involved. An effective Canadian response to international crises requires the establishment and promulgation of flexible inter-departmental procedures that facilitate responses by a wide variety of departments to disparate crises.
Leadership can be manifested in individuals, in responsible organizational units, and in guiding documents such as strategies and plans. However, followers need to be clear on where the leadership is, and they need confidence in the authority of the leadership. The actual mechanism for coordination can vary as long as the leadership is clearly prescribed.
Response to crises requires very rapid funding decisions and disbursement of funds. Even minor delays can have negative effects on overall program performance.
Many natural crises and crises arising from conflict involve unplanned migrations of people escaping the crisis, including IDPs and refugees. A rapid intervention can establish the protection to enable humanitarian support, and it can mean the difference between large numbers of deaths and survival. Even with peace, rapid response is important. The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building (Dobbins, Jones, Crane Degrasse, 2007) describes the security gap that develops immediately following resolution of a conflict. Anarchy typically follows in which people compete for security and resources, arming themselves, and organizing for protection and political advantage. This is just one aspect of post-crisis stabilization requiring immediate funding. Even the medium term peace dividends that people need to experience often require rapid disbursement of funding and other forms of support. Delays can shift positive momentum to countervailing forces.
Successful intervention in crises as envisioned by START/GPSF requires a suitable mix of personnel with both strategic and operational capabilities. Successful crisis operations require effective operational personnel on the ground proximate to the crisis.
To realize its mandate, START requires a mix of thinkers and doers. The big picture strategic needs have to be ably considered, and coherent workable strategies need to be developed. DFAIT has large capabilities in the strategic area, and they need to be effectively deployed. START also needs operational capabilities, which are equally specialized and which require people and systems working as teams, typically with a balance between headquarters staff and those in the field. The most effective implementing agencies rely on experienced core staffs that have forged into effective teams. Furthermore, getting things done in crisis settings requires effective people proximate to the crisis empowered by suitable roles, responsibilities and authorities to respond responsibly and effectively.
Successful interventions in fragile states like Sudan require synergy among Canadian government departments effectively harmonized with programming by international partners.
Success is always easier with teamwork and shared enthusiasm for the task. OGDs vary in their experience with crisis situations and most can learn from the experience of other departments. Canada is typically not the biggest player in these contexts, so we need to make the most of our moderate resources. Pulling together can go a long way towards leveraging the resources we do have, especially when these strategically complement the resources of our international partners.
Effective program implementation requires different management systems for crisis response and longer-term capacity building projects.
Effective crisis response demands skilled staffs both at headquarters and in the field with agreed mandates and appropriate decision-making authorities who are prepared to respond rapidly. Special procedures, authorities and access to decision-makers are often required. In contrast, long-term capacity building projects have different demands and are more amenable to conventional programing and approval processes.
Programing for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction should be informed by a holistic understanding of projects of all government departments as well as the landscape of projects of other donors.
The needs in post-conflict situations can be immense, so donors need careful consideration of the overall landscape of interventions before they set priorities. There are dangers of program redundancy, or in extreme cases, program contradictions. Moreover, unless carefully considered, programming may miss crucial gaps in overall support, risking the success of the whole.
In February 2007, DFAIT commissioned a formative evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) in Sudan. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the new Canadian whole-of-government approach to conflict prevention, peace operations, civilian protection and post-crisis stabilization as demonstrated by the GoC's response to the crisis in Sudan. DFAIT requested this evaluation to capture lessons learned in at the onset, which would help refine programming efficiencies and management and also feed into the subsequent overall formative evaluation of the GPSF, which is necessary to fulfil Treasury Board requirements to report on the programme's performance.
The evaluation examined the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the GPSF support to Sudan and focused on ways to improve future practice. DFAIT appreciates the support shown by the evaluators in highlighting the relevance and timeliness of the GPSF response in Sudan, going so far as to say that "Canada can be proud of its early response at a time when many other donors hesitated."(13) The report highlights that the GPSF represents a necessary and relevant mechanism which Canada can use to respond appropriately and in a timely and coordinated fashion to crises in countries such as Sudan, which present considerable political and operational challenges. It recognizes that the GPSF contribution to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has sustained that Mission's operational capability and fulfilled Canada's intended national and international commitments towards the situation in Sudan. It also emphasizes that projects funded by the GPSF related to civilian disarmament and the rule of law in south Sudan are relevant and supportive of the priorities of key national and international stakeholders.
