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Summative Evaluation - Global Partnership Program Nuclear and Radiological Security

(February 2008)

(PDF Version, 404 KB KB) *


Executive Summary

Introduction

With the dissolution of the USSR, Russia inherited tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and enough nuclear materials for tens of thousands more from the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia acknowledges that it does not have enough resources to account for, monitor, and adequately protect these nuclear materials. The risk that it could be stolen and passed to terrorists or states of proliferation concern constitutes a clear threat to international security.

G8 Leaders at the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis formed the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists, or those who assist them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons and related materials, equipment and technology, collectively known as Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD).

One of the four areas of priority concern identified at the Summit was the "disposition of fissile material." The Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program stream is one of the central components within Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP), mandated to achieve the principles of the Global Partnership by helping to account for, secure, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons and materials, and radiological materials, thus preventing terrorist acquisition and use.

NRS Profile

At the outset of the NRS program, Canada was faced with the need to rapidly implement projects in an environment characterized by little Canadian experience and capacity, extreme sensitivity on the part of recipient countries, and an absence of the necessary international agreements to facilitate cooperation. Therefore, in the early stages, NRS frequently worked through its international partners in funding third party and multilateral projects, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), the U.S. Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) project, and the Norwegian RTG project. As capacity and experience was gained through consultations with international partners and through initial bilateral projects, such as the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI) physical protection project, processes and templates were developed that assisted in subsequent projects. The development of good working relationships and agreements with recipient countries further facilitated the expansion of NRS projects.

The NRS program is now valued at $225M over the period 2003-2013. To date, 24 projects have been defined valued at $186.51M. Four projects worth $13.92 million have been completed, 17 projects worth $89.09 are underway, and three projects worth $83.5 million have not yet started. These projects can be grouped into five sub-areas:

Physical Protection

Fourteen NRS projects are related to enhancing the physical protection and related security infrastructure at nuclear material at five facilities. The work includes detection systems, barrier installations, remote security identification and alarm systems, and related training. These projects are all bilateral with Russian facilities.

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators

Four NRS projects are related to the decommissioning, replacement with alternative power sources, removal and disposal of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs). RTGs have been used as power sources in lighthouses and other navigational devices located in remote areas of Russia since the 1960s and contain highly radioactive material that poses security and environmental risks. Canada has cooperated with the U.S. and Norway in the removal of RTGs, and has worked with Russian facilities to develop a Master Plan for RTG decommissioning and to fabricate containers for RTG shielding and transportation.

Plutonium

Two NRS projects are related to plutonium. In one, Canada is waiting for the finalization of a U.S.-Russian framework agreement in support of Russia's plutonium disposition program that will help convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. Since no money was spent over the period covered by this evaluation, it has not been considered further. In the other project, Canada, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy and other Global Partnership partners, contributed to the construction of a fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk to permit the closure of an outdated weapons-grade plutonium producing nuclear reactor that is the sole source of energy for the region.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Canada has made two contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) of the IAEA. The NSF provides a delivery mechanism for Canada to implement Global Partnership projects in countries of the former Soviet Union where it does not currently have relevant bilateral agreements. Canada's contribution falls within the following three areas: 1) Physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, 2) Detection of malevolent acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, and 3) Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material.

Border Security in Ukraine

Canada has contributed to the enhancement of the capabilities of the Republic of Ukraine to detect and deter the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as to secure radiological sources. Ukraine is one of the most vulnerable pathways for illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. This project is in cooperation with the United States' Second Line of Defence (SLD) Program at the Department of Energy.

Summative Evaluation Objectives and Approach

The purpose of the summative evaluation of the Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program stream within the Global Partnership Program is twofold:

  • To provide an assessment of the program relevance, cost-effectiveness, and results achieved to date; and
  • To provide the information necessary to support the overall summative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program, of which the NRS is an important component.

The summative evaluation questions were developed following Treasury Board guidelines, and are based on the results of the formative evaluation, the outcomes envisioned for the program and its projects at their conception, and the issues identified to date in various progress reports. The evaluation questions have been matched with the questions for the overall GPP summative evaluation to facilitate the roll-up of results. The questions cover the following three areas:

  • Relevance - does the policy, program or initiative continue to be consistent with departmental and government-wide priorities and does it realistically address an actual need?
  • Success - is the policy, program or initiative effective in meeting its objectives, within budget and without unwanted outcomes?
  • Cost-effectiveness - are the most appropriate and efficient means being used to achieve objectives, relative to alternative design and delivery approaches?

Evidence to support analysis of these questions has been obtained through a document review interviews, and a case study.

Findings: Relevance

NRS is even more relevant today than it was at its conception. In the last five years, although the threat from nuclear and radiological materials has decreased where security measures have been improved, the overall threat has increased due to the increasing prevalence of terrorism. While quantification of the threat is difficult, and specifics of the threat are classified, there continue to be all too many examples of major terrorist events. This is a global issue - one in which Canada's international partners feel strongly that Canada has a role to play. The continuing relevance of GPP was reinforced at the 2007 G8 Summit, where Prime Minister Of Canada pushed for continued support of GPP.

On a range of issues, from missile defence to nuclear power for Iran, Russia has recently been stressing its independence from the positions of Western countries. In part, it can do this because of its strong economy and growing wealth. This raises two questions: 1) does Russia need Global Partnership support, and 2) does Russia want Global Partnership support?

In answer to the first question, it is true that Russia can afford a much greater contribution to the Global Partnership objectives than it could in 2002; and, as the Russian economy gets stronger, Russia is making a larger contribution to nuclear security. However, there is continuing evidence that Russia's wealth is not yet finding its way to all Russian facilities that hold nuclear and radiological materials and international support is desperately needed.

In answer to the second question, while Russia evidently values its independence on the international stage, it is clear that at the working level Global Partnership contributions are wanted and valued very highly. In the words of a Russian partner, "the Canadian contribution is definitely needed, thank you." Canada has not encountered evidence that the positive attitude towards the Global Partnership is changing in Russia, although some other countries have had different experiences. Canada continues to enjoy excellent relations with its Russian NRS partners and good access to Russian nuclear facilities.

Russian nuclear and radiological materials continue to be a concern because of the quantity of materials held and the state of much of the infrastructure, in spite of the robust economy. However, as the Global Partnership successfully implements projects there, other areas of the world will emerge as priorities for attention by the Global Partnership.

Findings: Cost Effectiveness

The NRS program implementation model received very favourable reviews from all consulted. Three alternative delivery models have been utilized:

  1. Bilateral - where Canada enters into an agreement/treaty with the country receiving the contribution, and then enters into implementing arrangements with specific facilities located within the country. Currently, Canada only has a bilateral treaty with Russia. Examples include the physical protection projects and some RTG projects;
  2. Third Party - where Canada provides funding to another country, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to the U.S. DOE Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs, and the Norwegian Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) program.
  3. Multilateral - where Canada provides funding to an international organization, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to the IAEA.

Each delivery model has advantages and disadvantages that make it appropriate in some situations, but not others. They have been used appropriately by the NRS program.

All indications are that NRS projects are mutually supportive, with each other and with the projects of other nations working on related projects, in obtaining their intended results.

Canadian operating costs are considered to be among the lowest in the international community. For example, Canada's bilateral projects have smaller project teams and fewer site visits than other countries, which results in lower operating costs. The primary advantage of lower operating costs is that more money is available for projects in Russia, thus contributing more to the mandate of GPP.

In general, the governance structure for NRS is considered appropriate and functions well, providing appropriate programs oversight and coordination. It has been described as "lean, but effective; excellent in all areas, especially compared to programs sponsored by other countries."

Overall, NRS/IGX management was commended by Russia for its efficiency and fast pace implementation (much faster than other countries), quality of documents, and good relationships.

The evaluation found no evidence of duplication of donor projects and programs. Potential duplication is avoided through good coordination and communications among donors.

In the projects reviewed, most of the GPP Project Management Framework procedures have been considered and well documented. The exception to this is the documentation and use of performance indicators. A draft Accountability, Risk and Audit Framework for GPP is currently been developed, but not yet finalized. While logic models exist for each individual NRS project, no logic model has been developed for the entire NRS program. The program would gain from a more strategic approach to program design and a longer-term vision supported by performance measures and targets related to the outcomes and impacts that the program intends to achieve.

Findings: Success

In all cases, projects have been, or are being, implemented as planned, comply with international standards and guidelines, and are being inspected by Canadian experts and certified by Russian authorities.

In some cases there have been delays in schedule for reasons outside of Canada's control, but these delays have been reasonable considering the challenges of working in Russia and the experiences of other countries.

An important issue for the NRS program is sustainability: whether the physical security improvements funded by Canada will be maintained by Russia once the program is finished. Sustainability is considered by NRS when determining upgrades, but assuring sustainability is difficult. Measures have been taken to improve the likelihood that use of Canadian funded upgrades will continue, however this will ultimately depend on Russian authorities providing the required leadership and resources. Canada will need to monitor this issue beyond the current life of the NRS program and possibly provide resources (such as post-warranty support) to ensure that the work of GPP continues to provide benefits into the future.

