Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

international.gc.ca

Common menu bar

• Français
• Home
• Contact Us
• Help
• Search
• canada.gc.ca

Breadcrumb

1. Home
2. >
3. About the Department

Summative Evaluation - Global Partnership Program: Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists

(January 2008)

(PDF Version, 584 KB) ^*

• Executive Summary
• List of Acronyms
  • 1.0 Introduction
    • 1.1 Purpose, Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation
    • 1.2 Evaluation Methodology and Limitations
  • 2.0 RFWS Profile
    • 2.1 Background
    • 2.2 Objectives
    • 2.3 Implementation Model
    • 2.4 Logic Model
    • 2.5 Financial
  • 3.0 Findings: Relevance
    • 3.1 The Intellectual Threat
    • 3.2 Relevance to Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives
    • 3.3 International Policy Environment
  • 4.0 Findings: Cost Effectiveness
    • 4.1 Program Implementation Model
    • 4.2 Cooperation between the RFWS and BNP Streams within GPP
    • 4.3 ISTC/SCTU Operations
    • 4.4 Governance Structure of RFWS
    • 4.5 Effectiveness of Cooperation
    • 4.6 Performance Measurement
    • 4.7 RFWS Program Management
  • 5.0 Findings: Success
    • 5.1 Achievements To Date
    • 5.2 Canada's Visibility, Credibility and Influence
  • 6.0 Lessons Learned
  • 7.0 Summary Conclusions
  • 8.0 Recommendations
• Annex A: Management Response and Action Plan

Executive Summary

Introduction

One of the areas of priority concern identified by G8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 as a component of the Global Partnership (GP) was the "redirection of former weapons scientists" in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The knowledge and skills acquired by former weapons scientists (FWS) could be acquired by terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This threat is enhanced if former weapons scientists are unable to find suitable and comparable employment in a non-weapons, or civilian, area. The Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) is one of the five program streams of the Canadian Global Partnership Program (GPP).

Evaluation Objectives and Methodologies

The objective of this summative evaluation is to assess the extent to which the Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) stream is: 1) relevant to Canada's international priorities and Russia's and other FSU countries' needs, 2) cost-effective, and 3) achieving results. As well, this evaluation was designed to contribute to the summative evaluation of the GPP as a whole by informing the assessment of GPP's net effects and analyzing GPP's contribution to Canada's international agenda.

Fourteen evaluation issues and questions, based on the Terms of Reference and a review of documentation, were analyzed for the evaluation of the RFWS stream. The evaluation relied on three lines of enquiry: a review of relevant documents and databases; interviews with 67 experts and beneficiaries representing the RFWS stream, other federal departments, other donors, the Science Centers in Kyiv and Moscow, and former weapons scientists; and one case study. Site visits were also conducted to two institutes in the greater Moscow region.

Profile of the Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists Stream of GPP

The RFWS stream, within Canada's GPP, has three main objectives. The first objective deals with the redirection of former weapons scientists in Russia and other FSU countries into peaceful and sustainable research activities. The second objective is to redirect institutes of proliferation concern into civilian areas and in a sustainable manner. The third is to provide science and technology (ST) and industrial benefits to Canada arising from the research that FWS undertake.

The most important implementation instruments in the redirection of former weapons scientists are the Science Centers: the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU⁽¹⁾) based in Kyiv. These multilateral organizations coordinate the efforts of numerous governments, international organizations, and private sector industries to provide former weapons scientists from the FSU with peaceful, civilian opportunities in international partnership.

The budget for the RFWS stream over the period 2003-04 to 2007-08 has been $18 million per annum. From 2003-04 to 2006-07 actual expenditures were $41.5 million or 46% of the $90 million budget planned for the four-year period. Table 1 shows actual expenditures disaggregated by operating costs, capital costs and transfer payments. In the initial years, the RFWS stream was exploring how to work with the science centers, which resulted in wide fluctuations of the actual expenditures.

Findings: Relevance

The "intellectual threat" sought to be mitigated by the RFWS stream, and in particular by the Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine, has evolved in the last few years. At the end of the Cold War, the threat was largely confined to Russia and its stockpiles of nuclear and radiological weapons and materials. Recent biological and chemical attacks in Central Asia, and particularly in regions that are ideologically and ethnically close to areas where terrorist groups are active, indicate a shift in the type of threat. In addition, personnel other than weapons scientists, who have knowledge of institutes and facilities, also present a potential interest to other states and terrorists. Besides that, where states might seek high-end and sophisticated weapons capabilities, terrorists could be satisfied with simpler and improvised capabilities.

According to the current redirection policy, at least 50% of the scientists in projects through the ISTC and STCU must be former weapons scientists (FWS). FWS are defined as scientists who have been engaged in the FSU weapons program in the 1980s. The implication of this 50% rule is that some younger scientists, who could be of even greater interest to terrorist groups, may inadvertently be excluded from participating in Science Center projects. Other donors and funding parties to the ISTC and STCU are aware of this potential threat and are currently reviewing this 50% FWS participation rule.

Canada's RFWS stream will therefore, need to adapt to this evolving intellectual threat. This includes addressing younger scientists by considering a reduction in the 50% FWS participation rule, increasing support to other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states and placing greater emphasis on biological and chemical threats.

Based on the activities and projects implemented by the RFWS stream from its inception till August 2007, this evaluation concluded that this GPP stream is relevant to Canada's foreign policy objectives, and in particular to Priority #1 identified in DFAIT's 2007-08 Report on Plans and Priorities: "A safer, more secure and prosperous Canada within a strengthened North American partnership."

Findings: Cost Effectiveness

The two Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) provide economies of scale that benefit Canada's RFWS program, as well as the programs and activities funded by other international donors. This includes quick access to the project management expertise and the critical mass of people at the Science Centers, as well as their track record with other FSU governments and science institutes. In addition, both Science Centers have offices in each recipient country to facilitate the delivery and implementation of redirection projects. The evaluation found that the current RFWS program implementation model through the Science Centers works well for the purposes of the Global Partnership Program. The RFWS stream has adopted a cost effective implementation model, by directly engaging the Science Centers in the redirection of former weapons scientists and institutes of proliferation concern.

The current RFWS project management systems, the project selection and feedback processes, and the close cooperation with other donors also contribute to the cost effectiveness of the RFWS stream within Canada's Global Partnership Program. RFWS also has access to the ISTC and STCU database to capture key information pertaining to project applications and funded projects, including the number of FWS involved in each project and the subject area (nuclear, biological, chemical, missile). In addition, RFWS uses the same project identification numbers as the Science Centers in order to facilitate the up and down loading of information.

Another key aspect facilitating the integration of FWS into the international scientific community in a sustainable manner is the development of grant application capacity of FSU scientists. One of the most effective ways to build such capacity is the provision of detailed feedback from scientific peer reviews. Canada has taken the lead and was the first funding party to implement this approach in 2006. Since then, other funding parties have followed suit. The effectiveness of the RFWS stream is also enhanced through the close cooperation between Canada and other funding parties (donors). Good coordination helps to identify projects to be funded by each donor or jointly be several donors, and the level of contribution of each funding party. This approach also ensures that there is no duplication with other G8 redirection programs.

Budget conditions require RFWS to direct all contributions (transfer payments) to the Science Centers. Although some Canadian firms are very engaged in science center projects with FWS, many Canadian participants from small organizations indicated that because they receive no compensation for their time (the project is traditionally defined by and for the FSU scientists), they limit their involvement to reading progress reports and responding to emails. Some Canadian participants have not travelled to Russia/FSU; their only contact with the FWS being through email and reviewing progress reports. Interviewed participants indicated that they would devote a lot more time and effort to the projects, if they were compensated for their time. Even a partial compensation would not only be an incentive for a more effective involvement in projects, but also a demonstration of DFAIT's appreciation of their participation. Such approach would also recognize the greater risks of working in Russia and other FSU countries, and help to "level the attractiveness" of Russia/FSU to Canadian organizations and institutes relative to other regions in the world such as China and India.