At the same time, the authors of the report felt that there was no coherent strategy of engagement for GPSF support to Sudan, and this was exacerbated by the lack of an on-the-ground presence to enhance Canada's participation in key fora for donor coordination. The report also identifies that DFAIT and the Canadian government as a whole should review, clarify and document publicly the whole-of-government concept overall, although this responsibility is outside the purview of the GPSF. It suggests ways that future operational support to African Union peacekeeping missions can be enhanced and it looks to the START secretariat to develop distinct response mechanisms for all types of programming under the GPSF.
The evaluation was conducted from March to September 2007 and covered the period from the GPSF's inception in May 2005 up to May 2007. It should be remembered that although funds were allocated in May 2005, the GPSF did not begin programming under its own Terms and Conditions until September 2006. As such, programming during the period of this review took place under two sets of Terms and Conditions: the Human Security Programme and the GPSF. Nevertheless, GPSF support in Sudan totalled almost $126 million from May 2005 to March 2007, $114 million of which was support to the African Union Mission in Sudan. The remaining $12 million was delivered by multilateral organisations, think tanks and NGOs in key peace building areas including security sector reform/rule of law and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).
The GPSF Sudan Formative Evaluation Report identified key areas which merited attention by START, as the managers of the GSPF, by DFAIT or by the Canadian Government as a whole. These were reflected in the five recommendations listed below. DFAIT has reviewed the recommendations and will act on those relevant to the Department and bring to the attention of other GPSF stakeholders those which represent a larger Canadian government responsibility.
DFAIT has identified that the intent of Recommendations One and Four are similar even though they target different levels of responsibility. In order to ensure that the Management Response is comprehensive, DFAIT addresses these two recommendations together.
Further to the findings of this evaluation, and informed by contemporary literature, DFAIT should clarify the intended meaning and operational modalities for the whole-of-government concept as applied to crises and fragile states, to GPSF and to START.
The lack of a clearly articulated and commonly understood vision amongst GPSF stakeholders of the whole-of-government concept (as it pertains to the Canadian context) has resulted in planning, implementation and evaluation challenges for the GPSF.
DFAIT should clarify, and formally document, roles and responsibilities with respect to the development, implementation, monitoring and reporting on country whole-of- government engagement strategies.
The informal nature of the relationships, roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis Canada's whole of government engagement with Sudan may lead to gaps in strategic development, implementation, monitoring or reporting.
The whole-of-government concept as it affects the GPSF is a multi-layered issue. There are responsibilities for the larger question of strategic vision at central agencies, while DFAIT guides the whole-of-government approach to specific countries. At the same time, START has a clear responsibility on how the whole-of-government approach is addressed vis-à-vis the GPSF in fragile states at large, including priority countries such as Sudan. It also has policy lead on key stabilisation and peacebuilding issues such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Mediation, the prevention and combat of the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Civilian Police Deployment (Civpol), to name a few.
As identified in the OECD DAC Peer Review Of The Development Co-Operation Policies And Programmes Of Canada: Main Findings And Recommendations in October 2007, Canada's whole-of-government approach is meeting with some success in fragile states and countries in conflict. The report notes that this approach "holds significant potential for policy coherence and co-ordinated programming across Canada's federal departments and agencies."(14) It goes further to suggest that Canada's whole of government practice should be shared with other OECD members as an example of good practice.
With respect to Sudan, the inter-departmental community has a very good understanding of the whole-of-government approach through inter-departmental co-ordination and flexible operational responses. The objectives of Canada's engagement in Sudan and operational modalities are articulated in successive decks and Memoranda to Cabinet (signed by three departments), and in the country strategy for Sudan which is updated annually. All relevant departments are extensively consulted during the preparation of these documents.
At the same time, GPSF decision documents and the GPSF Terms and Conditions outlines the responsibilities of the various GPSF stakeholders. Although not focussed solely on Sudan, the GPSF reports on its whole-of-government approach to fragile states through its annual report which addresses the results and achievements of the GPSF as a whole.
