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Summative Evaluation - Global Partnership Program

(February 2008)

(PDF Version, 1.98 MB) *


Executive Summary

Introduction

The objective of the Global Partnership Program (GPP) summative evaluation is to gain an in-depth assessment of the results of the first five years of the Program (2003-04 to 2007-08) and provide guidance on the future directions of the program. The evaluation is a requirement of Treasury Board and will be a major factor in the government's decision to establish funding for the next five years of the Program (2008-09 to 2012-13).

The Global Partnership Program summative evaluation consists of four discrete reports:

  1. A summative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program that includes:
    1. Summaries of stream-specific evaluations of:
      • Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)
      • Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)
      • Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)
    2. A review of actions taken on the recommendations of previous Global Partnership Program evaluations:
      • Formative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program
      • Formative evaluation of Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)
      • Summative evaluation of Nuclear Powered Submarines Dismantlement (NPSD)
    3. A multilateral funding review; and,
  2. Three stream-specific summative evaluation reports for Global Partnership Program streams conducted in the period April - November 2007:
    • Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)
    • Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)
    • Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)

Evaluation Approach and Methodologies

The Global Partnership Program evaluation and the individual stream evaluations have been informed and guided by the following pre-defined criteria; relevance, cost-effectiveness, and achievement of results:

Relevance

issues address whether the program continues to be consistent with the Government of Canada's and DFAIT's priorities and the needs of the intended beneficiaries in Russia and other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states.

Cost-effectiveness

issues focus on performance management and are concerned with how the initiative was planned and actually implemented. Cost-effectiveness examines whether resources are appropriately and efficiently utilized, and assesses the design and delivery approaches used to achieve outcomes.

Results

focus on the extent to which the GPP objectives are being achieved and whether the GPP funded projects are making a material contribution to the security and elimination of WMD.

The evaluations were guided by evaluation matrices developed for the overall Program and for each of the streams (given in the separate reports of the stream evaluations). These included evaluation questions, performance indicators and sources of information (documentation, interviews, and case studies). While evaluation questions were tailored to the specifics of each stream, the evaluation issues that the questions supported were those identified for the overall Program evaluation, thus facilitating the roll up of the separate evaluations. Methodologies for the evaluation included document and file review, key informant interviews, and site visits.

Program Profile

At the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, G8 Leaders, from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the European Union and Canada, united to launch the Global Partnership (GP). Leaders agreed to raise up to US $20 billion for a 10 year program (2002 to 2012) to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia, but expanding to other countries of the FSU and elsewhere that accept the Kananaskis principles and guidelines.(1)

As Chair of the G8 for 2002, Canada reinforced its leadership on this initiative by committing up to C $1 billion over 10 years, beginning in 2003. Canada committed to implement projects in all priority areas identified by the G8 countries, chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine dismantlement, fissile material disposition (nuclear security), the redirection of former weapons scientists, as well as biological non-proliferation owing to the significance Canada assigns to that terrorist threat. The Global Partnership initiative covers the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety, and implicates a wide variety of weapons and materials (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), along with missiles and related equipment, technology and expertise.

The legal framework for Canada's Global Partnership Program activities with Russia was established through a Bilateral Agreement between Canada and Russia, signed June 9, 2004. This agreement reflects a partnership relationship in which both parties work cooperatively and transparently to facilitate the reduction of risk associated with WMD. Only the US has successfully negotiated a Treaty with Russia with as comprehensive coverage as secured by Canada.

Total direct expenditures on the Global Partnership Program to March 31, 2007 were $288,402 million and total Program activities expenditures were $296,847 million,(2) not including approvals of $120 million for Kizner and $65 million for plutonium disposition.

Findings: Relevance

Findings of this evaluation indicate that the G8 Global Partnership Initiative and, in particular, the Canadian Global Partnership Program led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) are relevant to the ongoing DFAIT priorities for 2007-2008. They are also supportive of the current priorities of the Government of Canada, namely the focus on Afghanistan, the Americas and the emerging markets (Brazil, China, India and Russia). GPP initiatives are aligned with some of the Afghanistan objectives, namely to remove sources of weaponry at risk of falling into the hands of terrorists, including WMD. Canada has worked closely with the US throughout the first five years of the Global Partnership Program and has engendered a high level of respect among the US partners for the way in which Canada fulfills its commitments, the quality, consistency and effectiveness of Canada's projects, as well as the overall management of the Canadian Program.

At the international level, the continuing relevance of the Global Partnership Program is evident from the following statement in the Global Partnership Review of the 2007 G8 Summit, June 8, 2007:

"With its (these) achievements, the GP has already become an important force to enhance international security and safety. Our work has made the world safer. It has helped overcome the legacy of the Cold War by bringing people and nations together to seek the mutual benefits of enhanced global security through cooperation, and it has created a common understanding of the global importance of the tasks agreed upon in Kananaskis."

Findings: Cost Effectiveness

Resource Allocation:

Overall, the Global Partnership Program has allocated resources appropriately. Adjustments have been made from the beginning of the Program following the annual reviews of priorities. In 2002, Russia and the G8 agreed over four main priorities for the Global Partnership: nuclear submarine dismantlement, chemical weapons destruction, nuclear safety, and redirection of former weapons scientists. Biosecurity and biosafety were also included in the G8 Leaders' Statement, but not officially identified as a fifth priority at the inception of the GP. Now, a growing number of countries, including Canada are including biosecurity and biosafety as a major priority in their commitments to the Global Partnership.

An annual program review assesses current threats and proposes changes as deemed necessary. The Review is then presented for discussion and approval to Global Partnership Advisory Group (GPAG) and submitted to the Minister with recommendations for reprioritization and reallocation of Program resources.

Delivery Mechanisms:

GPP management is trying to select the most cost effective mechanisms for project delivery for each stream based on sound strategic management approaches. At the outset, the Canadian Global Partnership team at DFAIT benefited from discussions with its international partners in the Global Partnership on how to best design and implement projects in Russia and, as a result, Canada's bilateral agreements with Russia have in turn been used as good models by other donors. Bilateral projects with Russia have taken longer, especially for the initial negotiations, but have in fact given Canada much greater visibility in Russia, e.g. nuclear submarine dismantlement. Projects implemented through a third party/country which has an existing agreement with Russia, have also proved to be effective. In this case, Canada usually draws on existing management structures, expertise and capabilities of other donors, particularly the US and UK, e.g. chemical weapons destruction, plutonium dispositions, etc.

A number of benefits from using a multilateral approach have also been identified, e.g. projects implemented through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the two Science Centers - International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU). Major benefits include but are not limited to: (i) a common front is created among a number of donors, providing an effective political leverage and an opportunity to counter the Russian practice of dealing separately with individual donors and getting bilateral donors to compete; (ii) better opportunities to complete infrastructure projects that are large financially and too big for single donors; and (iii) an opportunity is given to Canada to support projects in countries with which Canada does not have a bilateral agreement. Many interviewees, both Canadian and international, commented that a mix of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms is needed to deliver larger projects effectively.

Program Governance:

The governance structure of the Global Partnership Program has, in general, ensured good program oversight and coordination. The Global Partnership Working Group (GPAG) plays a valuable role in providing broad policy advice from interested departments on the direction and implementation of the GPP. However, despite IGX efforts to overcome the lack of active interest by some GPAG members, the evaluation team found that GPAG has not been effectively utilized. Given the highly specialized nature of the Program and its activities, IGX has only recently started to more actively engage some specific interdepartmental groups through concrete MoUs.

Program Management:

The evaluation team concluded that the Global Partnership Program has been effectively managed by the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX). Evidence in support of this finding includes: the fact that Canada's commitments to the Global Partnership are being met as planned; the low administrative overhead costs for Program implementation (5%); as well as the fact that all GPP six-month reports to TBS have been favourably received. A noted weakness is the existence of three levels of HR and IT support - program, branch and corporate level, without clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for each level. The lack of compatible filing and reporting systems among the three levels presents further management challenges. It is recognized that the IFM Branch is working to obtain departmental corporate support to address its programming needs.

With regard to strategic and operational planning, it is noted that the Global Partnership Program is part of the Branch Business Plan linking the Program's strategic plans to other Branch policies and priorities. A concern, however, is the absence of a focus in the strategic plans on identifying any long-term side or spin off benefits to Canada resulting from this major investment in Russia, i.e., science and technology cooperation, technology commercialization, trade and investment.

Performance Measurement:

The first RMAF and RBAF prepared for the TB Phase 1 submission were off the shelf. More detailed draft logic models and performance indicators are being added through the ARAF that updates the earlier RMAF and RBAF and will be part of the Program TB submission process in 2008. Most program streams have started reporting against program indicators; however the results of this performance reporting were not available to this evaluation. Specific results are expected to be captured in the ARAF that will then be operationalized.

Knowledge and Skills:

Global Partnership Program partners in the UK, US and Russia commented on the professional skills of the Canadian program managers, their knowledge of project areas, their project leadership abilities, and their negotiating skills. The lengthy time taken for staffing actions is a problem, although IGX has made a dedicated effort on human resources, such that the Bureau's staffing performance is far above the average for DFAIT. The Human Resources Plan of IGX is assisting the Bureau in addressing issues of turnover, training and professional development.

Findings: Success

Most results of the Global Partnership Program are consistent with the intended outcomes. Many interviewees shared the view that "Canada is achieving everything it set out to achieve." Considering the serious impediments that Canada had to be overcome to get the Program underway such as lack of program infrastructure, slow decision-making in Russia, and large distances to project sites in the country, the accomplishments are all the more impressive. Canada has developed a level of trust with Russia that has been valuable to enhancing our role in the Global Partnership.

Canada is meeting its financial commitments to the Global Partnership and has also been successful in leveraging strategic resources for its projects through a collaborative approach with existing donors and through international organizations. Canada has also led the G8 in proposing mechanisms for non-G8 countries to join the Global Partnership effort, and has approached some of these countries such as South Korea and Australia to join in the NPSD or NRS work in Russia, particularly in the Far East. The move to include Asian countries is also demonstrating the wide geographic scope of the Partnership.

Among the Global Partnership Program projects, outcomes have been attained on time or in a shorter time than planned e.g. NPSD, while others have been slower than expected e.g. CWD. For CWD, Canada committed $98 million to completing Shchuch'ye and $120 million to building a similar destruction facility at Kizner. A concern with Kizner is the delay in the Russian planning stage that could jeopardize Russia's commitment to meet the 2012 deadline for the Chemical Weapons Convention. On NPSD, Canada intends to dismantle and/or defuel a total of 12 nuclear powered submarines in North West Russia in the period 2004-08. To date, eight submarines have been dismantled and four more are underway. Canada is planning to dismantle up to six submarines in the Far East subject to the scope of the 2008-2012 NPSD budget.

In the NRS stream, five nuclear facilities are now under contract for physical protection upgrades, and several additional projects are being developed. Bilateral programming was slow to start because access to and exchange of information procedures and related frameworks for Russian nuclear facilities took nearly a year to negotiate. Process adjustments were also necessary as, NRS management utilized the IAEA to support NRS in strengthening nuclear security in countries of the FSU with which Canada does not have bilateral agreements. Further, Canada's contribution to the US-led project to shutdown the last Russian weapons-grade plutonium production reactor has helped ensure that the project meets the 2011 shutdown target.

Canada joined the ISTC in March 2004 as a focus of the RFWS stream, and the Program assumed responsibility for the STCU in April 2006, and has funded over 200 projects at a cost of about $40 million involving the redirection of over 2300 former weapons scientists. The ultimate purpose has been to retain these scientists in Russia and the FSU, and to assist their integration into the world-wide community of scientists through the increased production and dissemination of scientific knowledge. The main challenge, however, is ensuring the sustainability of these projects and their results through commercial ventures as well as the extension of the RFWS process to other FSU states.

Within the BNP stream, in addition to biological redirection projects funded through the ISTC and STCU and involving 538 former bio-weapons scientists, Canada is pursuing a broad range of biosafety/biosecurity initiatives in the following areas: (i) assisting with development and implementation of effective and practical national biosafety/biosecurity standards and guidelines; (ii) assisting with the establishment of national and/or regional biosafety associations; (iii) providing biosafety/biosecurity training; and (iv) funding requisite biosafety/biosecurity upgrades at facilities of priority non-proliferation concern. BNP's current engagement with other FSU states is being extended to Russia through an integrated security/health approach.

Conclusions

Leadership Role:

Through the Global Partnership Program, Canada has continued to demonstrate the leadership that was shown in shaping the Global Partnership at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit. Within the last five years, Canada has been recognized as a leader in all areas of project implementation, has expanded its activities, and has also had success in leveraging strategic resources for its projects through other channels and programming mechanisms. Canada has led the G8 in encouraging new participants and in promoting a strategic review for the Partnership at its halfway point.

Achieving Objectives:

The Global Partnership Program has generated impressive results in the first five years of operation that have contributed to threat reduction of WMD proliferation from Russia and other states of the FSU. In addition to the specific achievements of the individual streams, the Program is building capacity in Russia and the other FSU states to maintain the security of vulnerable sites and materials. The successful implementation of GPP projects in Russia, has further reinforced Canada's relationship with Russia, has improved Canada's visibility and standing within the G8 and with other Global Partnership donors, and has strengthened Canada's relationship with the US.

Program Management:

Evidence is provided in the report of the strong management of the Global Partnership Program. Implementation by IGX of the recommendations of the CWD, NPSD and GPP formative evaluations and of the number of audits has contributed to improved program and project management practices. However, there are still some areas that require further improvements in terms of program management are: (i) the Program has to date been largely focused on the operational management and successful implementation of projects by each individual stream - more attention to the presentation and assessment of the overall Program results would enhance understanding of the Program's broader impact and the need for any changes of direction, and; (ii) the need to specify the Program's strategic goals and to start pursuing some potential spin off or side benefits for Canada from the Program's substantial investments in areas such as science and technology cooperation, commercialization, trade and investment.

Knowledge and Skills:

The high quality of the Canadian managers of the Global Partnership Program, their knowledge of project areas, their project leadership abilities, and their negotiating skills have been major factors in the success of the Program. The Individual Performance Measurement involving regular personnel assessments requires improvement, and this has now been accorded priority by IGX. Such personnel assessments are seen as important in the effort to achieve optimal Bureau performance.

Delivery Mechanisms:

The strategic use of different delivery mechanisms (multilateral, third party and bilateral) by the Program has been beneficial to the Program in implementing projects in a timely and cost effective manner.

Global Partnership beyond 2012:

The task of reducing WMD threats from Russia and other FSU states (and indeed, globally) will not be completed by 2012. The issue of continuing the Global Partnership investment has been raised by the US in the Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) but no longer-term commitment from the G8 has yet been made. Sustainability by Russia/FSU of current investments through the Global Partnership and financing beyond 2012 are two areas requiring close attention before future directions for the Global Partnership are discussed prior to completion of the initial mandate in 2012.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

It is recommended that the Global Partnership Program continue to be managed through the current structure of the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX) within DFAIT, taking into consideration the following recommendations relating to program-level and project-level management and budgets from previous and current evaluations, namely:

Follow-up on the recommendations from evaluations conducted in 2006 and early 2007:

Global Partnership Program - 2006 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that IGX complete its implementation of the recommendations of the formative evaluation relating to program-level and stream-level planning and reporting, and in particular, the development and implementation of an International Security Branch level Risk Management Framework in line with the management response.

Chemical Weapons Destruction - 2007 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that actions underway by IGX in response to the recommendations of the 2007 MDB-2 Formative Evaluation and in relation to the on-going projects relating to the railway and the local public address system be completed in time for the Shchuch'ye facility to become operational in 2009.

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

It is recommended that the recommendations of the 2007 NPSD Summative Evaluation be fully implemented, and, in particular, that NPSD activities be extended to the Far East to enable the dismantling of up to six submarines.

Specific Recommendations from current evaluations (December 2007):

Global Partnership Program (GPP) - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

While the Program and its five sub-streams are effectively managed, performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, have not been used in the ongoing stream and project management. It is recommended that this shortcoming be addressed through the implementation of the ARAF and the development of precise performance measures and indicators for each stream and for the Program as a whole.

Nuclear and Radiological Security Stream - 2007 Summative evaluation:

Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short time frame. It is recommended that NRS continue on the course that it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger bilateral physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, at facilities with Category I (weapons usable) material.

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

  1. Given that the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives, is well managed, and contributes to strengthening relations with other donors, particularly with the US, it is recommended that DFAIT continue the RFWS stream beyond March 31, 2008, and the implementation of Canada's redirection efforts under the multilateral framework of the two Science Centers - the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kyiv (Ukraine);
  2. Given that the involvement by Canadians, particularly in partner projects, increases the chances of long-term sustainability, continuous intellectual threat reduction and science and technology and industrial benefits to Canada, it is recommended that DFAIT remove the budget constraints to allow for more flexibility in RFWS programming, such as contributing part of the costs of collaborating with FSU scientists either through other streams of the Global Partnership Program and/or other programs at DFAIT;
  3. Given that the intellectual threat is now considered lower in some regions (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remaining high in others (e.g., biological threat in Central Asia), it is recommended that the RFWS focus on the most proliferation-sensitive institutes including those in other FSU states.

Biological Non-Proliferation - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

  1.  BNP has thus far achieved a number of important results in a relatively short time frame and in a cost-effective manner that are consistent with the overall objectives of GPP. Moreover, it is on the cusp of expanding significantly, with current planning underway for the construction of one of two Level-3 Biological Containment Laboratories. These are expected to have a significant impact on program objectives. It is therefore recommended that BNP be continued but at a level of full-stream funding that will allow it to realize its current strategy;
  2. (ii) To allow for improved program planning, it is recommended that BNP have the ability to contribute BNP program funds to the ISTC and/or STCU within the IGX budget. Having such an arrangement would sever its dependence on RFWS for ISTC and STCU access and give BNP the needed authority to allocate resources effectively over the longer term for its diverse initiatives;
  3.  The BNP stream has a diverse project portfolio that is set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in the Kyrgyz Republic. To improve oversight of existing initiatives and assist in the delivery of an expanding program, it is recommended that more resources be committed to the FSU region either within the ISTC or in the countries themselves. This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, and allow for quicker responses to issues that will emerge with the facility construction.
Recommendation 2:

Reducing threats of WMD in the longer term requires that threat reduction measures put in place by the Global Partnership Program be sustained beyond 2012. It is recommended that:

  1. A longer vision for Global Partnership Program activities beyond 2012 be developed.
  2. Sustainability of GPP investments, and in particular, the appropriate maintenance and use of Canada-funded projects and facilities in Russia be ensured by the inclusion of strict follow-up monitoring, audit and evaluation procedures by Canada for a certain period beyond the end date of the Global Partnership Program, in the project implementation arrangements. NRS projects are of a particular concern, especially the physical protection projects. This should be monitored to ensure that the upgrades funded by Canada continue to be used in an effective manner.
  3. It is also recommended that awareness raising campaigns be directed at senior managers in Canadian organizations (e.g. firms, crown corporations) of the benefits of redirection projects with FWS, and in particular, the benefits of partner projects which are under the direction of Canadian funding partners in order to advance Canadian R D, as well as to build the sustainability of RFWS projects.
Recommendation 3:

It is recommended that Embassy personnel in Moscow and Kiev, including Locally Engaged Staff and Canada-paid experts in the Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) be more actively involved in current and future project monitoring activities. This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, save long trips from Canada to Russia, and allow for quicker responses to issues as they emerge.

This approach will be particularly beneficial for the BNP stream and its diverse project portfolio, set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in Kyrgyz Republic. Embassy personnel, specifically on the Trade side, could also support RFWS stream objectives to advance S T and industrial benefits to Canada.

Recommendation 4:

It is recommended that IGX consider means of consolidating the achievements of Canada's investment in the Global Partnership Program in a broader strategic context. Approaches to be considered in support of this recommendation include:

  1.  presentation and assessment in annual reports and reports to TBS by IGX of the overall Global Partnership Program results in addition to individual stream results to enhance understanding of the Program's broader impact;
  2.  developing a longer-term vision, post 2012, to ensure sustainability of GPP projects and to scope the next phase of the Global Partnership overall and Canada's role, in particular;
  3.  identifying potential spin off and side benefits for Canada in areas such as science and technology and innovation cooperation, collaborative studies and exchanges in, for example, nuclear research and development (e.g. nuclear waste disposal), and the environment (e.g. climate change impacts on the Arctic); and,
  4. (iv) increasing the involvement of other departments and agencies through the STTAG and GPAG to build increased constituency of interest in the Program.
Recommendation 5:

Within the Global Partnership, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations. As the security of WMD gets improved in the Russian Federation and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions and areas, such as biological non-proliferation. It is recommended that, if G8 leaders make a decision with regard to the expansion of the Global Partnership Initiative to other regions of the world, consideration be given to Canada's participation in this extended geographic coverage. A longer-term vision for Canada's involvement in activities and projects related to non-proliferation and WMD treat reduction would help DFAIT and IGX, in particular, to preserve and effectively use the expertise and program management capacity of its staff.