Findings: Success

From FY 2003-04 to FY 2006-07, RFWS has supported nearly 200 projects involving approximately 2,300 FWS. Of the 2,300 FWS, half have been in the nuclear field, 25% in the biological field, 13% in missile, 7% in chemical, and 4% in other areas. The results achieved until March 31, 2007 are as follows:

• Increased production and dissemination of scientific results: all of the projects reviewed by the evaluation indicated that participating scientists have given presentations at international conferences and published technical papers. FSU project managers indicated that their only international conference presentations have been through the RFWS/science center projects.
• The RFWS/science center research grants have given FWS considerable international prestige and acknowledgement.
• RFWS projects ensured the establishment of a wider network of international researchers in specific fields.
• RFWS grants have allowed younger scientists to be involved in international and leading edge research.

Although many Canadian organizations have expressed interest in becoming an ISTC partner and in funding collaborative research with FWS, to date, there have not been any Canadian funded ISTC partner projects.⁽²⁾ Canadian partners have, however, funded several projects at the STCU. Many equate partner projects as "genuine collaboration" since they require input/effort from both Canadian and FSU institutes in order to define, conduct, and achieve the objectives of the research. As noted above, Russia and the FSU are perceived by Canadian firms as being riskier places to do business compared to other countries such as China and India, which are believed to provide a better return on investment.

CIDA's experience with the STCU provides an interesting and alternative approach for engaging Canada's private sector. As an economic development agency, CIDA was able to provide 50:50 cost share grants to Canadian firms to encourage their participation in research projects involving former weapons scientists. These "starter grants" resulted in active participation by the Canadian private sector. One of the institutes covered by the evaluation had a research project with a Calgary firm to develop geological software that allows the oil and gas industry to more accurately map and determine the location of vertical boundaries of an oil field. The revenues from this software are keeping 20 FWS employed in one institute from Ukraine, as well as enough funds to continue work on the next version of the software.

Conclusions

Relevance:

The RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives. Although the threat of former weapons scientists rendering their knowledge to terrorist groups or countries producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has diminished in some regions (e.g., Russia and Ukraine), it remains high in others, such as the countries of Central Asia.

Cost Effectiveness:

Although Canada's participation in the Science Centers through the Global Partnership Program is relatively recent⁽³⁾ compared to other donors, Canada has become a full contributing partner in a very short period of time. Sound management systems and access to the project database have greatly contributed to the cost-effectiveness of the RFWS program. The level of cooperation with other donors ensures no duplication of efforts. The evaluation found that the implementation model adopted by the RFWS stream is the most cost effective alternative.

Success:

RFWS is a well managed stream and its activities have helped, in cooperation with other donors, to create a more stable environment for former weapons scientists and their institutes. The RFWS stream is addressing the "intellectual threat" thus reducing the risk of former weapons scientists selling their knowledge to terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Current RFWS design requires all funds to be channelled via the Science Centers which limits RFWS' ability to respond to the evolving intellectual threat, such as providing support (like the CIDA cost share grants) to Canadian participants and enhancing the likelihood of long-term sustainability of the RFWS projects. Canadian firms, even larger ones, tend to be conservative and risk adverse. They still prefer focusing on China and India, places other than Russia/FSU, which are perceived to be "less risky countries to do business."

More effort is needed on behalf of DFAIT and the RFWS stream, in particular, to engage Canadian businesses by raising awareness amongst senior managers of the partner opportunities. Partner projects through the Science Centers offer not only leading edge research opportunities for younger scientists in Russia/FSU and a continuous reduction in the intellectual proliferation risk, but can also help Canadian businesses derive ST and industrial benefits.

The evaluation found evidence confirming that the RFWS stream has managed to increase the awareness of Canada's ST capabilities among scientists in Russia/FSU. Furthermore, based on the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge by ISTC and STCU-supported projects (e.g., number of technical papers published, number of presentations made at international conferences), former weapons scientists are being integrated into the international scientific community.

Recommendations

Given that the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives, is well managed, and contributes to strengthening relations with other donors, particularly with the US, it is recommended that DFAIT continue the RFWS stream beyond March 31, 2008, and the implementation of Canada's redirection efforts under the multilateral framework of the two Science Centers - the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) based in Kyiv.

Given that the involvement by Canadians, particularly in partner projects, increases the chances of long term sustainability/continuous intellectual threat reduction and science and technology and industrial benefits to Canada, it is recommended that DFAIT remove the budget constraints to allow for more flexibility in RFWS programming, such as contributing part of the costs of collaborating with FSU scientists to partner projects with Canadian businesses.

Senior managers in Canadian organizations (e.g., firms, crown corporations) are generally not aware of the benefits of engaging FWS in collaborative research, particularly partner projects which are under the direction of the funding partner. This lack of awareness is a barrier to the organization participating fully in regular projects and/or funding a partner project. It is recommended, therefore, that awareness raising campaigns be directed at senior managers in Canadian organizations, both public and private.

Given that the intellectual threat has evolved to being lower in some regions (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remaining high in others (e.g., biological threat in Central Asia), it is recommended that the RFWS shift its focus to other FSU states.

Given the RFWS stream's limited resources, it is recommended that ways to more fully utilize Embassy personnel be considered. For example, in order to enhance the attractiveness of redirection projects with former weapons scientists to Canadian organizations, particularly among senior managers in the private sector, embassy trade officers should be involved in awareness raising campaigns. In order to reduce the workload on RFWS-Ottawa staff, Embassy personnel might also support project monitoring in Russia.

Top of Page

List of Acronyms

AECL

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

BNP

Biological Non-proliferation

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

DED

Deputy Executive Director, ISTC and STCU

DoS

Department of State (US)

DFAIT

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EU

European Union

FSU

Former Soviet Union

FWS

Former Weapons Scientists

GB

Governing Board, ISTC and STCU

GoC

Government of Canada

GP

Global Partnership

GPAG

Global Partnership Advisory Group

GPP

Global Partnership Program

HDBP

Dibutyl Phosphoric Acid

HLW

High Level Waste

IGX

Global Partnership Bureau, DFAIT

ILW

Intermediate Level Waste

ISTC

International Science and Technology Center

KRI

Khlopin Radium Institute (Russian Federation)

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russian Federation)

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

NBC

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NRC

National Research Council Canada

NSERC

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada

OGDs

Other Government Departments

RD

Research and Development

RBAF

Risk-based Audit Framework

RFWS

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists

RMAF

Results-based Management and Accountability Framework

ST

Science and Technology

SAC

Scientific Advisory Committee, ISTC

SBDAs

Science Based Departments and Agencies

SPM

Senior Program Manager

SSHRC

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

STCU

Science and Technology Center in Ukraine

STTAG

Science, Trade, and Technology Advisory Group

TBP

Tributyl Phosphate

US

United States of America

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMMD

Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

ZIE

Evaluation Division, DFAIT

Top of Page

1.0 Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) countries inherited vast quantities of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and/or related destructive materials. In addition, tens of thousands of former weapons scientists found themselves unemployed or underemployed. The possibility of terrorist groups or countries of proliferation concern gaining access to Cold War-era weapons and materials of mass destruction and related knowledge represents a real danger to Canada and the international community.