The Sudan Country Strategy, guided by the Sudan Task Force, includes information on the GPSF's objectives, results and performance monitoring in Sudan for the year. While the Sudan Task Force is responsible for Canada's overall political and strategic engagement in Sudan, the inter-departmental community clearly understands that START manages the whole-of-government response to the crisis in Sudan as it relates to the GPSF, in close consultation and engagement with the Sudan Task Force, CIDA, DND and other government departments.
Given that both CIDA and DFAIT have programming and operational resources for crisis response and fragile states, and in order to eliminate duplication, the Terms and Conditions include an annex which specifically addresses operating principles, and roles and responsibilities for the two departments' respective programming. To date, there has been especially good co-operation between CIDA and DFAIT at the operational level when there are grey areas in terms of programming responsibility. It should be noted that due to the nature of crises and post-crises environments, there will always be some grey area, as stabilisation and reconstruction are a midway point between relief and longer-term development. However, the risk of duplication is mitigated through formal and informal consultation, which is part of an effective whole-of-government approach.
Not withstanding the above-mentioned understanding by all stakeholders of the modalities of the whole of government approach as it is applied to Sudan and the GPSF, DFAIT recognises that a more formal description of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities would serve to further enhance the implementation of GPSF programming and therefore accepts these recommendations.
DFAIT would recommend a three-pronged approach to the issue of whole-of-government as it relates to the GPSF: government-wide, DFAIT-wide and GPSF-specific. In the first instance, DFAIT will engage with the Treasury Board Secretariat to clarify the broader framework and operational modalities for Canada's whole-of-government approach in fragile states. This will serve to inform ongoing and future programs and policy development across departments.
In parallel, DFAIT will review its own tools and systems to ensure that its approach to the creation of whole-of-government modalities and strategies are clearly understood by all stakeholders and formally documented. START will be undertaking a study of the various management models that DFAIT employs to address fragile state environments including the Afghanistan Task Force, Sudan Task Force and Haiti Steering Committee. The purpose of the study is to determine the advantages and disadvantages to each model in order to more appropriately respond when a new crisis emerges. It is anticipated that through this process, the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities will be better defined and documented.
Additionally while, as mentioned above, the Country Strategy on Sudan and Memoranda to Cabinet contain strategies for Canada's involvement in Sudan, DFAIT recognises the value of preparing a public document describing Canada's whole-of-government Sudan strategy which, unlike Cabinet documents, is easily accessible.
At the GPSF level, START is working to strengthen the role of the START Advisory Board (SAB), one of the key whole-of-government mechanisms of the GPSF, in order to further enhance GPSF's crisis response. The SAB, with its membership representing seven government departments including DFAIT, advises START on whole-of-government approaches to policy development and responses to international peace and security challenges. The SAB requires strengthening in terms of membership and mandate to more effectively fulfill its function. DFAIT is working with Other Government Departments (OGDs) to address these areas. To date, this has included a meeting of the Advisory Board in November 2007 where the mandate was discussed and a clear workplan established.
The Interdepartmental Deputy Ministers' Committee, composed of the DFAIT Deputy Minister and the CIDA President, meets at least twice a year to ensure that respective Ministers are updated on START/GPSF's and CIDA's activities in crises and fragile states. This Committee advises Ministers on the means of achieving and implementing Government policies in crises, fragile states and countries or thematic areas of engagement. It reports on the results of START's and CIDA's activities in these environments, provides policy direction for joint activities, and reviews audit and evaluation reports. Any modification to CIDA's and START's Roles and Responsibilities will be made by this Committee. DFAIT will organise the next DM Committee meeting before the end of Fiscal Year 2007/2008.
On 11 September 2007, DFAIT hosted senior CIDA representatives for the first Interdepartmental Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Committee meeting, to review Government of Canada engagement in fragile states, consistent with the governance structure outlined in the Treasury Board Secretariat presentation of November 30, 2006. The discussion focused on a review of START/GPSF and CIDA achievements in fragile states for 2006/07 and planned activities for 2007/08; implementation of the CIDA/DFAIT Roles and Responsibilities Framework; and assessment of the recommendations of the START Advisory Board Report.