The physical security of the Russian nuclear facilities where Canada has provided upgrades has improved. However, it has not been possible within this evaluation to determine the degree to which improvements at these facilities have helped addressed the overall physical security problem within the Russian Federation. Such an understanding is critical to assessing the value of Canada's contribution, and should be the focus of program planning and assessment in the future.

The rate of removal and replacement of RTGs has increased, and is expected to increase further in the near future as capacity and experience increases. Canadian contributions have helped replace 15 RTGs, clear bottlenecks in the transportation of RTGs, and develop the Master Plan that coordinates the efforts of donor countries.

Canadian projects have not yet decreased the amount of plutonium at risk. Russia and the U.S. continue to work to finalise a framework agreement for the disposition of 34 tonnes of Russian plutonium. As a result, Canada has not yet made a contribution to direct disposition efforts. Significant progress has been made on the Zheleznogorsk reactor shut down, but until 2011 when that happens, there will not be a decrease in plutonium production.

Border security in Ukraine has been improved as a result of the Canadian contribution to the U.S. Second Line of Defense program. Again, it has not been possible within this evaluation to quantify the degree to which improvements in border security have helped address the overall problem of illegal trade in nuclear and radiological material, and consideration needs to be given to this in the future.

All of Canada's partners at the working level have indicated that cooperation with Canada has gone very well and that Canada is held in the highest regard as a result. This evaluation has not been able to assess the impact that this success has had on Canadian international relations at the political level.

The relationships between DFAIT and Rosatom, Russian facilities, Eleron, and ISTA are good. Russian organizations report "Canadian efforts can be given a high mark. All issues have been solved in a reasonable time. We are completely satisfied with the relationship. This is working better than other countries."

Russia has stated that previous work has provided a good basis for continued cooperation. The projects that Russia has proposed are indicative of the level of trust that has been developed between Russia and Canada.

There have been only minor commercial and scientific benefits to Canada from the NRS program. While this is not a primary objective of the program, there could be more attention given to the possibility of obtaining greater benefits for Canada.

Canada's international partners know and appreciate Canada's contribution at the working level. However, this evaluation has not been able to determine the degree to which Canada's contribution has had an impact on international relations at the political level.

In Russia, as a result of Canada's and other donors' investments, the risks and threats posed by the stockpiles of nuclear and radiological material have been considerably reduced. However, concerns were expressed by some experts and partners that some of the improvements may not be long term, that "there is not much evidence of the Russian government's willingness to fund appropriate maintenance over the long haul." Also, it is not possible for this evaluation to determine the degree to which Canadian and Global Partnerships efforts are making a difference because of the unknown full scope of the problems in Russia.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1:
Continue on current course

Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short time frame. It should continue on the course that it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger bilateral physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, and facilities with Category I (weapons usable) material.

Recommendation 2:
Monitor sustainability

Long-term sustainability of the results of some NRS projects is a concern, especially for the physical protection projects. These should be monitored to ensure that the upgrades funded by Canada continue to be used in an effective manner upon termination of the Canadian NRS program. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the wording of the Implementing Arrangements to ensure that Canada will be given the opportunity to monitor, audit and evaluate its bilateral projects in the long term. The need for monitoring arrangements and resources will extend beyond the current life of GPP.

Recommendation 3:
Improve performance measurement indicators

While most aspects of the GPP Project Management Framework are used effectively, NRS performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, are not being used by NRS for strategic decision making. This issue was highlighted in the 2006 Formative Evaluation; however, it seems that it has not yet been addressed by this program stream. Performance measures must consider the overall degree to which the security of nuclear and radiological material has been improved within Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, the extent to which the security of Canadians has been improved, i.e., the effectiveness of the NRS program, and the difference that Canada's contribution is making in Russia and in Canada.

Recommendation 4:
Enlarge the geographic scope of the Global Partnership

Within the Global Partnership Initiative, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations. When the security of nuclear and radiological materials gets improved in the Russian Federation and the countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions. If the Global Partnership makes such a decision, consideration should be given to using the NRS/IGX expertise and accumulated best practices for Canada's future involvement in similar projects and initiatives.

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Acronyms

CFE
Cost-Free Expert
DFAIT
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DOE
Department of Energy
EWGPP
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
FSU
Former Soviet Union
FSUE "VNIITFA"
Federal State Unitary Enterprise "All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation"
GP
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction
GPP
Global Partnership Program
GTRI
Global Threat Reduction Initiative
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IGX
DFAIT GPP Bureau
INM
Institute of Nuclear Materials
ITEP
Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics
MCC
Mining Chemical Combine
MOD
Ministry of Defence
MOT
Ministry of Transport
MPDG
Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group
NNSA
National Nuclear Security Administration
NRS
Nuclear and Radiological Security
NSF
Nuclear Security Fund
NTI
Nuclear Threat Initiative
PMF
Project Management Framework
PNPI
Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute
PWGSC
Public Works and Government Services Canada
RBAF
Risk Based Audit Framework
RCL
Raytheon Canada Limited
RMAF
Results-based Management and Accountability Framework
RTG
Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator
SLD
Second Line of Defense
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background

With the dissolution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Russia inherited tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and vast quantities of nuclear materials from the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Russia acknowledges that it does not have enough resources to account for, monitor, and adequately protect these nuclear materials. Thus, the risk that these materials could be stolen and passed to terrorists or states of proliferation concern constitutes a clear threat to international security.

G8 Leaders at the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis began to address these concerns in developing the principles guiding the Global Partnership. These principles relate to preventing terrorists, or those who assist them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons and related materials, equipment and technology, collectively known as Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Among these principles are: developing and maintaining appropriate measures to account for and secure WMD in use, storage and transport; developing and maintaining secure storage facilities for WMD; strengthening boarder controls, law enforcement and international cooperation to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD; and strengthening efforts to reduce stockpiles of WMD.

One of the areas of priority concern identified at the Summit was the disposition of fissile material. The Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program is one of the five streams of Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP), which is mandated to achieve the principles of the G8 Global Partnership initiative by helping to account for, secure, and eventually eliminate, nuclear weapons and radiological materials, thus preventing terrorist acquisition and use of such.

1.2 NRS Summative Evaluation Approach

The purpose of the summative evaluation of the Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program within DFAIT's Global Partnership Program is twofold:

  1. To provide an assessment of the relevance of the program, its cost-effectiveness, and the results achieved to date; and
  2. To provide the information necessary to support the overall summative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program, of which the NRS is an important component.

1.2.1 NRS Summative Evaluation Matrix

The summative evaluation questions (outlined in Table 1 below) were developed following Treasury Board guidelines, and are based on the outcomes envisioned for the program and its projects at their conception, and the issues identified to date in various progress reports. The evaluation questions have been coordinated with the questions for the overall GPP summative evaluation to facilitate the roll-up of results. The questions are of three types:

  • Relevance - does the policy, program or initiative continue to be consistent with departmental and government-wide priorities and does it realistically address an actual need?
  • Success - is the policy, program or initiative effective in meeting its objectives, within budget and without unwanted outcomes?
  • Cost-effectiveness - are the most appropriate and efficient means being used to achieve objectives, relative to alternative design and delivery approaches?

Evidence to support analysis of these questions has been obtained through file and document review, interviews, and a case study. The various lines of enquiry for each evaluation question are indicated in Table 1.

Table 1: NRS Summative Evaluation Matrix
Evaluation QuestionsDocument ReviewCase StudyInterviews
DFAITRussian FacilitesRosatom, VNIITFAInt'l PlayersRaytheonCNSCIAEA
Relevance
1. To what extent are the NRS strategic priorities, activities and outcomes still relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives? Have the threats posed by nuclear and radioactive materials stored in Russia and FSU states changed?XXX    X 
2. How have changes, if any, in the international policy environment since inception affected NRS activities and priorities?XXXXXX XX
Cost Effectiveness
3. Is the current program implementation model still appropriate? What is the benefit of delivering projects through IAEA, SLD, GTRI, and Norway? What alternative models were considered?XXXXXXXXX
4. Are the NRS projects mutually supportive in obtaining the intended results?XXX XX XX
5. Are the operating costs appropriate to the complexities of the projects?XXX  XXXX
6. To what extent does the governance structure for NRS provide the appropriate program oversight, coordination, and roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities?XXXXXXXXX
7. What are the strengths and weaknesses of NRS program management in terms of project selection, oversight and control, risk management, and knowledge and skills?

Are best practices supported and corrective actions taken?

XXXXXXX X
8. Does the current process encourage cooperation among other donors and like-minded countries? How effective is this cooperation? Has there been any duplication with other relevant G8 programs?XXXXXX  X
9. How appropriate is the performance measurement system of the NRS? What is the quality of information and how is it used to prioritize activities and inform the decision making process? To what extent do the RMAF, RBAF, Accountability Framework, and Project Management Framework continue to be relevant today and what revisions, if any, are needed?XXX  X  X
Success
10. What results have been achieved to date and are they consistent with the intended outcomes of the NRS? Has the NRS been able to achieve strategic leveraging of resources to maximize results? What have been the facilitating and impeding factors to the success of NRS? Are there any unintended results?