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List of Acronyms

ADM
Assistant Deputy Minister
BNP
Biological Non-proliferation
BTWC
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CBRN
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFIA
Canada Food Inspection Agency
CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
CW
Chemical Weapons
CWC
Chemical Weapons Convention
CWD
Chemical Weapons Destruction
DFAIT
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND
Department of National Defence
DoE
Department of Energy (US)
DPR
Departmental Performance Report
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment (Russian)
EU
European Union
FM
Fissile Materials
FSU
Former Soviet Union
FY
Fiscal Year
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GoC
Government of Canada
GPAG
Global Partnership Advisory Group
GP
Global Partnership
GPP
Global Partnership Program
GPSPF
Global Partnership Special Projects Fund
HEU
Highly Enriched Uranium
HR
Human Resources
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IGX
Global Partnership Bureau, DFAIT
IMS
Information Management Software
ISTC
International Science and Technology Center (Moscow)
IXS
Program Services Division, DFAIT
LPAS
Local Public Address System
MDB
Main Destruction Building
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NACD
Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament
NDEP
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NGO
Non-governmental Organization
NPS
Nuclear Powered Submarines
NPSD
Nuclear Powered Submarines Dismantlement
NPT
Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRCan
Natural Resources Canada
NRS
Nuclear and Radiological Security
NSERC
Natural Sciences Engineering Research Council
NTI
Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWS
Nuclear Weapons States
NNWS
Non-Nuclear Weapons States
OGDs
Other Government Departments
PAD
Project Approval Document
PHAC
Public Health Agency of Canada
PMF
Project Management Framework
PNPI
Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute
PO
Program Officer
PWGSC
Public Works and Government Services Canada
R D
Research and Development
RBAF
Risk-based Audit Framework
RFP
Request for Proposal
RFWS
Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists
RMAF
Results-based Management and Accountability Framework
ROSATOM
Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of Russia
RPP
Report on Plans and Priorities
RTG
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
S T
Science and Technology
SPM
Senior Program Manager
SPF
Special Projects Fund
STTAG
Science, Trade, and Technology Advisory Group
START
Stabilisation Reconstruction Task Force
STCU
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (Kyiv)
TB
Treasury Board
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
US
United States of America
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZIE
Evaluation Division, DFAIT

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Objectives and Scope of the GPP Summative Evaluation

The objective of the Global Partnership Program (GPP) summative evaluation is to gain an in-depth assessment of the results of the first five years of the Program (2003-04 to 2007-08) and provide guidance on the future directions of the program. The evaluation is a requirement of Treasury Board and will be a major factor in the government's decision to establish funding for the next five years of the Program (2008-09 to 2012-13).

The Global Partnership Program summative evaluation consists of four discrete reports:

  1. A summative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program that includes:
    1. Summaries of stream-specific evaluations of:
      • Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)
      • Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)
      • Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)
    2. A review of actions taken on the recommendations of previous Global Partnership Program evaluations:
      • Formative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program
      • Formative evaluation of Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)
      • Summative evaluation of Nuclear Powered Submarines Dismantlement (NPSD)
    3. A multilateral funding review; and,
  2. Three stream-specific summative evaluation reports for Global Partnership Program streams conducted in the period April - November 2007:
    • Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)
    • Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)
    • Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)

1.2 Evaluation Approach and Methodologies

Evaluation Approach

The Global Partnership Program evaluation has taken a comprehensive approach as required by the evaluation objective and scope. As noted above, the evaluation has a number of components as illustrated in Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1: Components of the Global Partnership Program

Components of the Global Partnership Program

The Global Partnership Program evaluation, as with the stream evaluations, is based on the following pre-defined criteria: relevance, cost-effectiveness, and achievement of results:

Relevance

issues address whether the program continues to be consistent with the Government of Canada's and DFAIT's priorities and the needs of the intended beneficiaries in Russia and other FSU states.

Cost-effectiveness

issues focus on performance management and are concerned with how the initiative was planned and actually implemented. Cost-effectiveness examines whether resources are appropriately and efficiently utilized, and assesses the design and delivery approaches used to achieve outcomes.

Results

focus on the extent to which the Global Partnership Program objectives are being achieved and whether the Global Partnership Program funded projects are making a material contribution to the security and elimination of WMD.

The evaluations were guided by evaluation matrices developed for the overall Program and for each of the streams to be evaluated. These included evaluation questions, performance indicators and sources of information (documentation, interviews, and case studies). While the evaluation questions were tailored to the specifics of each stream, the evaluation issues that the questions supported were those identified for the overall Global Partnership Program evaluation, thus facilitating the roll up of the separate evaluations.

Evaluation Methodology

The methodologies for the Global Partnership Program evaluation included document and file review, key informant interviews, and site visits. Details on the methodologies used are given as part of each work plan. General descriptions of the methodologies follow:

Document and file review
Interviews with key informants

Interviews were with the Global Partnership Program management and other DFAIT personnel (13), other federal government departments (3), Program partners in the UK (5), Washington Embassy and US partners (11), Moscow Embassy (3), Russian departments/agencies (2), and NGOs (6), and multilateral organizations providing Global Partnership Program delivery mechanisms (2).

Interviews solely related to the individual Global Partnership Program streams are given in the separate reports on the NRS, RFWS and BNP evaluations. Some interviewees appear in both the Global Partnership Program list and the stream lists.

Site visits

In order to deepen the Evaluation Team's understanding of the Program's implementation and success through in-person interviews and discussions, visits were undertaken to Washington, Moscow, St Petersburg, and London. These visits were arranged with the assistance of ZIE, IGX and the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. Group interviews also took place during visits in Russia to the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (9), VNIIFTA (8) and the Kurchatov Institute (4). These visits to Institutes are described in the NRS evaluation report.

Evaluation Limitations

The inability to fully address some aspects of the evaluation due to the sensitivity of the subject matter was a major limitation of the study. Security considerations meant dealing with incomplete information on a number of evaluation issues. For example, the basic assumptions underpinning the Program design and threat reduction were difficult to assess. In addition to the nature and risk level of the threat, the evaluation had to also deal with the differences in the perceptions of the risk between the Western countries and Russia. It was not possible for the evaluation team to mitigate this limitation.

Another limitation for the study was the lack of detailed knowledge of the Program as a whole in Canada, outside DFAIT. This limited the ability of the evaluation team to find opinions other than from stakeholders on the value of the Program for Canada, for example, improved security for Canada, Canada's international standing within the G8, and to Canada's relations with Russia and the US. A perspective on Canada's Program was obtained from the interviews with Canada's partners in the Global Partnership. In terms of stakeholder interviews, the potential limitations in trying to arrange them in Ottawa, Moscow, St Petersburg, and Kyiv (including site visits), London and Washington over the summer months were successfully overcome through the diligent efforts of IGX supported by the Canadian Embassy in Moscow for the visits in Russia and Ukraine.

1.3 Report Structure

The stream-specific evaluations are submitted as separate reports, but summaries of these evaluations are included as chapters in this Global Partnership Program summative evaluation report. Also included in this report are assessments of the follow-on actions in response to the recommendations of the evaluations of the destruction of chemical weapons (CWD) stream, and the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines (NPSD) stream, as well as the formative evaluation of the GPP. The report also reviews multilateral funding in support of the Global Partnership Program.

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2.0 GPP Profile

2.1 Global Partnership Overview

Goals and Challenges

The genesis of the Global Partnership begins with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that left the Russian Federation in possession of vast arsenals of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and delivery vehicles (e.g. submarines and missiles), plus related materials and know-how. More than a decade later, many of these weapons and materials are still inadequately secured and vulnerable to theft or illicit acquisition. Their potential acquisition by states of proliferation concern or terrorists represents a serious threat to Canadian and to international security, as well as to global stability.

Addressing this Cold War legacy was an enormous task, well beyond the capacity of Russia and other countries of the FSU. A few nations responded in the 1990s with bilateral and multilateral projects, notably the Cooperative Threat Reduction program initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar in the US, to help deal with the risks posed by these weapons and the infrastructure that supported their production. The terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 underscored the seriousness of the threat and acted as a catalyst for the formation by the G8 of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

At the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, G8 Leaders, from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the European Union and Canada, united to launch the Global Partnership (GP). The members agreed to raise up to US $20 billion for a 10 year program (2002 to 2012) to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia, but expanding to other countries of the FSU and elsewhere that accept the Kananaskis principles and guidelines.(3)

As Chair of the G8 for 2002, Canada reinforced its leadership on this initiative by committing up to C $1 billion over 10 years, beginning in 2003. This commitment was to implement projects in all four priority areas identified by the G8 countries (see 2.1.2), as well as biological non-proliferation owing to the significance Canada assigns to that terrorist threat.

Governance

G8 oversight and coordination has been undertaken, initially through the Senior Officials Group and more recently through the Global Partnership Working Group (in which all Global Partnership donors and recipient countries participate). It reports to Leaders through Political Directors. The Working Group meetings provide members with information on the activities, intentions and experiences of other participating countries and are invaluable in preventing duplication and overlap in the implementation of individual projects and in sharing experiences.

This approach is reflective of the Global Partnership as a flexible mechanism, allowing for international cooperation, and leaving to each participant the selection and implementation of projects according to its own priorities, although a number are done in cooperation. All countries retain the flexibility to choose the delivery mechanisms for their programs. Options include delivering programs through multilateral agencies, in cooperation with other donor countries or directly with Russia on a bilateral basis. To date, Canada's leadership in the advancement of the multi-country Global Partnership has had a significant and positive impact on Canada's bilateral relationship with Russia and the US, among others.

International cooperation and working through multilateral organizations considerably reduces the risks Canada would otherwise face in supporting cooperation projects under the Global Partnership. It has been used successfully to overcome difficulties on issues related to transparency, access and liability that would make it difficult to provide support for cooperative projects with confidence. The Senior Officials Group (SOG) in the G8, (later changed to the "Political Directors" and the GPWG) initially provided the basis for much of the legal structure and practices that are now, or in the process of, being put in place. Members are openly sharing their experience related to threat reduction projects, including best practices and project specific information that can significantly reduce project implementation risks. In its annual reports to G8 leaders, the Partnership advises on activities that have taken place and funding, and describes future plans.

Priorities

The Global Partnership initiative covers the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety; and implicates a wide variety of weapons and materials (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), along with missiles and related equipment, technology and expertise. G8 Leaders at Kananaskis identified chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine dismantlement, fissile material disposition (nuclear security) and the redirection of former weapons scientists as priorities.

2.2 Gobal Partnership Program Overview

Program Initiation

Canada's contribution to the Global Partnership of CDN $1 billion over a ten-year period was approved in August 2002. The Global Partnership Program (GPP) bureau was established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Corresponding to the four priority areas identified by the G8 Leaders, the Global Partnership Program has four main project streams: Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD), Nuclear Powered Submarines Dismantlement (NPSD), Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS), and Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS). A fifth project stream, Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP), was added into the Program through the Global Partnership Special Fund introduced in Phase II of the Program.

Program Objectives

The mission of the Global Partnership Program is:

To implement projects in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, in cooperation with these countries and/or other G8 members, to reduce the threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction to Canadians and the international community.

To achieve this mission, the Global Partnership Program has identified six strategic priorities:(4)

  1. Reduced Threat from WMMD and related expertise.
  2. Strengthening of the international non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament regime.
  3. Advancement of Canada's domestic and international security objectives.
  4. Achievement of industrial science and technology benefits for Canada.
  5. Significant reduction of environmental threats posed by vulnerable facilities in Russia/FSU.
  6. Responsible stewardship of public funds.

Program Organization

The evolution of the organization can be characterised by three phases: an initiation phase (2003-04) during which the legal framework, funding authorization and staffing were priorities; a second phase (2004-2005) during which the Global Partnership Program consolidated its organizational structure; and a third phase (2005-08) during which the Program entered into full scale implementation.

The Global Partnership Program is headed by a Director-General who is supported by two Directors and reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security Branch and Political Director. One Director manages Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear and Radiological Security and administrative issues; the other Director is responsible for Former Weapons Scientists, Biological Non-Proliferation and Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Senior Policy Advisor handles policy, communications and corporate issues. Each of the five project streams is managed by a Senior Program Manager.

The approved Terms and Conditions for the Global Partnership Program give the Minister of Foreign Affairs full approval, signing and amendment authority for the Program. In general, the Assistant Deputy Minister's approval authority is limited to $10 million, and the Director General, Global Partnership Program is limited to $5 million. The Phase I Terms and Conditions also stipulated that all projects would be presented to the Global Partnership Advisory Group (GPAG) for review. The GPAG was formed to provide advice to the Program, including review of project proposals. GPAG members include TBS, Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency, Public Health Agency Canada, Environment Canada and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, among others.

Figure 2-1: The current organization of the Global Partnership Program

Current Organization of the Global Partnership Program

Program Activities

Each of the five project streams uses different project delivery mechanisms as discussed in the following Chapters. Much of the work directly undertaken by IGX involves overall project planning, stakeholder consultations, risk assessment and management, project assessment and approvals, negotiation of contribution arrangements, contracting, managing and monitoring. The Bureau also undertakes a number of activities in support of the five streams including:

Legal:

Several key legal and related instruments have been negotiated. These include: a bilateral treaty with Russia covering submarine dismantlement, nuclear security and chemical weapons destruction; an MOU with the ISTC and more recently STCU in Ukraine; and MOUs with the IAEA, and with UK, US, Norway and others. There is also negotiation support for numerous bilateral implementing arrangements, contribution agreements and contracts to ensure that Canadian assistance is provided in a manner consistent with Canadian law, regulations, Treasury Board and broader policy requirements.

The legal framework for many of Canada's Global Partnership Program activities with Russia was established through a Bilateral Agreement between Canada and Russia, signed June 9, 2004. (Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, the Dismantlement of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines and Nuclear and Radioactive Material Protection, Control, and Accountancy). This agreement reflects a partnership relationship in which both parties work cooperatively and transparently to facilitate the reduction of risk associated with WMD.

The Treaty provides a number of significant safeguards for Canada's investment in the GPP, including: the establishment of schedules and milestones, contracting, access to facilities, privileges and immunities, tax exemptions, intellectual property, environmental soundness, evaluation, monitoring and verification, audits and evaluation and nuclear and non-nuclear liability. The Treaty also provides Canada with the unilateral right to suspend any project without incurring liability. It should be noted that only the US has successfully negotiated a Treaty with Russia with as comprehensive coverage as obtained by Canada.

Policy and Communications:

This function highlights the Program contribution to broad branch, departmental and Canadian objectives; bilateral and multilateral relations (particularly in the G8); and support for the NACD regime. Through various communications projects (including Annual Reports to Parliament, websites, video clips, brochures and other releases), a wide-range of domestic and international stakeholders is reached with information about the Program.

Finance/Travel:

The magnitude of financial tracking is significant given the number of streams and the bilateral, multilateral and third party funding mechanisms. The Program has its own financial officers and also has a dedicated travel person to manage team travel and visa support.

Human Resources (HR):

An HR Plan is in place and has been integrated into a Branch wide HR system, under the IFM HR Strategy.

Logical Model

The logic model below for the Global Partnership Program is taken from the draft Accountability, Risk and Audit Framework for the Program prepared by Government Consulting Services, Public Works and Government Services, dated February 5, 2007.

Logic Model for Global Partership Program

The logic model is a reasonable schematic summary of the activities, outputs and outcomes of the Program and the linkages between them. The evaluation team believes that the identification of reduced environment and health risks solely with the CWD and NSDP streams is accurate; however, they are also an intermediate outcome of the NRS and BNP streams. Also, industrial and scientific benefits to Canada are an intermediate outcome that could be associated with all the streams not just the RFWS stream. This latter concept could be captured by adding a further Ultimate Outcome: Spin-off benefits relating to science and technology cooperation, and technology commercialization. These changes would represent a greater focus on performance reporting at the program level, not only the project or stream level.

Funding

The most recent statement of Global Partnership Program expenditures for 2003-04 to 2006-07 is given in the Global Partnership Program Annual Report 2006-07, which is reproduced in Table 2.

Table 2.1: GPP Expenditures 2003-04 to 2006-07

GPP Expenditures

Funding for the Global Partnership Program for the years 2003-04 to 2007-08 of the program was authorized through approval of six Treasury Board submissions. A Phase I submission, approved in August 2003, provided funding for specific projects and defined signing authorities and eligible contribution recipients. In addition, this submission provided funding approval for administrative costs (including audit/evaluation costs) for the first five years of the Program, up to a maximum of 7% averaged over the span of the Program.

A Phase II submission, approved in October 2004, authorized several changes to the Program including a broader scope of projects and revised Terms and Conditions. The other two submissions were for project-specific approvals for the dismantlement of 12 nuclear powered submarines in the Russian Arctic (approved July 2004), and for the chemical weapons destruction projects at Shchuch'ye (approved July 2005). A fifth submission obtained TB approval for chemical weapons destruction projects at Kizner (approved 2007).

2.3 GPP Priority Areas

Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)

At the end of the Soviet era, the Russian Federation inherited approximately 40,000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons. Russia's chemical weapons are stored at seven facilities. Canada and other members of the Global Partnership are providing assistance to Russia to build the facilities necessary to safely destroy these stockpiles. Owing to significant investments by Russia, the United States, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom, all destruction facilities should be in place and operating or completed operations to meet the CWD Convention deadline.

Canada considered the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility to be a CWD priority as it will destroy Russia's most lethal and human-portable chemical weapons. Canada has committed $103.35 million to this chemical weapons destruction facility (including $5.35M prior to the Global Partnership Program) and is committing an additional $100 million to another high priority chemical weapons destruction facility near the Kizner chemical weapon stockpile.

Canada is also supporting the efforts of Green Cross International in Russia, and in particular the office in Shchuch'ye, to provide independent and objective information about Russia's chemical weapons destruction programme to the populations living in the vicinity of Russia's chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities.

Nuclear Powered Submarines Dismantlement (NPSD)

The end of the Cold War arms race left Russia with a legacy of nearly 200 nuclear submarines in need of immediate dismantling. Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States have supported Russia's submarine dismantlement process in order to secure the nuclear fuel on these submarines from both terrorism and proliferation threats, in addition to removing the enormous threat these submarines pose to the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic and Pacific regions. In 2004, Canada committed over $100 million for the dismantlement of 12 decommissioned nuclear submarines in Russia's North. Canada is planning to dismantle up to six additional submarines in the Russian Pacific Fleet using the same structure and project management approach.

In addition, Canada has contributed $32 million to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in order to help manage the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated from Russia's northern submarine fleet.

Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)

Securing and disposing of weapons-grade plutonium and HEU in Russia/FSU is a high priority for Canada and its international partners. Canada is addressing these nuclear and radiological security challenges by supporting projects to strengthen the physical protection at facilities that house these materials in order to reduce the risk of theft or sabotage; strengthening border controls to help prevent illicit trafficking; and removing and securing highly radioactive sources. As part of the NRS portfolio, Canada is also supporting a program for the disposition of 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium in Russian reactors.

Canada has also contributed $8 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. Under these arrangements Canada is funding a variety of security activities, including physical protection upgrades at nuclear facilities, physical protection training sessions, improvements to radiation detection at international borders, missions for the recovery of radioactive sources, and workshops to assist states in developing national systems of control over radioactive sources.

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)

The proliferation potential of unemployed or underemployed weapons scientists in Russia/FSU poses a serious threat to Canadian and international security. To reduce the proliferation risk, Canada and other partners are working to redirect these scientists by providing them with opportunities to apply their knowledge to peaceful scientific pursuits, while providing them with sustainable employment.

Through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), the efforts of numerous governments, international organizations, and private sector organizations are coordinated to provide weapons scientists from the FSU with new opportunities in international partnership. Since March 2004, Canada has supported 200 projects, redirecting 2300 former weapons scientists. In addition to providing funding to the ISTC/STCU, the RFWS portfolio seeks out Canadian individuals, institutes, organizations and companies to act as Partners or Collaborators in this portfolio.

Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)

Canada is pursuing a number of initiatives in Russia and other countries of the FSU to prevent terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring or developing biological weapons and related materials, equipment and technology. The Biological Non-Proliferation portfolio has, to date, largely supported biotechnology and life sciences projects through the ISTC aimed at the redirection of former bio-weapons scientists. It also has funded workshops and training activities in the FSU region relating to biological security and safety. BNP has begun work on a large project to enhance biosecurity and safety of dangerous pathogens in the Kyrgyz Republic, and the GPP is currently concluding a treaty with that country to effect the cooperation.

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3.0 GPP Summative Evaluation: Key Findings

The evaluation findings for the Global Partnership Program are presented along the three evaluation criteria: relevance, cost effectiveness and results, and are based on document and file reviews, site visits and interviews with DFAIT management, program officers, key stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries. The data collected for the individual streams and the detailed assessments of these streams are presented in separate reports, summaries of which are given in subsequent chapters of this report.

3.1 Relevance

Finding:
The G8 Global Partnership Initiative and DFAIT's Global Partnership Program, in particular, are relevant to the ongoing priorities of DFAIT.

The Global Partnership and the Global Partnership Program are directly relevant to three of the DFAIT's six ongoing priorities for 2007-2008, namely:

  • A safer, more secure and prosperous Canada within a strengthened North American partnership;
  • Greater international support for freedom and security, democracy, rule of law, human rights and environmental stewardship;
  • Accountable and consistent use of the multilateral system to deliver results on global issues of concern to Canadians.