This ADM committee is meant to meet twice yearly to ensure complementarity of efforts between START and CIDA in policy and programming engagement in fragile states. The committee's key functions are to: ensure Deputy Minister strategic direction on crisis management and fragile states is carried out; ensure policy coherence at a strategic level; share START/CIDA key engagements in crises and fragile states (both at a programming and policy level); provide guidance to the START Advisory Board; and, review, as required, the CIDA/DFAIT Roles and Responsibilities in Crisis and Fragile States Framework and advise respective Deputy Ministers if changes are required.
The committee agreed to the terms of reference outlined in the Governance Deck and will endeavour to meet twice yearly. The second meeting is scheduled to take place in April 2008.
|DFAIT will engage with the Treasury Board Secretariat to clarify the broader framework and operational modalities for Canada's whole-of-government approach in fragile states.||First quarter of Fiscal Year 2008/2009||DFAIT|
|START will undertake a study of the various management models that DFAIT employs to address fragile state environments including the Afghanistan Task Force, Sudan Task Force and Haiti Steering Committee.||First quarter of Fiscal Year 2008/2009||START Secretariat|
|DFAIT will prepare a public document describing Canada's whole-of-government strategy in Sudan.||Last quarter of Fiscal Year 2007/2008||Sudan Task Force|
|DFAIT will address the further strengthening of the role of the START Advisory Board in another meeting of the SAB scheduled for February 2008 where an updated Terms of Reference will be produced along with a formalised annual work plan.||Last quarter of Fiscal Year 2007/2008||START Secretariat|
|DFAIT will organise the next Interdepartmental Deputy Ministers' Committee to ensure that respective Ministers are updated on START/GPSF's and CIDA's activities in crises and fragile states.||Last quarter of Fiscal Year 2007/2008||START Secretariat|
DFAIT should clarify a strategy for GPSF support to Sudan, with particular attention to Canada's niche. The strategy should identify Canada's priorities and objectives for Sudan, the means to achieve those objectives, the resources required, the partners to be engaged, and the framework to be used for monitoring and reporting on performance towards realizing stated objectives.
While the divisions within START have developed engagement strategies for their respective areas of competence, responsibility and accountability for strategic planning and synergistic programming of GPSF as a whole in Sudan remains unclear.
On numerous occasions, Cabinet has approved START's strategies for GPSF support to Sudan. Memoranda to Cabinet have described how GPSF initiatives in Sudan have begun to effectively address security issues threatening the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and enabled Canada to take a visible role as a primary proponent of a function justice system in Southern Sudan.
On the working level, START has worked to develop and improve its strategic planning documents and practices but acknowledges that more can be done. As the program has matured, so too has the need for more integrated tools to enable synergistic programming of the GPSF. DFAIT has developed strategies for GPSF support to Sudan in the form of the concept papers which every year are updated, reviewed and approved by the DG-level Project Planning Committee (PPC). These papers clearly outline the policy rationale for engagement in Sudan, the strategic policy objectives, the strategic policy outcomes and results (linked to the GPSF logic model), the areas of programming (with funding allocations and prospective partners), coordination with CIDA and OGDs, and identified risks and mitigation strategies. These strategy/concept papers are matched closely with the Results and Achievement papers, and monitoring and reporting frameworks which provide information on the progress towards stated objectives. The PPC therefore has a clear understanding of the overall engagement of the GPSF in Sudan.
It is the opinion of DFAIT that the sub-programme logic models, and the soon to be revised overall GPSF logic model, provide appropriate guidance and strategic direction for GPSF programming in Sudan and elsewhere. START recognises that the framework for an overall countrywide strategic approach requires updating and has already begun this process in the context of the upcoming fiscal year. The above-mentioned concept papers are being revisited and will be revised to ensure that once approved they become an integral part of the country programming framework. This goes hand in hand with the work being conducted to improve performance measurements and integrate project results and will enhance linkages to illustrate areas of complementary results.
