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Summative Evaluation of START's Global Peace and Security Fund - Haiti

April 2009

(PDF Version, 735 KB) *

Table of Contents

Acronyms

ADM
Assistant Deputy Minister
BCF
Foreign Policy and Corporate Communications Division
CANADEM
Canada's Civilian Reserve
CBSA
Canada Border Service Agency
CCC
Canadian Commercial Corporation
CDPF
Country Development Program Framework
CIC
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CICA
Canadian International Corrections Agreement
CICC
Centre of Information and Joint Coordination
CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC
Civil - Military Cooperation
CIOPAZ
Brazilian Army Centre for Training in Peace Operations
CND
Canadian Dollar
CNDDR
Commission nationale pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion
CPA
Canadian Police Agreement
CPVD
Community Violence Reduction and Development Committees
CSC
Correctional Service of Canada
CVR
Community Violence Reduction
DAP
Département de l'Administration Pénitencière
DCL
Cabinet and Parliamentary Liaison Division
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFAIT
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DG
Director General
DND
Department of National Defence
DPKO (NY)
Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations (New York)
DR
Dominican Republic
DSA
Daily Service Allowance
DSNCRP
Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [PRSP])
EAC
Evaluation Advisory Committee
EU
European Union
FDF
Fond Développement Frontalier
FGCE
Haiti Task Force
FSD
Foreign Service Directive
FTE
Full Time Employee
FY
Fiscal Year
GBP
Glyn Berry Program
GoC
Government of Canada
GoDR
Government of the Dominican Republic
GoH
Government of Haiti
GPOP
Global Peace Operations Program
GPSF
Global Peace and Security Fund
GPSP
Global Peace and Security Program
HNP
Haitian National Police
HR
Human Resources
HSP
Human Security Program
IAM
Area Management Office
ICF
Interim Cooperation Framework
ICG
International Crisis Group
ICT
International Crime and Terrorism Division
IFM
Global Issues Branch at DFAIT
ILX
Mine Action and Small Arms Group
IOM
International Organization for Migration
IPOB
International Peace Operations Branch
IRC
Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Group
IRD
Executive Office - START
IRH
Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group
IRP
Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group
IT
Information Technology
IXS
Program Services Unit
JLH
United Nation Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Section
JUS
Justice Legal Services Division
LES
Locally Engaged Staff
M&E
Monitoring and evaluation
MDS
Environmental Policies and Sustainable Development Strategies Division
MHH
Human Rights, Gender Equality, Health and Population Division
MHS
Democracy and War Economies Division
MINUSTAH
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MoI
Ministry of Interior - Haiti
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MSA
Mission Subsistence Allowance
NGO
Non-governmental organization
OAS
Organization for American States
ODA
Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
OGDs
Other Government Departments
PADF
Pan-American Development Foundation
PCO
Privy Council Office
PDM
Project Development and Management Group
PMA
Performance Management Agreement
PPC
Program Planning Committee
PRMNY
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York
PRNCE
Canadian Embassy in Port-au-Prince
PSEP-C
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RLH
Haiti Task Force
RMAF
Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework
RMAF/RBAF
Results Management and Accountability Framework/ Results Based Accountability Framework
SAB
START Advisory Board
SALW
Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDMGO
Embassy of Canada to the Dominican Republic
SOP
Standard Operating Procedure
START
Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force - DFAIT
SMFH
Financial Services
SMPA
Program Analysis
TBS
Treasury Board Secretariat
TOR
Terms of Reference
TSU
Technical Support Unit
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNPOL
United Nations Police
US
United States
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
ZID
Office of the Inspector General
ZIE
Evaluation Division

Executive Summary

The purpose of this summative evaluation is to report on the achievements of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) in Haiti through an assessment of the different projects it has implemented since 2005 in terms of their contribution to the establishment of conditions that will foster stability and development in the country. The evaluation also examines the extent to which GPSF initiatives have complemented efforts made by other government departments (OGDs) of Canada as well as by other bilateral donors working in Haiti. The results, lessons learned, and recommendations that emanate from this evaluation are expected to assist management in the administration of the GPSF.

The GPSF and START

The GPSF was created in 2005 to fill a funding gap within the GoC by providing dedicated resources in support of activities that are not strictly within the mandates of the Department of National Defence (DND) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), but which are necessary to respond in a timely fashion to the needs of countries at risk of crisis or emerging from crisis. More specifically, the objective of the GPSF is to "ensure timely, coordinated responses to international crises requiring effective whole-of-government action though the planning and delivery of coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile states implicating Canadian interests."

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is the organizational unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) tasked with ensuring the development of a standing capacity for implementation of Canadian policy priorities in emergencies, conflict prevention, and peace-building on a whole-of-government basis. START has overall responsibility for administering the GPSF.

Context

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere and ranked 146 out of 177 countries in the 2007-2008 UN Human Development Index. Following decades of dictatorship and instability, Haiti is in the process of reinstituting a democratic government and developing its capacity, a slow process hampered by a volatile environment. Deficits in institutional capacity are across the board: the legislative infrastructure is outdated, the physical infrastructure is dilapidated, and human resources capacity is weak, communication and information management systems are almost non-existent and the administrative culture is fragmented and inefficient. In this context, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the international community have taken the lead in developing a stabilization and rehabilitation strategy.

Canada has played a leadership role in international efforts to re-establish security and stability in Haiti and to assist in longer-term reform. Haiti is the largest recipient of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the Western Hemisphere and Canada ranks as the second largest bilateral donor in Haiti after the United States (US). Canada's current involvement in Haiti is multifaceted. Canada contributed up to 520 Canadian troops as part of the Multilateral Interim Force mandated by the United Nations (UN) pending the full deployment of MINUSTAH. Since August 2004, Canada has contributed military and police personnel to MINUSTAH. Under the auspices of the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), Canada has implemented programs worth Canadian (CND) $300 million in support of Haiti's development, mainly through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

In July 2006, the GoC announced a commitment of at least CND $520 million in support of Haiti's stabilization, reconstruction, and development. In 2007, Canada's commitment was increased to $555 million over five years with the confirmation of contributions through the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA ) for deployment of personnel to MINUSTAH and DFAIT's GPSF for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007-2008.

GPSF involvement in Haiti, which began in FY 2005, now encompasses 26 projects and 9 implementing partners in four key sectors: community security, police, prison reform, and border security. The approximate value of these projects is $37,573,531.

Methodology

This evaluation was guided by an evaluation matrix that outlines the key questions to be addressed, sources of data, and method of data collection, in accordance with the evaluation's Terns of Reference (TORs). Data were collected through document reviews, stakeholder interviews and focus groups, and through a 32 person-day field mission to Haiti (November 12-21, 2008). A sample of seven GPSF projects, representing a range of projects in four sectors (police, community security, prisons, and border security), were selected for on-site inspection; all other GPSF projects were examined through document review.

Findings and Conclusions

Relevance

The GPSF, as a quick response mechanism to respond to needs of countries in crisis, is highly relevant and in accordance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles for engagement in fragile states. GPSF programming in Haiti is consistent with and supportive of GoC global foreign policy priorities in general and GoC priorities for the Americas and Haiti in particular. GPSF programming in Haiti is further aligned with the priorities of the GoH.

Success

While there is work to be done to improve specific elements of the program, GPSF has produced positive and encouraging results in an extremely challenging context. Results have been achieved through some innovative non-traditional intervention approaches. In the Prison sector, GPSF is helping the GoH move from a correction system that has been strictly punitive in orientation to one that supports rehabilitation and human dignity.

In the Police and Community Security sectors, GPSF has contributed to the modernization of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and applied methods tested in Brazil that are reducing community violence in Haiti's troubled urban neighbourhoods by engaging community leadership and integrating services in a community policing approach. In the area of borders, a formally neglected sector, the GPSF has strengthened the capacity of the GoH to supervise its frontiers and is contributing to the adoption of an integrated approach to border management.

The GPSF has implemented capacity development projects to support the sustainability of its infrastructure projects, and has moreover attracted other donors for subsequent investments, thus ensuring some form of sustainability. However, START does not yet have an overall transition strategy or a fully developed transition mechanism between GPSF and its partners.

Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

Overall, the GPSF has conducted planned activities and achieved targets within budgets in the four sectors of intervention. GPSF's strategic planning systems and instruments at the country level are robust, but need to be better developed at the sector level, particularly from a whole-of-government perspective. While GPSF's whole-of-government coordination mechanisms work reasonably well at the policy level, coordination at the level of programming remains a challenge.

Notwithstanding recent enhancements to START's financial and program data management system, data integrity remains vulnerable and systems are underutilized which poses a risk to project management and corporate memory retention.

GPSF performance monitoring and results reporting instruments at the project and country level are mature in design, but are in need of refinement. START's decision to place a local GPSF representative in Haiti has contributed significantly to the success of the program, but given the volume of work undertaken, the GPSF remains understaffed - which puts the ongoing quality of the portfolio and performance monitoring at risk.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

START should reflect upon the types of projects appropriate to the short to medium-term mandate of the GPSF with greater weight being placed on the catalytic potential of its interventions. In line with the foregoing, START should further adjust its performance metrics to reflect this aspect of its programming and develop and incorporate into its planning instruments transition strategies to ensure longer-term sustainability.

The GPSF, designed as a quick response mechanism, has successfully responded to the critical peace and security needs of Haiti, and in accordance with international best practice with respect to fragile state engagement. However, outstanding questions remain regarding how the short-term, in/out, model of GPSF interventions fit within the capacity building frameworks for longer-term sustainability. Addressing this is particularly pertinent in a country such as Haiti where the crisis is protracted requiring a sustained and long term-effort.

Given the mandate of the GPSF (or any program with similar characteristics), arguably greater attention and weight should be placed on the enabling role of GPSF interventions and the potential catalytic impact in both project selection and results reporting. Within this paradigm, the issue of transition or hand-off assumes critical importance. Although the GPSF has attracted other donors in most sectors, thus ensuring some form of sustainability, a formalized and effective transition mechanism between GPSF and its OGD partners, particularly CIDA, has not yet been sufficiently developed.

Recommendation 2:

START should review staffing requirements to ensure that these are aligned with the size of the portfolio and with the exigencies of current and future programming.

Given the complexities of the country, the number of projects, and the requirements for selecting and supervising projects, combined with the demands of a political officer, the workload of the START field representative is significant. As a result, the representative has been unable to devote the amount of time arguably required for effective monitoring and trouble-shooting. Accordingly, START should review staffing requirements at post to ensure that resources are aligned with the size of the portfolio. Furthermore, consideration should be given to augmenting local capacity in the areas of procurement and contract management.

Recommendation 3:

START should review and continue to develop its financial and information management systems to enhance program stewardship, corporate memory, performance monitoring and results reporting.

Notwithstanding refinements to existing systems, START continues to rely on financial and information management systems that have not been fully adapted to the exigencies of programming, thus placing program management and corporate memory at risk. The risk is compounded by the uneven use of the systems that are in place. While no major incident has been reported, these deficits call for management's attention.

Recommendation 4:

START should take proactive measures to strengthen the coordination of OGDs at the sector level, particularly with respect to planning.

While procedures and fora have been put in place to support whole-of-government coordination, coordinated planning at the sector level in Haiti remains largely uneven and ad hoc. As GPSF interventions in sectors of choice mature, and the challenge of sequencing and transition assume prominence, there will emerge a concurrent need to more actively involve OGDs in strategic planning to both identify opportunities for OGD involvement and to support longer term sustainability of GPSF interventions.

Recommendation 5:

START should reflect on the merits of a needs assessment of community security in Haiti with the view to identifying gaps in the security/development nexus suitable for GPSF support.

Restoring law and order to Haiti's many troubled urban communities will, ultimately, depend on the success of efforts to reintegrate these neighborhoods into the formal economy and raise living standards, efforts that are fundamentally developmental in orientation which are not strictly within the purview of the GPSF. The GPSF, however, does have a role to play in community security through interventions that contribute to the creation of a security space within which community development can occur. How to create this space in the temporary absence of a conventional police presence is not well understood and needs to be explored further in cooperation with relevant stakeholders (the police, community leaders, GoH, NGOs etc.) with the view to ascertaining how the GPSF can best add value to this area of programming.

Recommendation 6:

START should explore the feasibility of providing direct bilateral support to its GoH counterparts in the Police and Prison sectors as a complement to its current support to MINUSTAH.