The Global Partnership and the Global Partnership Program can also be considered as supportive of the Canadian government's priorities for the same period, stated as (i) Afghanistan, (ii) the Americas, and (iii) emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China). These initiatives are aligned with the objectives behind Afghanistan which are to remove and secure sources of weaponry, including WMD from terrorists. The emphasis in both these sets of priorities on good relations with the US is manifested in the close partnership developed with the US through the activities across the Program streams that have marked the first five years of the program. The US considers Canada as one of their most valued collaborators based on Canada's commitment to the GP effort and the quality of the Canadian program and its representatives.

At the 2002 G8 Summit, Canada was instrumental in shaping the Global Partnership as a multilateral system of projects and in developing the principles and guidelines that are the foundation of the Global Partnership projects being implemented by G8 members and other countries that have joined the initiative. In addition to its bilateral projects with Russia, Canada has continued to make use of multilateral mechanisms in delivering projects, such as the IAEA in the NRS stream, the ISTC in the RFWS stream, and the EBRD in the NPSD stream. The DFAIT priority on environmental stewardship is being addressed through the CWD and NPSD streams that in addition to being directed to threat reduction are substantially improving the environment on land and in the Arctic ocean in Russia.

At the international level, the continuing relevance of the Global Partnership Program is evident from the following statement in the Global Partnership Review of the 2007 G8 Summit, June 8, 2007:

"With its (these) achievements, the GP has already become an important force to enhance international security and safety. Our work has made the world safer. It has helped overcome the legacy of the Cold War by bringing people and nations together to seek the mutual benefits of enhanced global security through cooperation, and it has created a common understanding of the global importance of the tasks agreed upon in Kananaskis."

Finding:
Despite some changes in the international policy environment since the inception of the Global Partnership, the activities and priorities of DFAIT's Global Partnership Program continue to be relevant to Canada's international priorities and the needs of Russia and other states of the FSU.

The policy environment is constantly changing, particularly in Russia, but the Global Partnership remains relevant. The Russian economy has stabilized and Russia is responding by putting more money into the Global Partnership, tripling its contribution to $6 billion to 2012. Russia's increased revenues raise the question of why other countries need to put in so much. However, our interviews suggest that it will take a generation to transform Russia into a secure state making the required investments, and in the meantime, other countries continue to have a necessary role.

The threat is changing increasingly, and civilians are most often the target of terrorists, as evidenced by the recent terrorist attacks in London, Madrid and Glasgow and the continuing struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat is also expanding geographically to include South Asia, Central Asia and Africa (e.g., presence of radioisotopes in medical equipment). An informed estimate is that Russia still accounts for most of the nuclear and chemical weapons material at risk so if that can be secured or eliminated through the Global Partnership efforts, the focus could shift to the remaining countries presenting a risk. Clearly, however, the threat is long term and recognizing that reality, the US has proposed that the Global Partnership be continued for another ten years, a proposal of which Canada is generally supportive.

Global Partnership work is highly sensitive in Russia and does not proceed if it is not seen by Russia to be useful. Russia's top priorities continue to be CWD and NPSD, where Canada continues to be active and be responding to a real need. Canada's projects on nuclear security have had excellent cooperation from Russia including gaining access to previously closed sites and are viewed inside and outside Russia as responding to a real need.

On the other hand, there are threat reduction needs to which the Global Partnership Program has not been permitted to respond, as in the case of biological weapons, even though Russia recognizes that these weapon sites are poorly protected. States in the FSU do, however, also have real needs in this area. Canada is also working with two science centers (ISTC/STCU) in a number of countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, on projects to redirect former weapons scientists in the biosafety and biosecurity areas. In this instance, there were changes in the beneficiaries of the Program.

3.2 Cost Effectiveness

Finding:
Overall, the Global Partnership Program has managed to appropriately allocate resources in order to meet its intended results.

Resource Allocation

Overall, the Global Partnership Program has allocated resources appropriately. Adjustments in allocation have been made from the beginning of the Program, subject to annual reviews of priorities. In 2002, the given priorities were nuclear submarine dismantlement, chemical weapons destruction, nuclear safety, and redirection of former weapons scientists. Russia did not acknowledge that it had biological weapons. A program review assesses current threats, proposes changes if required, and is then approved by GPAG and submitted to the Minister with any recommendations for reprioritization and reallocation of Program resources.

Delivery MechanismsS

In this Section, the use of a range of delivery mechanisms for the Global Partnership Program streams is discussed.

At present, the streams do not all have the ability to use all delivery mechanisms. The choice of mechanism is a means by which to deliver a project most effectively, either by Canada alone or with partners, for example, other countries, multilateral organizations or NGOs. The selection of projects takes these factors into account. As well, Canada has benefited from other countries' previous experience with cooperative threat reduction activities. At the outset of the NRS program, for example, Canada benefited from discussions with its international partners in the Global Partnership on how to design and implement projects. A bilateral arrangement has been the approach selected for physical protection, and has also been used in two of the RTG projects: RTG Transportation Infrastructure and the RTG Master Plan. Canada now has considerable experience and its projects are considered models of how to implement bilateral projects by Russia and other donors.

Routing Canada's efforts through a third party (piggybacking) operating under an existing agreement with Russia or an FSU country has also proven to be a cost effective mechanism. This approach has been used in a number of programs. For example, within the NRS stream Canada is participating together with the US in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative for RTGs and the Second Line of Defense for border security in Ukraine. In this case, NRS has taken advantage of the robust management structures and the considerable expertise and capacity of the US DOE that could not be easily replicated with Canada's limited staff and resources. The "third party approach" has also been used in the Chemical Weapons Destruction stream, and specifically for the projects at Shchuch'ye.

Canada has allocated substantial resources to CWD and NPSD in response to the priority attached to these two areas by Russia. The evaluations of these two streams concluded that the projects were being delivered cost effectively, piggybacking on a UK agreement with Russia in the case of CWD, and efficient management of the implementing arrangements with Russia in the case of the NPSD. Canada's contribution to EBRD for the Northern Dimension Environmental Program (NDEP) got Canada on the map as an international player and, according to one observer, set the tone for NPSD, although the program addresses issues beyond the bilateral concerns on NPSD, including NRS remediation. At 20 million euros, Canada is the third largest donor to the program after France and the EU (40 million euros each).

Canada's participation in the NDEP is evidence of Canada's commitment to the nuclear security and safety problems posed by the Russian nuclear submarines, as well as an important confidence building element. Notwithstanding the above, the effectiveness of the project implementation process has been compromised by the large number of projects from other donors waiting to be approved. A strategic plan for NDEP was commissioned by the donors (submitted January 26, 2004), and a second plan was completed in August 2007, together with a management framework to operationalize the Plan. Interviews with EBRD representatives indicated the expectation that the NDEP fund (150 million euros) would be spent over the next few years and that, if the fund remains, Canada should continue to manage the expenditures with the other donors.

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) was set up in 1997 at the EBRD under the leadership of the G7 and the EU to assist Ukraine in transforming the existing shelter over Chernobyl's destroyed unit 4 to a stable and environmentally safe state. Canada's contribution to the Fund was originally made through CIDA but is now the responsibility of the Global Partnership Program. IGX represents Canada on the CSF Assembly of Contributors.

To achieve its goal, the CSF is financing the implementation of the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) which was elaborated in 1997 by Western experts, including Canadian and Ukrainian experts, as a step-by-step solution to the Chernobyl disaster. Implementation of the Plan started in 1998 and completion of the main construction projects is foreseen for 2012. EBRD recently received the approval of the CSF Assembly to proceed with a contract under the direction of a safety expert group of which Canada is a member, to build the sarcophagus at an estimated cost of US$1.3 billion. EBRD reports on all its investments, disbursements and financial controls are available to Canada and other donors.

For the BNP stream, given that significant access to Russia was not possible, Canada has directed its resources to other states of the FSU where the threat is considered to be significant and where Canada can negotiate agreements to allow full access. Cost effectiveness has been achieved through allocation of the Canadian resources to ISTC/STCU. These are multilateral institutions that manage projects taking place in a range of scientific facilities in Russia/FSU. Under NRS, Canada's main involvement with the IAEA is the NSF project. This project allows work in the rest of the FSU where Canada does not have relevant treaties in place.

The benefits of a multilateral approach, through, for example, EBRD, IAEA and ISTC/STCU, are considered to be: (i) a common front is created among a number of donors that provides political leverage - 'historically, Russia has played a chess game to perfection dealing separately with bilateral and multilateral donors and getting bilateral donors to compete'; and (ii) projects, often infrastructure projects, such as spent fuel storage, are large financially and too big for single donors. Many interviewees, both Canadian and international, commented that a mix of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms is needed to deliver projects effectively.

Further details on the relative advantages and disadvantages of bilateral, third party and multilateral approaches are given in the separate reports on the NRS, RFWS and BNP evaluations.

Finding:
The Global Partnership Program has established an efficient governance structure that ensures appropriate program oversight, coordination, and definition of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities.

The governance structures of the Global Partnership Program and its sub-streams have provided good oversight and coordination. Within DFAIT, senior management of the Program is represented by the Deputy Minister, Associate Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister (International Security) and Political Director, and the Director General (IGX). Supporting this structure are meetings, at least annually, with other departments/agencies in GPAG, an annual report on the Program by the Minister to Parliament, annual priority reviews, six-month reports to TBS, annual work plans and bimonthly progress reports by SPMs. In terms of project management, there is a Project Management Framework and concept papers for each project, as well as project approval documents for each stream.

Governance at the international level works well (positive comments were received not only by Canadian but also US and UK participants. Bureaucracy has been kept to a minimum which has enabled timely progress to be made in achieving the goals of the Global Partnership. The Global Partnership Working Group, chaired by a senior official of the current G8 presidency with annual reporting to G8 leaders, has been successful in avoiding duplication or overlap among the projects of donor countries. Canada's role in this forum is seen by other G8 members to be influential and maintaining the leadership Canada has shown from the beginning of the initiative.

The ad hoc arrangements of the Global Partnership have encouraged the participation of not only G8 members but other donors as well to provide contributions in line with the country's interests and capabilities. Some expressed concern, however, that the Global Partnership has not been sufficiently guided by a careful assessment of the global threat that would identify and prioritize the dangers of WMD worldwide; it is noted that this concern was reiterated in the 2007 Mid-Term Review of the Global Partnership issued by G8 Leaders.

Finding:
A gap in governance was noted in terms of the underutilization of the GPAG.

A gap in governance was noted in terms of the underutilization of GPAG to enhance decision making and provide constituency support for the Program, despite IGX engagement efforts. However, the Program does benefit from the input of OGDs, through more focused consultations, as well as through MOUs to provide expertise. As well, the creation of the Science, Technology and Trade Advisory Group (STTAG) offers a forum for interested departments and others to provide input on redirection priorities and activities.

Program Management

Finding:
Overall, the Global Partnership Program has demonstrated strong project management and implementation capacity.

The Global Partnership Program is strong in terms of project implementation as evidenced by Canada's leadership in meeting its Global Partnership project delivery commitments, the low overhead (5%) in implementation, and the favourable reception of its six-month reports to TBS. A weakness observed in implementation is the lack of a support capacity at the Branch level to handle common Branch services such as HR and IT with the result that separate systems have been established in the bureaus. It is recognized that the Branch is working to obtain departmental corporate support to address its programming needs that, in the case of IGX, will enable the Program to move ahead while contributing to Branch and corporate-wide processes. The ADM (IFM) has called for reporting formats for the bureaus to be the same and IGX has offered their format as a model.

It is noted that the Program is reflected in the Branch's (IFM's) strategic plans that are linked to other Branch policies and priorities, and was recently included in the DFAIT PAA as a sub-sub activity. In this context, the development of a longer term vision beyond the 2012 horizon at the Branch (IFM) level would be helpful in guiding a future Program. A concern is the absence of a focus in the strategic plans on identifying potential spin off benefits to Canada in areas such as science and technology cooperation, commercialization, trade and investment from the Program's substantial investments.

On project selection, practices differ by stream. In the case of RFWS, the process consists of a non-proliferation review and a science and technology review, both reviews affecting the decision to proceed but with the main consideration being the proliferation threat. For NPSD, NRS and BNP, projects that Canada invests in are selected on the basis of consultation with Russia and, in some cases, with other partners, for example the UK for CWD projects.

Risk Management:

The Global Partnership Program operates in a high risk environment and, consequently, has developed comprehensive risk management procedures and mitigation strategies. Every project in the Global Partnership streams has a risk registry that is maintained through the use of Risk Infromation and Assessment System (RIAS) software and updated monthly. These updates are included in the bi-monthly reports to the Director General. In response to a recommendation in the formative evaluation of MDB2, CWD is working with the UK and the contractor on Shchuch'ye to ensure a uniformity of language and ongoing updates of the risk registries.

Risk management is also undertaken through Canada's treaty with Russia which covers liabilities, and each project has implementation arrangements that include liability clauses. It was indicated that Canada has the strongest protections on paper, protecting its investments against such risks as corruption and dangerous sites. In fact, Canada's treaty has been used as a model by other donors in the Global Partnership. Interviewees also noted that the best protection derived from ensuring that Canada employs the best people available including competent contractors. In the event of accidents, however, Canada's treaty has been shown to be effective as was evidenced by the explosion on a submarine that was being dismantled through Global Partnership Program assistance, where according to the treaty, Canada was clear of any liability.

Knowledge and Skills:

Global Partnership Program partners in the UK, US and Russia commented on the high quality of the Canadian program managers, their knowledge of project areas, their project leadership abilities, and their negotiating skills. The lengthy time taken for staffing actions is a problem, although IGX has made a dedicated effort on human resources such that the Bureau's staffing performance is far above the average for DFAIT. The Human Resources Plan of IGX is assisting the Bureau in addressing issues of turnover, training and professional development.

The FUA noted that while performance measurement at the Bureau level is receiving attention, individual performance measurement involving regular personnel assessments required improvement. This has now been addressed and accorded priority. Such personnel assessments were seen as important to obtain optimal Bureau performance.

Finding:
Current GPP management processes and practices encourage cooperation among other donors, although there is still room for further improvement.

Overall in the Global Partnership, cooperation has been good, although the 2007 Mid-Term Review did note that "we will do more to increase the effectiveness of our cooperation" indicating that cooperation among donors could be improved. The GPWG keeps track of the activities of all donors to minimize the risk of competition and/or duplication of GPP initiatives. At the policy level, coordination also takes place among G8 Political Directors.

In terms of the Global Partnership Program, Canada promotes a cooperative approach to all its projects to achieve success. In NPSD, for example, Canada has contributed to the dismantling of 11 submarines where Canada has been responsible for storing the nuclear reactor and the US for the cutting up of the submarine using Russian contractors. The Typhoon class submarine, on which work is starting, similarly involves cooperation in which Canada is responsible for the fissile material, while the US handles the missile launchers. Cooperation is also being sought with new partners (e.g. Korea, Australia) for work in the Far East.

In the case of CWD, Canada in cooperation with the UK has provided funding for infrastructure projects and equipment for the second main destruction building at the Shchuch'ye facility while the US has funded the majority of the construction for the facility 'inside the fence' as well as the equipment for the main destruction building.

On nuclear safety, the Contact Experts Group of IAEA covers nuclear and radiological waste issues in Russia and the FSU. In the area of nuclear security, in light of the extreme sensitivities, work in Russia is done bilaterally, and outside Russia is coordinated with the IAEA and other partners, including the U.S., U.K. and Norway. As well, the Republic of Korea is contributing funds to assist Canadian nuclear security physical protection projects in Russia. In RFWS, there is close coordination among participants through the ISTC and STCU Governing Boards; in bio-safety and bio-security, coordination takes place on a project-specific basis.

Finding:
Evidence indicates considerable improvement in the development of the performance measurement system of the GPP in the last two years. Performance reporting is still focused mainly on the project and less on the program level. Further improvements in the performance and risk management practices are expected with the new GPP ARAF and the approval of a Branch-level Performance and Risk Management Action Plan.

The first RMAF and RBAF prepared for the TB Phase I submission were off the shelf. More detailed logic models and performance indicators have been developed in each subsequent submission and now have a high degree of sophistication. The ARAF that updates the earlier RMAFs and RBAFs will be part of the Phase III TB submission process. Reporting is now being done against indicators, although the results of this performance reporting were not available to this evaluation.

In response to the recommendations of the formative GPP evaluation on programming frameworks, IGX reviewed its existing practices to ensure that frameworks rely on logic models and that the indicators in use are appropriate. In addition, based on an examination by the Program Services Division (IXS) of the feasibility of a common PMF for the IFM Branch, an implementation plan for the framework is being developed. Again in response to the formative GPP evaluation, IXS led the development of a Branch level risk management framework. IFM, with support from IXS, IGX and other Branch divisions, will review options required to further risk management implementation in the Branch and develop an action plan, gain buy-in and proceed to implement an agreed approach.

3.3 Success

Finding:
The results, achieved by the Global Partnership Program since its inception, are consistent with the intended outcomes. No unintended results have been noted.

Program Level

The evaluation concluded that the results achieved by the Global Partnership Program from its inception until August 2007, were consistent with the intended outcomes. Many interviewees shared the view that "Canada is achieving everything it set out to achieve." Considering the serious impediments that Canada had to overcome to get the Program underway, such as the lack of program infrastructure, lack of previous experience in Russia, sensitivity of the information required for some of the project stream, as well as the geographic location and large distances to project sites in Russia, the accomplishments are all the more impressive. Canada has developed a level of trust with Russia that has been valuable to enhancing GPP's role and recognition in the Global Partnership.

Canada's leadership in project implementation in the first half of the Global Partnership has been a key ingredient of success (expenditures to March 31, 2007 reached $300 million). Canada has also had success in leveraging strategic resources for its projects through a collaborative approach with existing donors (e.g. collaboration with the UK on CWD, with Norway and the US on RTGs), and delivering projects through international agencies (e.g. IAEA, EBRD).

Canada has also played a leading role among G8 donors in proposing mechanisms for non-G8 countries to join the Global Partnership effort, and has approached some of these countries, especially South Korea and Australia, to join in the NPSD work in Russia in the Far East. The move to include Asian countries is also demonstrating the wide geographic scope of the Partnership.

The evaluation did not find evidence of any unintended results from the GPP implementation. However, some additional benefits, such as the involvement of Canadian industry in the Global Partnership Program work, have been slower to realize. This has been a secondary objective of the Program but still an important one. While some Canadian companies, such as Raytheon Canada Limited and Nuclear Safety Solutions, have been awarded contracts, it was noted that Canada does not control the bidding on projects (NAFTA or WTO rules) and the overwhelming majority of the work on Russian territory must be performed by Russians in order to ensure sustainability.

Project Level

Some of the Global Partnership Program streams have managed to implement projects and achieve results on time or in a shorter time than planned e.g. NPSD, while others have been slower than expected e.g., CWD projects at Shchuch'ye. Most of the delays have been caused by the Russian subcontractors, delivery issues, slower bidding processes, etc. For example, dealings with Rosprom in connection with tree cutting permits for the Shchuch'ye facility have caused delays beyond Canada's control. However, most of the delays have been overcome due to Canada's persistent efforts to address the problem. Results of the individual evaluations are presented in some detail in the following chapters and in full detail in the separate stream evaluation reports. A brief summary of achievements follows.

Within the CWD stream, Canada has committed $98 million for projects at the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Shchuch'ye and $100 million for a similar destruction facility at Kizner. Some partners have expressed a concern that delays in the Russian planning stage for Kizner could not only cause delays for Canada's project but could also jeopardize the commitment made by Russia to meet the 2012 deadline for the Chemical Weapons Convention. With regard to the NPSD stream, Canada has committed to dismantle a total of 12 nuclear powered submarines in North West Russia in the period 2004-08. To date, eight submarines have been dismantled and four more are underway. Canada is planning to dismantle up to six submarines in the Far East subject to the scope of the 2008-12 NPSD budget.

Results accounted by the NRS stream include the signed contracts and implementation agreements for physical protection upgrades of five nuclear facilities. Negotiations are currently underway for several additional projects. Bilateral programming within the NRS stream has been slow at the outset due to project sensitivities, and restricted access to information procedures and to nuclear facilities. Process adjustments have also been necessary as NRS management used the IAEA to support NRS in strengthening nuclear security in countries of the FSU with which Canada does not have a bilateral agreement. Further within this stream, Canada's contribution to the US-led project to shutdown the last Russian weapons-grade plutonium production reactor has helped ensure that the project meets the 2011 shutdown target. Some progress has recently been made between the US and Russia on projects related to plutonium disposition, for which Canada is making a material contribution. With regard to projects concerning RTG removal, security and replacement, Canada has worked closely with Norway and the US and has accomplished the initially planned results and outcomes.

Even though Canada joined the ISTC only in March 2004, GPP can already account for a number of results in the RFWS stream. For example, Canada has already funded over 200 projects at a cost of about $40 million involving the redirection of over 2,300 former weapons scientists. The ultimate purpose of these projects has been to retain these scientists in Russia and the FSU and to assist their integration into the world-wide community of scientists through increased production and dissemination of scientific knowledge. Despite IGX and RFWS management efforts to foster project cooperation between Canadian and Russian scientists and institutes, no such partnerships have so far been established. A major challenge for the Canadian team has been the issue of ensuring long-term sustainability through commercial ventures. Efforts to extend RFWS to other FSU states have not brought much success due to the declining overall funding for the Science Centers.