In recognition of this threat, the G8, under Canada's leadership, launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Partnership's objective is to prevent terrorists or countries of proliferation concern from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related know-how. G8 leaders identified four priority areas: dismantlement of nuclear submarines, chemical weapons destruction, fissile material disposition and the redirection of former weapons scientists to peaceful, sustainable research. They also committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing biological weapons.

1.1 Purpose, Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation

The Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) stream is one of the five sub-programs of the Global Partnership Program (GPP). The objective of this evaluation is to assess the extent to which the RFWS stream is: 1) relevant to Canada's international priorities and Russia's and other FSU countries' needs; 2) cost-effective; and 3) achieving results. The evaluation design and methodology also contributes to the summative evaluation of the Global Partnership Program by informing the assessment of GPP's net effects and analyzing GPP's contribution to Canada's international agenda.

This evaluation covers the activities and results achieved by the RFWS during the first five years of its ten-year mandate. This evaluation was conducted over a seven-month period from May to November 2007, with data collection activities taking place from June to August 2007.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

1.2.1 Evaluation Issues and Questions

Specific evaluation issues and questions, based on the Terms of Reference, were developed for the evaluation of the RFWS stream. These questions are included in Table 1-1 below, together with performance indicators and sources of information (documentation, interviews, and case studies).

Table 1-1 provides the weighting scale for the evidence. The number of marks (x) identifies the extent to which the questions were fed by the corresponding stakeholder group. No marks for a given group mean that it played a limited role, if any, in the examination of the corresponding question, while three marks indicate that it played an important role.

1.2.2 Document and Data Review

In addition to a review of relevant documents, the databases of the RFWS, ISTC and STCU were also reviewed in order to address the evaluation questions noted above.

1.2.3 Interviews

Interviews with 67 people were conducted, as outlined below in Table 1-2. Interviewees were selected from the following groups: a) RFWS officials, b) officials from other federal departments involved in the RFWS project selection process, c) officials/representatives from other funding parties involved in efforts to redirect former weapons scientists through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) based in Kyiv, d) Canadian participants, e) officials from the ISTC and the STCU, f) officials/representatives of FSU institutes involved in ISTC/STCU funded projects, and g) former weapons scientists, consisting of project managers and project participants.

Table 1-2: Number of RFWS Interviewees by Group

Interview guides were developed for each interview group. With the exception of officials from other funding parties and Canadian participants (which were conducted by telephone), interviews were conducted in person in Kyiv, Moscow and Ottawa. FWS and officials/representatives of institutes outside Kyiv and Moscow traveled to the STCU and ISTC to meet with the evaluation team. Interviews were also conducted at two institutes in the Moscow region.

1.2.4 Case Study

One case study was prepared to illustrate the extent to which the redirection of former wapons scientists can reduce the WMD proliferation threat, while also bringing some industrial and scientific benefits to Canada. The case study was also used to showcase best practices and lessons learned. The criteria for selecting the case study were as follows:

• Good prospects for sustainability, i.e., high probability of former weapons scientists being redeployed into the civilian economy;
• Potential benefits to Canada;
• Projects have engaged participants from Russia/FSU and Canada;
• ISTC or STCU are involved.

The case study focused on both the Russian and Canadian scientists, and the extent to which both sides have benefited from the project. The same interview guides were used for the RFWS and institute interviews, but with questions adapted and focused on the selected project.

The selected project, entitled "Process Adaptation for Treatment of High Level Waste (HLW) and Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) by Extraction with Zirconium Salt of Dibutyl Phosphoric Acid (HDBP) and its Testing Using Real Radioactive Waste" is a partner project developed by the Khlopin Radium Institute in St. Petersburg and the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. in Chalk River.

1.2.5 Study Limitations

Time constraints and requirements for access protocols by the host government restricted the study to two site visits of FSU institutions in the Moscow region.

• First, time constraints meant that visits could only be made to Kyiv and Moscow. There was insufficient time to visit other FSU countries and/or cities. In order to ensure a sufficient number and mix of respondents (subject area and country), scientists from various institutes had to come to the Science Centers for the interviews. For example, the deputy director and the project manager from a nuclear institute in St. Petersburg came to Moscow to be interviewed by the evaluation team, as did a project manager from a biological institute in the Kyrgyz Republic.
• Second, even though agreements between host governments and the Science Centers allow for visits to FSU research institutes by donors (e.g., an evaluation team from Canada), and even if the 30-day advance notice has been requested, the host government can and has prevented access. For example, a team from the UK who were supposed to be in Russia at the same time as the evaluation team were denied access.
• Third, data collection was carried out in July, when most people in the FSU were on summer holidays. This placed an additional burden on the RFWS team and the Science Centers to ensure a sufficient number and mix of respondents.

In spite of these constraints, 26 FWS in the area of nuclear, biological, chemical and missile weapons were engaged in the study. Site visits were also made to two institutes in the greater Moscow region.

Top of Page

2.0 RFWS Profile

2.1 Background

One of the priority areas for the Global Partnership Initiative, identified by G8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 was the redirection of former Russian weapons scientists. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demand for weapons scientists with knowledge and skills related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems decreased significantly. As a result, tens of thousands of weapons scientists were left without full-time employment. More than a decade later, unemployment and underemployment remains a serious problem for thousands of former weapons scientists in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). As many of these scientists retain the knowledge to design and build nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and associated delivery vehicles, the possibility exists that they could be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorist organizations and/or countries of proliferation concern. This proliferation potential poses a serious threat to Canadian and international security. To reduce the proliferation risk, it is critical to find ways to redirect these scientists by providing them with opportunities to apply their knowledge to peaceful scientific pursuits, while providing them with sustainable employment.

2.2 Objectives

The RFWS stream, within Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP), has three objectives. The first is to redirect former weapons scientists in Russia and other FSU countries into peaceful and sustainable research activities. The second is to redirect institutes of proliferation concern into civilian areas and in a sustainable manner. The third is to provide science and technology (ST) and industrial benefits to Canada arising from the research that the FWS undertake.

2.3 Implementation Model

The most important implementation instrument in the redirection of former weapons scientists are the Science Centers: the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) based in Kyiv. These multilateral organizations coordinate the efforts of numerous governments, international organizations, and private sector industries to provide former weapons scientists from the FSU with peaceful civilian opportunities in international partnership. Both Science Centers maintain FWS inventories, liaise with FSU institutes, and facilitate the integration of FWS into the global science and technology and business communities. The RFWS stream and the Science Centers support two types of projects:

• Regular projects, which are funded by RFWS via the Science Centers, and are led by the FWS/institutes of proliferation concern. A Canadian participant provides advice and guidance to the FWS project manager and the research team at the FSU institute(s).
• Partner projects, which are funded by the Canadian partner, and use the Science Centers to facilitate implementation. Partner projects are led by the Canadian partner, with the FWS included as members of the joint Canada-FSU research team.

In this report, Canadian organizations (other government departments, academics, private sector firms) involved in a regular project are referred to as "participants," whereas those that fund and lead partner projects are referred to as "partners."

It is noted that DFAIT's RFWS stream assumed responsibility for Canada's contributions to the STCU in fiscal year 2006-07. Previously the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) managed these contributions but its funding was limited to Ukraine. STCU Recipient Countries include Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Moldova. ISTC Recipient Countries include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It is noted that Georgia is a member of both ISTC and STCU.

A key aspect of integrating former weapons scientists into the global science and technology and business communities is "assessing/facilitating the review of FWS project proposals." This is similar to the process by which Canadian (as well as American and Western European) scientists obtain funding for their research. Central to the review process is the scientific and technical peer review coordinated by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DFAIT. The peer review coordinated by NSERC is similar to the peer reviews performed on research grant applications by Canadian scientists.