While GPSF support to the Police and Prison sectors through MINUSTAH has been highly valued, arguably Canada could enhance its impact with more targeted assistance that capitalizes on unique Canadian competencies through direct bilateral arrangements between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Correctional Services Canada (CSC) and their respective Haitian counterparts.

Top of page

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background

Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world and the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. According to the most recent poverty estimates (based on a 2001 survey), over 50 percent of the Haitian population lives below the US1$/day poverty line and 76 percent below the US2$/day poverty line. In the 2007-2008 UN Human Development Index, Haiti ranked 146 out of 177 countries.

Haiti is a fragile state with a long history of recurring cycles of violence and instability. Thirty years of brutal and consecutive dictatorships ended in 1986. From 1986 to 1991 the country was run by a series of interim governments that were appointed, fraudulently elected, or installed through a coup d'état. In 1987, Haiti's Constitution was replaced by a democratically-voted for Constitution that barred former Duvalierists and Macoutes from public office for a period of ten years. The populist Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected president in 1991 but was overthrown by a bloody military-led coup d'état seven months later in September 1991.Mr. Aristide returned to Haiti in October 1994, but was forced out in 2004. After two years (2004-2006), and many postponements, presidential and legislative elections were finally held resulting the in the election of Mr. René Préval as president.

Chronology of Recent Events in Haiti

May 2000: Fanmi Lavalas (FL) and its leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide win elections in May 2000. However, international election monitors find that Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council used an incorrect method for calculating the results for 8 of the upper-house Senate seats. In spite of the opposition party denouncing the election process, Mr. Aristide is declared President. Bilateral and multilateral donors freeze all aid pending a resolution of the dispute.

February 2004: The FL Government collapses. The growing opposition movement demands that Mr. Aristide resign. United States (US) and French troops enter Haiti to restore order under the framework of the UN-mandated MIF.

February 2004-February 2006: A transitional government is installed and a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Several thousand troops, mainly from Brazil and other regional countries participating in the MINUSTAH force arrive and are concentrated in Port-au-Prince.

February 2006: Presidential and legislative elections are held. René Préval, backed by FL supporters wins the presidency. The swearing-in of a new democratically elected legislature, president and prime minister feeds optimism that conditions might improve.

December 2006: Social problems resurface, including the problem of armed gangs and violent crime. Large scale interventions into shanty communities (Cité Soleil, Bel Air) force gang leaders to flee.

August 2007: The UN reiterates its commitment to the peacekeeping mission and calls for an extension of the mandate of the 9,000 Brazilian-led force. Levels of crime, human and drug trafficking continue to increase between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and violent crime continues to rise.

April-July 2008: After months of rising fuel and food prices, street protests against the high cost of living erupt in Port-au-Prince. The senate votes for the removal of the primer minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis. Ms Michèle Pierre-Louis wins the approval of the Chamber of Deputies and is declared prime minister in July 2008.

The process of reinstituting a democratic government is still in progress and, after decades of dictatorship, Haiti is gradually developing its state capacity, a slow process hampered by the volatile environment in which the country has evolved and large-scale emigration of educated Haitians.

The country faces deficits on all fronts. The legislative infrastructure is outdated, the physical infrastructure is dilapidated, and human resources capacity is weak. Communication and information management systems are almost non-existent and the administrative culture is characterized by clientalism, a lack of delegation, a high degree of fragmentation, and limited collaboration. In this context the United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the international community at large had to take the lead in developing a stabilization and rehabilitation strategy.

1.2 Canadian Involvement in Haiti

Canada established formal diplomatic relations with Haiti when a permanent mission was set up in Port-au-Prince in 1954. Canada's ties with Haiti are nourished by the presence of a major Haitian Diaspora in Canada, 90 percent of which reside in Quebec. The peoples of Quebec and Haiti have always shared a close relationship, having a common French background which laid the foundation for mutual exchanges and linkages, and in fact, money, merchandise, and educational material are frequently sent back to the island. In total, around US$1.5 billion in remittances from the Haitian Diaspora worldwide is sent every year back to the island. This represents the largest and most consistent single source of aid received by Haiti, and surpasses the contributions of all international bodies combined.

Haiti is a country of strategic importance to Canada, given the geographic, demographic and historical links between the two countries. Canada's Strategy for the Americas, which seeks to strengthen and reinforce Canada's leadership role in the Western Hemisphere, calls for a "pro-active engagement with the Caribbean to promote stability" and to work with partners including the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Mexico and other Latin American partners to "manage and influence transition in Haiti." More specifically, the strategy identifies Haiti as an important country implicating regional security and a country where Canada's whole-of-government approach can deliver results by helping Haiti to consolidate security gains and enable realization of longer term development goals.

Canada has played a leadership role in international efforts to re-establish security and stability in Haiti and to assist in longer-term reform. Haiti is the largest recipient of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the Western Hemisphere and Canada ranks as the second largest bilateral donor in Haiti after the United States (US). Canada's current involvement in Haiti is multifaceted. In 2004, Canada contributed up to 520 Canadian troops as part of the Multilateral Interim Force mandated by the United Nations (UN) pending the full deployment of MINUSTAH. Since August 2004, Canada has contributed military and police personnel to MINUSTAH. Under the auspices of the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), Canada has implemented programs worth CND $300 million in support of Haiti's development, mainly through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

In July 2006, at the first donor conference since the election of president Rene Preval, the GoC announced a commitment of at least Canadian (CND) $520 million (of which CND $485 million was to be channeled through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) over a five year period), in support of Haiti's stabilization, reconstruction, and development. In 2007, concurrent with the Prime Minister's visit to Haiti, Canada's commitment was increased to $555 million over five years with the confirmation of contributions through the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA ) for deployment of personnel to MINUSTAH and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) Programming for FY2007-2008.1

Canada's engagement in Haiti also aims to build stronger partnerships with other key actors in the hemisphere. For example, Canada currently partners with Brazil (immunization and community security/development) and Argentina (agriculture) in trilateral development projects in Haiti. At present, nine Latin American countries have troops deployed to MINUSTAH. In addition to these nine troop contributing countries, Colombia, Grenada, El Salvador and Jamaica deploy police officers. In the context of the G8 Heiligendamm Dialogue Process, Brazil and Canada are co-leading a process aimed at drawing lessons learnt from Canada-Brazil cooperation on peace and security initiatives in the country.

1.3 Profile of the GPSF and START

1.3.1 The GPSF

The GPSF was created in May 2005 to fill a funding gap within the GoC by providing dedicated resources in support of activities that are not within the mandates of the Department of National Defence (DND) or CIDA, but which are necessary to respond in a timely fashion to countries emerging from crisis or at risk of crisis. More specifically, the objective of the GPSF is to "ensure timely, coordinated responses to international crises requiring effective whole-of-government action though the planning and delivery of coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile states implicating Canadian interests." 2 The GPSF realizes its mission through three sub-programs:

  • Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP): GPOP supports the development of global capacity for peace operations with a primary focus on Africa through medium-term capacity building for integrated peace operations involving military, police, and other civilians. The program fulfills Canada's commitments to the G8 as reaffirmed by the Prime Minister at the St Petersburg and Heiligendamn summits.
  • Global Peace and Security Program (GPSP): GPSP is intended to provide timely, coherent, and effective responses to peace and security challenges of fragile states, including conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization initiatives. The GPSP's objective is to stabilize large-scale crisis situations and restore security for local populations while maintaining an analytical capacity to provide expert advice on conflict prevention and early warning.
  • Glyn Berry Program (GBP):3 GBP is intended to advance Canadian foreign policy priorities of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law around the world through diplomatic leadership and policy advocacy, strengthening multilateral mechanisms, Canadian capacity building, and targeted country-specific initiatives.

1.3.2 Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is the organizational unit within DFAIT tasked with ensuring the development of a standing capacity for implementation of Canadian policy priorities in emergencies, conflict prevention, and peace-building on a whole-of-government basis. More specifically, the mandate of START is to:

  • Ensure whole-of-government coherence in policy development and integrated conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives with respect to fragile states;
  • Plan and deliver coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile and failed state situations implicating Canadian interests; and
  • In a whole-of-government context, manage the GPSF and its three sub-programs.

1.3.3 START Organizational Structure and Roles and Responsibilities

The START organizational structure is depicted in Exhibit 1.1. START consists of a START Advisory Board (SAB) and a START Secretariat, which itself is composed of several sub-units. A summary of the responsibilities of these bodies is provided below.

Exhibit 1.1 START Organizational Structure

START Organizational Structure

START Advisory Board

The SAB is an interdepartmental, information-sharing body chaired by the Director General (DG) of the Secretariat. It is comprised of senior officials (mostly DGs from across government) that includes DFAIT, CIDA, DND, and other relevant federal departments, agencies, and crown corporations with responsibilities and capacities related to stabilization, reconstruction, peace-building, and international crises management (including Public Safety Canada [PSEP-C], Privy Council Office [PCO], the Department of Justice Canada, and others as required). The SAB is charged with:

  • Establishing a whole-of-government strategic policy, priority setting and direction with respect to fragile states and complex emergencies within the framework of individual departmental authorities.
  • Undertaking regular (annual or more frequent) assessments of progress towards the milestones and exit strategies defined in specific integrated country strategies along with the potential for reallocation of resources in line with the pace of events and opportunities presented by competing crises and priorities.
  • Information exchange on program-related activities to ensure activities complement each other and avoid duplication, while encouraging the formation of country task forces at the operational level as required.

The Advisory Board provides the Secretariat with information on other government programs and priorities; supports coordinated responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies; and shares advice and experience between and amongst represented departments and agencies. It is a foreign policy mechanism to align the GoC's geographic and thematic priorities for fragile states and to provide coherence in the allocation of resources to programs beyond those of the GPSF.

START Secretariat

START Secretariat has overall responsibility for the management of the GPSF. Established in September 2005, it brought together and reinforced existing departmental capabilities drawn from other DFAIT divisions for managing peace and security fund program funds and is charged with developing and delivering country-specific conflict prevention and peace-building plans and initiatives, and coordinating peace support operations and humanitarian policy and crisis responses. A DG, who reports directly to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), International Security in DFAIT, leads the Secretariat.

The Secretariat consists of an Executive Office (IRD), led by a Senior Director, and four policy and programming groups which are responsible for the identification, approval, monitoring, management, and evaluation of individual GPSF projects (each of which is led by a Director). These are described below.

Executive Office (IRD)

IRD is responsible for the strategic and policy management of START and for overall program management of the GPSF funds. IRD also provides programming and project management expertise and technical assistance to START's divisions. The financial staff housed within IRD verifies budgets as submitted in applications and provides financial wrap up of individual sub-programs to the START Secretariat. IRD also guides and manages START's relationships with key partner institutions, in particular the UN.

Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Group (IRC)

IRC is responsible for providing policy and operational leadership within START in the development of coherent, whole-of-government approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building (conflict assessment, early warning detection of potential conflicts for rapid response, mediation, transitional justice, security system reforms, rapid justice response, fragile states policy, state capacity building) in the context of fragile states and those already in crisis, as well as building a new, robust Canadian capacity to mediate conflicts within or between states. It provides ongoing early warning of conflict and crisis risk assessments for senior government officials.

Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group (IRH)

IRH is responsible for developing, implementing, and coordinating government-wide policy on international humanitarian affairs and development of Canadian responses to humanitarian crises, in both conflict (i.e., complex emergencies) and natural disasters.

Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group (IRP)

IRP is responsible for peace operations policy and best practices, security sector reform and engagement, and management of Canada's international police peacekeeping and corrections engagement. It is also responsible for planning and implementing Canadian engagement in integrated peace operations. It expands and contracts as necessary, contributing to Bureau-wide Task Forces and Working Groups.

Mine Action and Small Arms Group (ILX)

ILX is responsible for managing DFAIT's program to support the promotion, "universalization," and full implementation of the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, and for providing guidance to the overall intergovernmental program. It is also responsible for coordinating Canada's efforts to curb the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

START Review Committees

START has established two review committees to assist in the management of the GPSF: the Director General level Program Planning Committee (PPC) and the operational level Project Management and Development Group (PDM).

  • Program Planning Committee (PPC) - Chaired by the START DG or Senior Director, the PPC meets as required to review concept papers related to program policy and/or specific projects (usually projects valued at $500,000 or more, and projects that respond to GoC commitments and projects that raise the profile of the GoC). This committee is tasked with providing overall direction in the planning of these initiatives. The Committee includes relevant geographic and thematic DGs from within DFAIT and the START Directors as appropriate (relevant START program officials make presentations to the Committee). The PPC Secretariat is housed within IRD and reports directly to the START DG.
  • Project Development and Management Group (PDM) - The START Senior Director chairs this group. As a consultative body, the PDM endeavors to meet every week to review incoming proposals, make recommendations for funding consideration, and raise technical issues on the GPSF programming at large. The main purpose of the PDM is to provide a technical review of all GPSF proposals. The PDM includes representatives from each of the units within START, functional and geographic bureau, as well as contracting, legal, financial and other expertise as appropriate. The PDM Secretariat is also housed within IRD.