At the same time, in the course of better defining strategic frameworks, the current structure of START will be reviewed. START will examine whether the current structure meets the needs of the programme to deliver appropriate programming and policy development in a timely and accountable fashion.
|The framework for integrating concept papers into an overall GPSF country-specific programming strategy will be outlined and ready for implementation.||First quarter of Fiscal Year 2008/2009||START Secretariat|
|START will conduct a review of the current structure and develop recommendations as to how best to meet its programming needs and policy development needs.||First quarter of Fiscal Year 2008/2009||START Secretariat|
DFAIT should consider complementing operational support to future African Union peacekeeping missions with a comprehensive capacity development plan. The capacity development plan should take note of contributions of other donors and incorporate information on intended contributions of OGDs.
Addressing these institutional capacity deficits in synchronisation with operational requirements will be critical to the success of future conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations.
DFAIT has a comprehensive capacity development plan for peace operations for the African Union (AU) within the Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP) - a sub-program of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). GPOP has capacity building for peace operations for the AU as one of its principal priorities which is articulated in the GPOP Concept Paper of 2006 and the 2007 up-date thereof. The GPOP Concept Paper of 2006 states, inter alia "The process of developing the architecture is being informed by the AU's Darfur experience where Canada has been deeply involved. GPOP activities will respond to AU plans as well as the Canadian experience in working with the organization to date."
The GPOP AU capacity building plan is coordinated and implemented in close cooperation with the AU and other donors within the G8++ grouping (G8 partners, UN, EU, NATO and other donors), including the Africa Clearing House process and the Addis Ababa based G8 Contact Group. It is of note that the Evaluation draws heavily on the International Peace Academy AMIS Lessons Learned workshop held in Ghana in October 2006 which was funded by GPOP specifically to make the link between operational support to AMIS and medium term capacity building efforts.
The Canadian and G8 capacity building programs are being pursued with the AU simultaneously with the support to AMIS. The comprehensive capacity-building framework, therefore, was not available to inform the initial stages of the planning of the operational support. In an effort to draw on the AMIS experience in formulating its capacity building program with the AU, GPOP conducted an extensive technical assessment visit to the AU in October 2007 when both the police planning and the information analysis initiatives were assessed for conversion to long-term capacity building programs. Unfortunately, the mission assessed that the AU simply cannot absorb these functions into their core structures while the AU is occupied with the conversion of AMIS to the hybrid UN-AU mission, and with Somalia - an experience shared by other G8 donors.
The distinction which the Evaluation makes between Sudan initiatives which are referred to as "peacekeeping through AMIS" and "capacity development through technical assistance" is misleading in terms of assessing the success of the activities. The initiatives by Canada to establish within the Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF) an information analysis cell (initially by DND then taken over later by DFAIT) and a police advisor were taken to address clear operational deficiencies in the DITF/AMIS structure. The two initiatives were very successful in this regard, as DITF/AMIS built up over time its police program and its production of AMIS information products. A secondary objective of these initiatives was to build AU capacity in these areas. The secondary aim was less successful for the same reasons as the longer term capacity building program with the AU has not proceeded as rapidly as planned in that the AU was, and still is, preoccupied with the immediate concerns associated with Sudan, Chad and Somalia.
DFAIT will continue to work with the AU to build the capacity of the African Standby Force (ASF) based on the lessons learned from AMIS. A major shortfall noted during AMIS was the lack of training for senior level mission personnel in Darfur and senior staff at the AU in Addis Ababa. A two-year AU training plan has been developed with the goal of achieving operational readiness for all elements of the African Standby Force (ASF) by June 2010. Canada is supporting the development of associated training scenarios and senior level training courses that will incorporate the experiences of the AU in Darfur. The AU will also be developing a Peace and Security Department implementation plan for 2008 which will address the deficiencies noted during AMIS in areas such as logistics, planning and command and control at the AU strategic level. The implementation plan will be funded by donors through an innovative approach where similar discrete projects are bundled into baskets. Canada will coordinate funding support with other donor partners through mechanisms such as the annual G8 Africa Clearing House meeting scheduled in April 2008 to avoid duplication and gaps in support.
|DFAIT will coordinate funding support to the AU with other donor partners based on the implementation plan set for 2008.||Ongoing (As articulated in the GPOP strategy paper)||START/Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group|
The START Secretariat should determine the different needs and management requirements (e.g. nature and distribution of human resources, programming modalities, terms and conditions, reporting requirements) for programming in response to immediate crises and for capacity building as distinct from other types of GPSF programming.