The rights to the Intellectual Property generated through projects are set out in the project funding agreements between Canada and the ISTC or the STCU. For regular projects, the IP is owned by the FSU scientists (the originators of the IP) and Canada receives an automatic, royalty-free and irrevocable license to use and commercialise the IP within its territories. The Funding Party and the ISTC or STCU are notified of any record of invention identified during the course of a regular project. Under an MOU to manage any IP arising from Canadian funded projects, NRC-IRAP is then charged with conducting a patentability and non-confidential market assessment should any Canadian commercial entity express interest in exploiting the invention, it is possible to transfer to the Canadian private sector the Crown benefit of a royalty-free license to use and commercialize the IP.

For partner projects, it is possible for the partner to negotiate the ownership of the IP with the FSU scientists.

2.4 Logic Model

A logic model showing the linkages between the activities of the RFWS stream and the achievement of its outcomes is provided below in Figure 2-1. The logic model shows the chain of results connecting activities to the outputs and outcomes of the stream and to the ultimate and strategic outcomes of the branch and department respectively.

2.5 Financial

The budget for the RFWS stream over the period 2003-04 to 2007-08 is $18 million per annum. From 2003-04 to 2006-07 actual expenditures were $41.5 million or 46% of the budget of $90 million for the four-year period. Table 2-1 shows actual expenditures disaggregated by vote and fiscal year, which consisted of $1.1 million in operating costs, and $40.5 million in transfer payments to the science centers. In the initial years, the RFWS stream was learning how to work with the science centers, which resulted in wide fluctuations in actual expenditures.

Figure 2-1: Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS) Results-Based Logic Model (March 9, 2007)

Top of Page

3.0 Findings: Relevance

3.1 The Intellectual Threat

The collapse of the Soviet Union engendered widespread concern that Russian and states in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists and/or countries seeking to produce WMD. The ensuing decline in border security and the diminution of the role and power of the formerly ubiquitous security services significantly reduced the ability of Russia and other FSU states to safeguard these weapons. Another threat took a human form: Russian/FSU scientists with the knowledge about nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons suddenly had greater leeway to visit or immigrate to any country of their choice, including nations seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/or countries harbouring terrorists. More than a decade later, unemployment and underemployment remains a serious problem for thousands of former weapons scientists in Russia and other FSU states.

Russia and other FSU states inherited the largest WMD complex in the world with little government support for sustaining it at anywhere near Cold War levels. As a result, Russian/FSU science fell into a protracted crisis: salaries plummeted, funding for research dropped sharply, and the number of students pursuing careers in science dwindled. These developments gave Russian/FSU scientists both greater incentives and greater opportunities to sell their knowledge to governments and/or terrorist groups that harbour hostile intentions toward civil societies.⁽⁴⁾

The RFWS stream addresses an "intellectual" threat, that is, the risk of former weapons scientists providing their knowledge to terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two major challenges confront the RFWS stream: determining which scientists pose a threat, and the fact that there will always be a threat; it can never be reduced to zero. In the first instance, personnel who have knowledge that might be valuable to states and terrorists do not only include weapons scientists. Where states might seek high-end and sophisticated weapons capabilities, terrorists may be satisfied with simpler and improvised capabilities.

In the above instance the motivation for the illicit diversion of expertise is more than just economic distress. With the significant improvement in Russia's economic situation, economic deprivation is no longer the primary motivation of concern. Greed, ideological sympathies, and pride now loom as important motivators. ⁽⁵⁾ The general view is that for those few people who will be tempted to share critical information, there is little that can be done, regardless of whether that person is Russian, Canadian, American, British, or any other nationality. Addressing the intellectual threat is therefore about managing risk. By integrating former weapons scientists (FWS) into the international scientific community into peaceful areas of research and in a sustainable manner is widely seen as the most effective way to reduce the risk of intellectual proliferation.

The unanimous view is that the intellectual threat sought to be mitigated by the RFWS stream has evolved over the last decade and a half. The most obvious change is that former weapons scientists are getting older / closer to retirement age. The general view is that as FWS age, they are less inclined to move out of their institute and country to provide their knowledge to a terrorist group and/or country, and more inclined to stay in their institute and train the next generation of scientists. What is not known however, is what threat a FWS poses if any.

While younger scientists are not weapons scientists, i.e., they were not part of the Soviet Union's weapons program in the 1980s, the general view is that they pose a potential threat, particularly in relation to terrorist groups who may not need the same level of knowledge as FWS. Compared to their older counterparts, younger scientists are more inclined to move in search of more interesting and rewarding research. Many interviewees noted that younger scientists will stay at an institute long enough to get trained/be marketable, and then move on. Science center grants provide opportunities for younger scientists to be involved in international and leading edge research, which is generally believed to lower the intellectual proliferation risk. According to many FWS, the prospect of commercializing research is an area of particular interest to younger scientists.

Many FWS and science center officials interviewed estimated that science center grants accounted for 70-100% of a scientist's salary in the 1990s, whereas today science center grants only account for 10-30% of salary. However, while the situation is not nearly as dire as it was in the 1990s, they cautioned that many research institutes in other regions of Russia and FSU states continue to be poorly funded. Many laboratories continue to be poorly equipped, and scientists under employed. According to the Science Centers, some institutes have stable funding while others have been removed from the government budget. Some institutes are closing, or merging with other institutes. Some still receive government support and can access outside support. Mergers have put some out of work. Salaries are up at the Russian Academy of Sciences, but to do this they had to fire 20% of staff.

The only study that has attempted to measure the intellectual threat that this evaluation is aware of is the survey of Russian scientists conducted by Professors Ball and Gerber. Ball and Gerber surveyed over 600 Russian scientists to get a broad perspective and hard data on the state of Russian scientists and the International Science and Technology Center's (ISTC's) role in their professional lives. One of the findings of the study is that "Western funding has encouraged Russian scientists to do more work that has non-military commercial applications." ⁽⁶⁾ While recognizing the inherent difficulty in measuring intellectual non-proliferation, the general view (of FWS, science center officials, RFWS stream and other funding party officials) is that the intellectual threat is lower in Western Russia and Ukraine (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remains high in other FSU countries, notably Central Asia and in the biological field.

As several respondents noted, the threat has evolved. At the end of the Cold War, the threat was largely confined to Russia and nuclear. Biological and chemical attacks in Central Asia now pose a greater threat, notably in regions that are ideologically / ethnically / linguistically close to areas where terrorist groups are active such as the Taliban. In addition, personnel other than weapons scientists have knowledge that might be valuable to states and terrorists. Where states might seek high-end and sophisticated weapons capabilities, terrorists may be satisfied with simpler and improvised capabilities.

Current policy is that at least 50% of the scientists on science center supported projects must be former weapons scientists (FWS). FWS are defined as scientists who were engaged in the FSU weapons program in the 1980s. The implication of this 50% rule is that some younger non-FWS, of potential interest to terrorist groups, may inadvertently be excluded from participating on science center projects. Funding parties are aware of this potential threat and are currently reviewing this 50% FWS participation rule.

The RFWS stream will therefore, need to adapt to the evolving intellectual threat. This includes addressing younger scientists by considering a reduction in the 50% FWS participation rule, increasing support to non-Russian FSU states and placing greater emphasis on biological and chemical threats.

3.2 Relevance to Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives

Given the above, the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to the following foreign policy objectives, as indicated by DFAIT's 2007-08 Report on Plans and Priorities:

• Priority 1: a safer, more secure and prosperous Canada within a strengthened North American partnership. More specifically, the non-proliferation of the knowledge of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and counterterrorism are critically important to global security. Furthermore, in our knowledge-based economy, there can be no overstating the importance of business intelligence and information.
• Priority 3: Greater international support for freedom and security, democracy, rule of law, human rights and environmental stewardship. In particular, Canada will maintain its efforts, with NATO partners, to support security-sector reform and strengthen government institutions.
• Priority 4: Accountable and consistent use of the multilateral system to deliver results on global issues of concern to Canadians. Canada's membership in key international groups (e.g., Science Centers) provides a significant platform from which this country can exert influence in global affairs and advance Canadian interests and values. As such, DFAIT will continue to coordinate Canadian positions on G8 political and international security issues.