Results from the BNP stream include implemented projects for the redirection of biological weapons scientists funded through the ISTC and STCU and involving 538 former bio-weapons scientists. In addition, Canada is pursuing a broad range of biosafety/biosecurity initiatives in the following areas: (i) assisting with development and implementation of effective and practical national biosafety/biosecurity standards and guidelines; (ii) assisting with the establishment of national and/or regional biosafety associations; (iii) providing biosafety/biosecurity training; and (iv) funding requisite biosafety/biosecurity upgrades at facilities of priority non-proliferation concern. BNP's current engagement with Russia is through an integrated security/health approach.

Finding:
GPP is being implemented in a complex environment and the success of the Program depends on a number of facilitating and impeding factors.

The management and implementation of the Global Partnership Program by DFAIT, and in particular, by a single division/IGX Bureau has been seen by many partners and interviewees as a key facilitating factor in achieving results and success. The concentration of efforts within one division has enabled the establishment of a strong team with full program responsibilities and dedicated services, legal and financial, as well as strong synergies among the various groups representing each stream. For example, when IGX first went to the Treasury Board with its Phase I submission, limited authorities were provided until proper legal instruments were in place. The challenge was to meld Treasury Board policies on transfer payments onto the international situation, necessitating the assurance that the Crown was not taking on undue risk. The closeness of the working relationship with IGX and the legal advisor's early intervention greatly assisted the process.

Other factors contributing to the quick advancement of the Program and the achievement of specific results include but are not limited to Canada's comprehensive treaty with Russia that has covered many aspects of the Global Partnership Program, and the level of goodwill from Russia that has aided the development of close working relationships with Russian departments and agencies. Canada's ability to leverage other countries' programs through bilateral and multilateral arrangements was also noted as a factor contributing to the success of the Program. Excellent project management and strategic planning skills have contributed to the success of some streams. For example, in the NPSD stream, Canada was able to dismantle eight submarines in a very short time frame by working directly with a single Russian shipyard and focusing on a particular type of submarines, thus capitalizing on experience and efficient use of a specific technological framework.

Among the impeding factors to success, the slowness of the Russian bureaucracy in making decisions has been most frequently quoted. Inability to receive access to necessary but often protected information, as and when needed, and the absence of established procedures in Russia for the disclosure of such information has further impeded the ambitious Canadian project schedules. To some extent, these difficulties in working in Russia were expected and IGX has made every effort to mitigate them through regular contacts and high-level meetings between Russian and Canadian ministers. At the stream and project level, detailed risk registries have been developed and updated on an ongoing basis.

Another noted impeding factor has been the lack of program management systems in DFAIT (common systems in the International Security Branch would go some way to correcting this deficiency), in particular in terms of support in the human resources (HR) and information technology (IT) areas.

Finding:
The results of each stream indicate that, through Canada's contributions, the risk of WMD proliferation in Russia and other countries of the FSU has been reduced.

The results of each stream indicate that, through Canada's contributions, Russia and other countries of the FSU have, indeed, reduced the risks of WMD proliferation. Contributions include, for example, the dismantling of 11 nuclear submarines and defueling of a strategic submarine (Typhoon class), removal and securing 15 RTGs, physical protection of five nuclear facilities, improved border security in Ukraine and bio-safety and bio-security enhancement. Interviewees commented that, before Kananaskis, countries were not able to support this range of risk mitigation activities in Russia and now that the gates have been opened through the Global Partnership, not only specific threats but the interdependence of the various threats can be addressed.

Many interviewees from Canada, Russia, the U.K. and U.S. expressed the view that Canada's relationship with Russia has been of major importance to this development - some considered Canada to be "the conscience of the Global Partnership." Canada has managed to ensure a certain degree of project sustainability by using Russia's input on projects, mainly Russian equipment, thus making it serviceable and more sustainable in the long term.

At present, no agreement has been reached on the future of the Global Partnership beyond 2012. At the G8 2007 Summit, the U.S. proposed the Partnership's extension for another ten years, and offered funding, but a decision on what transpires after 2012 will be taken closer to that time, possibly at the G8 Summit in 2010 which Canada will be chairing.

Finding:
Interviews in Russia confirmed that as a result of the Global Partnership Program, Canada's visibility, credibility and influence in Russia/FSU has been considerably enhanced.

Another goal of the Global Partnership Program has been to create a relationship of confidence with Russia and other states of the FSU that would counter any concerns on the part of the Russian establishment that the Program is intruding on Russian security and/or Russian sovereignty. Evidence of this confidence building has been provided through the positive comments received in the interviews with Russian participants in the Program on the value of the Canadian contribution.

Also, trade with Russia has stepped up in the last year or so covering a number of areas including oil and gas and mining equipment, housing, commercial warehousing, agriculture, engineering services (e.g. SNC Lavalin), rail equipment (e.g. Bombardier), private aircraft (e.g. Bombardier), and the space sector. Again, these changes in trade patterns may have a tenuous connection to the Program but they represent progress overall in the relationship and the fact that Canada now better "knows the landscape" in Russia/FSU.

It was suggested in Section 3.2 (Program Management) that both a longer term vision for the Program beyond 2012 and a focus on identifying and pursuing spin off benefits for Canada would provide a firmer context for creating a legacy for Canada from the Program's significant investments in Russia/FSU. The Program could be used to open up more opportunities in science and technology cooperation, for example, in biotech, nuclear (e.g. nuclear waste), agricultural research, and environmental studies (e.g. the impact of climate change in the Arctic), technology commercialization, and for further investments in infrastructure and economic development in Russia and other FSU states.

Despite the positive climate that the Global Partnership Program instilled between the two countries, the visibility of the Program in both Canada and Russia remains low. A recent opinion survey undertaken in Canada indicates some awareness of the Program and support for its objectives among the Canadian population but little knowledge of the specific elements of the Program. Little discussion of the Program happens at the political level or in the media, which was surprising to a number of interviewees given the magnitude of the Canadian investment, but this may well be reflective of the ongoing focus on operational issues of the Program.

In Russia, interviews with non-government groups (e.g. Green Cross Russia) suggested that certain secrecy surrounds the Program activities, and that public information is scarce - some visibility existed on the NPSD among Russians in NW Russia but the CWD Program, for example, was not known to the Russian public, even to those living in the vicinity of the stockpiles. The level of awareness of existing CWD stockpiles in Russia has, however, changed markedly as a result of the funding provided by the Global Partnership Program to the Green Cross for outreach activities and provision of information to local residents, Canada's funding has made possible the issuing of a Russian language brochure on Canada-UK projects at Shchuch'ye, the creation of a Russian language website outlining Canadian activities, as well as a number of presentations on CWD at the National Dialogues.

Lessons Learned for Canada from GPP

Leadership:

Canada's leadership in the Global Partnership has been important to strengthening its relationships with donor countries. Canada has introduced a fresh voice to the global efforts and in the process expanded its influence in the area of WMD non-proliferation and gained experience in working with Russia/FSU.

Threat Reduction:

Threat reduction requires high level commitment within DFAIT, and the federal government as a whole, to enable the continuing and needed substantial financial investments ("threat reduction is expensive"). The limits of the Global Partnership Program in reducing nuclear threats also need to be recognized; the Program is contributing to the reduction of legacy weapons and materials, but it is not intended to address the full picture of WMD reduction, such as the nuclear arms reduction efforts by the US and Russia through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The Program is making an increasing contribution to other threat reduction initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and to the implementation of UNSC resolution 1540.

Collaboration:

Close international cooperation is essential to the Program; no one country can do everything, even the US. Regular interaction and collaboration with other donor countries have enhanced the impact of Canadian initiatives through increased project investments, knowledge sharing on some initiatives, improved timeliness of investments, strengthened regional coverage, and avoidance of duplication of initiatives.

Sustainability:

Reducing threats of WMD in the longer term requires that the securing, dismantling and physical protection measures put in place by the Global Partnership Program be sustained beyond 2012. This will involve training, increased Russian investment, creating sustainable employment for FWS through commercialization of research and, in some cases, continuing Canadian support through grants.

Spin-off Benefits:

A focus by the Global Partnership Program on identifying and pursuing spin off benefits for Canada would ensure a legacy for Canada from the Program's significant investments in Russia/FSU. The Program could be used to open up more opportunities for Canada's cooperation with Russia/FSU in the areas of science and technology (e.g. biotechnologies, nuclear/nuclear waste, agricultural research, and environmental studies on the impact of climate change in the Arctic), technology commercialization, trade, infrastructure investment and economic development. Support to Canadian firms may be needed to encourage involvement in the Program, because currently, Russia and other FSU states are seen as risky places to do business, compounded by barriers of distance and language.

Staffing:

Maintaining experienced and expert personnel is essential to achieving Program objectives, and, in particular, to fostering strong relationships with donor and recipient countries. Trust, credibility and legitimacy are all enhanced as a result and improve overall effectiveness of delivery and of success.

Expansion of GPP:

Based on the success of the Program in Russia/FSU and the lessons learned, consideration should be given to expanding the Program geographically to address the WMD/terrorist threat worldwide, for example in SE Asia.

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4.0 GPP Formative, CWD and NPSD: Key Findings

4.1 GPP Formative Evaluation

The following information is a summary of major findings recommendations of the 2006 Formative Evaluation of the GPP, as a well as a brief review of the actions taken and fulfillment of commitments made by IGX in the management response to this evaluation.

Findings

Relevance:

The Global Partnership Program remains highly relevant to Canadian domestic and international policies and priorities. It was implemented as a major Canadian foreign policy initiative to address the serious threat presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) through a G8-led Global Partnership.

The design and development of the Program was informed by a wide-ranging analysis of the nature of the threat posed by WMD, the experience of partners already engaged, the resources required to address WMD threats, the likelihood of contributions by other countries, and the implementation risks involved. The program has also undertaken a recent re-assessment of the evolving security threats posed by WMD and made adjustments in priority areas of activity to respond.

The program has contributed to Canada's standing among international partners in the field. The program is viewed in security policy circles in the United States as an example of Canada's willingness to make a substantive contribution to North American security. Any reduction in Canada's participation in the Global Partnership would have serious consequences for its international standing and for international efforts to deal with WMD.

Program Design and Delivery:

It is clear from the evaluation that, in establishing the Global Partnership Program, a large number of strategic choices were made to manage costs, risk, and complexities effectively. The choices have been largely documented. The current program design is consistent with original program documents and aligned with best practices in such areas as project selection criteria, project focus and project management structures.

The Program has managed to put in place sufficient delivery capacity to achieve its intended outputs and outcomes. At the same time, the Program has had to deal with some weaknesses in departmental systems and processes that are not always responsive to its needs. These include information management systems, project management systems, human resource management systems, risk management systems and results-based management (RBM) practices.

Efficiency and Effectiveness:

Over time, the Global Partnership Program has steadily strengthened its management and delivery capacities, in part by bringing together a critical mass of complementary in-house resources. This group has the capacity to handle an increasing number of complex projects and offer economies of scale in program delivery and, with its strong web of Canadian and international partnerships, is well positioned for the future. On the other hand, stream and program level results monitoring will need to be strengthened to respond to higher activity levels and associated project and program risks.

Success:

The Program has achieved significant results at the short-term and intermediate outcome levels. Capacity in Russia has been created and strengthened in a number of areas relating to securing and eliminating WMD. In particular, the program has strengthened planning systems, transferred knowledge on safe practices and contributed to significant investments in critical WMD destruction infrastructure. Canadian funding through the Program has also been an important component in joint program support by other G8 and non-G8 partners.

The Program has not been able to report significant increases in Canadian capacity with the exception of collaborative international science projects through the Re-Direction of Former Weapons Scientists Stream (RWFS), although Canadian companies have been contracted for monitoring project implementation and other professional services (e.g. Raytheon Canada, NSS).

CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation found the Global Partnership Program to be an effective and dynamic program that has overcome many challenges. In a relatively short time the program drew on the energy and dynamism of its staff to put in place an effective project management and implementation system customised to the needs of each of the four programming streams. The Program has developed a reputation among international partners for rapid, pragmatic, and high quality program delivery.

However, as the Program enters an intense implementation phase, it must put in place at the program level the required structures, systems and processes to support strategic planning, results-based management, human resource planning, and risk management. Program managers recognize these challenges and are implementing actions to meet them. These key integrative features had not yet progressed to the point where they could be assessed by this evaluation.

Finally, there are important strategic and operational challenges facing the program in the near to medium-term future. These include deepening the program's response to the challenge of biological security, dealing formally with pressures to expand the geographic spread of program activities beyond Russia and the FSU, and strengthening the commercial sustainability of activities in the RFWS stream. The program is well positioned to confront these challenges, not least of all through a strengthened strategic planning process.

The current status of IGX action on the recommendations of the Global Partnership Program formative evaluation is given in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: IGX Action Plan on GPP Formative Evaluation
RecommendationProposed ActionResponsible AuthorityProposed Completion DateCurrent Status
1 - Deliver as planned the following key program level documents - program-level strategic action plan, risk registry, communications strategy and HR management and learning plans.These documents had been under development during the formative evaluation and draft copies were shared with the evaluators:
  • A Strategic Action Plan has since been completed, reviewed and endorsed by Senior Management (IFM). It draws on best practices used elsewhere in DFAIT (RGM, BCD, IDD) and complements the Department's Strategic Planning and Priorities Framework.
  • The GPP SAP is supplemented with Results Based Logic Models for each of the five priority program areas, results of the Priority Review (approved by the Minister), Financial Projections, an HR Action Plan, HR Forward Plan and Learning Plan Templates (reviewed and approved by HR Senior Mgt).
  • A comprehensive Communications and Outreach Strategy (as acknowledged on page 51 of the report) has also been developed and endorsed by Senior Management.
IGX ManagementCompletedCompleted
2 - Determine what is the leading program-level design document (or develop it if it does not exist) and align planning and reporting against results in this document.
  • In the short term, IGX will consolidate the required documents into one area for ease of reference by program managers.
  • In the longer term, IGX will integrate existing documentation into one program-level design document and modify it on an ongoing basis to reflect refinements in the direction of the program.
  • IGX will also work with TBS to introduce as many common elements as possible into future TB submissions.
IGX Management2008

(New 5-year TB Submission)

2008

(New 5-year TB Submission)

3 - Implement systematic program level reporting against outputs and outcomes with indicators.
  • A more structured reporting will be introduced this year at the program level against outputs and outcomes (with indicators) based on undertakings outlined in the RMAF. This will go beyond a simple a roll-up of the ongoing reporting that already exists at the stream level and introduce a more strategic approach.
IGX Management and Senior Project ManagersApril 2007Completed April 2007
4 - Require annual work planning at stream-levels / sub-stream levels and analyse the costs and benefits of work planning at (or rolling up work plans from the stream level to) the program level.IGX will institute this year a formal, standardized work planning procedure at the stream level to take place annually. We will also evaluate the utility of rolling up the stream work plans to the program level and, if appropriate, formal, program-level work planning will be instituted, consistent with and reinforced by the commitments in Recommendations 2 and 3.IGX Directors

IGX Senior Project Managers

April 2007Annual work plans and roll-up in place
5 - Require stream and sub-stream level programming frameworks with logic models and indicators where they do not currently exist.Programming frameworks are used extensively in all streams as indicated in the report but there is scope for increased usage at the sub-stream level. IGX will review its existing practices and ensure that frameworks rely on the logic models and that the indicators are appropriate and updated as required.
  • In line with its mandate to promote best practices across the IFM Branch, the Program Services Division (IXS) will be engaging a consultant this summer to examine the feasibility of a common program management framework for the Branch.
IGX Management

IXS Management

December 2006Approval and development of an implementation plan for Program Delivery Framework (fall 2007)
6 - Address information management issues to eliminate fragmentation of data and information storage.
  • Infobank is FAC's approved information management system but it does not meet the requirements of program delivery. IGX has consequently adopted a paper-based file system as its master information retention system. This is used by all staff, albeit with different levels of consistency and IGX is already addressing this shortcoming.
  • As a longer- term solution, the Program Services Division (IXS) is engaged with the Office of the Chief Information Officer (SXD) to examine how Infobank could be customized to integrate the documentation and storage requirements of all program delivery groups.
IGX Management

IXS Management

December 2006

April 2007

IGX registry position transferred to IGX effective April 1, 2007

Updated SXKI-IXS MOU planned for late fall 2007

7 - Further strengthen efforts for the development of FAC-wide systems and processes designed to support high- risk and high-cost programming for IGX and related IFM programs.
  • The International Security Branch has made a commitment to Treasury Board to strengthen its application of results-based management and to develop a Branch-wide results framework that incorporates the work of the three program delivery streams including the GPP. The Program Services Division (IXS) has launched a formal review to assess the extent to which results information is used in decision making and business planning.
  • The existing program- level RMAF and RBAF will have to be updated at the very latest for the renewal of TB authorities in 2007/08. IGX would be open to having an integrated, IFM-wide RMAF / RBAF.
  • With specific reference to risk management, the Program Services Division (IXS) is leading the development of a Branch-level risk management framework. Following a detailed needs assessment, a Branch-level Risk Management Working Group comprised of members of all key program streams will lead the implementation and management of this activity on an ongoing basis to ensure consistency between Branch and Program-level risk management activities
IGX Management

IXS Management

April 2007

RMAF and ARBAF for the new TB Submission (2008-2015)

IGX ARAF in development as part of TB submission process

IFM, with support from IXS and other corporate stakeholders, will review options required to further RBM implementation within the Branch, and will develop an action plan, gain buy-in and proceed to implement an agreed approach (fall 2007)

4.2 Formative Evaluation of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Program

The following information is a summary of major findings recommendations of the 2007 Formative Evaluation of the CWD, as a well as a brief review of the status of commitments made by IGX in the management response to this evaluation.

Findings

Relevance:

The evaluation assessed the relevance of the second Main Destruction Building (MDB-2) project based on the actual need of the Russian government and the project's consistency with the priorities of the federal government and DFAIT.

The evaluation found that:

  • The project to fund equipment for the MDB-2 remains relevant because it continues to address the needs of the Russian partner. The Russian Federation has confirmed its intentions to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline and destroy its chemical weapons by 29 April 2012. Meeting this deadline would require that the MDB-2 and the entire Shchuch'ye facility be operational in 2008. The CWD equipment funded by Canada is crucial to meeting this deadline.
  • The MDB-2 project continues to be consistent with the Government of Canada priorities as demonstrated at the 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg when Canada announced its commitment to contribute an additional $100 million towards the chemical weapons destruction process in Russia. The MDB-2 project also contributes to three of the five strategic priorities outlined in DFAIT's Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007.
Governance and Delivery Mechanisms:

A number of issues related to project governance and delivery mechanisms were addressed, including, the extent to which the project design and governance structure ensure achievement of results. The roles and responsibilities of the various partners for the successful completion of the Shchuch'ye CWDF were considered. In addition, the evaluation team assessed the extent to which cooperation at Shchuch'ye has led to cooperation in other areas of interest to Canada; the capacity building value of this project for Canada and the Global Partnership Team at DFAIT (IGX); and the monitoring process once CWD begins.

Based on the evidence provided by key informants, document reviews and site visits, the evaluation found that:

  • The decision to implement the MDB-2 project through a second MOU with the UK has helped to leverage an existing successful relationship with the UK MoD and has provided considerable benefits to Canada. This approach has facilitated a rapid response to Russia's request, built on the UK capacity, experience and expertise in managing projects in Russia related to high financial and political risks, allowed Canada to influence the process, and provided transparency and accountability for Canadian taxpayers' dollars.
  • Drawbacks to the project structure include: privity of contract rests with the UK MoD, resulting in less direct control by Canada over the project, in a legal sense; perceived lack of visibility with the Russian partner; and less development of large scale project management and project delivery capacity in IGX and DFAIT as a result of efforts to minimize administrative overhead. The strengths of the project structure far outweigh the drawbacks and many of these are being mitigated by IGX and the UK MoD and do not jeopardize the ability to achieve results.
  • The project provides limited or no opportunity for domestic capacity building in the area of chemical weapons destruction and efforts by IGX to engage Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) were unsuccessful. However, this is understandable given that the GPP is focused on threat reduction and not domestic capacity building as was made known at the inception of the program.
Efficiency and Effectiveness:

In order to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the MDB-2 project, the following issues were considered: the mechanisms in place to promote efficiency and effectiveness; the procurement process and Canada's involvement; the control mechanisms that are in place to ensure sub-contractors deliver services on-time and on-budget; Canada's responsibility for monitoring the delivery, storage and installation of the equipment, as well as its reliability once operational.