Divisions Providing Support to START

Divisions within DFAIT that support START include country representatives of priority GPSF countries (the Country Task Forces or Steering Committees), Program Services Unit (IXS), Financial Services (SMFH), Program Analysis (SMPA), Justice Legal Services Division (JUS), Environmental Policies and Sustainable Development Strategies Division (MDS), Contracting (SPPG), Area Management Office (IAM), Foreign Policy and Corporate Communications Division (BCF), and the Cabinet and Parliamentary Liaison Division (DCL).

Other Divisions outside START drawing on the GPSF

Functional divisions outside START which may draw on the GPSF for programming include: the Democracy and War Economies Division (MHS); the International Crime and Terrorism Division (ICT); the Human Rights, Gender Equality, Health and Population Division (MHH); and the United Nation (UN) Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Section (JLH).

GPSF Funding Envelopes

GPSF's sub-programs are divided into units known as funding envelopes, each of which is assigned to a particular group or division charged with administering their respective apportionment of the GPSF for the year.4 As discussed in the following page, Haiti is a funding envelope that is coordinated by IRC.

1.3.4 Roles and Responsibilities - Haiti

START

The roles and responsibilities of the principal actors involved in the administration of the GPSF in Haiti are described below.

SAB: As noted above, the SAB is nominally charged with the responsibility of providing whole-of-government strategic policy, priority setting and direction with respect to fragile states, such as Haiti.

IRC: Haiti is a distinct funding envelope within the GPSF for which IRC has been assigned carriage. As such, IRC has overall responsibility for the coordination of GPSF programming in Haiti, including provision of strategic analysis and policy guidance on areas for potential peace-building, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization through periodic concept/strategy papers on thematic/geographic priorities.

IRC is responsible for the full project management cycle (as per START Treasury Board Terms and Conditions).All final decisions to develop and advance proposals through the formal GPSF approval process are made by IRC following extensive consultations and due consideration of recommendations from departmental stakeholders, including IRP, the Haiti Task Force (FGCE)/Embassy in Port-au-Prince (PRNCE), the Haiti Steering Committee, and inter-departmental working groups.5

IRP: IRP is responsible for providing peace operations policy and best practices guidance relating to security sector reform and for planning, implementing and managing Canada's international police peacekeeping and corrections engagements, such as Canada's contribution to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). IRP supports IRC in the development of the GPSF Country Concept paper and other strategic documents and manages related projects under IRC's overall guidance.6

START Representative at Port-au-Prince: The START representative in Port-au-Prince is responsible for identifying potential partners and projects for recommendation to IRC and IRP and providing feedback on programming priorities and projects considered for funding. The START representative is situated within the Political Section of the Canadian Embassy, and is currently accountable to PRINCE and reports directly to the Political Counselor and IRC Section Head - Americas Counselor. However, most day-to-day relations with DFAIT headquarters occur by way IRC.

The Geographic Branch

The Geographic Branch is responsible for Canada's overall bilateral relationship with foreign countries. The roles and responsibilities of the bodies within the Geographic Branch pertinent to Haiti are described below:

The Haiti Task Force (FSGE): The Task Force is responsible for Canada's overall bilateral relations with Haiti and is specifically charged with developing Canada's whole-of-government Country Strategy for Haiti. The RLH provides guidance to IRC and IRP on the overall policy framework for Canadian engagement in Haiti. This guidance includes recommendations on potential thematic and geographic areas for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace support operations, and peace-building programs.7

The Canadian Embassy in Port-au-Prince (PRNCE): PRNCE is mandated with managing and guiding Canadian bilateral relationships in-country and providing in-depth reporting and expertise on political and security developments relevant to Canada's priorities. PRNCE also performs a supporting role for OGDs active in the country.

Inter-Departmental Coordinating Bodies

There are several inter-departmental coordinating bodies specific to Haiti. The roles and responsibilities of these bodies are briefly described below:

Deputy Minister (DM) Committee: The DM Committee, composed of the DMs of DFAIT and CIDA, is responsible for ensuring compliance with the terms and conditions of an inter-departmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DFAIT and CIDA demarcating the roles and responsibilities between the two departments with respect to programming in fragile states, such as Haiti.

The Haiti Steering Committee: The Haiti Steering Committee is an inter-departmental body, co-chaired by DFAIT/GCD and CIDA. It is composed of representatives of START, DND, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and OGDs and agencies as required. It functions as a forum for the sharing of information among relevant GoC stakeholders and as an inter-departmental coordinating mechanism to respond to challenges as they arise.

Inter-departmental Working Groups: Supporting the Haiti Steering Committee and START are three inter-departmental working groups. These include: the Working Group on Security in Haiti, which is chaired by IRC; the Governance Working Group, which is chaired by CIDA; and the Communications Working Group, co-chaired by IRC and RLH. Together the working groups constitute a working-level information sharing forum that provides intelligence and analysis to departmental and extra-departmental stakeholders.

Other Government Departments (OGDs)

Three other key Canadian government departments - CIDA, RCMP, and Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) - work closely with DFAIT on the GPSF in Haiti.

CIDA: CIDA's mandate is to promote sustainable development and provide humanitarian assistance to reduce poverty in the poorest countries as measured through progress on the development goals of economic well being, social development, environment sustainability, and governance (including freedom and democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice and accountability re public institutions). CIDA has the operational lead for Canadian humanitarian assistance to natural and man-made disasters. CIDA works primarily through longer-term social and economic development and institution building. It is responsible for development policy and programming as part of a coherent Canadian foreign policy.

RCMP: The RCMP's International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB) deploys Canadian police personnel to failed and fragile states and countries around the world that have experienced or are presently experiencing conflict. These individuals provide training and police-related expertise which in turn helps promote international peace and security and increases social stability. The decision to deploy Canadian police is made within the framework of the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA), a partnership between the DFAIT, Public Safety, and CIDA.

CSC: The CSC, as part of the criminal justice system and respecting the rule of law, contributes to public safety by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens, while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control.8 CSC is a growing GPSF partner as GPSF engages more heavily in rule of law, justice and penal reform/support activities. CSC deploys correctional experts to MINUSTAH with GPSF support.

In addition to the above, other governments departments, such as the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), DND, and Justice Canada are also involved in Haiti.

1.4 Overview of GPSF in Haiti

GPSF involvement in Haiti began in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005/2006 and has evolved gradually. It now encompasses 26 projects, 9 implementing partners in four key sectors: community security, police, prison reform, and border security. The approximate value of these projects is $37,573,531.9 For the period under review approximately $24,833,048 had been disbursed.

Although the GPSF was established in May 2005, it operated under the Terms and Conditions of the pre-existing Human Security Program (HSP) until October 2006, at which time the GPSF secured its own Terms and Conditions. The Terms and Conditions of the HSP had significant implications for START during those first 16 months. The need to secure Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) approval for all projects in excess of CND $500,000.00, combined with need to renew its overall funding authority at the end of each FY, effectively limited START's ability to support all but small projects of a short-term duration.

Moreover, delays in TBS approvals translated into narrow windows for programming (often as little as six months to complete concept, approval, and implementation) which resulted in spending being heavily concentrated in the last two quarters of the FY. While most of the projects under examination for this evaluation were implemented post-October 2006, the Terms and Conditions of the HSP did impact on early program planning and project selection in FY 2006/2007.

The Country Strategy and the GPSF Haiti Envelope Concept Paper establish the policy rationale for Canada's engagement in Haiti. In the Government of Canada's Country Strategy10 the three following priorities are identified: 1) strengthening security; 2) improving governance and 3) reducing poverty. In February 2008, during his visit to Haiti, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reconfirmed Canada's commitment to advancing security system reform in Haiti with emphasis on leadership in police and border reforms.

The DFAIT country strategy for 2008 and the five year whole-of-government Strategy Haiti: A challenge befitting Canadian Leadership and Interests (2008) emphasize Canada's engagement in supporting police and corrections reforms in Haiti as a priority as well as advancing security system reform and re-establishment of the rule of law in Haiti. The Strategy is implemented through a pan-governmental approach coordinated by the Haiti Steering Committee, which is made up of representatives of the various departments and agencies involved in the efforts in Haiti.11

The 2008/2009 GPSF Haiti Envelope Concept Paper lists three overriding objectives for Haiti: 1) increasing security (through the reduction of insecurity at the community level); 2) re-establishing the rule of law (by developing the capacity of rule of law institutions); and 3) reducing regional factors of instability by increasing Haiti's capacity to manage its land and maritime borders. With its various projects in Prison, Police, community security and Border management the GPSF is the primary financing mechanism of the Canadian's Security agenda in Haiti.

Across its programs, START works in partnership with OGDs drawing on the whole-of-government expertise in order to maximize the value added of Canada's contribution in Haiti. For example, in partnership with the RCMP, through the instrument of the CPA, START is augmenting the deployment of police officers to MINUSTAH in order to assist with restoring security and advancing key security sector reforms. START is working on a similar arrangement with Correctional Services Canada (CSC) to facilitate the deployment of corrections officers.

START also works closely with other members of the international community (the G-10 Group composed of all major bilateral and multilateral agencies providing aid to the GoH) so as to ensure that all START-funded activities successfully support the overall stabilization efforts in Haiti. In 2007, a decision was made to deploy a START representative in the field to manage the increasing portfolio of initiatives in the four sectors. Since November 2008 START is the lead actor in the Border Sectoral Table created by the international community in the G-10 architecture of aid. As such, START coordinates the efforts of all donors in the border management sector.

1.5 Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purpose of this summative evaluation is to report on the achievements of the GPSF in Haiti in terms of establishing conditions that will foster stability and development in the country, through an assessment of the different projects it has implemented since 2005. The evaluation also examines the extent to which GPSF initiatives have complemented efforts made by other government departments (OGDs) of Canada as well as by other bilateral donors working in Haiti.

The evaluation addresses the following key objectives as described in the Terms of Reference (TORs):

  • To determine the progress made and results achieved against stated Objectives/Outcomes while noting the changes over the study period.
  • To review Canada's participation in international, bilateral and sector specific coordination mechanisms (including local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Haiti.
  • To assess the relevance of Canada's contributions through GPSF to Haiti's security, stabilization, and broader humanitarian and development agendas.
  • To assess whether appropriate management, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are in place to support the timely, efficient, and effective delivery and administration of Canadian resources committed to Haiti, and to determine whether effective feedback mechanisms are in place to support rapid policy development and decision-making.
  • To review Canada's whole-of-government approach in Haiti, as adopted by the GPSF, in order to assess whether it is consistent with the Government of Canada (GoC), international and Haitian priorities.
  • To derive lessons learned from GPSF funded programming in Haiti, including an examination of the appropriateness of approaches used for implementation, as well as from the international community on effective mechanisms for crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building, and post-conflict stabilization.
  • To assess the extent to which GPSF has demonstrated responsiveness to the local context and changing circumstances in Haiti and further how GPSF's feedback mechanisms ensure timely and appropriate action in the field (in policy, monetary, and programming terms).

The results, lessons learned, and recommendations that emanate from this evaluation are expected to assist management in the administration of the GPSF.

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2.0 Methodology

The TORs identified a series of key questions to be addressed in the evaluation. These questions were adapted and refined in the Evaluation Matrix which served as the guiding tool for the development of interviews and focus groups.

2.1 Project Sampling

In order to provide an accurate overview of GPSF programming in Haiti, the evaluation team reviewed all GPSF funded projects, closed and on-going, from 2006 to the present and, in consultation with PRNCE, selected a sample of seven projects (see Exhibit 2.1) for on-site inspection based on the following criteria: sectors, size of budget, level of advancement of the project (based on disbursement), and diversity of implementing partners. The other START projects were subject to a document review.