3.3 International Policy Environment

Changes were noted by IGX senior management and managers of the RFWS stream within GPP, other funding parties, and the Science Centers as follows:

• The Russian economy has strengthened as a result of rising oil prices. Many noted that the stronger economy is a key factor behind Russia's more belligerent stance towards the West, such as the dispute between Russia and the UK over the murder of ex-Russian agent, Alexander Litvinenko, and the planting of the Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole.
• Canadian scientists, members of the project review and selection process, and other funding parties noted that science center grants provide the West with a foot in the door. Indeed, many noted that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) feel that the Science Centers provide the West with a means to spy on Russia.
• The US has proposed that the scope of "redirection efforts" (e.g., the Science Centers) needs to be broadened to include countries other than the FSU, such as North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

The belief that the West is using ISTC for espionage combined with a stronger Russian economy is a key factor behind the reluctance of the MFA to extend the mandate of the ISTC beyond 2012 and to other countries other than the FSU; all other funding parties are apparently in favour of extending the mandate. Interviewees noted that even RosAtom and the Russian Academy of Sciences would like to see the ISTC mandate extended both in time and in scope.

• US priorities outside the FSU, notably Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to a decrease in regular project funding by the US Department of State (DoS) to both Science Centers (ISTC and STCU).
• The general view by other funding parties is that partner projects are stronger scientifically; they build stronger relations with the West due to partner interest in the results. Partner programming is seen as providing great opportunity for long-term sustainability, whereas regular projects are geared toward short-term engagement by the FWS.
• Institute sustainability is enhanced not only through commercialization. Many interviewees pointed out that Western research institutes are not sustainable, i.e., without government funding they would cease to exist. Very few Western institutes could survive on private sources alone.
• Due to budget constraints, other funding parties are being more selective in the institutes they support. For example, the US has identified several institutions that they consider "graduated" institutes and no longer in need of ISTC/STCU support. RFWS uses similar criteria to the US to determine which institutes to allocate its scarce budget.

The RFWS stream will therefore, need to adapt to an environment of decreased and more focused funding to and by the Science Centers. As will be noted later on, this will include allowing for more flexibility in the RFWS stream in order to place greater emphasis on sustainability and partner programming. These two approaches are considered to be the most effective means of addressing the evolving threat.

Top of Page

4.0 Findings: Cost Effectiveness

4.1 Program Implementation Model

The advantage of the Science Centers (ISTC and STCU) is that they provide economies of scale that all funding parties benefit from, including the RFWS stream of the Global Partnership Program. This includes access to the project management expertise and the critical mass of people at the Science Centers, as well as their track record with FSU institutes. In addition, both Science Centers have offices in each recipient country to facilitate delivery.

The disadvantage is that as Science Centers are multilateral organizations they are inherently more bureaucratic and slower, making it more difficult to engage commercial parties. Although efforts are being made to shorten the time to review partner projects recognizing that firms need to move quickly, the Science Centers are not designed to be technology brokering agencies, which adds another layer of difficulty in engaging the private sector. Some respondents feel that the funding parties have placed too much emphasis on commercialization and involving the private sector, when the prime objective remains to mitigate the proliferation threat and to instil a culture of non-proliferation.

The views of Canadian business were found to be similar to that of the general public. A survey commissioned by DFAIT on Canadian perceptions of Russia found that "about two-thirds of respondents agree that Russia represents a significant market for Canadian business (67%) and that the Canadian government should encourage Canadians to do business in Russia (68%). However, about the same proportion of respondents (63%) also believe that Russia is a difficult place to do business."

[The Antima Group, Canadian Perceptions of Russia, prepared for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 23, 2007, p. 25.]

However, other respondents feel that commercialization is the key to providing a "permanent" redirection. As noted earlier, sustainability can be achieved through long-term stable funding from domestic and foreign government sources. Sustainability does not always have to mean commercialization, however, without any commercial activities the prospects for sustainability are lower. Many respondents defined an institute's sustainability in terms of financially health and perspectives for a stable future, without reliance on science center funding. Institutes can rely on local (e.g., Russian) government funding, but they should be active commercially (domestic or international), and/or successful in competing for other grants. Other aspects of sustainability include the physical condition of the facility. Facilities in disrepair and without electricity have little chance of generating revenue, and if there is no revenue for facility upgrades and equipment, the institute is not sustainable. If the institute has young scientists speaking English, then it is more likely to be sustainable.

The general view is that alternative implementation models were not given serious consideration because the current program implementation model via the Science Centers is the most appropriate. One possible alternative is a bilateral model. However, it would not be too costly, nor would it make any sense for the RFWS stream to replicate the delivery infrastructure of the Science Centers.

4.2 Cooperation between the RFWS and BNP Streams within GPP

The general view is that the cooperation between RFWS and BNP is excellent. The RFWS team has always forwarded biological proposals to the BNP team for their advice and recommendation, which has ensured that biological redirection projects are mutually supportive of both streams. This cooperation has also been important in supporting the non-redirection activities of the BNP. Funded under the Special Project Fund with no formal and direct link to ISTC and STCU, BNP has been reliant on RFWS for final project approval and funding for all of its Science Center-delivered projects, for which RFWS has reserved some of its funds.

This arrangement, however, has in effect created a 'grey area' of accountability whereby BNP is responsible for the planning of its ISTC and STCU initiatives in the absence of full budget information and approval. This has not yet caused a problem for RFWS, as the stream has thus far enjoyed a budget surplus in two of the last four years. If, over the next five years, such an arrangement were to continue, problems would likely arise. This is due to the fact that BNP, as a fully funded stream, will likely place more demands on RFWS from an increase in the number of non-redirection BNP projects directed through the Science Centers at a time when RFWS may no longer be in surplus. From ISTC's perspective, this arrangement, while not problematic, is considered odd. For it requires ISTC to deal with RFWS managers for BNP project initiation and administrative matters, and shift to BNP managers for dealing with the substantive content of the initiatives.

4.3 ISTC/SCTU Operations

Over the 2003-04 to 2006-07 period operating costs amounted to $1.1 million and accounted for 2.6% of the total expenditures of $41.5 million. The general comment by other funding parties and Science Centers is that they don't know how Canada (RFWS) does what it does with the limited resources it has.

As a relative newcomer to ISTC, the RFWS team brought fresh ideas, new energy, and a very strong commitment to non-proliferation. One of the new ideas consisted of providing project applicants with feedback to their proposals. A key aspect of integrating FWS into the international scientific community in a sustainable manner is to develop the grant application capacity of FSU scientists. One of the most effective ways to do this is to provide detailed feedback from the scientific peer review. Canada (RFWS) took the lead and was the first party to do this. Since then, other funding parties have followed suit. Other funding parties noted that Canada's contribution to the ISTC is critical. Canada's contribution is essential particularly with respect to competency building. Canada gives important guidance, always provides helpful and useful feedback, and is an essential part of the ISTC.

With respect to the STCU, other funding parties noted that CIDA was restricted to only supporting projects in the Ukraine. This provided a challenge to STCU programming, since CIDA could not focus on other FSU countries covered by the center. Although CIDA's contribution has been effective, because its budget was small CIDA's contribution has been small.