The evidence showed that:

  • Delivering the MDB-2 project through a second MOU with UK MoD was, and continues to be, an efficient and effective readily available option even though it incurs some project management fees.
  • Additional efficiencies are gained through the arrangement with the UK MoD. It provides Canada with access to management capacity and expertise not available in IGX. This approach (in effect Aoutsourcing@) allows IGX to minimize the short-term human resource requirements that would be difficult to fill in a timely manner under DFAIT's recruiting system and that would not be cost-effective in the long-run.
  • Project management fees paid to the UK MoD and Bechtel reduce the amount of funding available for additional equipment. The only way to avoid this situation would be to transfer the money directly to ROSPROM - an option that was not considered viable due to the lower transparency and accountability in Russia with respect to the use of foreign funds.
  • Piggybacking on US purchases of similar equipment for Building 101 increases the efficiency and effectiveness of Canada's project by leveraging the preparation and groundwork already done by Parsons, the US Contractor, and reducing the financial and technical risks to the project.
Success:

To determine the progress of the project towards achieving established goals and milestones, the evaluation considered the following issues: the status of procurement and delivery of the equipment; complications and respective mitigation measures.

The evaluation confirmed that acceptable progress has been achieved towards established goals, particularly with the delivery of the first batch of Catalytic Reactors in August, 2006 and the second batch in December, 2006. The final batch was delivered to site in February 2007 with installation completed by the Russians in the spring, 2007. There have been complications, but these are not necessarily unexpected given the complexity of the CWD project and the challenges of working in the Russian context. Despite these complications, there is assurance that the original objectives and scope of the project will be met. Project risks are identified in risk registries prepared by IGX, the UK MoD, and Bechtel to reflect each stakeholder's respective risks. In the case of US contracting issues for the main destruction building, the IGX risk registry has not reflected ongoing developments.

Projects in the CWD stream not covered in the MDB2 evaluation are the construction of an 18 km railway connecting the chemical weapons storage depot near Planovy to the destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, and the construction of a local public address system (to provide timely information to area residents in the event of an incident leading to the leak of chemicals from the facility) and inter-site communications lines. The railway project is behind schedule and is now due for completion by December 20, 2007; the local public address system is expected to be completed by April 2008; and the inter-site communications project was completed in October.

Conclusion

The evaluation confirmed that this project has been undertaken in a complex environment, within very tight deadlines and that considerable efforts are being made by IGX and the UK MoD to manage the risks and complications. Despite these challenges, there is sufficient evidence that acceptable project progress has been achieved and it is suggested that the MDB-2 project is worthy of continued funding.

The current status of IGX action on the recommendations of the MDB2 2007 formative evaluation is given in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2: IGX Action Plan on MDB2 2007 Formative Evaluation
RecommendationProposed ActionResponsible AuthorityProposed Completion DateCurrent Status
1- Continue to work with the UK MoD to complete Shchuch'yeIGX will ensure that remaining packages of equipment funded by Canada for the MDB2 building at Shchuch'ye proceed to contract through the UK MoD; this includes the negotiation of fair and reasonable costs for the equipment and project management fees to minimize costs.CWD Senior Program ManagerSecond and third quarter of 2007Subcontract for the Destruction Process Lines ($16M) was signed on April 10, 2007; subcontracts for remaining packages of equipment were signed in September 2007
2 - Update the risk registriesIGX, with the UK MoD, will devise a more effective process of ensuring that project risk registries maintained by UK MoD and Bechtel are updated at minimum on a monthly basis and changes flow more effectively from the project specific registries to the overall UK MoD, Bechtel and Canada registries.

IGX will continue to update its overall Shchuch'ye risk registry on a monthly basis including mitigation measures for risks that may be affected.

CWD Senior Program Manager (with UK MoD)

CWD Senior Program Manager

Second quarter of 2007

Ongoing on a monthly basis

UK risk registries were enhanced at the UK program team meeting in Porton Down on September 20, 2007; (original meeting in July was postponed)

Canadian risk registry is updated on a monthly basis (see RIAS files) and updates are included in the bi-monthly reports to the DG

3 - Revisit the relationship with DRDCIGX will include DRDC in the next GPAG meeting.

IGX will continue to engage DRDC in program areas, as well as through its participation in GPP advisory bodies. 

IGX Management

IGX Management

OngoingDRDC attended the April 11, 2007 GPAG and are included in the list of GPAG representatives

IGX will continue to engage DRDC in GPP projects of interest

4 - Identify and utilize lessons learned from Shchuch'ye when considering options for KiznerIn addition to the extensive work on lessons-learned from Shchuch'ye to be applied to Kizner as reflected in the Kizner Treasury Board submission; IGX will prepare a formal lessons-learned paper on projects at Shchuch'ye to guide Kizner project implementation.CWD Senior Program ManagerSecond quarter of 2007A final lessons-learned paper on Shchuch'ye was submitted to DG on June 28, 2007

4.3 Summative Evaluation of the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Dismantlement Program

The following information is taken from the report of the NPSD Program summative evaluation dated March 12, 2007.

Findings and Conclusions

Relevance:

Funding the defueling and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines through the NPSD program remains relevant because it continues to meet the needs of the Russian partner. In 2002, there were 36 submarines in Northern Russia in need of dismantlement and a larger number in the Far East. In the 2004 Strategic Master Plan, as well as at the G8 summits, Russia continued to stress that dismantling the submarines is a high priority and requested international assistance to deal with this problem. The Canadian commitment to fund the dismantlement of 12 submarines in North West Russia represented a third of the submarines in the region in 2002 and is a significant contribution towards meeting the Russian needs.

The NPSD program is consistent with Government of Canada priorities as demonstrated by the announcement at the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. It also contributes toward two of the five strategic priorities outlined in DFAIT's Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007.

The NPSD program is responsive to both anti-terrorism and environmental safety goals of the Global Partnership. Funding the defueling and dismantlement of the submarines addresses the threat of sabotage and the risk of theft of highly enriched uranium that, if acquired by terrorists, could be used towards developing a nuclear warhead. Removing, treating and storing the radiological and hazardous materials from the submarines helps prevent a potential environmental disaster from occurring in the Arctic.

Program Governance and Delivery:

There are a number of key features of the program governance and management structure that contribute to the achievement of results, including: the project takes place on a bilateral basis; all dismantlement activity is conducted at the Zvezdochka shipyard; Implementing Arrangements are negotiated annually; the skills and experience of the IGX team reflect project requirements; experienced technical experts are involved; there is continuous oversight; and risk assessments are completed and consulted.

As with other streams in the Global Partnership Program, IGX senior management intentionally designed the program with a small departmental team that is supported by external technical experts. The IGX team has excellent negotiating skills, project management and IT experience, and even nuclear submarine experience. However, many of the skills and experience reside in one individual, leaving the program vulnerable to staff changes.

Technical personnel on the support team have experience working on submarine dismantlement activity at Russian shipyards as well as experience on nuclear submarines in the US and British navies. Not only does this experience elevate the credibility of the teams with the shipyard management and the Russian partner, Rosatom, it helps to facilitate communication because the stakeholders "talk the same language."

Monthly monitoring visits and annual Implementing Arrangement (IA) negotiations assist in building a rapport and mutual trust between the IGX teams and the shipyard personnel and improve the ability to mitigate risks. The structure of the Implementing Arrangements provides clarity for the shipyard as to tasks, milestones and payments. The monitoring visits provide discipline for the shipyard personnel to keep on schedule and allow the IGX teams to identify and mitigate risks.

All of the above features are appropriate to the context of working at the Zvezdochka shipyard. However, it is uncertain if this approach is replicable for a shipyard in the Far East. It is also unclear whether the success of this approach is dependent on the individuals involved.

Efficiency and Effectiveness:

A number of factors contribute to overall efficiency and effectiveness: parallel negotiations of the bilateral treaty and Implementing Arrangement allowed a fast start; stakeholders have a flexible approach; economies of scale benefits are achieved by dismantling one class of submarine; all activities are concentrated at one shipyard; project management costs are minimized; and the fixed price contract in Canadian dollars eliminates financial risk for Canada.

Negotiating Implementing Arrangement (IA) #1 at the same time as the bilateral treaty negotiations were ongoing, as well as preparing the Treasury Board (TB) Submission and the environmental assessment, allowed the NPSD program to maximize the available time in Phase 1 to be devoted towards achieving the results committed to TB and the Russian partner. This approach also sent a strong signal to the Russian partner that the Canadian program was serious about achieving results.

The mutual understanding and trust developed during negotiations and monitoring visits means that IGX does not have to micro-manage the shipyard whose managers have the flexibility to problem solve and not lose time waiting for direction from IGX. Depending on the circumstances, milestones can be shifted from one IA to another allowing the program to focus on achieving overall results.

Victor class submarines are the most cost-effective to dismantle because the reactors (there are two reactors per submarine) hold approximately the same number of fuel assemblies as that of a larger submarine, but the submarine's small size means there is less to dismantle. There is also less non-nuclear hazardous waste. By focusing on only one class of submarine, the shipyard has just one set of documents to prepare and has significantly increased the efficiency of personnel and streamlined processes.

Concentrating all activity at one shipyard minimizes project management costs by reducing travel costs and administrative overhead. By leveraging the experience of a former US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program official with knowledge of costing at the Zvezdochka shipyard, Canada negotiated the lowest cost per submarine compared to any western country for IA #1. This cost became the benchmark for subsequent IAs. Moreover, remaining at one shipyard increases the stakeholders' familiarity with their respective roles, responsibilities and capabilities, thereby increasing the efficiency of negotiations and implementation of the IAs.

Indicators of the efficiency and effectiveness of the program include goals being met on time and under-budget.

Success:

Progress achieved during the first two Implementing Arrangements demonstrates that the program will meet results in accordance with TB commitments. Specifically, the program is on track to fund the defueling of 12 submarines (seven defueled under IAs #1 and 2) and to fund the dismantlement of 11 submarines (five fully dismantled and one partially dismantled under IAs #1 and 2). The 12th submarine will be a Typhoon class (the largest submarine in the Russian navy) that will be dismantled with funding from the US Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Russia.

As a result of working with the NPSD program, project management capacity at the Zvezdochka shipyard has increased through the introduction of Microsoft Project Management software by the IGX team. Shipyard managers now use this software for the Canadian project, as well for other international projects.

Canada is now seen as a leader on the subject of dismantling submarines in Russia. As a result of the success of the program, other countries seek Canada's advice on working with Russia on dismantling submarines.

The shipyard has benefited from the Canadian program in other areas, particularly in worker safety and the environment. The NPSD program has increased awareness; provided funding for equipment and infrastructure; and arranged for training of shipyard personnel in Canada.

Another indicator of the success of the program is the high degree of satisfaction of the Russian partner and shipyard officials. The speed of program implementation, the technical expertise of the IGX and monitoring teams, the comprehensive, yet flexible Implementing Arrangements, the concern for, and financial commitment to, worker safety and the environment, and the professional approach taken by the Canadian team are considered key success factors for the program. Both the Russian partner and shipyard management suggested cooperating with IGX on future projects.

Providing the magnitude of the decommissioned nuclear submarine problem is similar in the Far East, there is justification to pursue Canadian involvement.

Environmental Impacts:

The most important, positive impact of the Canadian program is the funding of submarine dismantlement as this eliminates the danger of the decommissioned, deteriorating submarines sinking and potentially leaking hazardous materials into the sea. There is no readily apparent evidence of environmental damage at the shipyard that could be attributable to the Canadian program.

The NPSD program funded the preparation of an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and the project monitoring team assists in the achievement of targets in the EMP. In addition, the program funded the construction of an extension to the Harris Pad to include features to protect the environment and arranged for training of shipyard personnel in Canada related to environmental and waste management and safety. Environment-related projects are financed from the 5 per cent infrastructure fund.

Some environmental issues remain to be resolved, such as the treatment of hazardous substances at the drain pipes; disposal of hazardous materials at the local household facility; and repairs to the Yagri Island bridge. A recent announcement that Germany has agreed to finance the construction of a radioactive waste storage facility at Sayda Bay will largely resolve the hazardous waste storage issues facing the shipyard. The other environmental issues could be addressed with sufficient funding.

The current status of IGX action on the recommendations of the NPSD summative evaluation is given in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: IGX Action Plan on NPSD Summative Evaluation
RecommendationProposed ActionResponsible AuthorityProposed Completion DateCurrent Status
1 - Continues to implement the NPSD program at the Zvezdochka ShipyardContinue programming until the end of 2007/08.

A fifth implementation arrangement will be negotiated December 2007-January 2008

NPS Senior Program ManagerJanuary 2008Fourth implementation arrangement under implementation (Signed by Minister April 12, 2007).

Negotiations of any subsequent IAs (#6 and upwards) subject to TBS approvals and funding availability. Current DFAIT strategic review may lead to cancellation of further submarine works in Northern Russia. IA#5 is being negotiated with FSUE EP Zvezda (in the Far East) September 2007 to design upgrades to the Bolshoi Kamen to Smolyaninovo rail line Oct 07 - Feb 08 (so it can carry spent nuclear fuel in 2009 following actual engineering works in 2008).

2 - Implements lessons learned from negotiated implementation agreementsCompile Lessons Learned and integrate them in the negotiation strategy of the NPSD program this year.

Share lessons learned across programs: Sharing lessons learned is part of a review of IGX information sharing processes that has been launched after the February IGX retreat.

NPS Senior Program ManagerMid-February 2008Fourth implementation arrangement successfully negotiated Feb 07 and now under implementation

NPS program continues to set the bar for other IGX (and DFAIT) programs.

3 - Sets aside funding for environmental related projects separately from the infrastructure projectsSet aside funding for environmental related projects which will be included in the financial arrangements for projects in the Russian Far East fiscal years 2008/9 through 2010/11.NPS Senior Program ManagerApril 2008This will be done in IA#6 upwards at both proposed shipyards subject to funding availability. Current DFAIT strategic review may lead to substantive cuts to the NPS program which may negate any opportunity for environmental related projects
4 - Strengthens IGX team by recruiting more staff to provide support to existing staffProvide three team members for the SPM.

Staff the PM-04 position in May and the PM-02 position in June.

Create an engineer position in July and staff the position by September 2007.

IGX DGSeptember 2007Three Position Status:

PM04 position to be filled by a part-time resource currently on loan from PWGSC (October 2007)

A potential AS-2 identified. Job offer to be made once security clearances completed (anticipate October 2007)

Engineer position (a deputy for the SPM) not created (new position freeze).

5 - Leverages the successful Canadian experience to attract other international donors to the programContinue to engage good prospects like Korea, Japan and Australia.

Write to potential donors to seek their contributions, once plans for the Far East are clearer.

Take the opportunity of an international conference in May to hold consultations with Korea.

Take the opportunity of negotiations in the Far East in November/ December 2007 to hold consultations with Japan.

NPS Senior Program ManagerDecember 2007Korea ready to provide funding following engagement by NPS program in 2007 but under current TB authority not possible without a change to Terms and Conditions. Good will generated, however, by the NPS initiative will probably see funds go to NRS program instead.

Australia and New Zealand yet to be contacted formally pending a final decision on the scope of the 2008-2012 NPS program.

Italy has expressed some early interest in providing funds for Far East work (relationship and opportunity needs substantive development)

Consultations now being held with Japan on regular occasions (next meeting Sep 14 in Tokyo)

6 - If IGX decides to continue the NPSD program in the Far East, the report recommends investing in measures to mitigate risks and ensure workers' safety at the beginning of the implementation, and transferring knowledge and management expertise from the Zvezdochka shipyard to the Far EastIntegrate measures to mitigate risks and ensure workers' safety in the resultant project that we will propose to the chosen Russian partner.

Include steps in projects to ensure the transfer of knowledge and management expertise from the Zvezdochka shipyard to the selected Far East shipyard.

NPS Senior Program ManagerAugust 2007Negotiations not yet started but the environmental assessment of FSUE Zvezda being conducted September 2007 provides opportunity to start addressing the issue.

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5.0 Summative Evaluation of the Nuclear and Radiological Security Program: Key Findings

5.1 NRS Background

With the dissolution of the USSR, Russia inherited tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and enough nuclear materials for tens of thousands more from the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia acknowledges that it does not have enough resources to account for, monitor, and adequately protect these nuclear materials. The risk that it could be stolen and passed to terrorists or states of proliferation concern constitutes a clear threat to international security.

G8 Leaders at the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis formed the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists, or those who assist them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons and related materials, equipment and technology, collectively known as Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD).

One of the four areas of priority concern identified at the Summit was the "disposition of fissile material." The Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program stream is one of the central components within Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP), mandated to achieve the principles of the Global Partnership by helping to account for, secure, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons and materials, and radiological materials, thus preventing terrorist acquisition and use.

5.2 NRS Profile

At the outset of the NRS program, Canada was faced with the need to rapidly implement projects in an environment characterized by little Canadian experience and capacity, extreme sensitivity on the part of recipient countries, and an absence of the necessary international agreements to facilitate cooperation. Therefore, in the early stages, NRS frequently worked through its international partners in funding third party and multilateral projects, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), the U.S. Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) project, and the Norwegian RTG project. As capacity and experience was gained through consultations with international partners and through initial bilateral projects, such as the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI) physical protection project, processes and templates were developed that assisted in subsequent projects. The development of good working relationships and agreements with recipient countries further facilitated the expansion of NRS projects.

The NRS program is now valued at $225M over the period 2003-2013. To date, 24 projects have been defined valued at $186.51M. Four projects worth $13.92 million have been completed, 17 projects worth $89.09 are underway, and three projects worth $83.5 million have not yet started. These projects can be grouped into five sub-areas:

Physical Protection

Fourteen NRS projects are related to enhancing the physical protection and related security infrastructure at nuclear material at five facilities. The work includes detection systems, barrier installations, remote security identification and alarm systems, and related training. These projects are all bilateral with Russian facilities.

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators

Four NRS projects are related to the decommissioning, replacement with alternative power sources, removal and disposal of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs). RTGs have been used as power sources in lighthouses and other navigational devices located in remote areas of Russia since the 1960s and contain highly radioactive material that poses security and environmental risks. Canada has cooperated with the U.S. and Norway in the removal of RTGs, and has worked with Russian facilities to develop a Master Plan for RTG decommissioning and to fabricate containers for RTG shielding and transportation.

Plutonium

Two NRS projects are related to plutonium. In one, Canada is waiting for the finalization of a U.S.-Russian framework agreement in support of Russia's plutonium disposition program that will help convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. Since no money was spent over the period covered by this evaluation, it has not been considered further. In the other project, Canada, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy and other Global Partnership partners, contributed to the construction of a fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk to permit the closure of an outdated weapons-grade plutonium producing nuclear reactor that is the sole source of energy for the region.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Canada has made two contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) of the IAEA. The NSF provides a delivery mechanism for Canada to implement Global Partnership projects in countries of the former Soviet Union where it does not currently have relevant bilateral agreements. Canada's contribution falls within the following three areas: 1. Physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials; 2. Detection of malevolent acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; and 3. Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material.

Border Security in Ukraine

Canada has contributed to the enhancement of the capabilities of the Republic of Ukraine to detect and deter the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as to secure radiological sources. Ukraine is one of the most vulnerable pathways for illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. This project is in cooperation with the United States' Second Line of Defence (SLD) Program at the Department of Energy.

5.3 Evaluation Findings

5.3.1 Relevance

The evaluation concluded that NRS is even more relevant today than it was at its conception. In the last five years, although the threat from nuclear and radiological materials has decreased where security measures have been improved, the overall threat has increased due to the increasing prevalence of terrorism. While quantification of the threat is difficult, and specifics of the threat are classified, there continue to be all too many examples of major terrorist events. This is a global issue - one in which Canada's international partners feel strongly that Canada has a role to play. The continuing relevance of GPP was reinforced at the 2007 G8 Summit, where Prime Minister of Canada pushed for continued support of GPP.

On a range of issues, from missile defence to nuclear power for Iran, Russia has recently been stressing its independence from the positions of Western countries. In part, it can do this because of its strong economy and growing wealth. This raises two questions: 1) does Russia need Global Partnership support, and 2) does Russia want Global Partnership support?

In answer to the first question, it is true that Russia can afford a much greater contribution to the Global Partnership objectives than it could in 2002; and, as the Russian economy gets stronger, Russia is making a larger contribution to nuclear security. However, there is continuing evidence that Russia's wealth is not yet finding its way to all Russian facilities that hold nuclear and radiological materials and international support is desperately needed.

In answer to the second question, while Russia evidently values its independence on the international stage, it is clear that at the working level Global Partnership contributions are wanted and valued very highly. In the words of a Russian partner, "the Canadian contribution is definitely needed, thank you." Canada has not encountered evidence that the positive attitude towards the Global Partnership is changing in Russia, although some other countries have had different experiences. Canada continues to enjoy excellent relations with its Russian NRS partners and good access to Russian nuclear facilities.

Russian nuclear and radiological materials continue to be a concern because of the quantity of materials held and the state of much of the infrastructure, in spite of the robust economy. However, as the Global Partnership successfully implements projects there, other areas of the world will emerge as priorities for attention by the Global Partnership.

5.3.2 Cost Effectiveness

The NRS program implementation model received very favourable reviews from all consulted. Three alternative delivery models have been utilized:

  1. Bilateral - where Canada enters into an agreement/treaty with the country receiving the contribution, and then enters into implementing arrangements with specific facilities located within the country. Currently, Canada only has a bilateral treaty with Russia. Examples include the physical protection projects and some RTG projects.
  2. Third Party - where Canada provides funding to another country, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to the U.S. DOE Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs, and the Norwegian Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) program.
  3. Multilateral - where Canada provides funding to an international organization, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to the IAEA.