Indicators:

  • Projects are implemented and comply with international standards and guidelines, and sustainability is considered.
  • Enhanced bilateral relationship between DFAIT and Russia, the United States, and Ukraine on Global Partnership issues is enhanced, contributing to the improvement of Canadian international relations;
  • Relationships are enhanced between DFAIT, Rosatom, the nuclear facilities, Eleron, and ITSA, MOD, MOT, IAEA, and the Global Partnership partners.
  • Increased rate of removal and replacement of RTGs.
  • The projects act as building blocks with Russian partners for future related projects.
  • Commercial benefits for Canadian companies (advisory services, oversight work).
XXXXXXXXX
11. To what extent has NRS contributed to Canada's visibility, credibility and influence in the area of WMD threat reduction? Is Russia, as a result of Canadian investments, more securely embarked on the path to reduce risks and threats posed by their stockpiles of WMD?XXXXXXXXX
12. What are the lessons learned for Canada from NRS in terms of: Creating a Canadian capacity to significantly secure and eliminate WMD? Increasing Canada's visibility in efforts to reduce WMD? Enhancing Canada's relationship with the U.S., Russia and other G8 nations? Enhancing environmental protection?XXXXXXXXX

1.2.2 Data Collection

Interviews

Interviews were conducted with 41 people, as outlined below in Table 2.

Table 2: Organizational Involvement in Projects
OrganizationNumber of Interviewees
DFAIT/IGX2
Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute9
VNIIFTA8
Kurchatov Institute4
Nuclear Threat Initiative2
Rosatom5
Raytheon Canada Limited3
Department of Energy4
Department of State1
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited2
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission1
Total41

Interview guides were developed for each interview group and sent to the respondent in advance of the interview. Most interviews were conducted in person in Ottawa, Washington, Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Case Study

A case study was prepared of the physical protection project at the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI). This project was chosen for the following reasons:

  • Canada intends to focus on physical protection projects in the future;
  • Physical protection projects are implemented under bilateral mechanisms with Russia. Therefore, Canada has a degree of control in these projects that is not possible under third party and multilateral mechanisms; and
  • PNPI's access procedures enable it to accommodate a site visit. As this facility falls under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences rather than Rosatom, the access procedures were more flexible.

Site Visits

The interviews and case study related to NRS were supported by site visits to Washington, Moscow and St. Petersburg.

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2.0 NRS Projects

The Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) program is valued at $225M over the period 2003-2013. To date, 24 projects have been defined, valued at $186.51M. Spending over the period 2003-04 to 2006-07 is shown in Table 3. Expected expenditures for the period 2007-08 to 2012-13 are shown in Table 4.

Table 3: Actual Expenditures, NRS ($000's)
VoteFY 2003/04FY 2004/05FY 2005/06FY 2006/07Total
Vote 1 - Operating Costs$64.2$187.3$581.9$1,878.5$2,711.9
Vote 10 - Transfer Payments$2,993.5$10,016.5$640.1$11,989.2$25,639.3
Total$3,057.7$10,203.8$1,222.013,867.7$28,351.2
Table 4: Expected Expenditures, NRS ($000's)
VoteFY 2007/08FY 2008/09FY 2009/10FY 2010/11FY 2011/12FY 2012/13Total
Vote 1 - Operating$2,802$2,750$2,750$2,750$2,750$2,750$16,552
Vote 10 - Transfer$20,274$25,830$20,430$22,055$25,000$32,805$146,394
Total$23,076$28,580$23,180$24,805$27,750$35,555$162,946

2.1 Physical Protection

In addition to its nuclear weapons stockpile, Russia possesses at least 600 tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear material, of which less than 25% is properly secured against theft and sabotage. In its bilateral cooperation with Russia, the NRS focus is primarily on projects to improve the security of this nuclear material through the provision of physical protection upgrades at nuclear sites.

Most projects begin with Rosatom proposing new project sites to Canada for consideration, including sites within the closed nuclear cities where the majority of vulnerable nuclear material is located. A successful foundation has now been created for cooperation between Canada and Rosatom, the main custodian of Russia's nuclear materials, in addition to other partners, including the Russian Academy of Sciences. Initial resistance from Russian government partners to cooperation projects with Canada in the area of nuclear and radiological security has been overcome following high-level meetings with DFAIT's senior management and the successful relationships building approach of the Global Partnership Bureau (IGX) and the NRS team.

Canada's first Implementing Arrangement for a physical protection project was signed in October 2005 with the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI), which formed a template for the legal mechanisms to ensure effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all future physical protection projects. Fourteen projects now exist related to enhancing the physical protection and related security infrastructure for nuclear material at five facilities: the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI), the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (ITEP), the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC), the Mayak Production Association (Mayak PA), and the Institute of Nuclear Materials (INM). While the majority of the facilities are under the authority of Rosatom, PNPI is under the authority of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The physical protection upgrades strengthen the security of weapons-grade (Category I) nuclear materials against theft and unauthorized access. These physical protection upgrades include but are not limited to detection systems, barrier installations, remote security identification and alarm systems, and related training. The Russian facility implements the upgrades through subcontractors such as Eleron and ITSA, while Canada monitors the implementation. Project management, advisory and monitoring services are provided by Raytheon Canada Limited. Within the G8 community, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany are funding similar work at Russian nuclear facilities. Canada's program, however, is the second largest in terms of funding, next to that of the United States.

In the future, following the 2006 Strategic Priority Review of Canada's Global Partnership Program, NRS will focus on larger projects, at fewer facilities, mainly in closed cities, and containing Category I (weapons-grade) material.

2.2 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators

Currently, four NRS projects are related to the decommissioning, replacement with alternative power sources, removal and disposal of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs). RTGs have been used as power sources in lighthouses and other navigational devices located in remote areas of Russia since the 1960s. RTGs contain highly radioactive material that poses security and environmental risks. There have been more than ten cases of vandalism for metal. Although in all cases to date the radioisotope heat source was recovered, securing and disposing of RTGs lowers the terrorist threat significantly and improves the safety of personnel and physical protection of the environment. Information reviewed for this evaluation indicated that the threat posed by RTGs is difficult to quantify: it is deemed to be both lessened and increased by their remote location: on the one hand, they are difficult to access, but on the other - they are usually poorly monitored.

The RTG-powered lighthouses in Russia are managed by Russia's Ministry of Defence (MOD) or Ministry of Transport (MOT), in conjunction with Rosatom. There are close to 800 RTGs scattered throughout the Russian Federation, although it is believed that not all of the RTGs are presently accounted for.

A number of countries, including the United States, Norway, Germany, Denmark, and France have engaged with the decommissioning of RTG. Canada's input has helped to reduce the threat posed by RTGs in a number of ways, including:

  • In cooperation with Norway, Canada funded the removal, and replacement with solar panels, of five RTGs in the Arkhangelsk region.
  • In cooperation with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) of the United States' Department of Energy (DOE), Canada is funding the removal and replacement of ten RTGs. GTRI identifies, secures, removes and/or facilitates the disposition of vulnerable, high-risk nuclear and other radiological materials around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and the international community. One of its activities focuses on securing radiological sources and it has now retrieved more than 60 RTGs.
  • Canada contributed to the infrastructure needed to remove, secure and replace RTGs by funding the manufacture of transportation and shielding containers by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation" (FSUE "VNIITFA"). Under the project, VNIITFA has manufactured 17 transportation containers: 3 of type IEV1 now in use, and 14 of Type IEV2 that will be used shortly. They have also fabricated 16 shielding containers, and 20 slings for lifting the transportation containers.
  • Canada funded the creation of a Master Plan for RTGs by the Kurchatov Institute that is now being used by relevant Russian agencies and organizations, as well as all donor countries to help efficiently address the RTG issue. The Institute coordinated participation of all Russian agencies and organizations involved with RTGs in the development of the Master Plan, including Rosatom, MOT, MOD, VNIITFA, Mayak PA, and other relevant Russian agencies and organizations.

2.3 Plutonium

2.3.1 Plutonium Disposition Plans

Two NRS projects are related to plutonium. In one, Canada is waiting for the United States and Russia to conclude an agreement in support of Russia's plutonium disposition program that will help convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. A decision has been made by Canada to commit money for this project; however the project has not yet started.

The Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group (MPDG) was a G8 working group set up in 2002 to decide on the conditions for carrying out the Russian weapons-grade plutonium disposal program. In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation concluded an agreement declaring that each had 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium in surplus to defence requirements. This agreement provides for the destruction of these stocks of plutonium in Russia and the United States over a fifteen-year period. The Russian section of this program will be partially financed by the U.S., with the possibility of other contributions as part of the G8 Global Partnership.

In late 2001, implementation of the American side of this program went ahead. In July 2006, Russia announced that the program will start by consuming the plutonium in the BN 600 rapid reactor.