Budget conditions require RFWS to direct all contributions (transfer payments) to the Science Centers. Although some Canadian firms are very engaged in science center projects with FWS, many Canadian participants from small organizations indicated that because they receive no compensation for their time (the project is traditionally defined by and for the FSU scientists), they limit their involvement to reading progress reports and responding to emails. Some Canadian participants have not even travelled to Russia/FSU, their only contact with the FWS is through email and reviewing progress reports. If they were compensated for their time they indicated that they would devote a lot more time and effort to the project. Canadian participants are not expecting to be compensated for 100% of their time or at market rates, but they note, even a partial contribution would help. A partial contribution would indicate to Canadian participants that DFAIT values their participation. It recognizes the greater risks of working in Russia and the FSU, and helps to "level the attractiveness" of the FSU relative to other regions in the world such as China and India.

It is difficult to separate out the contributions of Canadian staff at the Science Centers, as they are an integral part of the RFWS team. There is a monthly teleconference with the RFWS team in Ottawa, and once each year Canadian staff at the Science Centers travel to Ottawa.

However, several interviewees noted that personnel in the Embassies are not being fully utilized. At the moment, they are being used primarily as "travel agents," whereas they could provide input into policy as well as assist in program delivery, such as monitoring. Another area where Embassy staff might play a valuable role is with respect to the third objective of RFWS - providing scientific and industrial benefits to Canada; e.g., involving trade officers.

4.4 Governance Structure of RFWS

The governance structure for the RFWS stream is provided in Figure 4-1. The RFWS stream is led by a Senior Program Manager (SPM), and assisted by a Senior Business Development Manager, and assisted by a Program Officer and two Program Assistants. As noted in Figure 4-1, RFWS consists of two arms: an implementation/delivery and an advisory arm.

Figure 4-1: RFWS Stream Governance Structure

As noted in the profile, there are two implementation/delivery mechanisms for the redirection of scientists: the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) based in Kyiv. Canada occupies a seat on the Governing Board (GB) of both Science Centers. As of November 2007, Canada is represented on both Governing Boards by the GPP Director. At the secretariat level, Canada occupies one of the Deputy Executive Director (DED) positions. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlines the respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities between the Science Centers and the GPP-RFWS.

Several other organizations, as noted in Figure 4-1, provide advisory services to the RFWS stream. The three advisory organizations are Environment Canada, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the National Research Council (NRC). Each is governed by a MOU with DFAIT. Environment Canada provides the services of a scientific advisor to the RFWS stream and represents Canada on ISTC's Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). NSERC coordinates the scientific and technical peer review. NRC assesses results and manages the intellectual property generated through DFAIT-funded projects. Other organizations and agencies, such as science based departments and agencies (SBDAs), the Science, Technology and Trade Advisory Group (STTAG), and other funding parties (e.g., US, EU) provide advice on an as required basis.

Interviewees in each of the implementation/delivery and advisory arms indicated that their roles, responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly defined and understood. This includes other organizations involved in the peer review such as the National Research Council Canada (NRC). The governance structure for the RFWS provides the appropriate oversight and coordination with respect to the redirection objectives, specifically former weapons scientists and institutes of proliferation concern. However, as noted earlier, budget conditions restricts the RFWS to direct all transfer payments to the Science Centers which removes any flexibility for supporting Canadian researchers, and hinders opportunities for leveraging resources and achieving the third objective of scientific and industrial benefits to Canada.

4.5 Effectiveness of Cooperation

The cooperation between RFWS and other funding parties (donors) is described by the US, EU and the Science Centers as being excellent. This includes determining which donor will fund which projects, and if jointly funded, the contribution of each funding party as well as establishing coordinated policies and positions toward the Science Centers. Several interviewees noted that the coordination between Canada and the US is stronger than with the EU.

Many noted that the demand for science center grants / funding exceeds budget. It means that cooperation between the funding parties has become more important, since everyone is trying to leverage limited funds. This level of cooperation ensures that there is no duplication with other G8 redirection programs.

In addition, many donors have had cuts to their budgets for regular projects. As a result, greater emphasis is being given to partner projects. The implication for RFWS is that Canadian funding for regular projects has become increasingly important to both Science Centers.

4.6 Performance Measurement

The RFWS stream operates in a high risk environment. One of the challenges, as noted earlier, is determining which scientists pose a threat. The RFWS stream, as is the case with redirection programs of other funding parties, is dependent upon the host government to indicate who is a former weapons scientist. The Rand study highlights the difficulty in obtaining verifiable data on the number of FWS, where it notes that a key question "is the size of the pool of NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) weapons expertise in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, there is little confirmable data on the number of personnel in the NBC weapons complexes, and estimates of these numbers vary widely, particularly for the chemical and biological complexes."⁽⁷⁾ To address this data challenge, RFWS and other funding parties have focused on institutes rather than individual scientists, e.g., it is easier to collect information on a fewer number of institutes rather than on a larger number of individuals dispersed across several countries. RFWS has identified certain institutes of higher priority for Canadian funding based on assessments that it carries out of the proliferation risks. Addressing the intellectual threat, as noted earlier, is about managing risk. Like other streams, RFWS has a risk registry that it updates, based on ongoing institutional assessments, on a regular basis.

Perhaps the most useful day-to-day management tool is RFWS' project database. The database captures key information pertaining to project applications and funded projects, including funding amount disaggregated by donor, the number of FWS involved in each project and by subject area (nuclear, biological, chemical, missile), the FSU institutes, and contact information of the Canadian participant. In addition, RFWS uses the same project identification numbers as the science center databases in order to facilitate the up and down loading of information.

The RMAF and logic model for RFWS was recently updated in March 2007. The logic model is an appropriate reflection of the activities and chain of results to the achievement of the strategic outcomes and Canada's foreign policy objectives. One of the immediate outcomes in the logic model however, only refers to "GPP funded projects," i.e., there is no mention of partner funded projects. With this minor change to the logic model (i.e., change the immediate outcome to "GPP and partner funded projects reflect Canadian ST and non-proliferation priorities"), the RFWS management tools continue to be relevant today.

4.7 RFWS Program Management

The strengths of RFWS program management, as noted earlier, include:

• Focus on redirection: the stream is focused on the redirection objectives by prioritizing institutes of proliferation concern.
• Project database: the stream uses the same project identification numbers as the science center databases, which facilitates the up and down loading of information.
• Project selection: NSERC coordinates a scientific and technical peer review on behalf of the stream.
• Knowledge: Environment Canada provides scientific advice to the stream and also participates in the ISTC's SAC.
• Personnel: other funding parties hold the RFWS team as well as Canadian staff at the Science Centers in high regard. Canada (RFWS) "energized" the Science Centers with new ideas such as providing detailed feedback to FSU project applicants, contributed to capacity building.
• Cooperation with other funding parties: the level of coordination with other funding parties ensures that there is no duplication of efforts.

The weaknesses of RFWS program management, as noted earlier, include:

• Utilization of embassy staff: embassy staff could play a more active role in program delivery, such as monitoring, as well as in facilitating Canadian organizations to advance ST and industrial benefits to Canada.

Top of Page

5.0 Findings: Success

5.1 Achievements To Date

Strong performance against the following indicators:

• Project milestones met
• Canadian and FSU scientists engaged
• Former weapons scientists are being integrated into the global scientific community, entering the civilian economy

Over the 2003/04 to 2006/07 period RFWS has supported nearly 200 projects involving approximately 2300 FWS. As shown below in Figure 5-1, half are in the nuclear field, 25% in the biological field, 13% in missile, 7% in chemical, and 4% in other areas. The results that have been achieved to March 31, 2007 are as follows:

• Increased production and dissemination of scientific results: all of the projects reviewed by the evaluation have given presentations at international conferences and published technical papers. FSU project managers indicated that their only international conference presentations have been through the RFWS/science center projects.
• Having the RFWS/science center research grant gives FWS prestige/acknowledgement as a scientist at the international level.
• Provided a wider network of international researchers in their field.
• Allowed younger scientists to be involved in international and leading edge research.