Exhibit 2.1 Projects Reviewed During the Field Mission12

Table 1: Projects Reviewed During the Field Mission
SectorNo.Project nameAllocated BudgetDisbursementImplementing Partner
Border Management07-279Capacity Building in Migration Management$2,472,705CompletedInternational Organization for Migration (IOM)
08-019Rehabilitation of the Malpasse Border Post$498,831OngoingIOM
Prisons07-024Refurbishment of Cap Haitien Prison - Phase I$89,230CompletedPan-American Development Foundation (PADF)
06-219Deployment of 4 CSC Officers to MINUSTAH$568,667CompletedCANADEM
Community Security07-048Bel Air Community Security$440,305OngoingViva Rio (Brazilian NGO)
Police Reform07-249Deployment of Canadian Civilian Police to MINUSTAH$3,224,130OngoingCANADEM
07-249Refurbishment of National Police School$3,262,790CompletedIOM

2.2 Data Collection and Analysis

Data were collected through document reviews, stakeholder interviews and focus groups, and through a 32 person-day field mission to Haiti (November 12-21, 2008).

Data gathered through either structured text (documents) or unstructured text (interview and focus group notes) were aggregated and synthesized to identify emerging trends. Content analysis was used to review the documents, which made up one important data set for this study. Most of the documentation was retrieved from Ottawa and was complemented by additional documents retrieved in Haiti.

In Canada 17 interviews were held with representatives of DFAIT (IRC, IRP, IRD, Evaluation Division (ZIE)), as well as with OGDs including CIDA, the DND, the Department of Justice, CSC, the RCMP, Privy Council Office (PCO), and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEP-C). Members of the evaluation team also interviewed senior representatives from CANADEM and attended a debriefing of retired police officers recently returned from Haiti after a nine-month deployment. The evaluation team also attended the Haiti Steering Committee meeting held on November 19th 2008, as well as the Haiti Security Working Group meeting in December 2008.

The most important aspect of the data collection process was the mission to Haiti. While the bulk of the mission took place in Port-au-Prince, the evaluation team split up and conducted parallel interviews in Cap Haitien and the Bel Air neighbourhood in Port-au-Prince, the Malpasse border crossing post and the National Police School. In Haiti the team interviewed stakeholders from the following categories: the Canadian Embassy, representatives from various government bodies of the Government of Haiti (GoH), MINUSTAH, civil society, project beneficiaries, and other bilateral donors.

Finally, in order to explore in more depth the impacts of GPSF projects, the team conducted the following additional interviews: one focus group of three immigration officers in Cap Haitien; two informal small group discussions involving prison guards, customs and police officers; and a focus group with 11 community leaders of Bel Air. Informal discussions with two local residents near the Malpasse border were also conducted.

2.3 Limitations to Data Collection

In planning for this summative evaluation, the evaluation team had put forward two potential challenges inherent to evaluating peace-building and conflict prevention activities. These were: the conflict context in Haiti, which could have prevented data collection in specific zones; the rapid and evolving Policy Framework in the country, which in some cases can affect the ability of evaluators to meet some stakeholders; and the absence of baseline studies in each of the sectors under review. The actual limitations encountered by the evaluation team in conducting the evaluation turned out to be some difficulties in securing relevant documents, performance data of varying quality and completeness, some challenges in establishing meetings with preferred interlocutors, and the limited time available in Haiti which precluded site visits to several high value GPSF projects.

2.4 Report Structure

This report is comprised of seven chapters. Following introductory chapters one and two, chapter three examines the relevance of the GPSF in reference to the priorities of the GoC, the GoH and to the broader international community. The fourth chapter provides a high level overview of some of the salient achievements of the GPSF in Haiti. The fifth chapter examines the efficiency and cost effectiveness of GPSF management structures and systems. Chapter six includes a detailed appraisal of GPSF programming in its four sectors of intervention, namely police, community security, prisons and borders, in reference to the evaluation criteria of relevance, results, and efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The seventh and final chapter consists of conclusions and recommendations.

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3.0 Relevance of the GPSF

3.1 Overview

Relevance refers to the ability of a program to meet the needs and gain the support of its priority stakeholders. It also refers to the extent to which its objectives are consistent with global priorities and beneficiaries' requirements, and to what extent they remain valid over time given changed circumstances.

The findings in the following sections respond to the questions about relevance posed in the TORs and the Evaluation Matrix.

3.2 Relevance to Canadian Priorities

Finding 1:

The GPSF is relevant to DFAIT policy priorities and complements other DFAIT activities.

Inside DFAIT, the relevance and the complementarity of GPSF with other DFAIT activities is worth noting. START seeks to ensure comprehensive, expertise-based programming supportive of other foreign policy priorities such as good governance, poverty reduction, gender equality, protection and promotion of human rights, human security in the cities, and others. It does so through consultation with other DFAIT divisions, including IRP (corrections and police and military peacekeeping deployments), FGCE (Bilateral relations and communications), ICT (organized crime issues, and human trafficking), ILX (small arms), IRH-GHA (disaster-risk management), MHS (community security in relation to youth gangs and urban violence), GHH (migration, gender equality, human rights issues), GDS (compliance with Canada's Environmental Protection Act), PRMNY (diplomatic support to Canada's priorities with the UN including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)), PRNCE (bilateral relation and key support for all aspects of START programming on the ground), and SDMGO (Hispaniola issues).

Finding 2:

GPSF is relevant to Canada's priorities for both Haiti and the region.

GPSF programming is particularly relevant to and in accordance with Canada's Country Strategy for Haiti. The objectives and expected results outlined in the Country Strategy 2008-2009 of Haiti, for example, include: a more efficient and professional police force, correctional system, and judicial system; deployment of Canadian police officers to support MINUSTAH; and support for the reform of the HNP (see section 6.1.3 for details).

As discussed in section 6.1.3, GPSF is also relevant to Canada's Strategy for the Americas, which seeks to strengthen and reinforce Canada's leadership in the Western hemisphere and calls for "pro-active engagement within the Caribbean to promote stability," as well as working with partners including the US, Mexico, and the European Union (EU), to "manage and influence transition in Haiti."

Finding 3:

GPSF is relevant to Canada domestically, as stability and peace in Haiti have a direct impact on public safety in Canada.

The GPSF program reinforces a long-standing relationship that Canada has had with Haiti since the mid 1950s. It is also relevant to Canada as the situation in Haiti impacts on Canadian domestic issues. Canada is host to a large Haitian Diaspora, which is active in providing assistance and advocating on Haiti's behalf. Furthermore, as several respondents from the Canadian government have noted, stability and peace in Haiti have a direct impact on public safety in Canada, particularly with regard to money-laundering and drug-trafficking and human trafficking issues (see section 6.1.3).

3.3 Relevance to Haiti

Finding 4:

The GPSF is aligned with GoH priorities and responds to identified needs in Haiti.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté [DSNCRP]) 2008-2010 which is the first Strategy developed by the GoH since the election of President Preval identifies the various priorities of the GoH in terms of three pillars:

  • Pillar 1: Growth Vectors: Agriculture and Rural Development; Tourism; Infrastructure; Science and Technology
  • Pillar 2: Human Development : Priority Accorded to Basic Services
  • Pillar 3: Democratic Governance: Priority Accorded to Justice and Security

Though this document is currently under review and will likely see modifications, a reading of the original document and GPSF's suite of projects shows a strong alignment between GPSF projects and the third pillar of the DSNCRP, which accords priority to justice and security.

START's programming decisions were informed by an objective assessment of Haiti's security needs, resulting in the identification of areas of vulnerability in Haiti's security infrastructure. START has made great efforts to ensure that its interventions in Prison, Border, Police and Community Security sectors are aligned with the priorities of the GoH and that they focus on strengthening the capacity of the same to address the country's challenges.

For example, there have been some gains in the past two years in reducing violence and improving the security situation in Haiti and respondents have noted the need to strengthen and build upon these gains. Interviews with stakeholders from the GoH and from the PRNCE suggest that while the focus has been on maintaining security (and for obvious reasons), it is important to take an overall approach to rule of law issues with particular emphasis on justice, prisons, police reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

In the Police sector, the GoH National Police Reform Plan (2007) identifies three broad objectives, namely the professionalization of human resources, reinforcing operational capacity, and strengthening the institutional capacity of the HNP. The GPSF supports the training of the HNP and correction officers through support to the National Police School as well as the improvement of key operational and command and control infrastructure. Based on respondents' feedback, these initiatives are considered a very relevant response to Haiti's needs.

The GoH is aiming to extend the HNP over the entire national territory, to improve relations between the police and the population, set up community policing, and develop partnerships between the HNP and public security actors, civil society, local communities, elected representatives and the population. START has been a key government interlocutor on promoting a community policing doctrine by way of its project with the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio.

In the Border Management sector, GPSF projects are responding to needs identified by the GoH. START has been instrumental in facilitating the GoH's articulation of its border management strategy, which initially outlined major land crossings with the Dominican Republic (DR) as infrastructure priorities. Through support to the construction of border posts in Malpasse and Belladere, START is clearly responding to these needs.

Finding 5:

Stakeholders in Haiti appreciate the ability of the GPSF to act quickly in response to identified needs.

Stakeholders in Haiti have remarked favourably on the ability of the GPSF to mobilize and disburse resources quickly. For several representatives of the Haitian government, this characteristic of the program allows the GoH to demonstrate some quick results, which is critical in garnering the confidence of the population. GPSF's rehabilitation of the border post in Malpasse, which was built in a short period of time and in response to strong local requests, is a case in point.

The same can be said of the prison cells in Cap Haitien and the National Police School which are tangible evidence in the eyes of the public and other international partners that something is being done to address the country's law enforcement challenges.

The GPSF is also cited as a source of funding that supports areas where other donors have historically been reluctant to intervene. In the prison and border management sector, for example, GPSF has carved a niche which is gaining momentum.

Finding 6:

GPSF projects target a range of geographic areas and populations segments in Haiti that have been identified as priorities for improving security.

As security in Haiti is the one of the major goals of the GoH and MINUSTAH, the GPSF projects cover a range of territory and population segments that have been identified as critical to the country's security - primarily in prison locations, at Haiti's borders, and in communities with high levels of violence.

As the capacity of police to make arrests improves, and in the absence of sufficient judges, the prison population is growing and conditions in prisons are further deteriorating. Thus, GPSF projects also target both the prison population (through improved facilities) and the capacity of correction officers (through training). In the border management sector, a key area of focus for the GoH, GPSF targets government immigration officers to improve their capacity at the Malpasse border, which is the largest port of entry from the DR to Haiti and other crossings. The border is important for trade and immigration, but is also a crucial entry point for arms, drugs and human trafficking.

With respect to the regions where GPSF is deploying its activities in Haiti, these follow the location of prisons to which CSC officers are deployed (e.g., Cap Haitien, Hinche, Carrefour) and border posts (e.g., Malpasse, Belladère) as well as communities such as Cité Soleil and Bel Air where community security has been cited as a critical problem.

3.4 Relevance to International Community, Best Practices, and Other Stakeholders

Finding 7:

GPSF approaches demonstrate alignment with OECD best practices for fragile State engagement and several of the principles on aid effectiveness.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee's (OECD-DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States has become something of an international standard of good practice with respect to programming in fragile states. While all 10 principles are relevant there are several key principles where START has distinguished itself, and thus warrant particular mention:

  • Principles 1 and 7 (considering context and aligning with local priorities) - The starting point for each START/GPSF project was engaging in discussions with the appropriate GoH agency and supporting the overall MINUSTAH priorities.
  • Principle 9 (act fast) - START has been praised by all stakeholders for acting quickly and has generally tried to ensure that START, CIDA, or another donor agency will take on any subsequent phases.
  • Principle 8 (donor coordination) - Through its representative at the Post in Port-au-Prince, START has made a significant contribution to donor coordination, one of the principles of aid effectiveness. The START representative played an instrumental role in the establishment of the Border Management Working Group, a body which has evolved into a key sectoral table for donor coordination and policy reform in border management. In recognition of START's role in constituting this forum, as well as its leadership role in the sector, START has been appointed chair of this working group.13The START representative also participates in working groups in the prison, police, community security and justice sectors. Ad hoc meetings with MINUSTAH and other donors are also regularly held to ensure on-going information exchange and coordination.

OECD's 10 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

1) Take context as the starting point; 2) Do no harm; 3) Focus on state-building as the central objective; 4) Prioritize prevention; 5) Recognize links between political, security and development objectives; 6) Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies; 7) Align with local priorities in different ways and different contexts; 8) Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors; 9) Act fast…but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; and 10) Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Finding 8:

GPSF programming engages actors in the international community and complements the interventions of other stakeholders.