The issue of civil and nuclear responsibility between the Russians and Americans was resolved by the signature of a special bilateral agreement in July 2006, in which the two countries have agreed on the final framework for this project. The official announcement is expected in the near future.

Attempts to implement the agreement through the MPDG were recently ended and the U.S. and Russia have agreed that they will pursue the agreement bilaterally. Other donors funds will also be contributed through the U.S. to the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) program. There is also a possibility that funds could be provided through the IAEA, who may be involved in the verification of disposition.

2.3.2 Zheleznogorsk Reactor Shutdown

In the other project, Canada, in cooperation with U.S. DOE and other Global Partnership partners, contributed to the construction of a fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk to permit the closure of an outdated weapons-grade plutonium producing nuclear reactor that is the sole source of energy for the region. The Zheleznogorsk project is part of the broader EWGPP program within the Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction of the United States Department of Energy (DOE).

The purpose of the EWGPP program is the permanent shutdown of the last three operating Russian nuclear reactors that produce weapons-grade plutonium. The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed to halt their production of plutonium, and have been cooperating for the past decade to close their plutonium production facilities. In Russia, ten of these plutonium reactors have been shut down, while three (two at Seversk and one at Zheleznogorsk) remain in operation.

These three reactors are not only proliferation threats; they also pose a significant nuclear safety risk. The design of the reactors predates that of the Chornobyl plant, and is one of the least safe designs in operation today. Under the EWGPP program, the United States is providing support to the Russian Federation for the construction of replacement fossil fuel energy plants in exchange for the permanent shutdown of these plutonium reactors. DOE contracted with U.S. firms to oversee the work, all of which will be carried out by Russian contractors and subcontractors.

The reactor at Zheleznogorsk will be shut down by 2011. The total project cost is capped at $US 443 million. The Canadian contribution of $9 M over the period 2004 to 2006 was used for civil/structural design, installation of temporary facilities, and utilities and site preparation. Canadian and U.K. contributions kept the project alive during a period of funding shortages within the U.S. program and have allowed time for DOE to promote the project to U.S. funding sources.

2.4 International Atomic Energy Agency

In March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a three-year plan of activities in the area of nuclear security and the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), to which Member States were called upon to contribute. The NSF was established to support the implementation of nuclear security activities to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. As a result of the success of the first plan, a second Nuclear Security Plan (2006-09) was developed. The implementation of these Nuclear Security Plans is almost wholly dependent on the donation of extra budgetary funds by Member States and others to the NSF and on in-kind contributions. Canada, for instance, contributed $4 million to each Nuclear Security Plan, for a total of $8 million.

The IAEA has consolidated most of the Agency's nuclear security related activities into one program. With the exception of a small Regular Budget component, most funding comes from the NSF. Safety programs and the Safeguards Program, in particular, include activities that, while established to support safeguards and safety objectives, also support the objectives of the nuclear security program. These programs are largely funded by the IAEA Regular Budget and supported by other extra budgetary contributions but funds from the NSF are used to enhance or accelerate implementation of these activities for nuclear security purposes.

The NSF provides a delivery mechanism for Canada to implement Global Partnership projects in countries of the former Soviet Union where it does not currently have relevant bilateral agreements. Canada's contribution falls within the following three areas: 1) Physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials; 2) Detection of malevolent acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; and 3) Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material.

Canada is also funding one Cost-Free Expert (CFE) position in the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security to assist with the implementation of the NSF projects.

2.5 Border Security in Ukraine

Canada has contributed to the enhancement of the capabilities of the Republic of Ukraine to detect and deter the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as to secure radiological sources. This project is in cooperation with the United States' Second Line of Defence (SLD) Program within the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in DOE.

SLD works to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material by securing international land borders, seaports and airports that may be used as smuggling routes for materials needed for a nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device. In order to improve border security, SLD provides fixed and handheld equipment, related communications tools, and training for personnel to enhance sustainability in equipment use and interdiction procedures at borders and crossing points. SLD has installed monitoring equipment in more than 20 countries in the Baltic region, Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean regions.

Ukraine is one of the most vulnerable pathways for illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Through this project(1), Canada has contributed $4.9 M to the DOE for improvements to Ukrainian border security, including the provision of fixed and handheld equipment, related communications tools, and training for personnel to enhance sustainability in equipment use and interdiction procedures at borders and crossing points.

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3.0 NRS Relevance

3.1 Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives

Findings:
NRS strategic priorities, activities and outcomes continue to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives. The threats sought to be mitigated by the project have increased. In response to the increasing threat, the NRS budget has been increasing and NRS has been given a stronger focus.

NRS is even more relevant today than it was at its conception. In 2001, the events of 9/11 had shown the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In the last five years, although the threat from nuclear and radiological materials has decreased where security measures have been improved, the overall threat has increased due to the increasing prevalence of terrorism. While quantification of the threat is difficult, and specifics of the threat are classified, there continue to be all too many examples of major terrorist events in places such as London, Spain, and Russia. More incidents of trafficking of nuclear materials have been recorded and key routes are becoming obvious (e.g. Ukraine). This is a global issue, one in which Canada's international partners feel strongly that Canada has a role to play.

The continuing relevance of GPP was reinforced at the 2007 G8 Summit, where Prime Minister Of Canada expressed continued support of GPP (Text Box 1), and previously Minister of Foreign Affairs McKay announced $5M for the U.S. Second Line of Defense program (Text Box 2).

Text Box 1: G8 Press Release

"Leaders took the opportunity of their annual statement on non-proliferation to reaffirm their common resolve to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). G8 members underlined their commitment to international efforts in this area, particularly in the face of challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea. The statement calls on all States to abide by international non-proliferation treaties and signals the G8's willingness to help countries that require assistance to meet treaty obligations."

"Canada has taken a lead role in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in 2002. With its commitment of up to $1 billion over 10 years and its success in project implementation, Canada is, with the United States, the best performer under this G8 initiative."

PMO Press Release, the 2007 G8 Summit, 8 June 2007, Heiligendamm, Germany

Text Box 2: SLD Press Release

DFAIT Press Release, May 7, 2007 (7:20 p.m. EDT), No. 65

Canada Announces $5 Million to upgrade border and airport security in Ukraine to Prevent Nublear Terrorism

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, today announced a contribution of $5 million to upgrade security systems at airports and other border crossings in Ukraine to prevent nuclear terrorism. The announcement was made following a bilateral meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Ukrainian counterpart, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, during Mr. Yatsenyuk's visit to Canada.

"We are pleased to be working together with Ukraine on this endeavour," said the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "To prevent nuclear terrorism, it is essential to upgrade security systems and address the legacy of risks left in countries of the former Soviet Union. The last opportunity to detect and deter the movement of these materials is often at international borders."

This contribution is part of Canada's commitment to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by the G8 in 2002 under Canada's leadership. The Global Partnership addresses a number of non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear security issues, initially in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Canada has committed up to $1 billion over 10 years to the Partnership.

This project will be implemented through an agreement with the Second Line of Defense program of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. The U.S. Department of Energy has worked for nearly a decade to improve border security in several countries of the former Soviet Union.

In response to the increasing threat of nuclear terrorism, the NRS budget has been increasing and has been given a stronger focus. A similar change of focus has occurred in the U.S.

3.2 International Policy Environment

Findings:
Russia has recently been stressing its independence from the positions of Western countries. This has not yet affected NRS activities and priorities, but may in the future.

On a range of issues, from missile defence to nuclear power for Iran, Russia has recently been stressing its independence from the positions of Western countries. In part, it can do this because of its strong economy and growing wealth. This raises two questions: 1) does Russia need global partnership support; and 2) does Russia want Global Partnership support?

In answer to the first question, it is true that Russia can afford a much greater contribution to the Global Partnership objectives than it could in 2002; and, as the Russian economy gets stronger, Russia is making more of a contribution to nuclear security (although, in projects such as Zheleznogorsk, the contribution is in-kind, rather than monetary). However, there is continuing evidence that Russia's wealth is not yet finding its way to all Russian facilities that hold nuclear and radiological materials. This was made quite clear from the evaluation team's visit to the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI). Although nuclear material at PNPI has been secured as a result of Canadian and U.S. efforts, the overall security infrastructure of the facility remains in a poor condition and further international support is desperately needed.

In answer to the second question, while Russia evidently values its independence on the international stage, it is clear that, at the working level, the Global Partnership contributions are both wanted and valued very highly. Canada has not encountered evidence that the positive attitude towards the Global Partnership is changing in Russia, although some other countries have had different experiences. Canada continues to enjoy excellent relations with its Russian NRS partners and good access to Russian nuclear facilities, for a number of reasons, including: Canada's respect of Russian values; Canada has kept its promises; and, especially in contrast to the U.S. and Britain, Canada has a small, low profile program.

Russian nuclear and radiological materials continue to be a concern because of the quantity of materials held and, in spite of the stronger Russian economy, the state of much of the security infrastructure. However, as the Global Partnership successfully implements projects in Russia, other areas of the world are emerging as priorities for attention concerning nuclear and radiological materials by the Global Partnership.