Figure 5-1: Distribution of 2300 FWS by Subject Area, 2003/04 to 2006/07

RFWS a relative newcomer after only four years, so still too early for performance against the following indicators:

• Former weapons scientists are starting to advance beyond dependence on the ISTC/STCU
• Scientific and technological innovations created from successful sub-project research benefit Canada
• Canadian industry investments in projects and project results
• Leveraging of partner dollars
• Canadian industry revenue generated

Although many Canadian organizations have expressed interest in becoming a partner and funding collaborative research with FWS, to date there have not been any Canadian funded partner projects. Many equate partner projects with "genuine collaboration" since they would require input / effort from both Canadian and FSU institutes in order to define, conduct, and/or achieve the objectives of the research. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) defines collaboration as an ongoing, active and integrated working relationship among the members of a broadly based team of researchers, each of whom brings different perspectives to complex research questions requiring long-term funding. The research could be of such scope as to require broadly based collaboration among researchers from various disciplines, sectors, and institutions.⁽⁸⁾

The Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) experience with the STCU up till 2005/06 provides an interesting and alternative approach for engaging Canada's private sector. As an economic development agency, CIDA was able to provide 50:50 grants (up to $40K) to Canadian firms to encourage them to collaborate on CIDA/STCU funded research projects. According to the STCU this resulted in increased and active participation by the Canadian private sector. One of the Ukrainian institutes studied by the evaluation participated in a partner project with a Calgary firm to develop geological software that allowed oil and gas firms to more accurately map and determine the location of the vertical boundaries of oil fields. The Ukrainian institute is currently receiving enough revenues to keep 20 people employed and enough funds to continue working on the next version of the software. The Ukrainian institute and its partner from Calgary hold a US patent for the software. Although the general view is that public awareness of GPP and RFWS is low, the study is unable to make any comment regarding the indicator, "improved public awareness of non-proliferation efforts," as a public opinion survey was outside the scope of this evaluation. However, a public opinion survey commissioned by DFAIT⁽⁹⁾ found that:

• About two thirds (64%) of all respondents agree that weapons of mass destruction from Russia could be used by terrorists and unfriendly countries.
• 58 percent believe that Russian weapons scientists could work for terrorist groups or unfriendly countries.
• A large majority (82%) of respondents support the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Factors that facilitate the success of the RFWS stream include:

• Research grants: FWS are able to access research grants (from the Science Centers) which allow them to participate in international and leading edge research, acquire updated equipment, attend and give presentations at international conferences.
• Management: effective management systems employed by the stream such as the project database and the peer review of proposals, provision of detailed feedback to applicants, effective cooperation with other funding parties, and the knowledge, capabilities and responsiveness of the RFWS team.
• Multilateral framework: the Science Centers provide access to institutes that may not be possible under a bilateral framework.
• Canada's political position: people like Canadians, Canada is not a super power and not perceived as a threat.

Factors that impede the success of the RFWS stream include:

• Host government concurrence: even though access to institutions is in the agreement with the Science Centers, a host government can and has impeded access; as well, a host government defines who is a former weapons scientist.
• Canadian perceptions: Russia and the FSU are perceived as being riskier places to do business, other countries such as China and India are perceived to provide a better return on investment, the different languages in the FSU, and distance from Canada and North America.

5.2 Canada's Visibility, Credibility and Influence

The RFWS stream has played a significant role in raising Canada's profile with other funding parties, particularly with the US. According to the US, Canada's RFWS is a major player in both Science Centers, both from a funding and an effort (policy, work) point of view. Canada contributes and does its homework. Canada's program complements the US very well, which includes the sharing of priority institutes. Canada is a full participatory member in the Science Centers, an equal partner to the US and EU, and Canadian views are always sought.

The EU also indicated that RFWS has enhanced Canada's visibility, credibility and influence. They noted that both the EU and Canada are trying to keep to the core mission of the Science Centers, whereas the US is pushing beyond the limits into commercialization. The US is pulling out from the very core (i.e., regular projects) and is being replaced by Canada. Without Canada, ISTC would collapse. The situation is somewhat different with the STCU, because partner projects account for more than 50% of STCU's funding.

Many FWS indicated that as a result of the science center projects their awareness of Canada's ST capabilities has increased. Before their first inclination would be the US or the EU as suitable international partners, whereas now, Canada makes their preferred list of potential international partners. Some noted that Russia has the same nuclear waste disposal problem as Canada as they also produce heavy water. Both Russia and Canada have a lot in common: the geological environment is similar and both have lots of land, i.e., it is a natural fit that will hopefully form the basis of strengthening relations. However, they added that their preference is to have Canadian counterparts more fully engaged in the project so that they could more fully appreciate and benefit from Canadian expertise.

Recognizing the inherent difficulties in measuring the intellectual proliferation threat, the general view is that the intellectual proliferation risk has decreased as a result of Canadian and other donor's redirection investments. FWS are being integrated into the international scientific community, as indicated by the number of presentations at international conferences and publishing of technical papers. However, as noted earlier in evaluation question 1, the threat remains high in other regions such as biological and chemical in Central Asia.

Top of Page

6.0 Lessons Learned

Increasing Canada's Capacity

The lessons learned in terms of increasing Canada's capacity to significantly reduce the intellectual proliferation threat include:

• Sustainability is key: The most effective way to reduce the intellectual proliferation risk is to ensure that efforts taken today (e.g., research projects supported by science center grants) are sustainable over the long term. While sustainability does not necessarily have to be the commercialization route (e.g., long term funding could come from government sources), experience and the general view is that institutes must either be active commercially or able to attract research grants from a variety of sources. CIDA's experience with the STCU demonstrates the validity of this view.
• Other donors are pursuing their own scientific and commercial interests: Given that the intellectual threat has evolved, other funding parties are supporting projects that also meet their own commercial and/or strategic interests while not abandoning the non-proliferation objective. Due to budget cuts to the US Department of State's redirection (or Science Centers) program, the US is focusing on partner projects. In 2006, US funding for partner projects was $18 million compared to $4.1 million for regular projects at the ISTC.
• Engaging the private sector is a challenge: In 2006, there were 51 US partner projects worth $18 million at the ISTC, of which only 3 projects were funded by the private sector worth $160K. Thus, the US also has difficulty engaging its private sector to participate in redirection research projects. The remaining 48 projects worth $17.9 million were funded by other US government departments and agencies. An example of a US government agency partner is the US National Cancer Institute that teams up with priority institutes, which not only suits the cancer institute's research objectives but also meets the redirection/non-proliferation goals of the US DoS.
• Partner funding enhances prospects for sustainability: As noted above, many equate partner projects with genuine collaboration since they would require input from both Canadian and FSU institutes in order to define, conduct and/or achieve the objectives of the research. The CIDA/STCU example with the Calgary firm and the Ukrainian institute provides compelling support for this view.
• Support to industry is needed: Russia and the FSU are seen as riskier places to do business. Distance and language also contribute to Canadian industry's reluctance to get more engaged. It is noted that although Science Centers do cover some of the travel costs, they only assist western firms who they feel are serious about becoming funding partners. Again CIDA's experience with the STCU suggests that some support to industry helps them to get their "foot in the door." As well, CIDA's support was not restricted to projects; it was left to the Canadian firm to determine how they would allocate the 50:50 CIDA cost share grant.
• Reduction in overall funding to the Science Centers:Contributions by other donors, notably the US, for regular programming at ISTC/STCU have been decreasing. The Science Centers provide the RFWS stream with the delivery infrastructure. As overall funding for regular programming declines, in future this could be a potential impeding factor to RFWS programming particularly with respect to supporting projects in other FSU countries, such as in Central Asia. There are two consequences from the reduction in overall funding:
  • Declining ISTC/STCU salaries: the stronger economic situation in Kyiv and Moscow combined with no increases in science center remuneration has meant that staff salaries are no longer competitive. This has meant that both Science Centers have lost a lot of good locally engaged staff in recent years.
  • Declining size of science center grants: the daily rate per scientist has not changed since the late 1990s/early 2000s. This is particularly problematic for younger scientists in cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kyiv, who can always find higher paying jobs outside the research centers. Many FWS noted that if the daily rate is not increased, in future it will become increasingly difficult to attract younger scientists to take part in science center projects.