In Haiti, START works closely with other members of the international community and other stakeholders to ensure that their combined efforts contribute to the stabilization of Haiti. For example:

  • GPSF/START works with the G-10 Group, composed of all major bilateral and multilateral agencies providing aid to the GoH, to ensure that all START-funded activities successfully support the overall stabilization efforts in Haiti.
  • GPSF/START's efforts in the rehabilitation of police infrastructure in the Department of the South have led to the development of a model that involves other international stakeholders throughout the country. For example, Spain will act in the South-East Department, the USA in Artibonite and North-West, Germany in the North, etc. (See section 7.1.3.)
  • The GPSF rehabilitation of the National School of Police provided an opportunity to collaborate closely with the US, which funded the refurbishment of other parts of the police school campus (see section 7.1.4).
  • START and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section are working toward cooperation in the Police and Corrections sectors (see section 7.1.4).

3.5 Relevance to Canada's Whole-of-Government Strategy

Finding 9:

At the policy level, the GPSF is effective in promoting Canada's whole-of-government engagement, but is less effective at the coordination and planning level.

The GPSF was designed to function as an instrument to support whole-of-government engagement in fragile states. Across its programs, START works in partnership with other Canadian government departments, drawing on their expertise to maximize the value added of Canada's contribution in Haiti. It does so by providing dedicated resources that OGDs can access through such mechanisms as the CPA as well as on a project basis (see section 6.5 on Resource Mobilization). As noted above in section 3.2.2, START works closely with several OGDs (the RCMP and CSC) in contributing Canadian expertise to MINUSTAH and UN agencies.

START, in conjunction with the Geographic Branch, DFAIT, also performs an important coordinating role, particularly with CIDA through the cooperation framework. CIDA's programming priorities in Haiti focus on medium and longer-term goals in the areas of governance (including justice and security system reform) and access to basic services (including health and infrastructure). START, on the other hand, responds to shorter-term needs, providing catalytic, whole-of-government support to urgent priorities with targeted programming in specific sectors. Although the evaluation team found that incidences of duplication of effort have largely been avoided (see section 6.3), and that several proposed areas of intervention such as vetting and registration of police officers or rehabilitations of prisons were recommended by CIDA, the cooperation framework is still in need of refinement.

As discussed in section 6.3, the mechanisms in place to support whole-of-government coordination work well at the policy level but have fallen short in promoting harmonized programming, primarily as a result of the different mandates, priorities, and planning cycles of OGDs.

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4.0 Overall Achievements of the GPSF

4.1 Introduction

While specific project results are discussed in Chapter Five, it is worth noting some of the achievements of the GPSF at the program level. This chapter examines GPSF contributions to shifts in development paradigms, and its achievements in programming for capacity development.

4.2 Contributions to Shifts in Development Paradigms

Finding 10:

The GPSF is contributing to a shift in doctrine in the Prison Sector

In the criminal justice system, punishment and rehabilitation are two of the four acknowledged objectives (with deterrence and incapacitation being the others). In Haiti, which has been ruled by military regimes for most of its history since its independence in 1804, punishment has been the primary goal when dealing with individuals who commit crimes. Unfortunately, due to various problems faced by the correction system in Haiti (e.g., the shortage of prison space and an inefficient and reportedly corrupt justice system), convicted prisoners and those awaiting trial often share cells - in short, potentially innocent people and petty offenders are treated the same as hardened criminals. In addition, the local culture has tended to favour punishment over rehabilitation. Local populations consider any prisoner as persona non grata who should not be given any special treatment to be reintegrated into normal life.

GPSF projects have endeavored to support a transition from a strictly punitive approach to corrections to one which places greater emphasis on rehabilitation as a way to reduce recidivism. GPSF has done this in two ways: First, through infrastructure projects, it is demonstrating that prisoners should be given opportunities to retain their dignity through safety, hygiene, and nutrition (e.g., the Cap Haitien Prison project provided more space and toilets) and to develop and grow (Cap Haitien Phase II includes areas for recreation and education). Second, in its capacity development projects such as the training and mentoring of Corrections Officers, it is exposing correction personnel (who until now have only known the punishment model) to alternative ways of engaging with prisoners and their families. At the time of the evaluation, START was in the process of approving the construction of a 750-detainee prison near Port-au-Prince which is designed to reduce the pressure on the now overcrowded National Penitentiary.

Finding 11:

The GPSF is contributing to the adoption of an integrated service model for border management.

Around the world, border management is moving away from the traditional approach that involved multiple agencies working independently of one another (often called the "silo" model) to one that integrates all agencies responsible for border security, customs, and immigration. There is growing recognition that these functions are interrelated and that the silo model does not allow for synergy, does not take advantage of information technology, and does not allow for the standardization of best practices. National policies that integrate and modernize border functions are critical for growth and development, and have been shown to reduce costs, increase efficiencies, improve security, and facilitate trade.

The GoH is grateful for GPSF support in integrating border services and reported that it is establishing a National Council for Border Coordination and Integration (a ministerial level council chaired by the Prime Minister) that will include all agencies working on the border (e.g., the National Police, National Port Authority, National Airport Authority, General Customs Administration), as well representatives of Haiti's immigration, agriculture, public health, and transport authorities. The START facilitated Border Working Group has been instrumental in encouraging the GoH integration. The GPSF projects are supporting a gradual and incremental shift to integrated border management in Haiti, but more will need to be done as the GoH itself moves ahead in addressing the security of its land and maritime borders.

Finding 12:

The GPSF is contributing to the development of alternative policing models.

Community security has become a critical issue in Haiti (particularly in Port-au-Prince communities such as Cité Soleil and Bel Air which have become notorious for criminality and violence due to the desperate social and economic conditions prevailing in these communities), which threaten the stability of the country as a whole. Athough the military approach to law enforcement has succeeded in restoring some semblance of order in these communities, there is a growing recognition that this approach will ultimately alienate the population, prove counter-productive and should be replaced by a more conventional civilian policing approach. Haiti's national police forces, however, remain in a nascent stage of development and it is understood that it will take some time before the HNP will be in a position to exercise its authority in Haiti's many troubled communities, thus requiring an alternative approach to fostering community security in the interim. GPSF, in partnership with Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO, has successfully pioneered and applied an approach that incorporates community outreach and development programs. The results are promising and were noted by Her Excellency the Governor General of Canada, the Honorable Michaelle Jean, in her mission to Haiti in January 2009.

Finding 13:

The Canada-Brazil cooperation on peace and security has yielded encouraging results.

DFAIT and CIDA have demonstrated leadership in its support in South-South and triangular cooperation opportunities between Haiti and Brazil. Canada's opportunity to take a leadership role in this process was recently advanced at the 33rd G8 summit with the announcement of the formal Heiligendamm Process that will enhance cooperation between the G8 Countries and five emerging economies, including Brazil. Canada has demonstrated regional leadership through many positive bi-lateral and multi-lateral efforts in the region that are strongly linked to Canada's strategy and priority focus on the America's. Given the importance of the GoC's "America's Strategy," Haiti is viewed as an opportunity for engagement with Latin America, as outlined in the February 2008 Strategy Paper "Haiti: A Challenge Befitting Canadian Leadership and Interests":

"Here is a chance for Canada to develop trilateral cooperative projects that will strengthen our relationship with key countries in the Americas -Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico---and help to entrench their commitment to Haiti and the longer-term presence of the international community in that country."14

All efforts to take into consideration regional leverage opportunities while recognizing regional interests towards the stabilization and enhanced prosperity of Haiti exemplify a global best practice in supporting fragile states, mainly that no fragile state can be considered in isolation with success increasingly likely when linked to organic solutions, solid capacity building and regional stakeholder support.

In the GPSF funded FRIDE report, South-South initiatives, particularly the support to the Viva Rio Community Security project highlights opportunities where Brazil can provide best practices and lessons learned in tackling community violence and gang management issues that plague many Haitian communities. Exploring effective community models for strengthening peace and security while addressing other key development areas would help to advance objectives of the GPSF in a sustainable manner. There may be opportunities for Canada to lead cooperative dialogue processes as part of broader Latin American engagement on ensuring security in the region. Stability and resulting development in Haiti would provide for more regional security that would benefit all countries in the southern hemisphere. Additional leveraging for triangular engagement could be explored by the GPSF and potentially CIDA (in the case of joint strategies or complimentary programming) through the United Nations established Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC).

4.3 Achievements in Institutional Capacity Development

Finding 14:

The GPSF is contributing to durable police sector reform and to the capacity of the HNP.

The police infrastructure projects supported by GPSF have dealt with critical capacity deficits in the HNP through the refurbishment and expansion of the National School of Police (which can now accommodate up to 1000 recruits per year) and the rehabilitation and provisioning of 14 commissariats in the Department of the South. Although support to the Inspectorate General has suffered delays, its is expected that the new building will be completed and equipment by the end of 2009.

The National School of Police project, implemented by the International Organization for Migration, refurbished existing student barracks, classrooms and other facilities (laundry, dining, weight lifting room), and constructed and equipped six new barracks, a cafeteria and kitchen. It also installed new water tanks and sewer lines, and constructed a new access road. The upgraded facilities not only increase the school's capacity, but will lead to increased self-esteem, credibility of the police, and motivation of the officers.

The rehabilitation of commissariats in the Department of the South, implemented by UNOPS/UNDP, rehabilitated 14 commissariats and provided equipment and IT/office materials for 21 commissariats. The project, which was scheduled to end in June 2008, was completed in November 2008.

Finding 15:

The GPSF is contributing to community security and stability through its support to Viva Rio.

Viva Rio programming in peacekeeping training for the Haitian police has brought stability to the poor urban community of Bel Air through the application of a community policing approach developed in Brazil over a ten-year period.

It has contributed to the mediation of peace accords among rival youth gangs, and provided incentives and rewards for maintaining peace in communities through scholarships and professional incentives to 300 children and youth and community leaders. Viva Rio has developed a strong network of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in security and development in the area, including the GoH and the command of MINUSTAH's Brazilian contingent in Bel Air.

Community violence in Bel Air was reduced significantly through a combination of law enforcement, community incentives, and development actions. Through a training manual, video, and simulation exercises, all of which have been translated into several languages, the approach can be shared with other peacekeeping missions and troop contributing countries to increase their capacity to deal with community members and institutions in high risk communities.

Finding 16:

The GPSF is contributing to the GoH's capacity to control its borders.

GPSF interventions in the border sector, which were designed to address urgent capacity deficits (e.g., border facilities, equipment, training, legislation on immigration and trafficking, etc.), are contributing in a tangible way to enhancing security and services along Haiti's borders and have helped to lay the foundations for border rehabilitation and future development. They are highly regarded and appreciated by stakeholders, including senior GoH officials, implementing partners, other bilateral donors engaged in the sector, immigration officials, and the community at large.

START has been a catalyst in the border sector. It has attracted interest and resources and has demonstrated leadership by lobbying for the expansion of MINUSTAH's mandate to include borders, specifically the development of an integrated border management plan, and as the chair of the Border Management Working Group which now includes four bilateral donors. Nevertheless, the rehabilitation of Haiti's borders and border communities will take many years, and the achievement of intermediate outcomes is dependent on a range of factors outside the control of any single project or donor, including: infrastructure (power, water and sewage, roads, telecommunications and transportation equipment), a legislative and institutional framework to encourage and compel inter-ministerial cooperation, and donor coordination. While the creation of the Border Management Working Group is positive, it will be difficult for donors to align programming without a multi-year strategy for border development, which the ICG has identified as an urgent necessity. As a first step and as an extension of the Working Group's discussion, MINUSTAH is assisting Haiti develop a border management plan to serve as the basis for multi-year development strategy.

Finding 17:

The GPSF is contributing to the GoH's capacity to administer its prisons in accordance with international standards.

GPSF infrastructure projects in the prison sector have achieved their results and Haitian authorities and beneficiaries report a high level of satisfaction with the outputs and the approach, which is based on the principle that prisoners deserve to be detained with dignity with protection from physical and sexual assaults and threats to health. The projects have led to better facilities, have increased citizen's level of trust in correctional reform, and have encouraged other donors to invest in the prison sector.

The first phase of the rehabilitation of the Cap Haitien prison led to modest but valued improvements in the life of detainees. The second phase of the project, which began in November 2008, will triple the space allocated to each inmate, provide a separate building to detain minors, and will transform the prison into a rehabilitation centre with a library, training centre, and a dispensary. The prison administrator sees these changes as a major step forward, while recognizing that if the number of inmates continues to increase these efforts will have limited effects.