Each delivery model has advantages and disadvantages that make it appropriate in some situations, but not others. They have been used appropriately by the NRS program.

All indications are that NRS projects are mutually supportive, with each other and with the projects of other nations working on related projects, in obtaining their intended results.

Canadian operating costs are considered to be among the lowest in the international community. For example, Canada's bilateral projects have smaller project teams and fewer site visits than other countries, which results in lower operating costs. The primary advantage of lower operating costs is that more money is available for projects in Russia, thus contributing more to the mandate of GPP.

In general, the governance structure for NRS is considered appropriate and functions well, providing appropriate programs oversight and coordination. It has been described as "lean, but effective; excellent in all areas, especially compared to programs sponsored by other countries."

Overall, NRS/IGX management was commended by Russia for its efficiency and fast pace implementation (much faster than other countries), quality of documents, and good relationships.

The evaluation found no evidence of duplication of donor projects and programs. Potential duplication is avoided through good coordination and communications among donors.

In the projects reviewed, most of the GPP Project Management Framework procedures have been considered and well documented. The exception to this is the documentation and use of performance indicators. A draft Accountability, Risk and Audit Framework for GPP is currently been developed, but not yet finalized. While logic models exist for each individual NRS project, no logic model has been developed for the entire NRS program. The program would gain from a more strategic approach to program design and a longer-term vision supported by performance measures and targets related to the outcomes and impacts that the program intends to achieve.

5.3.3 Success

In all cases, projects have been, or are being, implemented as planned, comply with international standards and guidelines, and are being inspected by Canadian experts and certified by Russian authorities.

In some cases there have been delays in schedule for reasons outside of Canada's control, but these delays have been reasonable considering the challenges of working in Russia and the experiences of other countries.

An important issue for the NRS program is sustainability: whether the physical security improvements funded by Canada will be maintained by Russia once the program is finished. Sustainability is considered by NRS when determining upgrades, but assuring sustainability is difficult. Measures have been taken to improve the likelihood that use of Canadian funded upgrades will continue; however this will ultimately depend on Russian authorities providing the required leadership and resources. Canada will need to monitor this issue beyond the current life of the NRS program and possibly provide resources (such as post-warranty support) to ensure that the work of GPP continues to provide benefits into the future.

The physical security of the Russian nuclear facilities where Canada has provided upgrades has improved. However, it has not been possible within this evaluation to determine the degree to which improvements at these facilities have helped addressed the overall physical security problem within the Russian Federation. Such an understanding is critical to assessing the value of Canada's contribution, and should be the focus of program planning and assessment in the future.

The rate of removal and replacement of RTGs has increased, and is expected to increase further in the near future as capacity and experience increases. Canadian contributions have helped replace 15 RTGs, clear bottlenecks in the transportation of RTGs, and develop the Master Plan that coordinates the efforts of donor countries.

Canadian projects have not yet decreased the amount of plutonium at risk. Russia and the U.S. continue to work to finalise a framework agreement for the disposition of 34 tonnes of Russian plutonium. As a result, Canada has not yet made a contribution to direct disposition efforts. Significant progress has been made on the Zheleznogorsk reactor shut down, but until 2011 when that happens, there will not be a decrease in plutonium production.

Border security in Ukraine has been improved as a result of the Canadian contribution to the U.S. Second Line of Defense Program. Again, it has not been possible within this evaluation to quantify the degree to which improvements in border security have helped address the overall problem of illegal trade in nuclear and radiological material, and consideration needs to be given to this in the future.

All of Canada's partners at the working level have indicated that cooperation with Canada has gone very well and that Canada is held in the highest regard as a result. This evaluation has not been able to assess the impact that this success has had on Canadian international relations at the political level.

The relationships between DFAIT and Rosatom, Russian facilities, Eleron, and ISTA are good. Russian organizations report "Canadian efforts can be given a high mark. All issues have been solved in a reasonable time. We are completely satisfied with the relationship. This is working better than other countries."

Russia has stated that previous work has provided a good basis for continued cooperation. The projects that Russia has proposed are indicative of the level of trust that has been developed between Russia and Canada.

There have been only minor commercial and scientific benefits to Canada from the NRS program. While this is not a primary objective of the program, there could be more attention given to the possibility of obtaining greater benefits for Canada.

Canada's international partners know and appreciate Canada's contribution at the working level. However, this evaluation has not been able to determine the degree to which Canada's contribution has had an impact on international relations at the political level.

In Russia, as a result of Canada's and other donors' investments, the risks and threats posed by the stockpiles of nuclear and radiological material have been considerably reduced. However, concerns were expressed by some experts and partners that some of the improvements may not really be long term, that "there is not much evidence of the Russian government's willingness to fund appropriate maintenance over the long haul." Also, it is not possible for this evaluation to determine the degree to which Canadian and Global Partnerships efforts are making a difference because of the unknown full scope of the problems in Russia.

5.4 Conclusions

The conclusions of the study are presented below according to the three evaluation issues of relevance, cost effectiveness and results achieved.

5.4.1 Relevance

NRS continues to be relevant in a world that is increasingly subject to terrorist activities. As the Russian economy strengthens, Russia is contributing more to the security of its nuclear and radiological materials. However, many Russian facilities are still poorly funded and require international contributions. While Russia is increasingly asserting its independence, it is clear that international contributions are wanted and valued. It is in the self-interests of G8 nations to support Russia in these matters, and Canada has an important role to play. This view has been echoed by the Prime Minister of Canada at the most recent G8 Summit.

5.4.2 Cost Effectiveness

The implementation of the NRS program is considered to be excellent, NRS projects complement, but do not duplicate, the projects of other nations, and Canadian overhead costs are considered to be the lowest in the international community. Overall, NRS management was commended by its partners for its quality, efficiency, and good relations.

5.4.3 Success

NRS projects have been, or are being, implemented as planned and comply with international standards. Where there have been delays, they have been outside of Canada's control and are reasonable given the challenges of working in Russia and the experiences of other countries. Ensuring sustainability will be difficult and will require continued attention by NRS/IGX. NRS projects have increased the security of nuclear and radiological material in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, although it is not possible to quantify the degree of improvement. Relations between Canada and its international partners are excellent and Canada's contribution is known and appreciated both at the working level in Russia and within the G8 Global Partnership Working Group.

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6.0 Summative Evaluation of the Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Program: Key Findings

6.1 RFWS Background

The redirection of former weapons scientists in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) is another are of priority concern identified by G8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 as a component of the Global Partnership (GP). The knowledge and skills acquired by former weapons scientists (FWS) could be acquired by terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This threat is enhanced if former weapons scientists are unable to find suitable and comparable employment in a non-weapons, or civilian, area. The Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) is one of the five program streams of the Canadian Global Partnership Program (GPP).

6.2 Profile of the Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Stream of GPP

The RFWS stream, within Canada's GPP, has three main objectives. The first objective deals with the redirection of former weapons scientists in Russia and other FSU countries into peaceful and sustainable research activities. The second objective is to redirect institutes of proliferation concern into civilian areas and in a sustainable manner. The third is to provide science and technology (S T) and industrial benefits to Canada arising from the research that FWS undertake.

The most important implementation instruments in the redirection of former weapons scientists are the Science Centers: the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU(5)) based in Kyiv. These multilateral organizations coordinate the efforts of numerous governments, international organizations, and private sector industries to provide former weapons scientists from the FSU with peaceful, civilian opportunities in international partnership.

6.3 Evaluation Findings

6.3.1 Relevance

The "intellectual threat" sought to be mitigated by the RFWS stream, and in particular by the Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine, has evolved in the last few years. At the end of the Cold War, the threat was largely confined to Russia and its stockpiles of nuclear and radiological weapons and materials. Recent biological and chemical attacks in Central Asia, and particularly in regions that are ideologically and ethnically close to areas where terrorist groups are active, indicate a shift in the type of threat. In addition, personnel other than weapons scientists, who have knowledge of institutes and facilities, also present a potential interest to other states and terrorists. Besides that, where states might seek high-end and sophisticated weapons capabilities, terrorists could be satisfied with simpler and improvised capabilities.

According to the current redirection policy, at least 50% of the scientists in projects through the ISTC and STCU must be former weapons scientists (FWS). FWS are defined as scientists who have been engaged in the FSU weapons program in the 1980s. The implication of this 50% rule is that some younger scientists, who could be of even greater interest to terrorist groups, may inadvertently be excluded from participating in Science Center projects. Other donors and funding parties to the ISTC and STCU are aware of this potential threat and are currently reviewing this 50% FWS participation rule.

Canada's RFWS stream will, therefore, need to adapt to this evolving intellectual threat. This includes addressing younger scientists by considering a reduction in the 50% FWS participation rule, increasing support to other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states and placing greater emphasis on biological and chemical threats.

Based on the activities and projects implemented by the RFWS stream from its inception till August 2007, this evaluation concluded that this GPP stream is relevant to Canada's foreign policy objectives, and in particular to Priority #1 identified in DFAIT's 2007-08 Report on Plans and Priorities: "A safer, more secure and prosperous Canada within a strengthened North American partnership."

6.3.2 Cost Effectiveness

The two Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) provide economies of scale that benefit Canada's RFWS program, as well as the programs and activities funded by other international donors. This includes quick access to the project management expertise and the critical mass of people at the Science Centers, as well as their track record with other FSU governments and science institutes. In addition, both Science Centers have offices in each recipient country to facilitate the delivery and implementation of redirection projects. The evaluation found that the current RFWS program implementation model through the Science Centers works well for the purposes of the Global Partnership Program. The RFWS stream has adopted a cost effective implementation model, by directly engaging the Science Centers in the redirection of former weapons scientists and institutes of proliferation concern.

The current RFWS project management systems, the project selection and feedback processes, and the close cooperation with other donors also contribute to the cost effectiveness of the RFWS stream within Canada's Global Partnership Program. RFWS also has access to the ISTC and STCU database to capture key information pertaining to project applications and funded projects, including the number of FWS involved in each project and the subject area (nuclear, biological, chemical, missile). In addition, RFWS uses the same project identification numbers as the Science Centers in order to facilitate the up and down loading of information.

Another key aspect facilitating the integration of FWS into the international scientific community in a sustainable manner is the development of grant application capacity of FSU scientists. One of the most effective ways to build such capacity is the provision of detailed feedback from scientific peer reviews. Canada has taken the lead and was the first Funding Party to implement this approach in 2006. Since then, other funding parties have followed suit. The effectiveness of the RFWS stream is also enhanced through the close cooperation between Canada and other Funding Parties (donors). Good coordination helps to identify projects to be funded by each donor or jointly be several donors, and the level of contribution of each funding party. This approach also ensures that there is no duplication with other G8 redirection programs.

Budget conditions require RFWS to direct all contributions (transfer payments) to the Science Centers. Although some Canadian firms are very engaged in science center projects with FWS, many Canadian participants from small organizations indicated that because they receive no compensation for their time (the project is traditionally defined by and for the FSU scientists), they limit their involvement to reading progress reports and responding to emails. Some Canadian participants have not travelled to Russia/FSU; their only contact with the FWS is through email and reviewing progress reports. Interviewed participants indicated that they would devote a lot more time and effort to the projects, if they were compensated for their time. Even a partial compensation would not only be an incentive for a more effective involvement in projects, but also a demonstration of DFAIT's appreciation of their participation. Such approach would also recognize the greater risks of working in Russia and other FSU countries, and help to "level the attractiveness" of Russia/FSU to Canadian organizations and institutes relative to other regions in the world such as China and India.

6.3.3 Success

From FY 2003-04 to FY 2006-07, RFWS has supported nearly 200 projects involving approximately 2,300 FWS. Of the 2,300 FWS, half have been in the nuclear field, 25% in the biological field, 13% in missile, 7% in chemical, and 4% in other areas. The results achieved until March 31, 2007 are as follows:

  • Increased production and dissemination of scientific results: all of the projects reviewed by the evaluation indicated that participating scientists have given presentations at international conferences and published technical papers. FSU project managers indicated that their only international conference presentations have been through the RFWS/science center projects.
  • The RFWS/science center research grants have given FWS considerable international prestige and acknowledgement.
  • RFWS projects ensured the establishment of a wider network of international researchers in specific fields.
  • RFWS grants have allowed younger scientists to be involved in international and leading edge research.

Although many Canadian organizations have expressed interest in becoming an ISTC partner and in funding collaborative research with FWS, to date, there have not been any Canadian funded ISTC partner projects.(6) Canadian partners have, however, funded several projects at the STCU. Many equate partner projects as "genuine collaboration" since they require input/effort from both Canadian and FSU institutes in order to define, conduct, and achieve the objectives of the research. As noted above, Russia and the FSU are perceived by Canadian firms as being riskier places to do business compared to other countries such as China and India, which are believed to provide a better return on investment.

CIDA's experience with the STCU provides an interesting and alternative approach for engaging Canada's private sector. As an economic development agency, CIDA was able to provide 50:50 cost share grants to Canadian firms to encourage their participation in research projects involving former weapons scientists. These "starter grants" resulted in active participation by the Canadian private sector. One of the institutes covered by the evaluation had a research project with a Calgary firm to develop geological software that allows the oil and gas industry to more accurately map and determine the location of vertical boundaries of an oil field. The revenues from this software are keeping 20 FWS employed in one institute in Ukraine, as well as enough funds to continue work on the next version of the software.

6.4 Conclusions

Relevance:

The RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives. Although the threat of former weapons scientists rendering their knowledge to terrorist groups or countries producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has diminished in some regions (e.g., Russia and Ukraine), it remains high in others, such as the countries of Central Asia.

Cost Effectiveness:

Although Canada's participation in the Science Centers through the Global Partnership Program is relatively recent(7) compared to other donors, Canada has become a full contributing partner in a very short period of time. Sound management systems and access to the project database have greatly contributed to the cost-effectiveness of the RFWS program. The level of cooperation with other donors ensures no duplication of efforts. The evaluation found that the implementation model adopted by the RFWS stream is the most cost effective alternative.

Success:

RFWS is a well managed stream and its activities have helped, in cooperation with other donors, to create a more stable environment for former weapons scientists and their institutes. The RFWS stream is addressing the "intellectual threat" thus reducing the risk of former weapons scientists selling their knowledge to terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Current RFWS design requires all funds to be channelled via the Science Centers which limits RFWS' ability to respond to the evolving intellectual threat, such as providing support (like the CIDA cost share grants) to Canadian participants and enhancing the likelihood of long-term sustainability of the RFWS projects. Canadian firms, even larger ones, tend to be conservative and risk adverse. They still prefer focusing on China and India, places other than Russia/FSU, which are perceived to be "less risky countries to do business."

More effort is needed on behalf of DFAIT and the RFWS stream, in particular, to engage Canadian businesses by raising awareness amongst senior managers of the partner opportunities. Partner projects through the Science Centers offer not only leading edge research opportunities for younger scientists in Russia/FSU and a continuous reduction in the intellectual proliferation risk, but can also help Canadian businesses derive S T and industrial benefits.

The evaluation found evidence confirming that the RFWS stream has managed to increase the awareness of Canada's S T capabilities among scientists in Russia/FSU. Furthermore, based on the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge by ISTC and STCU-supported projects (e.g., number of technical papers published, number of presentations made at international conferences), former weapons scientists are being integrated into the international scientific community.

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7.0 Summative Evaluation of the Bio Non-Proliferation Program: Key Findings

7.1 BNP Background

The Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP) program of the Global Partnership Program is Canada's contribution to addressing the threat that has emanated from the remnants of the Former Soviet Union's vast biological weapons program. BNP addresses some of principles endorsed by the 2002 Kananaskis Summit G8 leaders as they relate to biological materials, equipment and know-how. These include promoting the adoption and strengthening of multilateral treaties (Principle 1), providing measures to account for, and secure, pathogens in use, storage and transport (Principle 2), securing facilities against sabotage (Principle 3), strengthening export and transshipment controls (Principle 5) and in minimizing holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins (Principle 6).

At its inception in January 2003, BNP activities were limited to supporting RFWS bio-related projects, which now form only a small component of its overall activities. In February 2006, BNP was elevated to full stream status, having developed and implemented over the course of three years a multifaceted program and strategy that has achieved a range of results. Despite having full stream status, BNP continues to be supported through the Global Partnership Special Projects Fund (GPSPF), and currently relies on RFWS cooperation to pursue initiatives that use the Science Centers in Russia (ISTC) and Ukraine (STCU) as delivery mechanisms.

7.2 Program Profile

The BNP stream has developed three areas of activity, all related to reducing the threat associated with the proliferation of biological weapons and related materials. These are the redirection of former weapons scientists, biosafety and biosecurity, and international governance issues related to stemming the proliferation of biological weapons and biomaterials.

Biological Redirection

The original core of the BNP program has been its redirection activities, whereby RFWS has been provided with recommendations in the selection of bio projects which are to be supported by grants run through the ISTC and STCU and which involve Canadian research partners. In addition to providing advice on initial project selection, BNP officers also engage in follow up visits over the course of the project as part of its monitoring efforts and seek to involve RFWS-supported institutes in biosafety/security initiatives.

Biosafety and Biosecurity

The largest component of the BNP program is a series of initiatives aimed at enhancing biosafety and biosecurity in Russia and other states of the Former Soviet Union. These initiatives have been developed out of a four pronged strategy concerned with (i) the development and implementation of national biosafety/biosecurity standards; (ii) providing assistance in establishing national and regional biosafety associations and integrating professionals within existing international biosafety associations; (iii) providing biosafety and biosecurity training; and (iv) upgrading bio facilities, and constructing new facilities to address serious proliferation concerns.

This strategy has been proven to be effective, having been originally developed by the World Health Organization and used by the Office of Laboratory Security of the Public Health Agency of Canada, one of five WHO Biosafety Collaborating Centres. Its integration into BNP came initially from effective cooperation with the Office of Laboratory Security (OLS), which culminated in the OLS Director joining IGX as Senior Biosafety Advisor on a half-time basis in October (2004) and on a full-time basis in October 2006.

Support for Global BNP Initiatives

BNP's third focal area is the most loosely defined but nonetheless integral to the broader success of non-proliferation of biological weapons and materials. Interdependence of biosecurity with other areas of state activity - such as international treaties, export controls and national health systems - have required a broader engagement with the issues of bio non-proliferation. To date, activities have generally related to strengthening the international governance and understanding of biological non-proliferation, biosecurity and biosafety. This includes engaging FSU states to have them integrated into the international system through accession to existing biological weapons related treaties (e.g. BTWC) and to comply with the principles of multilateral fora such as the Australia Group.(8)

7.3 Evaluation Findings

7.3.1 Relevance

By focusing on building capacity to improve the security and safety of biological materials in Russia and other FSU states, the BNP program is directly targeting the risks associated with the proliferation of biological materials and weapons in these countries. In so doing, the BNP stream continues to be broadly relevant to several of the priorities and commitments of DFAIT and the Government of Canada.

Underpinning the relevance of the BNP program is the assumption that there is in fact a risk in the potential for both states and non-state actors to use biological weapons or agents acquired from Russia/FSU. This assumption is, by the majority of accounts, widely supported. Indeed, the level of risk and associated threats are recognized as being high and on the increase. Two broad reasons are quoted for these trends. The first reason has to do with the nature of biological pathogens and the potential for their use as weapons. The second reason has to do with the countries themselves, their historical association with the Soviet biological weapons program, their current poor state of biological infrastructure, and the weak level of biosafety and biosecurity awareness.

7.3.2 Cost-Effectiveness

BNP Implementation Model:

The BNP program(9) has, since its inception, been funded through the Global Partnership Special Project Fund, and continues to be so even after having been elevated to full-stream status in February 2006. To deliver its diverse program, the BNP stream relies on several mechanisms, but most extensively on the Science Centers, and primarily ISTC, which it accesses through the RFWS stream. To date, this arrangement has not been much of an impediment to achieving BNP objectives. Strong working relationships and communication with RFWS and the Science Centers have meant that no proposals have yet been turned down for want of funds or attention. As a full stream program, however, and one that is to expand significantly in expenditures, the benefits of BNP operating through RFWS are less apparent. BNP has thus far been selective in the projects it pursues through the RFWS stream, but as the program expands, this approach will likely prove to be an impediment. Moreover, its reliance on RFWS for ISTC resources has made financial planning for the various initiatives more difficult by the fact that there is no clear articulation with RFWS on how much money is or will be available to BNP.

Management:

Delivery of BNP initiatives depends on a wide variety of actors, engaged formally and informally within the overall governance structure. This system appears to be effective in achieving BNP objectives, with no major difficulties noted. At the management level, the BNP group has benefited from the strong support within the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX) from senior management, and from an informality that has allowed for ready access to top levels of management. This has helped quicken responses to key issues and engender a positive and effective working environment. BNP management has reached out effectively to other Canadian departments and agencies as well as to other donor countries to help it develop and deliver its strategy. Formally, BNP has established or is in the process of establishing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with three government agencies, and informally, the group has maintained highly productive relationships with U.S. and U.K. counterparts through weekly interactions, regular group consultations, and strong cooperation.