The existing GPSF programming mechanisms do not differentiate between the distinct needs of the various types of programming undertaken through the GPSF. Established GPSF planning and operational procedures are better suited to short and intermediate-term post-crisis needs than either immediate crises or capacity building.
START recognizes that the capacity to respond to all types of GPSF programming would enhance our programmes and ensure more appropriate action across the spectrum of initiatives. The challenges of providing timely responses to immediate crises or for longer-term capacity building initiatives would be mitigated if the required Cabinet and Treasury Board approval would be obtained for longer-term programming. This will enable the development of human and technical resources required for the entire range of programming mandated to the GPSF.
Despite these challenges, START has developed, where necessary, internal programming mechanisms that respond to the specific needs of crises. In particular, START, working with the Afghanistan Task Force, has recently developed, approved by the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Kandahar Initiative for Peace and Security Fund (KIPS) in Afghanistan, a key innovation that provides a delivery mechanism for urgent 'quick impact' initiatives, to respond to immediate needs in conflict areas. KIPS enhances the effectiveness of DFAIT's presence at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) by allowing the funding of small scale projects that create the enabling environment for larger-scale GPSF projects for stabilisation at the local level. This effort also exemplifies the whole-of-government approach as projects are identified by an inter-departmental committee based in the PRT, comprised of DFAIT, DND, CIDA, RCMP and CSC to ensure appropriateness, coherence and complementarity.
At the same time, DFAIT acknowledges that this is just a first step. The START Secretariat looks forward to longer-term authorities which will allow for a more tailored response to each of the distinct types of programming for which the GPSF was created.
DFAIT will review existing programming frameworks vis-à-vis the needs and management requirements for programming for each of the distinct types of programming. Areas of priority will include the nature and distribution of human resources and programming modalities. Should policy and funding authorities be secured from Cabinet and Treasury Board to continue programming as of April 1, 2008 until 2012-13, a five-year strategic work plan will be created, implemented and reviewed on a yearly basis.
It should be noted that any new mechanism that addresses distinct programming needs would reflect the GPSF's due diligence requirements and follow the Treasury Board Transfer Payment Policy and the Financial Administration Act.
|DFAIT will conduct a review of each of the distinct types of programming within the GPSF mandate and set out the needs and management requirements for each. It will then review existing frameworks to ascertain how they can be revised to accommodate those needs.||Last quarter of Fiscal Year 2008/2009||START Secretariat|
START requested this formative evaluation of the GPSF in Sudan to provide insight into the successes and challenges of programming the GPSF in crises and post-conflict environments and improve implementation going forward. START appreciates the useful feedback and comments provided and is committed to continuing to work closely with corporate and OGD partners to address the recommendations of the GPSF Sudan Formative Evaluation. To address whole of government issues, DFAIT will engage with Treasury Board to clarify the framework under which the GPSF will work. DFAIT also will strengthen the role of the START Advisory Board, prepare a public document describing Canada's whole-of-government strategy in Sudan and undertake a study of possible models to address fragile state environments.
To improve the strategic planning of projects across the spectrum in Sudan, DFAIT will undertake a review of strategic and planning tools as well as the various management models that DFAIT employs to address fragile state environments. Once longer-term programming authorities have been received, DFAIT will undertake a review of existing programming frameworks vis-à-vis the distinct needs and management requirements of immediate crises and for capacity building programming. Finally, DFAIT will continue to work with the AU to build the capacity of the African Standby Force (ASF), building on the lessons learned with AMIS.
1. Even though the GPSF operated under the terms and conditions of the Human Security Program during much of the period, the GPSF stakeholders have agreed that the GPSF RMAF/RBAF is the more appropriate reference for this evaluation.
3. G8 partners at the Sea Island Summit of 2004 committed to an Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Operations, which builds upon the Evian Summit of 2003 and elements of the G8 Africa Action Plan that emerged from the G8 Kananaskis Summit of 2002 (START Standard Operating Procedures - Edition 2, Nov. 2006).
10. At the time of writing, the Evaluation Team was advised that START is in the process of developing other reporting mechanisms that will produce information on policy and programming results by country.