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4.0 NRS Cost Effectiveness

4.1 Implementation Models

Findings:
The current program implementation model is still appropriate. Delivering projects through IAEA, SLD, GTRI, and Norway is quick, easy, and efficient; gives Canada access to countries with which is does not have agreements in place, and increases the integration of international efforts.
  1. Bilateral - where Canada enters into an agreement/treaty with the country receiving the contribution, and then enters into implementing arrangements with specific facilities located within the country. Currently, Canada only has a bilateral treaty with Russia. Examples include the physical protection projects and some RTG projects;
  2. Third Party - where Canada provides funding to another country, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to the U.S. DOE GTRI and SLD programs, and the Norwegian RTG program.
  3. Multilateral - where Canada provides funding to an international organization, which then provides a contribution to the recipient country. Examples include contributions to IAEA.

Each delivery model has advantages and disadvantages that make it appropriate in some situations, but not others. These are reviewed below.

4.1.1 Bilateral

Bilateral projects provide Canada with opportunities for more control and visibility. However, they also require more work, knowledge of how to implement projects, and that agreements be in place with recipient countries, as well as with individual nuclear facilities.

Bilateral projects have been the approach chosen for physical protection, and they have also been used in two of the RTG projects: RTG Transportation Infrastructure and the RTG Master Plan.

At the outset of the NRS program, Canada benefited from discussions with its international partners in GP, particularly the U.S. and U.K., on how to design and implement projects. Canada now has considerable experience and its projects are considered models of how to implement bilateral projects by Russia and the other GP countries.

While bilateral projects require more overhead than Third Party and Multilateral projects, Canada is considered to have lower overheads than other countries (see Section 4.3 below).

Bilateral projects have not been conducted in countries outside of Russia, such as Ukraine because Canada does not yet have the appropriate agreements in place to make the projects possible. In such cases, Canada uses other mechanisms such as working through the IAEA and U.S. DOE are available.

4.1.2 Third Party

Third party projects provide Canada with a quick, easy, and efficient way to implement projects in recipient countries. However, for such projects to be implemented, there must be a level of trust between Canada and the implementing country that the projects will comply with Canadian standards. The downside of this approach is that in some cases, in some cases, Canada may not be able to receive respective international recognition for its contribution when the money is managed by another country (see Section 5.3). Russian authorities shared with the Evaluation Team their preference to work with Canada directly through bilateral mechanisms rather than through third parties.

Canada has been involved as a Third Party with the U.S. in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative for RTGs and the Second Line of Defense for border security in the Ukraine. Such projects contribute to improving Canada-U.S. relations, a key priority of the Government of Canada. In these projects, Canada also relies on the robust management structure, implementation mechanisms and procedures already established the U.S. DOE and approved by Russia. Under these agreements with the U.S., all Canadian money is spent in the recipient country. No Canadian money is used for U.S. overhead.

As noted earlier, in the case of Ukraine, Canada does not have agreements in place allowing Canadian involvement through a bilateral mechanism. However, National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) authorities are eager to work with Canada through third party arrangements and have provided a list of benefits (Text Box 3) and reasons indicating why this approach is worth to be considered by Canada.

Canada has also been involved as a Third Party with Norway in removing, decommissioning, securing, and replacing RTGs. This project is considered cost-effective for Canada, since Canada's contribution is going towards implementation in Russia only, rather than to cover management overhead expenses.

4.1.3 Multilateral

Multilateral projects provide Canada many of the benefits of Third Party implementation, plus the benefits of a highly integrated and coordinated international effort. Canada's main NRS multilateral involvement is with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). Contributing funds to the IAEA allows the Global Partnership Program team to help implement NSF projects in other former Soviet Union republics with which Canada does not have bilateral treaties. Currently, IAEA NSF projects are implemented in countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. Canada is the second largest contributor, which gives the country clout at the IAEA on other international issues and priorities, such as Iran, technical cooperation fund direction, internal funding, security focus, etc.

As in the case of the third party projects, multilateral projects also require a level of trust that the implementing organization will ensure the appropriate standards and monitor their implementation. In the case of the IAEA, reports to Canada have not always been on time, particularly in the beginning (due to the lengthy approval process), but this situation has significantly improved in the last two years.

Text Box 3: Benefits of Using NNSA's Funding Mechanism
  • Enables a contributor country to support a nuclear security and/or nonproliferation activity that is in its national security interest without the need for management infrastructure to support and oversee the project.
  • Provides for leveraging of limited funds to address a significant nuclear security and/or nonproliferation issue.
  • Provides an opportunity for a contributor country to support a nuclear security and/or nonproliferation activity that it may not be able to fund independently.
  • Provides a contributor country membership status in a significant nuclear security project with its peers.
  • Provides buy-in and international visibility at limited cost to the contributor country.
  • Enables a contributor country to support and address a nonproliferation activity in a country with whom it does not have a "government to government agreement" or where other political limitation restricts direct support.
  • Provides an opportunity for the contributor country to report success for its support of and achievements in nonproliferation and seek credit towards G8 Global Partnership pledges.
  • Eliminates time consuming and expensive duplication of effort needed to establish terms of reference, contracts, reporting protocols, site access etc.
  • Offers an opportunity to a contributor country to commit funds quickly that may otherwise be transferred to activities not related to nonproliferation.
  • Increases the probability for project success.
  • Provides, in some cases, liability indemnification that otherwise may not be available.
  • Provides tangible results and credit accrual to nations who on their own might not be able to make a meaningful contribution. This could, in turn, generate within their individual countries yet additional future funds to be made available for similar future projects.

4.2 Mutual Support

Findings:
NRS projects are mutually supportive in obtaining the intended results.

The evaluation revealed that NRS projects are mutually supportive, with each other and with the projects of other nations, in obtaining their intended results.

NRS projects are developed with consideration of experiences and achievements in previous Canadian projects, and are developed in consultation with Russian authorities and international partners to ensure that the most critical needs are met first, e.g. the most vulnerable facilities are first secured.

With respect to RTGs, in particular, Canada was instrumental in improving international cooperation by supporting the development of the RTG Master Plan, which provides a road map to the decommissioning and replacement of RTGs. Norway and the U.S. are also involved, and some interest is being shown by France. Russia is now trying to attract other donors, with the U.K., Germany, and Denmark expressing interest.

4.3 Operating Costs

Finding
Operating costs are appropriate to the complexities of the projects.

Canadian operating costs are considered to be among the lowest in the international community. These lower operating costs are as a result of Canada's third party project results having no direct operating costs, and its bilateral projects having smaller project teams and fewer site visits than other countries.

The primary advantage of lower operating costs is that more money is available for projects in Russia, thus contributing more to the mandate of GPP.

4.4 Governance Structure

To what extent does the governance structure for NRS provide the appropriate program oversight, coordination, and roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities?

Figure 1: NRS Governance Structure

Figure 1 illustrates the governance structure for the NRS Stream

The evaluation team found that the governance structure for NRS is appropriate for the projects and activities of this program, well-functioning and facilitating the necessary program oversight and coordination. Interviewees have described NRS governance as "lean, but effective; excellent in all areas, especially compared to programs sponsored by other countries." There is seen to be clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities among the team.

Reporting within the team has many facets. On physical protection projects, for example:

  • The Raytheon Canada Limited (RCL) team prepares reports after visits to Russian sites and on a weekly, monthly and annual basis. Site visit reports identify negotiated milestone completion dates and costs in accordance with Canada/Russia Implementing Arrangements and report completion status against these targets. Milestones include acquisition of equipment and materials, delivery of equipment and materials, installation of physical protection systems, testing, and training.
  • Weekly status review meetings are held with the entire team (DFAIT, RCL, and RCL subcontractors).
  • Weekly review meetings are held between RCL and its subcontractors.
  • Weekly review meetings are held within the RCL support team.
  • Weekly reports provide forward-looking targets for several key tasks for the year and track weekly accomplishments by the team (NRS/IGX, RCL and subcontractors).
  • Individual monthly reports are produced for Program Management and each of the 5 sites in Russia.
  • Individual annual reports are produced for Program Management and each of the 5 sites in Russia.

A concern was expressed by RCL that there may be a requirement for too much detail, at times, in this reporting.

Another concern was related to the current service agreement between PWGSC, DFAIT and Raytheon Canada Limited (RCL), which restricts RCL's flexibility to utilize the appropriate project support resources. According to RCL interviewees, quarterly program reviews by IGX would be helpful to RCL in understanding and anticipating future requirements. RCL would be willing to undertake additional oversight responsibilities in order to allow NRS/IGX to focus more on strategy.

On other bilateral and third party projects, such as with VNIITFA and the U.S. DOE, DFAIT receives monthly reports, regular meetings, and responses to ad hoc questions in order to monitor project performance.

4.5 Program Management

Finding:
Best practices in program management are supported and corrective actions taken as necessary.