Costs:

Based on the significant number of concrete outputs in a relatively short period of time and with modest operating expenditures, the evaluation concluded that the BNP program is, overall, cost-effective in its operation. This performance is due to the fact that several activities of the program have only a nominal dollar value but are nonetheless of importance to achieving BNP objectives, as well as to the use of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) for the redirection of bio-weapons scientists.

BNP operating costs have been increasing steadily as the program has expanded but are still low in comparison to other GPP streams. The budget for 2006-07 was $272,900 compared to $222,700 in the previous year.

7.3.3 Success

The BNP stream has achieved planned results in each of its three focal areas: 1) redirection of former weapons scientists; 2) biosafety and biosecurity; and 3) support for global BNP initiatives. All results to date are in line with intended outcomes of the BNP, though it should be noted that due to the relatively recent ramping-up of the BNP program, results and impacts have not had the benefit of a full five years of operation at a steady level as is the case with the other streams.

Redirection Support:

From March 2004, the BNP stream has been involved in the redirection of 538 former BW scientists and technicians through some 29 projects, funded by RFWS, worth $US 6,565,991.(10) Projects are ongoing in Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. The BNP group has also been involved in the monitoring of several of these projects, through follow-on site visits at respective institutes.

Biosafety and Biosecurity:

The largest component of the BNP program is a series of initiatives aimed at enhancing biosafety and biosecurity in Russia and the other FSU states. These initiatives have been developed out of a four pronged strategy concerned with (i) the development and implementation of national biosafety/biosecurity standards; (ii) providing assistance in establishing national and regional biosafety associations and integrating professionals within existing international biosafety associations; (iii) providing biosafety and biosecurity training; and (iv) upgrading bio facilities, and constructing new facilities to address serious proliferation concerns. Initiatives in each of these areas are as follows:

  • Standards Guidelines: Seven (7) manuals translated in Russian - distributed to hundreds of scientists and institutes in six (6) FSU states;
  • Associations: Established three (3) professional associations; supported 80 scientists to attend international association conferences;
  • Training: One training centre established, three in development; organized / sponsored eight (8) workshops; presentations and outreach at 26 workshops and conferences;
  • Facilities: Planning for Level-3 Biological Containment Laboratory in the Kyrgyz Republic; 39 assessment visits of institutes in five FSU states; approximately 26 upgrades of equipment and practices ($5.5M).
Support for global BNP initiatives:

Efforts related to the international governance of biosafety and biosecurity have been varied and included commissioning a study "Pathogens for Peace" from the Washington D.C. based Stimson Centre, fostering the accession of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and supporting Canada's participation in the Australia Group. Thus far, the BNP group has engaged with both Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the issue of the BTWC, both of whom have now acceded to the convention. The effect has been to strengthen the commitment in Central Asia to the non-proliferation of biological weapons and related material.

7.4 Conclusions

BNP Strategy

BNP has managed to achieve impressive results in a relatively short time frame, having only attained full-stream status late in the first half of the GPP. Through accessing expertise and experience of a range of delivery support actors including other Canadian departments and agencies and other donor countries, the BNP group has developed and begun to deliver a strategy addressing threat reduction arising from the proliferation of biological weapons and related materials. The strategy embraces a comprehensive, 'full spectrum' approach that focuses on biosecurity and biosafety, the redirection of former weapons scientists and the related governance aspects. In addition to building capacity to secure biological materials in Russia and the FSU states, the strategy has helped open up dialogue with Russia, has improved Canada's visibility and standing within the global biosecurity and biological non-proliferation community, and has strengthened Canada's relationship with the US.

BNP Challenges

For all its success, the BNP stream faces several challenges in the second half of the GPP funding period. In order to continue to realize its objectives, maintaining staff stability in BNP will be important to sustaining productive relationships in FSU states. Indeed, Canada's standing in the area of biosecurity and biosafety among recipient states and within the global BNP community is mainly due to the quality and professionalism of its staff. A second challenge will be to ensure that current initiatives respond to the recognition that for BNP program outcomes to be sustained, long-term training and engagement will be required beyond the current funding window of 2012. This is particularly relevant to the bio-containment facilities now being planned, which will be running well after the GPP program has ended.

Improving benefits to Canada is another challenging area for most of the GPP streams and for BNP in particular. Besides pursuing enhanced international security in the area of biological weapons and materials, the BNP team is trying to address this challenge by "twinning" a new laboratory in the Kyrgyz Republic with the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) in Winnipeg, by engaging other government departments and Canadian organizations, and by supporting the RFWS sustainability efforts.

A fourth challenge is related to establishing BNP as a separate stream of GPP with substantially more funding than it currently is allocated under the existing Global Partnerships Special Project Fund. This growth will bring new responsibilities, a more direct link the science centers, and require a full staffing which has been difficult to achieve since being elevated to full-stream status in February 2006.

BNP Extension

Finally, as BNP moves towards 2012, there is considerable interest within the BNP and biosecurity community and among donor countries to see Canada continue its leadership role in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. In particular, given the global nature of the threat, there is a need and interest in having Canada extend the regional focus of its successful strategy beyond Central Asia and Russia. Such a move will require that in-depth deliberations and planning begin in the near future if key personnel are to be maintained beyond 2012.

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8.0 Multilateral Funding Review

8.1 Introduction

In the absence of a signed bilateral agreement with Russia during Phase I of the Global Partnership Program and in order to mitigate the risk of not meeting its commitments to the Global Partnership, Canada funded a number of projects through multilateral and third party mechanisms.

The multilateral delivery mechanism used by GPP consisted mainly of contributions to programs of multilateral, intergovernmental, and international institutions and organizations involved in threat reduction activities in Russia and the FSU. For example, in the case of the NRS stream, fissile materials security was supported through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the decommissioning of nuclear submarines in the NPSD stream through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environment Program (EBRD-NDEP); and, re-employing weapons scientists in the RFWS stream was funded through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU).

The third party delivery mechanism employed by GPP was based on contributions made by Canada via another country member of the Global Partnership which has an existing bilateral agreement with Russia (or the FSU) allowing third party contributions. For the CWD program, for example, Canada channelled its contribution through an MOU with the U.K. which already had an agreement with Russia.

After the bilateral agreement between Canada and Russia was signed in June 2004, Canada started using direct funding mechanisms for project delivery in addition to the multilateral and third party mechanisms. The bilateral contracts and the respective implementing arrangements facilitated Canada's direct project support to Russian entities involved in threat reduction.

In some cases, Canada has also used contribution agreements as a vehicle for the delivery of specific project components. For example, in the CWD stream, IGX supports the activities of Green Cross, which runs a network of local public outreach offices in Russia, providing independent and objective information about Russia's CWD program to people living in the vicinity of Russia's CW storage and destruction facilities.

8.2 GPP Experience with Multilateral Delivery Mechanisms

This section outlines the way in which different delivery mechanisms have been used by Canada to fund projects in the various Global Partnership Program streams. Particular attention is paid to the specific role of the multilateral mechanisms in supporting Canada's GPP objectives.

NRS Stream

Before having an agreement with Russia, IGX considered the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be the most appropriate vehicle for Canada to deliver on its pledge to implement projects to improve security of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Russia and the FSU. The IAEA has extensive experience working in Russia and six other countries of the FSU on programs dealing with the protection and securing of nuclear and other radioactive materials; with locating and securing of radiological sources; and with installing of border detection equipment. The IAEA also has the capacity and capabilities to respond to urgent situations that require immediate and effective upgrades to nuclear safety and security.

In 2004, Canada made an initial $4 million contribution followed by a second contribution of $4 million in 2006 towards IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) for projects in the former Soviet Union. These projects included, among other activities, sending IAEA teams to help better secure nuclear facilities, to train personnel in nuclear security and to search for, recover and ensure the safe disposal of radioactive sources. The IAEA agreed to Canada's request to specify where Canadian funds are to be spent, i.e., on areas that specifically reflect the goals and objectives of the Global Partnership Program.

GPP contribution to the IAEA has also provided Canada with the opportunity to be represented on the Contact Expert Group (CEG) of the IAEA. The CEG was established under the auspices of the IAEA in 1996 to provide assistance to the Russian Federation in the handling of accumulated radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The Group does not have programs but it is a good vehicle for discussion and has recently been used by Canada in the NPSD stream as a cost effective means for involving other countries in submarine dismantlement in the Far East.

At the outset of the GPP, Canada benefited not only from its work with the IAEA but also from the discussions with its international partners in the Global Partnership, particularly the US and UK, on how to design and implement projects related to nuclear and radiological security. Now, with a bilateral agreement in place with the significant experience gained through working with international organizations and other partners, Canada is increasingly focussing on bilateral projects, which have become the preferred approach for physical protection.

NPSD Stream

To enable a rapid acceleration of the nuclear submarine dismantling process, Canada contributed $32 million in 2003/04 through the Northern Dimension Environmental Program (NDEP) of the EBRD. The NDEP's focus on infrastructure is of primary importance, as it helped remove the bottlenecks and provide and/or improve the fundamental elements in the dismantlement process e.g. securing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive material at various sites and increasing storage capacity. Contributing through the EBRD-NDEP fund allowed Canada to take advantage of the Bank's more than ten years of experience in Russia in the implementation and financial management of major projects related to post-Soviet remediation. Also, it enabled Canada to draw upon the experience of the other members already involved with the EBRD-NDEP on this initiative.

NDEP is the only special fund of EBRD - the program provides an environmental window on nuclear activities that is coupled with both the banking and decommissioning activities. EBRD started with an upfront commitment of 150 million euros to the Nuclear Window Fund of which Canada's contribution was significant. The fundamental issue slowing down expenditures from the fund has been the lack of transparency and strategy that EBRD considers to be extremely important in the nuclear area. In EBRD's view, there must be a long-term strategy and established end point in terms of nuclear fuel storage and environmental repair. The delay in commencing projects was due to the program starting with a blank page and the need to develop a picture of what had to be done; it was not a consequence of this being a multilateral mechanism.

Canada is a member of the NDEP Assembly, Nuclear Committee, where Canada plays an active role. The Committee meets frequently to (i) monitor the payment of the committed contributions to the Fund, (ii) review the effectiveness of the activities financed, (iii) approve the annual budget and financial statements of the Fund, and (iv) ensure that the appropriate visibility is given to the activities financed by the Fund, taking into account the needs of the various contributors. This representation affords Canada the opportunity to supervise the Fund through having a voice in direct project selection, specifying milestones, engaging in problem solving, and addressing requests by recipient states.

EBRD has recently recognized that a number of projects could go ahead in the context of a strategic master plan whose first stage has been completed (SMP 1). The Russians have agreed to work with a joint team and as of the end of August 2007, EBRD had a final plan (SMP 2). This plan is expected to help donors to see how the NDEP funding will be used. What EBRD now sees is that Russia is investing in nuclear security and safety upgrades. EBRD does not have a complete picture of the nuclear waste issue in Russia and suspects that Russia itself does not know the full extent of the problem. A consequent concern for GPP is the 2012 horizon of the Program which may prove to be too close for the Global Partnership to achieve its goals. EBRD interviewees have expressed the view that the nuclear waste program should be extended to FSU recognizing that the E.U. and the U.S. are already active there.

RFWS Stream

International Science and Technology Center

The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow was established in 1994 specifically to deal with the threat from the many nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile specialists displaced at the time of the disintegration of Russia/FSU. The Center functions as a referral agency to provide, in cooperation with numerous governments, international organizations and private business, employment in peaceful scientific pursuits. The ISTC develops the inventory of former weapons scientists and liaises with Russian institutions, in cooperation with member-country collaborators, to set out peaceful scientific projects that are available for funding by ISTC parties. ISTC covers Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

The RFWS stream and the ISTC support two types of projects: (i) Regular projects, which are funded by RFWS via the Science Centres, and are led by the FWS institutes of proliferation concern. A Canadian participant provides advice and guidance to the FWS project manager and the research team at the FSU institute(s); and (ii) Partner projects, which are funded by the Canadian partner, and use the Science Centers to facilitate implementation. Partner projects are led by the Canadian partner, with the FWS included as members of the joint Canada-FSU research team. The key difference between the two is that regular projects are funded by the Science Centers and led by the FWS, whereas partner projects are funded and led by the Canadian partner.

As a full voting member of ISTC, Canada can nominate a member to the Governing Board: currently the IGX Director General, thereby allowing Canada to have input on the direction of ISTC policy. In addition, Canada's financial contribution provides for the creation of a position of one of the Deputy Executive Directors in the ISTC Secretariat. Canada has viewed this position as an added element in its capacity to monitor and be informed on ISTC operations. This person, while fully integrated within the ISTC, is a Canadian point of contact within the ISTC Secretariat. As a funding party to the ISTC, Canada has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which details how Canada's funds will be spent.

The cooperation between RFWS and other Funding Parties (donors) is described by the US, EU and the Science Centers as excellent. This includes reaching agreements on which donor will fund which projects, and if jointly funded, the contribution amount of each funding party. Many noted that the demand for science centre grants/funding exceeds the available budget. This indicates that cooperation between the Funding Parties has become even more important in terms of successful leveraging of limited funds. The current level of cooperation also ensures that there is no duplication with other G8 redirection programs.

One possible alternative to ISTC for Canada could have been a bilateral model. However, it was considered to be too costly and duplicating the delivery infrastructure of the Science Centers.

Science and Technology Center in Ukraine

Canada was involved in the formation of the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), which is a similarly-structured organization to the ISTC in Moscow. A Canadian held the position of Executive Director at the STCU from its inception in 1994 until 2004. IGX assumed responsibility for the STCU in fiscal year 2006/07 from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), benefiting from the lessons learned from the CIDA experience with STCU. The STCU covers Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. Both ISTC and STCU cover Georgia.

Chernobyl Shelter Fund

In 1997 the international community entrusted the EBRD with managing the Chernobyl Shelter Fund. The G7 countries, the European Union, Ukraine and other countries have so far pledged approximately 720 million to the Fund. The CSF finances a comprehensive programme to deal with the long-term dangers posed by Chernobyl. Along with constructing the new containment shelter, the programme includes stabilising the existing shelter and providing an integrated monitoring system to report on radiation, structural stability and seismic events, among other things. Canada has contributed 34.9 million to the Fund.

A protracted procurement process for the Shelter is now complete and is being monitored by donors to ensure compliance. A final report from observers of the procurement process was received recently by EBRD and a draft contract has been developed. The current estimate of the cost of the sarcophagus is US$1.3 billion to be built over 4-5 years. EBRD received the approval of the Assembly to proceed with a contract with a US company under the direction of a safety expert group of which Canada is a member. The spent fuel storage is part of an integrated nuclear protection approach to Chernobyl.

EBRD provides scrutiny on all its investments, disbursements and financial controls. Project management in the field includes financial experts. There is regular reporting to donors; for example, the Assembly on the Chernobyl Shelter Fund has held 26 meetings in nine years and each meeting submits a report. Annual audits of financial statements are carried out and independent audits were conducted in 2002, 2005 and 2007. Environmental audits are also commissioned. Each donor is entitled to documents placed on the EBRD network.

8.3 Advantages/Disadvantages of Multilateral Delivery Mechanisms

A number of benefits of a multilateral approach through, for example, EBRD, IAEA and ISTC/STCU, have been identified: (i) a common front is created among a number of donors that can provide political leverage to counter the Russian practice to deal separately with bilateral and multilateral donors thus provoking bilateral donors to compete; (ii) capacity to manage large projects, often infrastructure projects such as spent fuel storage, that are too big for single donors; and, (iii) visibility among other members of the international organization.

In the case of the Science Centers (ISTC and STCU), these multilateral mechanisms provide economies of scale that all funding parties benefit from, including the Global Partnership Program. This includes access to the project management expertise and the critical mass of people at the Science Centers, as well as their track record with FSU institutes. In addition, both Science Centers have offices in each recipient country to facilitate delivery.

A drawback to the multilateral approach has often been the slowness of decision-making because of the need for consensus building among donors and bureaucratic procedures. For example, while a splurge of new projects is expected from EBRD, it has been noted that Russia is concerned about the speed of implementation of EBRD projects. In the case of ISTC and STCU, similar delays have made it more difficult to involve commercial parties, an important component in the sustainability of the science projects. Other disadvantages that have been noted are the inability of donors to direct their contributions to particular activities of the organizations and difficult access to their audits and evaluations.

In terms of bilateral delivery, Canada benefited from discussions with its international partners in the Global Partnership on how to design and implement bilateral projects and, as a result, Canada's bilateral agreements have tended to be models used by others. Bilateral projects have taken longer to negotiate, but have tended to give Canada greater control over project implementation and greater visibility. Routing projects through a third party (piggybacking) operating under an existing agreement with Russia has also been effective because it has drawn on existing management structure, expertise and capabilities of other donors, particularly the US and UK. A disadvantage has been a lack of visibility for the Canadian contribution.

8.4 Conclusion

In general, this study has found that good strategic decisions have been made by the Global Partnership Program in selecting the most cost effective mechanisms for project delivery in the case of each stream. The multilateral funding review indicates that both multilateral and bilateral mechanisms are needed to deliver the Program and attain the desired objectives in a cost effective manner.

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9.0 GPP: Summary Conclusions

Leadership Role:

Through the Program, Canada has continued to demonstrate the leadership that was shown in shaping the Global Partnership at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit. Canada is recognized as a leader in all areas of project implementation, and has expanded its activities and also had success in leveraging strategic resources for its projects through other channels. Canada has led the G8 in encouraging new participants, and in promoting a strategic review for the Partnership at its halfway point.

Achieving Objectives:

The Global Partnership Program has generated impressive results in the first five years of operation that have contributed to threat reduction of WMD proliferation from Russia and other states of the FSU. In addition to the specific threat reduction achievements of the individual streams, the Program is building capacity in Russia and the other FSU states to maintain the security of vulnerable sites and materials, has further reinforced Canada's relationship with Russia, has improved Canada's visibility and standing within the G8 and with other Global Partnership donors, and has strengthened Canada's relationship with the US.

Program Management:

The Global Partnership Program is strong in terms of project implementation as evidenced by Canada's leadership in meeting its Global Partnership project delivery commitments, the low overhead (5%) in implementation, and the credibility of the Program's management capabilities that has been built with the Treasury Board. Implementation by IGX of the recommendations of the CWD, NPSD and GPP formative evaluations and of audits is further strengthening management at the project and overall program levels.

Two areas for improving Program management are noted in this report: (i) the Program has to date been largely focused on the delivery of the individual streams - more attention to the presentation and assessment of the overall Program results would enhance understanding of the Program's broader impact and the need for any changes of direction, and; (ii) identification in the Program's strategic plans and pursuit of potential spin off benefits to Canada from the Program's substantial investments in areas such as science and technology cooperation, commercialization, trade and investment.

Knowledge and Skills:

The high quality of the Canadian managers of the Global Partnership Program, their knowledge of project areas, their project leadership abilities, and their negotiating skills have been major factors in the success of the Program. Individual performance measurement involving regular personnel assessments requires improvement, and this has now been accorded priority by IGX. Such personnel assessments are seen as important to obtain optimal Bureau performance.

Delivery Mechanisms:

The strategic use of different delivery mechanisms (multilateral, third party and bilateral) by the Program has been beneficial to the Program in implementing projects in a timely and cost effective manner.

Global Partnership beyond 2012:

The task of reducing WMD threats from Russia and other FSU states (and indeed, globally) will not be completed by 2012. The issue of continuing the Global Partnership investment has been raised by the US in Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) but no longer-term commitment by the G8 has yet been made. Sustainability by Russia/FSU of current investments through the Global Partnership and financing beyond 2012 are two areas requiring close attention before future directions for the Global Partnership are discussed prior to completion of the initial mandate in 2012.

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10.0 GPP: Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

It is recommended that the Global Partnership Program continue to be managed through the current structure of the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX) within DFAIT, taking into consideration the following recommendations relating to program-level and project-level management and budgets from previous and current evaluations, namely:

Follow-up on the recommendations from evaluations conducted in 2006 and early 2007:

Global Partnership Program - 2006 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that IGX complete its implementation of the recommendations of the formative evaluation relating to program-level and stream-level planning and reporting, and in particular, the development and implementation of an International Security Branch level Risk Management Framework in line with the management response.

Chemical Weapons Destruction - 2007 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that actions underway by IGX in response to the recommendations of the 2007 MDB-2 Formative Evaluation and in relation to the on-going projects relating to the railway and the local public address system be completed in time for the Shchuch'ye facility to become operational in 2009.

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

It is recommended that the recommendations of the 2007 NPSD Summative Evaluation be fully implemented, and, in particular, that NPSD activities be extended to the Far East to enable the dismantling of up to six submarines.

Specific Recommendations from current evaluations (December 2007):

Global Partnership Program (GPP) - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

While the Program and its five sub-streams are effectively managed, performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, have not been used in the ongoing stream and project management. It is recommended that this shortcoming be addressed through the implementation of the ARAF and the development of precise performance measures and indicators for each stream and for the Program as a whole.

Nuclear and Radiological Security Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short time frame. It is recommended that NRS continue on the course that it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger bilateral physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, at facilities with Category I (weapons usable) material.