The Cap Haitien prison projects have had a multiplier effect as other donors (including USAID, START, and the EU) have indicated their willingness to support the rehabilitation of existing prisons and the construction of four new prisons.

The GPSF is providing operational support and capacity development to Haitian correctional staff. The training provided through START, which was developed by Haitians and is jointly delivered by Haitian and Canadian correction officers, has been well received by officers who report that they have increased their knowledge and professional satisfaction. However, the effectiveness of CSC officers deployed to provide on-site mentoring and supervision of prison personnel has been limited due to inadequate resources to cover the vast territory and distances between prisons. As CSC deployments are subject to MINUSTAH priorities (and are often used to support these priorities), CSC, with START encouragement, is considering bilateral arrangements with the GoH which would allow CSC to have greater autonomy in staff deployment.

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5.0 Efficiency & Cost Effectiveness of GPSF

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to assess the extent to which START's governance and management mechanisms support efficient and effective program planning, management, performance monitoring, and results reporting at the country level.

5.2 Strategic Planning

Finding 18:

While systems and instruments in support of strategic planning at the country level are robust, strategic planning at the sector level remains underdeveloped.

Although the SAB is nominally charged with establishing the strategic policy, priority setting and direction with respect to GPSF engagement in fragile states, the evaluation team found little evidence that the Advisory Board has performed this role with respect to Haiti. Effective strategic planning for the GPSF occurs at the envelope level that, in the case of Haiti, is a responsibility that has been assigned to IRC within START (including the START representative at Post) with policy input from the Geographic Branch, other DFAIT functional divisions both within and outside START, and relevant OGDs.

The primary strategic planning instrument at the country level is the GPSF Concept Paper, a document which is updated annually. The principal, though not exclusive, role of the Concept Paper is to define the GPSF's strategic priorities and objectives in a given country and to align programming to same. Although the GPSF Concept Paper for Haiti has undergone a considerable evolution in both form and content, the process involved in its development has remained more or less the same since its inception in 2006.

The process begins at headquarters with IRC, based on its own research and analysis, taking the lead in defining the strategic priorities and objectives for the GPSF in Haiti. Careful attention is placed on ensuring that strategic choices made for Haiti are consistent with and supportive of the interests and priorities of relevant START stakeholders, namely IRP (deployments to MINUSTAH), ILX (small arms) and IRH-GHA (disaster risk management), which is then followed by consultations with broader departmental stakeholders.15 These consultations help ensure that policy and programming are aligned with GoC and departmental foreign policy priorities. These intra-departmental consultations are then augmented by extra-departmental consultations with relevant OGD partners which, in the case of Haiti, have included CIDA, RCMP, CSC, PSC, CIC, JUS, and the CBSA. With these consultations complete, the Concept Paper is then submitted to the PPC for review and approval.

The process in developing the Concept Paper is not only consultative in nature, but iterative as well, building on the lessons learned from the previous year. This is clearly evident in the changes, both in form and content, one observes in Concept Papers over the last several years. The first Concept Paper for Haiti (06/07), and drafted in the spring of 2006, clearly reflects not only the limitations of the Terms and Conditions imposed on the GPSF for the first half of that FY, but also a program uncertain of its niche in Haiti.16 Areas defined in the document for programming demonstrate little focus, capturing a range of programming options under the broad headings of governance, justice reform, security system reform, and disaster risk reduction, few of which were actually supported by projects.

The strategic objectives articulated in the Concept Paper for Haiti (07/08), though less amorphous than 06/07, remained equally broad in scope, essentially citing priorities identified by the UN as the guide to programming while highlighting overall START cum GPSF objectives to promote whole-of-government coordination and enhance Canada's catalytic leadership in selected domains of intervention.17 Notwithstanding the generalities of the foregoing, the Concept Paper for 07/08 marks, for the first time, a clustering of interventions around four distinct sectors, namely police reform, prisons and correctional system reform, community security, and border and migration management, which have guided GPSF programming in Haiti ever since.

The Concept Paper for 07/08 also included a section on "lessons-learned" which highlights a variety of principles or "rules of thumb" to guide future GPSF programming in Haiti. Several of the more salient lessons-learned cited in the document include: the need to align programming with the priorities of the GoH and to ensure adequate Haitian buy-in; the need to strengthen cooperation between START and OGDs, particularly CIDA, in order to present a coherent approach to Canada's stabilization and development efforts; the need to enter into partnerships with local and international stakeholders and to support donor coordination; and the need to strengthen START's "on-the-ground" capacity to liaise with partners and monitor developments. As revealed in the case studies, the observance of these principles or rules of thumb has, on the whole, generated significant dividends for the GPSF in Haiti and demonstrates START's capacity to learn and adjust from past experience.

The Concept Paper for 08/09 again builds on the lessons-learned from the previous year, more clearly demonstrating alignment of objectives with GoC foreign policy priorities, refining the objectives themselves in accordance with GPSF programming in the selected sectors of intervention, while introducing a results and risk-based management framework to the document for performance monitoring and results reporting purposes (see section 6.4 for details). The Concept Paper also includes a section on the activities of "Other DFAIT Divisions and OGDs" which, though not prescriptive in nature, describes the roles DFAIT divisions and OGDs perform in support of Canada's whole-of-government strategy of engagement in Haiti, while highlighting areas of complementary programming.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Country Concept Paper has over the last several years undergone a significant improvement. No longer just an inventory of projects grouped around a set of loosely articulated goals, the Concept Paper of today approximates a bone fide strategic planning tool, setting clear country level objectives, describing the activities in support thereof with well defined and reasonable output and outcome statements, complemented by an articulation of the operational modalities for implementation, barring one exception; modalities for transition and/or disengagement in accordance with time horizon prescribed for the GPSF.18

Although strategic planning at the country level is, as remarked above, mature, strategic planning at the sector level appears somewhat ad hoc, particularly from a whole-of-government perspective. While the process of stakeholder consultation which supports the development of the Concept Paper mitigates the risk of GoC partners duplicating their efforts or working at cross-purposes, the evaluation team found little evidence of systematic whole-of-government strategic planning at the sector level. This is true for all four sectors of GPSF intervention in Haiti.

Although the Working Group on Security in Haiti, which is inter-departmental in composition, does contribute to START's overall strategy of engagement in Haiti by functioning as a forum for information sharing, it has not produced anything approximating a whole-of-government strategy for security system reform.19 There are four probable reasons for this: first, the Working Group has no clear mandate to do so; second, representation at the Working Group is not at a level to support effective decision-making; third, the different mandates and priorities of OGD participants limit the extent to which programming can be aligned with agreed objectives; and fourth, the planning cycles among OGDs often differ, thereby frustrating alignment of planning frameworks.

Regarding the planning cycles of OGDs, the difference between START and CIDA warrants particular mention. Although the MOU governing the relationship between START and CIDA on programming in fragile states calls for "planning frameworks [to] be established in close coordination," this is easier said than done when START's planning cycle is annual and CIDA's planning cycle is multi-year. The principal planning instrument for CIDA at the country level is the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF). Once the CDPF for a country, and Haiti is no exception, is approved, there is only limited room for adjustments both at the country and sector level, thereby reducing the scope for harmonized planning.

With GPSF interventions in the four sectors changing in breadth, depth, and type, engaging new OGDs and other implementing partners, there is, arguably, a need to adopt a more systematic and longer-term approach to planning in these sectors. The perceived need to complement GPSF interventions in support of border security with CIDA developmental resources, as well as the resources of other OGDs with expertise in border management, is a case in point.20 The same principle applies to GPSF interventions in support of community violence reduction, which calls for significant investments in community infrastructure and economic development. As discussed elsewhere in this report, although there is evidence of synergistic programming between START and OGD partners, these examples would appear to be more the product of periodic consultations and adjustment than of pre-planned design.

5.3 Whole-of-Government Coordination

Finding 19:

Mechanisms in place to support whole-of-government coordination work reasonably well at the policy level, but coordination at the level of programming remains a challenge.

Whole-of-government coordination is effected through a number of different mechanisms at a variety of different levels e.g., at the level of the Deputy Minister's Committee, the Haiti Task Force, the Haiti Steering Committee, the sector working groups, IRC, the project review committees, and the Post. As regards the Deputy Minister's Committee, its role is, in the first instance, to ensure compliance with the division of roles and responsibilities between DFAIT and CIDA with respect to fragile state engagement as defined in the inter-departmental MOU, and, in the second instance, to approve the broad parameters for Canada's whole-of-government strategy of engagement in Haiti, which ultimately finds expression in the annual Country Strategy.

Regarding the inter-departmental MOU, this document was developed at the request of TBS to reduce the risk of overlap and duplication in programming between DFAIT and CIDA by delineating the operating principles, scope, time-frames, and thematic areas of focus between the DFAIT and CIDA. Although it highlights differences in programming orientations between START and CIDA in those thematic areas of common interest (humanitarian crises, democratic transitions, conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict stabilization, and reconstruction), the MOU document more or less defers to the signatories to work out the modalities of implementation, while affirming the role of the ADM Committee in monitoring compliance.

A review of START and CIDA programming in the four sectors of GPSF interventions demonstrates that although instances of duplication have largely been avoided at the project level due to regular consultations between START and CIDA representation at the Embassy in Port-au-Prince, there is some overlap in the nature of those interventions at the thematic and sector levels. While START is ostensibly responsible for the provision of infrastructure and training support to the HNP, CIDA too is involved in supplying infrastructure and training to the HNP, albeit with different facilities and with different beneficiaries. START is supporting physical infrastructure development in the prison sub-sector while CIDA is also engaged in infrastructure development in this sub-sector.

The evaluation team obtained several and at times conflicting explanations from stakeholders for this mix of programming. For example, the evaluation team was advised that some infrastructure projects in support of the HNP administered by CIDA were launched prior to the creation of the GPSF and were in the process of being handed over to START. In yet another case, the evaluation team was advised that in the area of physical infrastructure development, CIDA focuses on the development of new facilities while START focuses on the rehabilitation of existing facilities. For every explanation proffered, however, there were always exceptions, rendering any attempt to rationalize interventions based on the roles and responsibilities articulated in the inter-departmental MOU problematic.

In many respects, the Haiti Steering Committee functions as the guardian of Canada's whole-of-government Country Strategy for Haiti, monitoring developments in real-time, sharing information among departmental and GoC stakeholders, including information generated by the sector working groups, with the view to ensuring that the efforts of partners remain relevant and responsive to the needs of Haiti as well as relevant and responsive to GoC priorities and objectives for the country and the region as a whole.

Although primarily responsible for ensuring policy coherence among the varied GoC actors engaged in Haiti, the evaluation team did find some evidence of the Haiti Steering Committee performing a "trouble-shooting" role, brokering partnerships between OGDs in response to a perceived opportunity, and engaging high level diplomacy where necessary to respond to the concerns of stakeholders operating in Haiti.21 Some concerns regarding the role of the Haiti Steering Committee were brought to the attention of the evaluation team, but overall stakeholders conveyed a high level of satisfaction with the performance of the Committee as an information sharing body.22

IRC, which sits in the sector working groups and the Haiti Steering Committee, also contributes to whole-of-government coordination. Beyond the development of the Country Concept Paper which, as remarked earlier, involves extensive consultations with GoC stakeholders, IRC actively solicits the participation of OGDs in support of specific projects23 and liaises with OGD partners engaged in project implementation. It is also important to keep in mind that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed for the GPSF specifically require project officers to certify that all relevant stakeholders, including extra-departmental stakeholders, have been consulted on project proposals submitted for PDM and PPC review, thereby mitigating the risk, at a minimum, of duplication or GoC partners working at cross purposes.

START's representative in Port-au-Prince also supports whole-of-government coordination by identifying projects and proposing potential GoC partners, liaising with OGDs representatives at the embassy and in conveying information relevant to START and OGD partners at headquarters through IRC and other venues, such as the sector working groups and the Haiti Steering Committee. There are, however, limitations on what the START representative can accomplish by way of whole-of-government coordination in the field. OGDs personnel at the embassy rarely have the authority to enter into programming arrangements with GoC partners, and even face limitations on what information can be shared between departments.24

In summary, while the mechanisms in place to support whole-of-government coordination work well at the policy level and have largely succeeded in avoiding incidences of duplication of effort among OGDs, these mechanisms have fallen short in promoting the kind of harmonized programming originally envisaged for Canada's whole-of-government engagement strategy. Indeed, given the different mandates, priorities, and planning cycles of OGDs, expectations for whole-of-government coordination, particularly at the planning level, may need to be adjusted.