Increasing Canada's Visibility

The lessons learned in terms of increasing Canada's visibility in efforts to reduce the intellectual proliferation threat include:

• Visibility with other donors up: Canada's visibility with other donors is increased under the multilateral framework of the Science Centers. Many also noted that in an era of scarce resources, it is best to pool efforts.
• Visibility with recipient institutes/scientists up: Canada's visibility with recipient institutes and scientists would be enhanced if Canadian counterparts could become more fully engaged in the research.

Canada's Relationship with the US

The lessons learned in terms of enhancing Canada's relationship with the US, Russia and other G8 nations include:

• Joint efforts enhance relationships: Canada's relationship with US, Russia and other G8 nations has been enhanced because the parties are working together to achieve the common goal of reducing the risk of intellectual proliferation. This holds for individuals delivering the redirection program as well as the scientists involved in the research. At the scientist level, the relationship would be enhanced as noted above if Canadian scientists could become more fully engaged in joint research.

Enhancing Environmental Protection

The lessons learned in terms of enhancing environmental protection include:

• Good potential for enhancing environmental protection: The RFWS, compared to other funding parties, is relatively new. It is therefore too early for any impacts, either environmental and/or commercial.

Top of Page

7.0 Summary Conclusions

The conclusions of the study are presented below according to the three evaluation issues of relevance, cost effectiveness and results achieved.

Relevance

Although the threat of former weapons scientists (FWS) providing their knowledge to terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has evolved, it is lower in some regions (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remains high in others (e.g., biological threat in Central Asia), the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives.

Cost Effectiveness

Although Canada is relatively new to the Science Centers (redirection) compared to other donors, it has become a full contributing partner in a very short period of time. The stream relies on management systems, such as the project database, that contribute to its cost effectiveness. The level of cooperation with other donors is effective and ensures no duplication of efforts. We conclude that the implementation model adopted by the RFWS stream is the most cost effective alternative.

Results

RFWS is a well managed stream whose activities have helped, in cooperation with other donors, to create a more stable environment for former weapons scientists and their institutes. The RFWS stream is addressing the "intellectual threat" and we conclude that the risk of former weapons scientists providing their knowledge to terrorist groups and/or countries seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction has been reduced.

RFWS has created greater awareness of Canada's ST capabilities by scientists in the FSU. Furthermore, based on the production (e.g., number of technical papers published) and dissemination of scientific knowledge (e.g., number of presentations at international conferences) by RFWS-ISTC supported projects, former weapons scientists are being integrated into the international scientific community.

Engagement by Canadians in RFWS-ISTC projects that lead to long-term sustainability and reduced intellectual threat as well as benefits to Canada could however be improved. Canadian firms, even large ones, are conservative and risk averse. They are focusing on China and India, places other than the FSU which is perceived to be a "more risky place to do business." More effort is needed to engage Canadians (such as raising awareness amongst senior managers) in redirection efforts and in particular on funding partner projects.

Current design requires all funds to be channelled via the Science Centers which limits RFWS' ability to respond to the evolving intellectual threat, such as providing some support (like the CIDA cost share grants) to Canadian participants to enhance the likelihood of long-term sustainability that provide international and leading edge research opportunities for younger scientists, a continuous reduction in the intellectual proliferation risk, and derive ST and industrial benefits to Canada.

Top of Page

8.0 Recommendations

Given that the RFWS stream continues to be relevant to achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives, is well managed, and contributes to strengthening relations with other donors, particularly with the US, it is recommended that DFAIT continue the RFWS stream beyond March 31, 2008, and the implementation of Canada's redirection efforts under the multilateral framework of the two Science Centers - the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) based in Kyiv.

Given that the involvement by Canadians, particularly in partner projects, increases the chances of long term sustainability/continuous intellectual threat reduction and science and technology and industrial benefits to Canada, it is recommended that DFAIT remove the budget constraints to allow for more flexibility in RFWS programming, such as contributing part of the costs of collaborating with FSU scientists to partner projects with Canadian businesses.

Senior managers in Canadian organizations (e.g., firms, crown corporations) are generally not aware of the benefits of engaging FWS in collaborative research, particularly partner projects which are under the direction of the funding partner. This lack of awareness is a barrier to the organization participating fully in regular projects and/or funding a partner project. It is recommended, therefore, that awareness raising campaigns be directed at senior managers in Canadian organizations, both public and private.

Given that the intellectual threat has evolved to being lower in some regions (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv) but remaining high in others (e.g., biological threat in Central Asia), it is recommended that the RFWS shift its focus to other FSU states.

Given the RFWS stream's limited resources, it is recommended that ways to more fully utilize Embassy personnel be considered. For example, in order to enhance the attractiveness of redirection projects with former weapons scientists to Canadian organizations, particularly among senior managers in the private sector, embassy trade officers should be involved in awareness raising campaigns. In order to reduce the workload on RFWS-Ottawa staff, Embassy personnel might also support project monitoring in Russia.

Top of Page

Annex A: Management Response and Action Plan

Top of Page

¹ DFAIT, through RFWS, assumed responsibility for Canada's contribution to the STCU in 2006/07. Previously, these contributions were managed by CIDA..

² A partner is any entity other than the funding party (i.e., DFAIT) who expresses an interest in funding a project..

³ Although CIDA became a funding party to the STCU in 1994, it's support was limited to the Ukraine. DFAIT became a funding party to the ISTC in 2004..

⁴ 4. Ball, Deborah Yarsike, and Gerber, Theodore P., "Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?", International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), p. 50..

⁵ RAND Corporation, National Security Division, Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem, Prepared by John V. Parachini, David E. Mosher, John Baker, Keith Crane, Michael Chase, Michael Daugherty, for the United States Department of Energy, 2005, p. 7..

⁶ Ball, Deborah Yarsike, and Gerber, Theodore P., A Survey of Russian Scientists: Is the ISTC Effective? Presentation by Deborah Yarsike Ball, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Theodore P. Gerber, University of Wisconsin, April 2004, p. 10..

⁷ RAND Corporation, National Security Division, Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem, Prepared by John V. Parachini, David E. Mosher, John Baker, Keith Crane, Michael Chase, Michael Daugherty, for the United States Department of Energy, 2005, p. 15..

⁸ See http://www.sshrc.ca/web/apply/program_descriptions/mcri_e.asp As noted earlier in evaluation question 5, Canadian participants, particularly from small organizations indicated that because they receive no compensation for their time, the project is defined by and for the FSU scientists they limit their involvement to reading progress reports and responding to emails..

The Antima Group, Canadian Perceptions of Russia, prepared for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 23, 2007, pp. 28-30..

Office of the Inspector General

^* If you require a plug-in or a third-party software to view this file, please visit the alternative formats section of our help page.

Primary navigation

Date Modified:

2012-12-31