Program management of multilateral and third party projects primarily involves the review of regular reports from the implementing agency. The following analysis concerns the bilateral projects over which IGX has the most involvement and control. Many of these are physical protection projects in which RCL is involved for project oversight. Overall, NRS/IGX management was commended by Russia for its "efficiency and fast pace (much faster than other countries), quality of documents, and good relationships."

Program Management:

The NRS technical support program was developed after meetings with international experts who work in the area of international nuclear material protection, control and accountability. NRS/IGX sought both the advice of international subcontractors and U.S. Department of Energy input (lessons-learned/best practices) prior to developing the technical program requirements in the areas of program management documentation, reporting requirements, and team/site communication plans. These organizations were also consulted for best practices in the composition and structure of the site technical team. NRS/IGX has also incorporated existing federal program requirements, such as the Risk Registry, into the NRS design. NRS/IGX and the Russian Federation began their cooperation on two smaller, less complex, sites so that NRS/IGX gained practical Russian Federation experience prior to assisting at very large and complex sites in order to gain first-hand experience in working on Russian facilities prior to engaging with larger and more complex projects. This process was invaluable to NRS/IGX in the further development of their program management approach. The NRS program has also benefited from RCL's program management experience in leading teams and providing technical services on multi-disciplined programs, and in particular from their expertise in nuclear facility protection and security systems.

Project Selection:

NRS project selection involves consultations with recipient countries and other countries to determine needs, which are then evaluated against Canadian priorities. The process for physical protection project selection is indicative of the process followed for all NRS projects. NRS/IGX meets with officials of the Russian Federation (Rosatom) on a routine basis to review potential new cooperation projects. NRS/IGX undertakes an extensive analysis of the cooperation projects proposals to determine project priority lists (greatest potential risk reduction) based on the best available information. As part of this process, NRS/IGX consults with RCL technical experts as well as other appropriate parties. NRS/IGX then notifies Rosatom which cooperation projects they are willing to consider supporting. NRS/IGX then undertakes a scoping visit, along with RCL technical experts, to further assess the proposed cooperation project. NRS/IGX and the facility then begin negotiations on the scope of work to be carried out. In many cases, project selection is constrained, since Russian cooperation and guidance is required. NRS/IGX is currently finalizing a project selection criteria guidance document to aid in the formal site evaluation process for future project selection.

Oversight and Control:

NRS/IGX is very active in program development and implementation of best practices in order to improve the program management and cost effectiveness. Weekly telecoms are conducted to ensure clear communications and direction to project participants, such as RCL and RCL sub-contractors. Monthly teleconferences are conducted with the Russian facility, NRS/IGX and RCL sub-contractors. The routine communication results in real time feedback and management decisions for any potential programmatic issue. The NRS Senior Program Manager oversees all NRS/IGX projects, with the support of the Nuclear Security Advisor, two Ottawa-based Program Officers and a Program Assistant, as well as a Moscow-based Program Officer. Each Ottawa-based Program Officer is responsible for overseeing the daily operations related to specific projects.

Risk Management:

Routine and clear communications with all stakeholders (RCL, NRS/IGX, Russian facilities, Rosatom, others) is encouraged and practiced in order to manage project risk. If an issue arises, NRS is very quick to arrange a meeting and develop a path forward to reduce or eliminate project risk. NRS/IGX has also integrated a Risk Management Plan (risk registry, risk matrix, and risk mitigation actions) into each project. These activities help document and mitigate project risk on a routine basis, and corrective actions are taken as required. As part of the monthly reports on each cooperation project, the risk management plan is reviewed. The Risk Management Plan is also reviewed after every cooperation project visit.

Knowledge and Skills:

NRS and RCL are using subcontractors who have previous international/Russian Federation nuclear material protection, control and accounting experience in order to support the DFAIT/RCL contract. NRS/IGX developed the technical expert requirements based on the best practices of other international Russian Federation site teams.

Lessons-learned are developed from every trip and used to improve best practices. Although IGX had, at the outset of the NRS program, limited experience in managing programs that provide technical services, it has provided strong program management leadership and technical expert knowledgeable in nuclear facilities.

4.6 Donor Cooperation

Findings:
The current consultation processes encourage cooperation among donors and like-minded countries. The cooperation is effective and no duplication with other relevant G8 programs has been found.

The evaluation found out that the Global Partnership is based on donor cooperation, and there is no duplication of efforts and projects. Duplication is avoided through good communication among donors. For example, IAEA donor cooperation meetings have 30+ countries represented, and major donor side meetings beforehand involving Canada, U.S., Germany, France, Japan, Australia.

Cooperation with the U.S. is complicated by the breadth and depth of their activities in nuclear security - activities which predate the Global Partnership and extend well beyond the current geographical focus of the Global Partnership to over 90 countries. U.S. activities are spread across a number of departments, principally the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State (DOE 40%, DOD 40%, State 20%). Over the last five years, there has been a rationalization of these activities and activities are now better organized and coordinated, especially in DOE where all nuclear non-proliferation programs are currently integrated. However, the Global Partnership Initiative as a whole is managed for the U.S. by the Department of State. DOE projects in the area of NRS in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are submitted to the Department of State for credit under the Global Partnership. Initially, some DOE projects had duplicated some IAEA projects in specific instances; now the U.S., EU, and IAEA have regular coordination meetings to avoid duplication of effort and funding.

The Master Plan for RTGs, funded by Canada, has made a substantial contribution to donor cooperation in this area, and "is in great demand by the U.S., Germany, France, Sweden, and Canada."

4.7 Performance Measurement

Findings:
The NRS stream has not yet developed a robust performance measurement system. The Accountability, Risk and Audit Framework for GPP has still not been finalized; the performance indicators for NRS are sparse at the moment and no specific targets have been identified. While output indicators exist for individual NRS projects, there are no outcome indicators and the NRS program-level logic model has not yet been completed.

Program design starts with the GPP Project Management Framework (PMF) and related items, which over the life of a project covers the following:

  • Recipient Project Proposal
  • Project Concept Paper
  • Scoping Studies / Proposal Analysis
  • Project Approval Documents
  • TB Submission
  • Risk Management Plan
  • Logic Model and Performance Indicators
  • Treaties/Agreements/MOU/Contracts/Amendments
  • Project Management/Work Plan
  • Project Disbursements
  • Financial Reports
  • Progress Reports
  • Project Trip Reports
  • Project Modifications
  • Correspondence
  • Briefings
  • Handover Notes

In the projects reviewed, most of these items had been considered and were well documented. The information was generally of high quality was used to prioritize activities and inform the decision making process. The information was updated as applicable. Particular attention is given to the development and revision of the risk management plan.

The exception to this is the documentation and use of performance indicators. A Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) was developed for GPP at the outset of the program. However, there is little indication that the performance measurement plan of the RMAF was used. Certainly, many of the long-term and intermediate outcomes performance indicators listed in that document are not being tracked.

More recently, a draft Accountability, Risk and Audit Framework for GPP was developed. However, it has still not been finalized and the performance indicators for NRS are sparse at the moment, and no targets have been specified. While, output indicators exist for individual NRS projects, there are no outcome indicators and the program-level logic model has not yet been completed. IGX has indicated that indicators at the program level are difficult to create, but that the indicators that exist do provide guidance to project management on goals. An RMAF does exist for the IAEA contribution, but not for any other projects.

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5.0 NRS Success

5.1 Results Achievement

5.1.1 Project Implementation and Sustainability

Findings:
All implemented projects comply with international standards and guidelines. Sustainability has been considered, although it cannot always be assured.

In all cases, projects have been, or are being, implemented as planned, comply with international standards and guidelines, and are being inspected by Canadian experts and certified by Russian authorities. The IAEA standards are being followed for materials protection requirements. Whenever possible, site upgrades are implemented to fully meet Russian Federation regulatory guidelines with the emphasis on risk reduction cost effectiveness. Formal Site Characterization reports are prepared to determine baseline and upgrade risk reduction values.

In some cases there have been delays in schedule for reasons outside of Canada's control, but these delays have been reasonable considering the challenges of working in Russia and the experiences of other countries.

An important issue for the NRS program is sustainability: whether the physical security improvements funded by Canada will be maintained by Russia once the program is finished. Sustainability is considered by NRS when determining upgrades, but assuring sustainability is difficult. Measures have been taken to improve the likelihood that use of Canadian funded upgrades will continue, however this will ultimately depend on Russian authorities providing the required leadership and resources. Canada will need to monitor this issue beyond the current life of the NRS program and possibly provide resources (such as post-warranty support) to ensure that the work of GPP continues to provide benefits into the future.

However, sustainability will ultimately depend on Russian authorities providing the required leadership and resources. Rosatom recognizes the need to ensure sustainability through annual upgrades of 5-10% of the value of the project per year. They expect Russia to be self financing for physical protection in the future through: the Russian federal budget, Rosatom funds, and facility funds.

Canada will need to monitor this issue and possibly provide resources (such as post-warranty support) to ensure that the work of GPP continues to provide benefits into the future. The Implementing Arrangement contains audit provisions for seven years to see if security is maintained. NRS/IGX's intention is to do spot checks during this period.