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

(i) Given that the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives, is well managed, and contributes to strengthening relations with other donors, particularly with the US, it is recommended that DFAIT continue the RFWS stream beyond March 31, 2008, and the implementation of Canada's redirection efforts under the multilateral framework of the two Science Centers - the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kyiv (Ukraine); (ii) Given that the involvement by Canadians, particularly in partner projects, increases the chances of long-term sustainability, continuous intellectual threat reduction and science and technology and industrial benefits to Canada, it is recommended that DFAIT remove the budget constraints to allow for more flexibility in RFWS programming, such as contributing part of the costs of collaborating with FSU scientists either through other streams of the Global Partnership Program and/or other programs at DFAIT; and (iii) Given that the intellectual threat is now considered lower in some regions (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remaining high in others (e.g., biological threat in Central Asia), it is recommended that the RFWS focus on the most proliferation-sensitive institutes including those in other FSU states.

Biological Non-Proliferation - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

(i) BNP has thus far achieved a number of important results in a relatively short time frame and in a cost-effective manner that are consistent with the overall objectives of GPP. Moreover, it is on the cusp of expanding significantly, with current planning underway for the construction of one of two Level-3 Biological Containment Laboratories. These are expected to have a significant impact on program objectives. It is therefore recommended that BNP be continued but at a level of full-stream funding that will allow it to realize its current strategy; (ii) To allow for improved program planning, it is recommended that BNP have the ability to contribute BNP program funds to the ISTC and/or STCU within the IGX budget. Having such an arrangement would sever its dependence on RFWS for ISTC and STCU access and give BNP the needed authority to allocate resources effectively over the longer term for its diverse initiatives; and (iii) The BNP stream has a diverse project portfolio that is set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in the Kyrgyz Republic. To improve oversight of existing initiatives and assist in the delivery of an expanding program, it is recommended that more resources be committed to the FSU region either within the ISTC or in the countries themselves. This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, and allow for quicker responses to issues that will emerge with the facility construction.

Recommendation 2:
Reducing threats of WMD in the longer term requires that threat reduction measures put in place by the Global Partnership Program be sustained beyond 2012. It is recommended that:
  1. A longer vision for Global Partnership Program activities beyond 2012 be developed.
  2. Sustainability of GPP investments, and in particular, the appropriate maintenance and use of Canada-funded projects and facilities in Russia be ensured by the inclusion of strict follow-up monitoring, audit and evaluation procedures by Canada for a certain period beyond the end date of the Global Partnership Program, in the project implementation arrangements. NRS projects are of a particular concern, especially the physical protection projects. This should be monitored to ensure that the upgrades funded by Canada continue to be used in an effective manner.
  3. It is also recommended that awareness raising campaigns be directed at senior managers in Canadian organizations (e.g. firms, crown corporations) of the benefits of redirection projects with FWS, and in particular, the benefits of partner projects which are under the direction of Canadian funding partners in order to advance Canadian R D, as well as to build the sustainability of RFWS projects.
Recommendation 3:

It is recommended that Embassy personnel in Moscow and Kiev, including Locally Engaged Staff and Canada-paid experts in the Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) Moscow be more actively involved in current and future project monitoring activities.

This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, save long trips from Canada to Russia, and allow for quicker responses to issues as they immerge. This approach will be particularly beneficial for the BNP stream and its diverse project portfolio, set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in Kyrgyz Republic. Embassy personnel, specifically on the Trade side, could also support RFWS stream objectives to advance S T and industrial benefits to Canada.

Recommendation 4:
It is recommended that IGX consider means of consolidating the achievements of Canada's investment in the Global Partnership Program in a broader strategic context. Approaches to be considered in support of this recommendation include:
  1. presentation and assessment in annual reports and reports to TBS by IGX of the overall Global Partnership Program results in addition to individual stream results to enhance understanding of the Program's broader impact;
  2. developing a longer-term vision, post 2012, to ensure sustainability of GPP projects and to scope the next phase of the Global Partnership overall and Canada's role, in particular;
  3. identifying potential spin off and side benefits for Canada in areas such as science and technology and innovation cooperation, collaborative studies and exchanges in, for example, nuclear research and development (e.g. nuclear waste disposal), and the environment (e.g. climate change impacts on the Arctic); and,
  4.  increasing the involvement of other departments and agencies through the STTAG and GPAG to build increased constituency of interest in the Program.
Recommendation 5:
Within the Global Partnership, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations.

As the security of WMD gets improved in the Russian Federation and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions and areas, such as biological non-proliferation. It is recommended that, if G8 leaders make a decision with regard to the expansion of the Global Partnership Initiative to other regions of the world, consideration be given to Canada's participation in this extended geographic coverage. A longer-term vision for Canada's involvement in activities and projects related to non-proliferation and WMD treat reduction would help DFAIT and IGX, in particular, to preserve and effectively use the expertise and program management capacity of its staff.

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Annex A: Management Response and Action Plan

RecommendationsIGX Management Response and Action PlanResponsibility CentreTime Frame
Recommendation 1:
It is recommended that the Global Partnership Program continue to be managed through its current structure of the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX) within DFAIT, taking into account the following recommendations relating to program-level and project-level management and budgets from current and previous evaluations, namely:Agree

It is intended to maintain the structure of IGX in Phase III of the GPP.

Global Partnership Bureau (IGX)

Director General (DG)

Ongoing

Global Partnership Program - 2006 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that IGX complete its implementation of the recommendations of the formative evaluation relating to program-level and stream-level planning and reporting, and in particular, the development and implementation of an International Security Branch-level Risk Management Framework in line with the management response.

Agree

As the Summative Evaluation report shows, IGX actions recommended by the Formative Evaluation have been completed and implemented, including through the Phase III TB Submission and ARAF (February 2008). This was done in consultation with the Program Services Division (IXS).

IGX DGPart of Phase III TB Submission Process
 The Branch Risk Profile will be updated after the DFAIT Risk Profile is finalized and approved.Program Services Division (IXS) DirectorFirst Quarter FY 2008-09

Chemical Weapons Destruction - 2007 Formative Evaluation:

It is recommended that actions underway by IGX in response to the recommendations of the 2007 MDB-2 Formative Evaluation and in relation to the on-going projects relating to the railway and the local public address system be completed in time for the Shchuch'ye facility to become operational in 2009.

Agree

The recommendations of the 2007 MDB-2 Formative Evaluation were addressed in an Action Plan and have been implemented. All equipment packages for Shchuch'ye have been signed. The railway is expected to be completed in August 2008. IGX is continuing to work with partners at the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility to complete all Canadian-funded activities by the end of 2008.

Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Portfolio Senior Program Manager (SPM)Completed / Ongoing

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

It is recommended that the recommendations of the 2007 NPSD Summative Evaluation be fully implemented, and, in particular, that NPSD activities be extended to the Far East to enable the dismantling of up to six submarines.

Agree

The evaluation recommendations have all been implemented. The GPP Phase III TB Submission proposes that NPSD activities be extended to the Russian Far East, for the dismantlement of up to 5 submarines, plus a railway upgrade to transport spent nuclear fuel, as well as dismantling up to 2 submarines in North West Russia. The planning is already underway.

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement (NPS) Portfolio

SPM

Completed / Ongoing

Global Partnership Program (GPP) - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

While the Program and its five sub-streams are effectively managed, performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, have not been used in the ongoing stream and project management.

It is recommended that this shortcoming be addressed through the implementation of the ARAF and the development of precise performance indicators for each stream and for the Program as a whole.

Agree

A GPP-wide ARAF has been developed in connection with the Phase III TB Submission. It contains logic models and performance measurement indicators at all levels and for all portfolios, which will be applied to reporting in Phase III and used regularly as a management tool.

IGX, DG / Directors / Senior Policy Advisor (SPA) / SPMsOngoing

Nuclear and Radiological Security Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:

Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short timeframe. It is recommended that NRS continue on the course it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, at facilities with Category 1 (weapons usable) material.

Agree

This is the approach taken in the GPP Phase III TB Submission. The portfolio will concentrate on working at the most proliferation-significant facilities under Rosatom's purview, including two very large facilities within Rosatom's defence complex. The highest priority will be attached to Russian nuclear facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material.

Director / NRS SPMOngoing
Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:   
(i) Given that the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives, is well managed, and contributes to strengthening relations with other donors, particularly with the US, it is recommended that DFAIT continue the RFWS stream beyond March 31, 2008, and the implementation of Canada's redirection efforts under the multilateral framework of the two Science Centers - the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kyiv (Ukraine)Agree

In the GPP Phase III TB Submission, it is proposed to continue the RFWS stream, working through the two Science Centers, and also with bilateral partners, where cost-effective.

Director / Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) Portfolio SPMOngoing
ii) Given that the involvement by Canadians, particularly in partner projects, increases the chances of long-term sustainability, continuous intellectual threat reduction and science and technology and industrial benefits to Canada, it is recommended that DFAIT remove the budget constraints to allow for more flexibility in RFWS programming, such as contributing part of the costs of collaborating with FSU scientists either through other streams of the Global Partnership Program and/or other programs at DFAIT.Agree

This is the approach taken in the GPP Phase III TB Submission. It is proposed that the GPP be able to contribute towards partner projects, and consideration will be given to establish linkages with other organizations whose objective is to maximize economic benefits to Canada through innovation. Cooperation with other divisions of DFAIT has already increased; in this regard, the GPP is reflected in the new Russia Market Plan, and the Program has established an effective working relationship with the DFAIT Science and Technology Division, including via its "Going Global Program" as a source of support.

RFWS SPM / Senior Business Development Manager (SBDM)FY 2008-09 / Ongoing
 The Phase III TB Submission also proposes that the Biological Non-Proliferation Stream contribute to the ISTC and STCU to fund activities (see below).RFWS / Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP) Portfolio SPMOngoing
(iii) Given that the intellectual threat has evolved to being lower in some regions (e.g. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remaining high in others (eg. biological threat in Central Asia), it is recommended that the RFWS focus on the most proliferation-sensitive institutes including those in other FSU states.Agree

This is the approach taken in the GPP Phase III TB Submission for the RFWS stream. As well, Biological Non-Proliferation stream activities delivered using the Science Centers platform include training, assistance and upgrades to vulnerable facilities in several Central Asian countries.

Director / RFWS / BNP SPMsFY 2008-09 / Ongoing
Biological Non-Proliferation Stream - 2007 Summative Evaluation:   
(i) BNP has thus far achieved a number of important results in a relatively short time frame and in a cost-effective manner that are consistent with the overall objectives of the GPP. Moreover, it is on the cusp of expanding significantly, with current planning underway for the construction of one of two Level-3 Biological Containment Laboratories. These are expected to have a significant impact on program objectives. It is therefore recommended that BNP be continued but at the level of full-stream funding that will allow it to realize its current strategy.Agree

This is the approach taken in the GPP Phase III TB Submission, with full stream funding proposed for the BNP stream, and funding allocated for up to three biocontainment laboratories.

IGX DG / Director / BNP SPMFY 2008-09 / Ongoing
(ii) To allow for improved program planning, it is recommended that BNP have the ability to contribute BNP program funds to the ISTC and/or STCU within the IGX budget. Having such an arrangement would sever its dependence on RFWS for ISTC and STCU access and give BNP the needed authority to allocate resources effectively over the longer term for its diverse initiatives.Agree

In Phase III, it is proposed that BNP have the ability to work directly with and through the two Science Centers.

BNP SPMFY 2008-09 / Ongoing
(iii) The BNP stream has a diverse project portfolio that is set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in the Kyrgyz Republic. To improve oversight of existing initiatives and assist in the delivery of an expanding program, it is recommended that more resources be committed to the FSU region either within the ISTC or in the countries themselves. This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, and allow for quicker responses to issues that will emerge with facility construction.Agree

As the project advances to the construction stage, staff will be added in the field to manage increased activity. ISTC and Embassy personnel will be increasingly leveraged. To date, the assistance of the Embassies in Moscow and Almaty, as well as the two Science Centers, have been very helpful, particularly Embassy support in advancing the Kyrgyz Republic lab project and the bilateral treaty negotiations.

IGX DG / Directors / SPMsOngoing
Recommendation 2:
Reducing threats of WMD in the longer term requires that threat reduction measures put in place by the Global Partnership Program be sustained beyond 2012. It is recommended that:   
(i) A longer term vision for the Global Partnership Program activities beyond 2012 be developed.Agree

The United States has proposed an extension to 2022. All G8 partners agree that WMD threats will not be eliminated by 2012, and as a result, extension will be necessary. At the same time, options for the scope/focus of the extension will need to be put before Canadian and G8 leaders, prior to 2012. These options would of course have significant new resource implications. IGX management will continue work within the G8 to prepare these options for Ministerial and Prime Ministerial consideration in due course.

IGX DG / Senior Policy AdvisorOngoing
 In Phase III, at both the Program and stream levels, measures to ensure the future sustainability of GPP projects beyond 2013 and identify lessons learned (including through the final Summative Evaluation) will be implemented.IGX DG / Directors / SPMsOngoing
(ii) Sustainability of GPP investments, and in particular, the appropriate maintenance and use of Canada-funded projects and facilities in Russia be ensured by the inclusion of strict follow-up monitoring, audit and evaluation procedures by Canada for a certain period beyond the end date of the Global Partnership Program, in the project implementation arrangements. NRS projects are of a particular concern, especially physical protection projects. This should be monitored to ensure the upgrades Canada has provided continue to be used in an effective manner.Agree

As noted above, in Phase III, projects have sustainability as a major feature, particularly in the areas mentioned, including via many provisions of the Canada/Russia Treaty, which remain in effect long after the conclusion of projects.

IGX DG / Directors / SPMsOngoing
 With regard to NRS, sustainability is already an integral part of all physical protection projects, and a robust sustainability strategy is in place to ensure that security upgrades remain effective. Measures include use of indigenous equipment, provision of extended warrantees and spare parts and of operator and maintenance training at facilities receiving upgrades and the development and provision of training courses and laboratories in Obninsk.NRS SPMOngoing
iii) It is also recommended that awareness raising campaigns be directed at senior managers in Canadian organizations (e.g. firms, crown corporations) of the benefits of redirection projects with former weapons scientists, and in particular, the benefits of partner projects which are under the direction of Canadian funding partners in order to advance Canadian R D, as well as to build the sustainability of the RFWS portfolio.Agree

A partner promotion strategy is being developed for Phase III. It will include targeted outreach focussed on collaboration with Science Based Departments and Agencies, industry associations and academia and attendance at major science conferences/related trade shows, along with FWS participation. As well, with the new Russia Market Plan, there may be greater opportunities for synergy of efforts to attract Canadian companies to do business in Russia through partner projects. Increased information to promote the expertise of FWS will be available on the GPP's website, including opportunities for participation in projects.

RFWS SPM / SBDMFY 2008-09 / Ongoing
Recommendation 3:
It is recommended that Embassy personnel in Moscow and Kiev, including Locally Engaged Staff and Canada-paid experts in the Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) be more actively involved in current and future project monitoring activities. This will help improve information flows between the project sites and Ottawa, save long trips from Canada to Russia, and allow for quicker responses to issues as they emerge. This approach will be particularly beneficial for the BNP stream and its diverse project portfolio, set to become more complex with the construction of the containment facility in Kyrgyz Republic. Embassy personnel, specifically on the Trade side, could also support RFWS stream objectives to advance S T and industrial benefits to Canada.Agree

Greater use is already being made of MOSCO Embassy personnel, both Canada Based and Locally Engaged, in monitoring (eg. in NPS and NRS monitoring visits) and in other activities. Further, position changes to ensure operational effectiveness are being put into place. With respect to BNP, under the ISTC Deputy Executive Director, a supplemented monitoring regime has been implemented. The Kiev Embassy has been supportive of STCU-related activities, including the Canada-Ukraine Business Summit (2008), which may produce major commercial and S T benefits.

IGX DG / Directors / SPMs / REE/MissionsFY 2008-09 / Ongoing
 BNP monitoring will be increased as the laboratory project is implemented. In regard to the RFWS stream, trade personnel in the Embassy in Moscow and elsewhere are being leveraged to better support RFWS activity, particularly through advising Canadian companies interested in the Russian market of the opportunities offered by the GPP.BNP SPM / RFWS / SBDMOngoing
Recommendation 4:
It is recommended that IGX consider means of consolidating the achievements of Canada's involvement in the Global Partnership Program in a broader strategic context.

Approaches to be considered in support of this recommendation include:

Agree

This is a timely recommendation, at this midway point of the Program. The role of the GPP has been recognized in the DFAIT PAA as a "Sub-Sub Activity," contributing to the DFAIT strategic outcome that the inter- national agenda is shaped to Canada's benefit and advantage in accordance with Canada's interests and values.

IGX DG / Senior Policy AdvisorOngoing
(i) presentation and assessment in annual reports and reports to TBS by IGX of the overall Global Partnership Program's results in addition to individual stream results to enhance understanding of the Program's broader impact;(i) The Global Partnership Program is now at a steady and growing state of activity, with projects showing real results, offering greater opportunities to showcase the accomplishments of the Program and its contribution to achieving the Government's strategic objectives, particularly in public documents. These broader results will be presented in reports to Treasury Board and Annual Reports, the GPP's website and other outreach materials and activities.IGX DG / SPA / Senior Communications ManagerOngoing
(ii) developing a longer-term vision, post 2012, to ensure sustainability of GPP projects and to scope the next phase of the Global Partnership overall and Canada's role, in particular;(ii) Issues regarding the post-2012 phase of the Global Partnership and Canada's role will be addressed as part of Canada's involvement in the G8 process, with the objective of putting forward Canadian ideas for the future of the Partnership and its activity, and to define Canada's engagement therein. Options will be put forward for ministerial consideration in this regard.DFAIT Senior Management / IGX, DG / SPAOngoing
(iii) identifying potential spin-off and side benefits for Canada in areas such as science and technology and innovation cooperation, collaborative studies and exchanges, in, for example, nuclear research and development (e.g. nuclear waste disposal), and the environment (e.g. climate change impacts on the Arctic);(iii) The Program has made considerable efforts to engage Canadian companies for monitoring and other activities, such as Raytheon Canada for NRS monitoring, Smith Carter for the programming of the Kyrgyz Republic biocontainment laboratory, and Nuclear Safety Solutions for an NPS environmental assessment. RWFS projects are also selected with a view to reflecting Canadian S T R D interests and priorities, including through the use of Canadian collaborators on projects.IGX DG / Directors / SPMsOngoing
 The work of the Program, particularly with respect to Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement and Nuclear and Radiological Security (eg. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators) are contributing to improved environmental protection in the Arctic, by removing potential sources of pollution/proliferationNPS / NRS

SPMs

Ongoing
 From a policy perspective, an important legacy or spin-off benefit is the Global Partnership Program's contribution to other international non-proliferation activities in which Canada is involved, such as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.IGX /SPAOngoing
(iv) increasing the involvement of other departments and agencies through the STTAG and GPAG to build increased constituency of interest in the Program.(iv) In addition to engaging STTAG and GPAG members on a regular basis (eg. latter in annual priority review), the Program has expanded its relationships with OGDs to make use of their interests and expertise, including through formal MOUs. These are also contributing to increased awareness and support of the program.IGX DG / Directors / SPA / SPMsOngoing
Recommendation 5:
Within the Global Partnership, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations. As the security of WMD gets improved in the Russian Federation and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions and areas, such as biological non-proliferation. It is recommended that, if G8 leaders make a decision with regard to the expansion of the Global Partnership Initiative to other regions of the world, consideration be given to Canada's participation in this extended geographic coverage. A longer-term vision for Canada's involvement in activities and projects related to non-proliferation and WMD threat reduction would help DFAIT and IGX, in particular, to preserve and effectively use the expertise and program management capacity of its staff.Agree

Canada is committed to completing its work in Russia and the FSU, where the largest WMD stockpiles are located. Canada is recognized as a leader in all Global Partnership Programming. At the same time, we are only as strong as the weakest facility worldwide, and with this in mind, G8 Leaders have agreed to expand geographically (reaffirmed most recently at the 2007 G8 Summit in Germany). Recommendations will be provided to Ministers this year related to Canada's implementation of the Leaders' decision.

DFAIT Senior Management/ IGX DG / SPAOngoing

2008

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1 Global Partnership Program, Making a Difference, Annual Report 2005-06, DFAIT.

2 Global Partnership Program 2006-2007 Annual Report, Financial Tables Total, February 15, 2007

3 Global Partnership Program, Making a Difference, Annual Report 2005-06, DFAIT

4 Global Partnership Program 2006/07 Strategic Action Plan

5 DFAIT, through RFWS, assumed responsibility for Canada's contribution to the STCU in 2006/07. Previously, these contributions were managed by CIDA.

6 A partner is any entity other than the funding party (i.e., DFAIT) who expresses an interest in funding a project.

7 Although CIDA became a funding party to the STCU in 1994, its support was limited to the Ukraine. DFAIT became a funding party to the ISTC in 2004.

8 The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible.

9 BNP program and BNP stream are interchangeably used in this summative evaluation report. Initially designed as sub-streams of the Global Partnership Program (GPP), BNP and the other four streams of the GPP have developed into full-fledged programs from a design, management and implementation perspective.

10 Note: All funding through ISTC is reported in US dollars.

Office of the Inspector General


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Date Modified:
2012-12-28