5.4 Performance Monitoring and Results Reporting

Finding 20:

START/GPSF performance monitoring frameworks and documents are adequate, but the quality of reporting, which is done primarily at the output level, varies among partners.

The GPSF has documents in place that are appropriate for reporting with a results-based approach.

At the country level, for example, the country Concept Papers have a performance monitoring framework that includes a section on project outputs and outcomes, and IRC produces an annual report on achievements (although it was noted that achievement reports are focused primarily on activities).

Haitian National Police Reform: Construction/Refurbishment of 14 police stations and equipment of 21 police stations in Haiti's Southern Department

This project will contribute to the achievement of the following GPSF immediate or intermediate outcomes:

  • Increased Canadian influence and catalytic leadership
  • Enhanced prospects for reconstruction and stabilization
  • More effective and stable post-conflict institutions
  • Improved Canadian contributions to the restoration of security and indigenous governance capacity

Project Document GPSF 07-027 November 28, 2007, point 11.

At the project level, a combination of several documents identify and report on results.

  • The Project Description document includes a section on the project's contribution to achievement of GPSF immediate or intermediate outcomes (see sidebar).
  • The project Results-Based Performance Framework is results-oriented and includes sections on activities, expected results (both outputs and outcomes), and risks and mitigation strategies. The format, however, does not include a section on lessons learned or a section to analyze emerging issues and problems. It should be noted that lessons learned have been included in Concept Papers and, through interviews with START staff in Haiti, there is evidence that these lessons do inform programming.
  • The format of the Final Project Report is adequate and stipulates that the report should refer to and be based on the Results-Based Performance Framework. In addition to the required sections on description of objectives, issues in implementation and financial reporting, the framework also includes a section on final outcomes, unforeseen results, and impacts on specific beneficiaries.

Basically, the format of GPSF reporting is adequate. However, the quality of reporting varies among partners: for example, reports from IOM were quite detailed and provided information along the results chain, while reports from UNDP were less detailed and did not go beyond results at the output level. There is, arguably, a need for more stringent quality control over reports prepared by partners that could be exercised by the START representative in Port-au-Prince or another officer dedicated to this purpose.

The tendency for partners to report on outputs, and to a much lesser extent on immediate outcomes, ought not to be a surprise given the short-term and quick impact nature of GPSF investments. Indeed, the character of the GPSF calls into question whether success should be assessed with the same level of expectation as more traditional development projects. As quick impact interventions, arguably greater weight, in terms of reporting on results, ought to be placed on the catalytic role these interventions perform i.e., in garnering stakeholder support and establishing the foundations for longer-term development.

START's ability to monitor performance has been greatly facilitated by the decision to deploy a START representative in the field. As noted in section 5.6 of this report, the START representative in Port-au-Prince has played an indispensible role in reporting back to headquarters on progress and, in some instances a lack of progress, in the implementation of GPSF projects. However, the number of projects to be tracked, and the geographic dispersion of these projects, renders it difficult for the START representative, even with the support of a Locally Engaged Staff (LES), to give these projects the attention they arguably require in an environment such as Haiti.

Finding 21:

Accountability for whole-of-government performance monitoring and results reporting is unclear

The Haiti Country Strategy has no formal framework for whole-of-government performance monitoring or results reporting and accountability for same at the country level remains unclear.25 Canadian OGDs in receipt of GPSF support and that provide assistance to MINUSTAH, namely the RCMP and CSC, have little programmatic control over the use of their resources, thus rendering accountability for performance and results problematic. While IRC produces an annual Progress and Achievement Report for the Haiti Envelope, the report is largely project and activity focused, and does not specifically address whole-of-government performance as such. Finally, although the SAB is nominally charged with reviewing and assessing progress against "integrated country strategies," which presumably refers to the country concept papers as it pertains to the GPSF, the evaluation team was not made aware of the SAB having fulfilled this responsibility with respect to Haiti.

5.5 Resource Mobilization

Finding 22:

In general, GPSF's ability to mobilize resources quickly in response to pressing stabilization needs is appreciated by the GoH. Achieving the optimal balance between the need to respond quickly while exercising due-diligence remains a challenge.

As remarked elsewhere in this report, and confirmed in the case studies, the GPSF's ability to disburse resources rapidly is one of its greatest virtues, but also a source of vulnerability. Responding rapidly to needs in highly unstable environments carries with it great risks. Notwithstanding these risks, START is not absolved from being accountable for its investment decisions. Over the last several years, START has developed processes and procedures which significantly mitigate the risks attendant to its rapid disbursement mandate. START's multi-layered project review and approval process, supported by the SOPs, is rigorous, ensuring that project proposals and prospective implementing partners are subject to a high degree of scrutiny. This process, however, can also contribute to delays in disbursements, sometimes significant delays.26

The Formative Evaluation of the GPSF, conducted in 2007, remarked on these delays, citing the review process itself, whereby technical matters are addressed at the committee level, rather than at the level of functional experts, as one probable endogenous cause for these delays. To mitigate this risk, and streamline the review and approval process, the report recommended that project proponents obtain certification from functional experts prior to presentation before committee. The report also suggested that Division heads approve, as a matter of course, project proposals before they are submitted for committee review as a means of expediting the approval process.

Nevertheless, the GPSF has proven an effective instrument for whole-of-government resource mobilization, though developing capacity within OGDs to participate in stabilization missions remains a work-in-progress. The GPSF was designed to function as an instrument to facilitate the participation of OGDs in Canada's conflict prevention, peace operations, and post-conflict stabilization missions abroad. It does so through direct department-to-department transfers on a project basis, but transfers of this kind have limitations in terms of their ability to contribute to departmental capacity to participate in overseas missions. This is particularly true of OGDs that do not have an express international mandate, such as CSC. Once funding for a project ceases, the capacity developed to support the project is often dissipated or lost.

In addition to direct department-to-department transfers referenced above, the GPSF supports whole-of-government resources mobilization through more systematic arrangements, such as the CPA with the RCMP. This arrangement, which provides Canada with a standing capacity to deploy up to 200 police officers to UN and regionally based peace operations, has come to be considered something of a model for police deployments and has garnered international attention. Interviews with senior personnel at the RCMP confirmed a high degree of satisfaction with the CPA which was reported to have significantly enhanced the RCMP's capacity to contribute to peace operations abroad.

The evaluation team was advised in November 2008 that negotiations were under way with CSC to develop something akin to the CPA, entitled the Canadian International Corrections Agreement (CICA), which would support the development of a standing capacity within the department to participate in overseas missions. The status of that initiative, however, remains uncertain.

Finding 23:

There are several cases where large sums of committed funds have been released in one disbursement, a practice which places GPSF investments at risk.

Best practice, and indeed TBS policy, requires funds to be released upon the meeting of certain milestones established in a pre-defined payment schedule. Among the suite of projects supported by the GPSF in Haiti, two high value projects disbursed between 73 percent and 82 percent of total committed funds in one tranche, in both cases in the final quarter of the FY, with the balance of committed funds being disbursed in the first quarter of the following FY.27

Notwithstanding technical compliance with TBS policy, the practice of disbursing large sums of money absent evidence of meeting a pre-defined deliverable is risky. Both of the aforementioned projects were administered by the UNDP, both involved physical infrastructure development, and both experienced significant delays in implementation, resulting in large sums of unused funds. While the evaluation team confirmed that these unused funds were deposited in interest bearing accounts, generating returns in the order of 1.8% per annum, it nonetheless represents an inefficient use of GPSF resources and a practice which should be avoided.

5.6 Human Resource Management

Finding 24:

START has made significant progress in securing staff with the requisite training and experience in project management, however, staff turnover has had a mild disruptive affect on project management.

START's progress in addressing human resource needs relating to the GPSF has been supported by a branch-wide staffing plan launched by the Global Issues Branch (IFM). The Departmental Human Resource and Business Plan Priority (2007-2010) highlights the need to develop, among other skills, project management expertise, which START has endeavored to achieve through a combination of training and recruitment. For the period under review for this evaluation, START, and in particular, IRC, experienced a large turnover of staff. While the evaluation team was not advised of any significant disruption to operations as consequence of this staff turnover, partners in Haiti did remark on a general slow down in response times to requests.

Finding 25:

START's decision to field a permanent representative in Port-au-Prince has yielded significant returns, although the volume of work is taxing the capacity of the representative.

The value of having a person in the field - a person to monitor events on the ground, liaise with partners and stakeholders, and assist the same in real-time - cannot be understated, particularly in an environment such as Haiti. It is extremely difficult, and indeed hazardous, to plan and manage complex programs from afar or through proxies, even trusted proxies, as many donors have discovered to their chagrin.

The START representative in Port-au-Prince has in no small measure made a significant contribution to both the shape of GPSF's assistance portfolio and to its success. Partners interviewed in Haiti universally remarked on the value of having a local contact person to assist in the preparation of project proposals, address administrative issues as they arise, and participate in broader policy issues of relevance to stakeholders.

As remarked in the case studies, the START representative in Port-au-Prince has played an instrumental role in promoting donor coordination - a key objective of the GPSF - which arguably could not be effectively achieved from headquarters in Ottawa. Nor, arguably, could the GPSF achieve the level of GoH support and buy-in to its initiatives were it not for the trust, forged through personal contact, established between the START representative and GoH interlocutors.

Notwithstanding the above, the last several years has witnessed a dramatic increase in GPSF programming in Haiti, both in the number of projects being supported, and the value of these projects. Compared to CIDA's staff complement in the field, numbered at 55 and which administers an aid portfolio of CND $110 million per annum (a ratio of CND $2 million per FTE), the START representative, supported by one LES, administers a portfolio valued at CND $15 million (a ratio of CND $7.5 million per FTE). It also bears mentioning that the START representative also acts a First Secretary in the Political Section of the Canadian embassy, which provides START with certain opportunities and advantages, but also places demands on the START representative above and beyond those strictly relating to the GPSF. For example, the START representative serves as Acting Political Counselor in the absence of the Counsellor and, as such, supports the Embassy in the organization of high-level visits.

These demands on the START representative, as remarked earlier, have encroached on the ability of the same to monitor project performance with the degree of intensity required. Moreover, and as a corollary to the preceding paragraph, GPSF projects in Haiti are changing in size and complexity. Physical infrastructure projects, as noted in the case studies, constitute a significant component of overall GPSF programming in Haiti, calling on skills in the areas of contracting and procurement which are not among those identified in the job description of the START representative. Arguably, support in these areas may be necessary to complement the core skills of a future START representative.

5.7 Financial and Records Management

Finding 26:

Notwithstanding recent enhancements to START's financial and program data management system, data integrity remains vulnerable and the system is underutilized.

Previous evaluations and audits of START and the GPSF cited risks to effective financial management by the use of stand-alone/ black-book systems that are highly vulnerable to error and which give rise to excessive transaction costs owing to the manual processing of data. Despite efforts to find an alternative to the black-book systems currently in use, a corporate solution has yet to be found. START's Relational Data Management System (RDMS), which is founded on a Microsoft Access platform, has undergone some significant refinements and enhancements since it was adopted in 2007, although the system is still dependent on manual input from a variety of distinct databases and thus vulnerable to error.28 This risk of error is compounded by the fact that use of the system is optional, thereby undermining assurance that the data is accurate and up-to-date. In the conduct of this evaluation, the evaluation team encountered inconsistencies in the financial reports provided which, although ultimately reconcilable, exposed the risks to managers relying on these disparate data sources.

Finding 27:

START's records management systems, despite some limitations, are adequate, but underutilized, thus posing a risk to project management and corporate memory retention.

DFAIT's corporate Information Management System, InfoBank, though having its detractors - limited ability to update documents, awkward search functions, etc. - is by most standards a fairly robust electronic records management system. Notwithstanding START having officially adopted InfoBank as the system of choice, use of the system remains optional. As such, its reliability as a source of data is wholly dependent on the extent to which it is actually used, which is by no means consistent among divisions and personnel within START.

START's physical records management system, which is supported by the GPSF SOPs, is robust in design, but also dependent on adherence to established procedures, which is by no means uniform. Project files assembled by IRD for this evaluation were found to be of varying completeness with one file presented being nothing more than an empty jacket. Some project files could not be retrieved, owing to uncertainty as to which project officer had carriage of the file or where it had been deposited.29 This presented a challenge to the evaluation team, but more significantly it signals a need for greater vigilance to be exercised in complying with the SOPs.