5.1.2 Physical Security

Findings:
The physical security of Russian nuclear facilities has improved at the four sites where Canada has been involved.

The physical security of the Russian nuclear facilities where Canada has provided upgrades has improved. Canadian contributions have improved physical security at four sites: PNPI, ITEP, MCC, Mayak and INM.

However, it has not been possible within this evaluation to determine the degree to which improvements at these facilities have helped addressed the overall physical security problem within the Russian Federation, i.e., what percentage of Russia's nuclear facilities and materials have been secured by Canada, how does this compare to and compliment the activities of other donors, and ultimately what is the difference that Canada is making in Russia. Such an understanding is critical to assessing the value of Canada's contribution, and should be the focus of program planning and assessment in the future.

5.1.3 Removal and Replacement of Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators

Finding:
Canada's involvement has contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness in the removal and replacement of RTGs.

The rate of removal and replacement of RTGs has increased, and is expected to increase further in the near future as capacity and experience increases. Canadian contributions have helped achieve the following results:

  • Norway RTGs - As a result of Canadian funding, five RTGs were replaced with solar cell panels.
  • U.S. DOE Global Threat Reduction Initiative - Canada provided funding for the disposal and replacement of ten RTGs. Ten RTGs have been recovered with Canadian funding, at 20-25 curies each. The U.S. has recommended that the RTGs be replaced with solar cells and batteries; however they will require more extensive maintenance.
  • RTG Master Plan - Canada funded a Master Plan, which will help to ensure that the RTG related efforts of donor countries are coordinated and that activities will occur in the proper sequence.
  • RTG Transportation Infrastructure - Canada provided funding for the production of special containers to ensure safe transportation of the RTGs from their current location to the specialized institutes for dismantlement. These projects have cleared bottlenecks in areas where other countries were not contributing and have enabled the rate of disposal to increase.

The U.S. GTRI expects that all RTGs will be secured by 2014. There were approximately 1,000 RTGs at the beginning of the program in 2003; as of August 2007, the information is about 465 remaining RTGs (250 Far East, 130 Northern, 85 Baltic). Norway has committed to replace the RTGs in Northwest Russia and the U.S. plans to support the replacement of those in the Far East. The 46 land based Baltic Sea RTGs are equipped with alarm systems; however the Northern Sea Route still remains a problem.

VNIIFTA reports a current rate of disposal of 50-60 per year, with a capacity of 100-120 per year. In 2004, the U.S. disposed of 63, Norway 20, and the Russian Ministry of Defence 5. However, this declined last year to only 6 RTGs replaced by Norway 6, zero by the U.S., and 10 by the Russian Ministry of Defence. The U.S. expects to be able to send 100 RTGs per year to storage in the future.

Most RTGs belong to the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Transport. They have had no budget provisions for removal, dismantlement, and replacement, but in the period 2008 to 2015, the Ministry of Transport will receive Ru 450 million. The Ministry of Defence will continue to use international financing.

RTGs can either be removed directly to disposal or stored for later disposal. RTGs in the east have been sent first to VNIITFA for removal of the radioactive material, and then to Mayak for disposal. However, transportation of RTGs to VNIITFA's location in Moscow presents a safety concern. It would be preferable to have the RTGs dismantle at Mayak. This will require the construction of a hot cell at Mayak - a proposal that France is considering funding. It would take four to five years to complete the hot cell, by which time the need for it will almost be over.

RTGs in the Far East have been put into storage for the past three years. The storage area has very good physical protection; however it is felt that the cost of dismantling the RTGs will increase with age.

5.1.4 Plutonium

Finding:
The amount of plutonium at risk has not yet been decreased.

Significant progress has been made on the Zheleznogorsk reactor shut down that Canada is funding under the US DOE Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program. However, until 2011 when that happens, there will not be a decrease in plutonium production.

Russia and the U.S. continue to work towards finalising a framework agreement for the disposition of 34 tonnes of Russian plutonium. Once this agreement is signed, Canada will make a contribution to this project.

5.1.5 Border Security

Finding:
Border Security in Ukraine has improved as a result of Canada's contribution; however it is not possible to identify the extent of the positive impact Canada's and U.S. contribution to the overall border security in Ukraine.

Border security in Ukraine has been improved as a result of the Canadian contribution to the U.S. Second Line of Defense program.

It is, however, not possible to quantify the degree to which improvements in border security have helped addressed the overall problem of illegal trade in nuclear and radiological material.

5.1.6 Bilateral Relationships

Finding:
The evaluation found that the bilateral relationships between Canada and Russia, Canada and the United States, and Canada and Ukraine on Global Partnership issues have been enhanced, contributing to the improvement of Canada's overall international visibility.

All of Canada's partners at the working level have indicated that cooperation with Canada has gone very well and that Canada is held in the highest regard as a result. This evaluation has not been able to assess the broader impact that this success may have on other relations, beyond non-proliferations, between Canada and Russia.

5.1.7 Organizational Relationships

Finding:
Organizational relationships between DFAIT, Rosatom, the nuclear facilities, Eleron, and ITSA, MOT, IAEA, and the Global Partnership partners were found to be stable and based on mutual trust and cooperation.

The evaluation found that the relationships between DFAIT and Rosatom, the nuclear facilities, Eleron and ISTA to be good and constructive. Many interviewees in Russia commended Canada for its efforts and work effectiveness. On a number of occasions it was noted that "All issues have been resolved in a reasonable time." All interviewed parties expressed their satisfaction with the efficient cooperation with Canada. On a few occasions, beneficiaries stated that Canadian projects were moving forward much easier than those with other countries.

5.1.8 Future Projects

Finding:
The successful and efficient implementation of Canada-funded projects has gained the trust of the Russian partners, ensuring cooperation on future related projects.

Russia stated that the relationship with Canada is better than with the other G8 countries and that previous work has provided a good basis for continued cooperation. For example, Rosatom has a plan for physical protection upgrades, which includes technical support from Canada. Proposals for 10 facilities to be involved in future work have been submitted to the Canadian team. Also, the Russian Ministry of Defence has indicated an interest in cooperating with Canada in several areas relating to the security of decommissioned nuclear weapons. As a result, Canada now has access to a number of sensitive Mayak plants to which the U.S. is not given access. These examples are indicative of the level of trust that has been developed between Russia and Canada.

5.1.9 Commercial Benefits

Finding:
There have been minor commercial benefits for Canadian companies.

The NRS is a non-proliferation program and obtaining commercial benefits has not been a primary objective. Nevertheless, there have been some minor commercial benefits for Canadian companies. While Canadian firms are involved in the physical protection projects, approximately 75% of the contract value goes to US subcontractors due to the lack of appropriate expertise in Canada. It is worth noting that all sub-contractors have been selected as part of an open tender bid on MERX. In order to ensure sustainability of results, including post-warranty maintenance of upgrades, NRS uses Russian firms for hardware and installation labour.

5.2 Facilitating and Impeding Factors

Has the NRS been able to achieve strategic leveraging of resources to maximize results? What have been the facilitating and impeding factors to the success of NRS? Are there any unintended results?

NRS has leveraged resources where appropriate, particularly through the use of third party and multilateral implementing mechanisms.

Factors cited as facilitating the success of NRS include:

  • NRS's timely response to issues and commitments;
  • NRS's timely decision making;
  • NRS's committed managers;
  • NRS's excellent communications;
  • NRS's use of international best practices; and
  • NRS's Implementing Arrangement template.

Factors cited as impeding the success of NRS include:

  • PWGSC's responsiveness to contractual and security issues raised by RCL; and
  • The rigid contractor/subcontractor technical staff salary structure that has limited the short-term utilization of some specialized skills (cost/project estimators) and thus reduced the ability of the project teams to provide timely responses to NRS/IGX. This deficiency has been corrected by inclusion of the Response Force Specialist on recent site negotiation visits.

5.3 Canada's Visibility

Finding:
NRS has contributed to Canada's enhanced visibility, credibility and influence in the area of reducing the overall threat form nuclear and radiological materials.

Interviews and meetings with experts from Russia, the U.K and the U.S. clearly indicated that international partners know and appreciate Canada's contribution to the WMD threat reduction. Partners from the US State Department and the Department of Energy commended the NRS team and IGX management for their efficient and effective cooperation. The evaluation found that Canada's visibility has considerably increased within the G8 GPWG and Canada has been commended on a number of occasions for its leadership role.

Canada's specific projects in Russia are also highly valued by the Russian beneficiaries at the working level.

However, this evaluation has also noted that Canada often fills gaps and does work where other countries cannot or are not allowed to. For example, while the US physical security projects focus on rapid upgrades, Canada has chosen to focus on more comprehensive upgrades. As well, there are Russian facilities where the US has not been allowed to undertake work, but where Canada has been asked by Rosatom to provide support. While this evaluation was not able to determine the extent to which Canada's approach is more or less efficient than the US approach, it would be worthwhile for GPP and the NRS program, in particular, to conduct some in-depth comparative analysis of current practices and approaches used by other countries, and to incorporate results and best practices into future strategic decision making. Another overall observation made by this evaluation indicates that while the comparatively small NRS team is mainly focused on project implementation and operational procedures, it lacks time and capacity to conduct research of best practices and to engage in longer-term strategic planning of Canada's involvement in the area of nuclear and radiological security.

5.4 Reduction of Risks and Threats

Finding:
Risk and threats posed by Russia's stockpiles of WMD have been considerably reduced as a result of Canada's investments in the Global Partnership.

Russia, as a result of Canadian investments, is more securely embarked on the path to reduce risks and threats posed by its stockpiles of WMD. However, concerns were expressed that "there has not been much evidence of the Russian government's willingness to fund appropriate maintenance over the long haul." Also, it was not possible to determine, through this evaluation, the degree to which Canadian and Global Partnership efforts are making a difference because the full scope of the problem in Russia is not known, e.g. there is no official information available on the number of nuclear and radiological facilities in Russia and other former Soviet Union states that need enhanced physical protection and upgrades.

5.5 Lessons Learned

Lessons learned for Canada and DFAIT, in particular, from NRS Projects and Experience:

  • The Canadian capacity to negotiate and implement NRS projects, within both DFAIT and the private sector has improved considerably from the program's initial implementation, due to significant learning on the job by NRS and RCL, and the desire and dedication to improve.
  • Working in Russia is difficult. Good and effective communications are hard to achieve because of language and cultural differences. Progress is slower in Russia than it would be for similar projects in Canada for a variety of reasons, mostly cultural (role of bureaucracy, culture of avoiding making decisions, etc.). Patience and perseverance are required.
  • Before a cooperation project is negotiated, NRS consults with DFAIT's sustainable environment bureau to determine if an environmental assessment is required under the CEAA. To date, no environmental assessments have been conducted. In the case of the Norway RTG project, the documentation provided by Norway and Russia was sufficient to serve as Canada's environmental assessment. For the U.S. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production project, the environmental controls in the design were acceptable to Canada. The Canadian money was used only for design work to avoid the need for a Canadian environmental assessment.
  • Based on U.S. experience, the use of indigenous Russian equipment helps to ensure sustainability.
  • Based on U.S. experience, a ceiling on contract values ensures that Russian partners understand they cannot increase the amount they receive from Canada even if their costs rise.

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6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

The conclusions of the study are presented below according to the three evaluation issues of relevance, cost effectiveness and results achieved.

6.1.1 Relevance

NRS continues to be relevant in a world that is increasingly subject to terrorist activities. As the Russian economy strengthens, Russia is contributing more to the security of its nuclear and radiological materials. However, many Russian facilities are still poorly funded and require international contributions. While Russia is increasingly asserting its independence, it is clear that international contributions are wanted and valued. It is in the self-interests of G8 nations to support Russia in these matters, and Canada has an important role to play. This view has been echoed by the Prime Minister of Canada at the most recent G8 Summit.

6.1.2 Cost Effectiveness

The implementation of the NRS program is considered to be excellent, NRS projects complement, but do not duplicate, the projects of other nations, and Canadian overhead costs are considered to be the lowest in the international community. Overall, NRS management was commended by its partners for its quality, efficiency, and good relations.

6.1.3 Success

NRS projects have been, or are being, implemented as planned and comply with international standards. Where there have been delays, they have been outside of Canada's control and are reasonable given the challenges of working in Russia and the experiences of other countries. Ensuring sustainability will be difficult and will require continued attention by NRS/IGX. NRS projects have increased the security of nuclear and radiological material in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, although it is not possible to quantify the degree of improvement. Relations between Canada and its international partners are excellent and Canada's contribution is known and appreciated both at the working level in Russia and within the G8 Global Partnership Working Group.

6.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1:
Continue on current course

Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short time frame. It should continue on the course that it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger bilateral physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, and facilities with Category I (weapons usable) material.

Recommendation 2:
Monitor sustainability

Long-term sustainability of the results of some NRS projects is a concern, especially for the physical protection projects. These should be monitored to ensure that the upgrades funded by Canada continue to be used in an effective manner upon termination of the Canadian NRS program. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the wording of the Implementing Arrangements to ensure that Canada will be given the opportunity to monitor, audit and evaluate its bilateral projects in the long term. The need for monitoring arrangements and resources will extend beyond the current life of GPP.

Recommendation 3:
Improve performance measurement indicators

While most aspects of the GPP Project Management Framework are used effectively, NRS performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, are not being used by NRS for strategic decision making. This issue was highlighted in the 2006 Formative Evaluation; however, it seems that it has not yet been addressed by this program stream. Performance measures must consider the overall degree to which the security of nuclear and radiological material has been improved within Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, the extent to which the security of Canadians has been improved, i.e., the effectiveness of the NRS program, and the difference that Canada's contribution is making in Russia and in Canada.

Recommendation 4:
Enlarge the geographic scope of the Global Partnership

Within the Global Partnership Initiative, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations. When the security of nuclear and radiological materials gets improved in the Russian Federation and the countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions. If the Global Partnership makes such a decision, consideration should be given to using the NRS/IGX expertise and accumulated best practices for Canada's future involvement in similar projects and initiatives.

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Appendix A: Management Response and Action Plan

RecommendationsIGX Management Response and Action PlanResponsibility CentreTime Frame
Recommendation 1: Continue on current course
Overall, NRS has achieved significant results in a short timeframe. It is recommended that NRS continue on the course it has charted, utilizing the effective relationships and mechanisms established during the first five years. This course will focus on larger physical security projects at fewer sites, in closed cities, at facilities with Category I (weapons usable) material.Agree

This is the approach taken in the GPP Phase III TB Submission. The portfolio will concentrate on working at the most proliferation-significant facilities under Rosatom's purview, including two very large facilities within Rosatom's defence complex. The highest priority will be attached to Russian nuclear facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material.

Director/NRS SPMOngoing
Recommendation 2: Monitor sustainability.
Long-term sustainability of the results of some NRS projects in a concern, especially for the physical protection projects. These should be monitored to ensure that the upgrades funded by Canada continue to be used in an effective manner upon termination of the Canadian NRS program. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the wording of Implementing Arrangements to ensure that Canada will be given the opportunity to monitor, audit and evaluate its bilateral projects in the long term. The need for monitoring arrangements and resources will extend beyond the current life of GPP.Agree

In Phase III, projects have sustainability as a major feature, particularly in the areas mentioned, including via many provisions of the Canada/Russia Treaty, which remain in effect long after the conclusion of projects.

IGX DG/Director/NRS SPMOngoing
With regard to NRS, sustainability is already an integral part of all physical protection projects, and a robust sustainability strategy is in place to ensure that security upgrades remain effective. Measures include use of indigenous equipment, provision of extended warrantees and spare parts and of operator and maintenance training at facilities receiving upgrades and the development and provision of training courses and laboratories in Obninsk.NRS SPMOngoing
Recommendation 3: Improve performance measurements indicators.
While most aspects of the GPP Project Management Framework are used effectively, NRS performance measurement indicators, beyond simple output measures, are not being used by NRS for strategic decision making. This issue was highlighted in the 2006 Formative Evaluation; however, it seems that it has not yet been addressed by this program stream. Performance measures must consider the overall degree to which the security of nuclear and radiological material has been improved within Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, the extent to which the security of Canadians has been improved, i.e., the effectiveness of the NRS program, and the difference that Canada's contribution is making in Russia and in Canada.Agree

A GPP-wide ARAF has been developed in connection with the Phase III TB Submission. It contains logic models and performance measurement indicators at all levels and for all portfolios, including NRS, which will be applied to reporting in Phase III and used regularly as a management tool.

IGX, DG/Director/Senior Policy Advisor (SPA)/NRS SPMOngoing
Recommendation 4: Enlarge the geographic scope of the Global Partnership.
Within the Global Partnership Initiative, there have been discussions regarding enlarging the geographic scope of its operations. When the security of nuclear and radiological materials gets improved in the Russian Federation and the countries of the former Soviet Union, priorities for attention will naturally move to other regions. If the Global Partnership makes such a decision, consideration should be given to using the NRS/IGX expertise and accumulated best practices for Canada's future involvement in similar projects and initiatives.Agree

Canada is committed to completing its work in Russia and the FSU, where the largest WMD stockpiles are located. Canada is recognized as a leader in all Global Partnership Programming. At the same time, we are only as strong as the weakest facility worldwide, and with this in mind, G8 Leaders have agreed to expand geographically (reaffirmed most recently at the 2007 G8 Summit in Germany). Recommendations will be provided to Ministers this year related to Canada's implementation of the Leaders' decision.

DFAIT Senior Management/IGXDG/SPAOngoing 2008

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1 In a related project, Canada has contributed $0.85 M through the IAEA (see Section 2.4) to equip the Zhytomyr border detachment, which covers part of Ukraine's international border with Belarus.


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Date Modified:
2012-12-28