5.8 Risk Management

Finding 28:

START has instituted a formal system of risk management both at the envelope and project levels, although risks identified remain largely focused on project implementation. Moreover, the ultimate utility of these systems depends on the effectiveness of ongoing risk monitoring.

The GPSF operates in environments that are by their nature fraught with risks and Haiti has its share of them. Macro risks to programming, which is to say risks that impact on all actors in Haiti, are identified and updated annually in the Country Concept papers. Mitigation strategies developed for these risks are, for the most part, reasonable and proportionate, although identification of levels of management or person/s best placed to respond to specific risks, and they will vary depending on the nature of the risk, is not always clear. Quite often the risk mitigation strategy simply remarks that "Canada will…" do this or that in response to a given threat. While responsibilities may be understood by management, the lack of a formalized system identifying lead responsibility and accountability can potentially result in confusion and duplication of effort.

At the project level, risk management is supported by a requirement for project proponents to identify and document risks and the mitigating strategies proposed to address them. These are subject to intensive scrutiny, and where warranted revision, through the established project review and approval process. The effectiveness of a risk mitigation strategy, however, is dependent on two factors: 1) timely and accurate reporting, and 2) independent monitoring. Regarding the first factor, START is very much dependent on the quality of reporting provided by its implementing partners, which varies. Regarding the second factor, the role of the START representative in Port-au-Prince warrants particular mention.

The START representative in Port-au-Prince performs a critical function monitoring and reporting to headquarters on the progress of projects supported by the GPSF. An example of how critical this function can be is the role the START representative performed in alerting headquarters to the problems encountered in the implementation of the Community Security project administered by the UNDP - problems which were not self-evident in the reports furnished to START by the UNDP. This intelligence allowed START to respond quickly to a serious threat to its investment, thereby averting further financial losses and potential embarrassment. As remarked earlier, however, the varied demands placed on the START representative constrains the ability of the same to engage in the kind of intensive monitoring GPSF projects arguably require.

One risk to START's investments which is not formally recognized or addressed either at the project or envelope level is the risk to the sustainability of the interventions the GPSF supports. A well designed and executed project that in the end falters for a lack of "take-up" is as much a risk to START's investments as a poorly designed and executed one. START, of course, cannot be held fully accountable for the life of a project once it ceases to have effective control over it, but it can take proactive measures to increase the likelihood that project impacts will be sustainable. The importance START places on garnering GoH support for its initiatives is one risk mitigation approach, but further effort is required in garnering the support of other stakeholders.

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6.0 Sector Case Studies

6.1 Police Sector

6.1.1 Context

From the late 1990s, the Haitian National Police (HNP) became a force with increasingly corrupt, politicized, criminal and abusive elements. Haitian law enforcement authorities were widely perceived as part of the problem of insecurity in Haiti and, at the time of the international intervention in 2004, the HNP was recognized as being in dire need of reform and restructuring. Moreover, during the conflict in 2004, most of the infrastructure of the HNP had been destroyed or vandalized. Some 125 commissariats needed to be rehabilitated and 75 needed rebuilding. The number of vehicles and radio communication equipment had been significantly reduced and office supplies destroyed.

The HNP is at the center of the short, mid- and long-term stability of Haiti. Assistance to the HNP is an integral part of MINUSTAH's mandate and a focus of international donors. In its August 2008 report, the Secretary General of the UN recognized that the HNP was not yet equipped to uphold the rule of law alone and that MINUSTAH was still indispensable to ensure stability. From 2006 to 2008, MINUSTAH's composition has been significantly reconfigured in order to reduce the number of troops and to increase the number of the police. There are currently more than 900 police officers coming from 38 countries and 1,000 police composing the Formed Police Units.

According to the UN, and in the absence of a any major deterioration in the security environment, the "planned substantial increase in HNP capacity in the coming 12 months should pave the way for the beginning of a systematic and progressive assumption of function and geographical responsibilities by the HNP," together with a "corresponding reconfiguration of the Mission's own capabilities." Between 2004 and 2008 the UN reported that "progress was made towards the professionalization of the HNP personnel, its institutional strengthening and the development of its infrastructure."30

The HNP currently includes 8,546 officers, of whom 8.5 percent are female. The target envisaged in the Reform Plan is to have 14,000 trained and vetted officers by 2011. The goal of 30 percent women in the force remains distant. Recruits are graduating with new uniforms and equipment and are more visible on Port-au-Prince streets, conducting more patrols and stop-and-search roadblocks. Salaries have increased some 35 percent and further training opportunities appear to have helped establish a sense of pride among recent police academy graduates.

A recent survey conducted by MINUSTAH suggests that while the public's view of the police has improved, some problems remain to be tackled: accusations of brutality and complicity in crimes (related to drug trafficking and kidnapping), poor preparation of files sent to the court, lack of equipment, understaffing of many stations, as well as no functioning administrative system to track or punish absences.31

Although the 19th promotion (i.e., class) of cadets graduated in November 2007, the 20th promotion, numbering some 700 cadets (of whom 12 percent are women), started its training with delay during summer 2008. Recruitment for the 21st promotion has been ongoing since then in order to train the 21st promotion before the end of the year. It is expected that some 1,200 cadets will graduate from the Police School in the first half of 2009. The basic training has taken place in Haiti and is being supplemented by bilateral initiatives to provide specialized courses and scholarships (in Chile, Colombia, France, Mexico, and Turkey, to name a few).

Meanwhile, alongside the internal review mechanisms of the HNP, MINUSTAH is implementing a joint vetting process that will provide the basis for police certification. Despite the confidence shown by senior police authorities that vetting is being conducted properly, "there is skepticism as to whether it will go deep enough to cleanse the force."32 There is also concern that the already thinly-stretched HNP could end up unable to fulfill its task should many officers be dismissed.

Substantial contributions by countries involved in the Peace and Security initiatives through MINUSTAH have permitted important progress in the development of necessary infrastructure and strengthening of institutions, including a significant expansion of the HNP School, completed in June 2008, which includes the construction of six new barracks and the renovation of 27 classrooms and other facilities, as well new HNP stations in Cité Soleil and the Département du Sud.

It is expected that by the end of 2011, a number of key objectives of the HNP Reform Plan will be attained or within reach, namely:

  • Fourteen thousands officers trained. Although, as noted by all respondents, including representatives from the International Crisis Group (ICG), the CPA representative, the UN and the GoC in Haiti, it may take more years to reach this target if the current pace is maintained.
  • HNP certification process.
  • HNP capacity to provide essential police services throughout the country.

Also, it is important to note the progress, led by MINUSTAH and HNP, in dismantling armed gangs through the arrest and imprisonment of several prominent gang leaders as well as over 700 other gang members, which enabled the state to regain access to the areas of the capital, such as Cité Soleil that were previously controlled by gangs.

6.1.2 GPSF Programming in Support of the Police Sector

GPSF has disbursed CDN $13,980,744 in support of four projects in the Police Sector, accounting for roughly 58 percent of all GPSF disbursements to Haiti since 2006. These four projects, the quantum of funds in support thereof, the implementing agency, disbursements to date, and current status, are summarized in Exhibit 6.1 below.

It is important to note that DFAIT also supports the deployment of up to 100 Canadian Police officers (expected to number 100 by January 2009) to MINUSTAH through the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) managed by the RCMP. The cost of this initiative is not reflected in the exhibit below.33

Exhibit 6.1 GPSF Projects in the Police Sector

Table 2: GPSF Projects in the Police Sector
Project TitleImplementing PartnerCommitment $CDNDisbursed $CDN1Status
Total $14,667,739$13,980,744 
1 GPSF Database report, November 10th report
Deployment of Canadian Police Experts with MINUSTAHCANADEM$2,941,941$2,581,225Closed
Refurbishment of HNP Police School Training QuartersIOM$3,262,790$2,936,511Closed
HNP - Strengthening the capacity of the Inspectorate GeneralUNDP$5,000,000$5,000,000On-going
Renovation of HNP Police Stations in the South DepartmentUNDP$3,463,008$3,463,008On-going

With the exception of the deployment of Canadian Police officers, which is a Technical Assistance project, the aforementioned projects focus on the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and equipment supply. A brief description of each project is presented below; project results are discussed in section 6.1.4.

Deployment of Canadian Police Experts with MINUSTAH - $2,941,941 (Committed) - Project Number 07-002

Canada had committed to furnishing MINUSTAH with 100 police experts, but was unable to meet this target.34 CANADEM was engaged by START to make up for this short-fall by tapping into Canada's reserve of retired officers. The mandate of this project was to place 20 Canadian Police Experts with MINUSTAH to support the successful implementation of the HNP reform plan and build the capacity of the HNP through advising police authorities and mentoring and coaching national police personnel. The task of the implementing partner, CANADEM, was to recruit, contract, equip, brief, insure and deploy 20 recently retired Canadian Police experts. The candidates were approved by DFAIT on recommendation from the RCMP. While in mission, according to UN SOPs, the Police experts were under the direct command of the RCMP designated Canadian Contingent Commander for administrative purposes. CANADEM's role was logistical and administrative in nature, while MINUSTAH/the Canadian Contingent Commander oversaw the Police Experts' in-mission activities.

Refurbishment of HNP Police School Training Quarters - $3,262,790 (Committed) - Project Number 07-249

The goal of this quick impact project was to improve and expand police school training facilities through the refurbishment of existing facilities and construction of additional ones to accommodate twice the number of police recruits and improve access to the school for the correctional officers. Key activities included: refurbishment of existing facilities, construction of new facilities, and purchase of new equipment. By ensuring that Haiti has adequate facilities to accommodate and professionally train sufficient numbers of police officers, the project directly contributes to timely implementation of the HNP reform plan. The project took place between February and July 2008. The total value of the Canadian investment was $3,262,790 and the implementing partner was the International Organization for Migration.

HNP - Strengthening the Capacity of the Inspectorate General - $ 5,000,000 - Project Number 06-251

This project was essentially an infrastructure project to improve the facilities of the Inspectorate, with some equipment and technical assistance. The $5 million project, implemented by UNDP, intended to construct a building to accommodate +/- 100 persons composing the Inspectorate General team, provide office equipment, 25 vehicles for the IG, and set up five databases to manage the HR files of the HNP. The project had multiple and diverse problems due to apparent disagreement between the MINUSTAH, the UNDP, and the GoH. Pending the final implementation of the project, the equipment and technical assistance/training were furnished in rental accommodations. Construction is expected to begin in April 2009.

Renovation of HNP Police Stations in the South Department - $ 3,463,008 - Project Number 07- 027

The project, funded entirely by GPSF and implemented by UNOPS/UNDP, aimed at rehabilitating 14 police stations (commissariats) in the Department of the South (Département du Sud) and providing basic equipment (communications, IT, crowd control equipment). It also intended to provide 24 vehicles and 24 motorbikes to 21 police stations for the HNP to perform patrols and other police functions in a professional manner. The project, after two requests for extension, lasted one year and was expected to be completed by the end of 2008. This project was not visited during the field visit and, in the absence of a monitoring report it is premature to discuss results achieved to-date. It was reported that work on the stations was completed on December 31, 2008.

6.1.3 Relevance

Finding 29:

GPSF programming in the Police Sector is particularly relevant to and in accordance with Canada's Country Strategy for Haiti.

Haiti is a country of strategic importance to Canada. Canada's Strategy for the Americas, which seeks to strengthen and reinforce Canada's leadership in the Western hemisphere calls for "pro-active engagement within the Caribbean to promote stability," as well as working with partners including the US, Mexico, and the European Union (EU), to "manage and influence transition in Haiti." Any situation in Haiti has an impact on the security in the Hemisphere and an influence on domestic issues in Canada. Law and order issues in Haiti impact on public safety in Canada in terms of organized crime associated with drug-trafficking and proceeds of crime smuggled into Canada (see section 7.4 on border security). Consolidation of gains in the security sector will in turn pave the way for future progress in development.

Promotion of security and establishment of the rule of law in Haiti is not possible without an effective, professional and accountable police force. The reform of the police is key35 to stabilization and reconstruction in Haiti and paves the way to sustainable development. In this area, Canada is guided by the 2006 HNP Reform Plan, which sets out short, medium, and long-term goals in several areas, including: vetting and recruitment of police officers and strengthening the capacity of key institutional units such as the Inspectorate General.

In the Stratégie Pays 2008-2009 of Haiti, the following strategic objective is noted: "Support and reinforce an approach which gives priority to the strengthening of the Haitian institutional capacities in all areas." One of the short term results expected from the development of this strategy is "a police force, a correctional system and a judicial system progressively more efficient and more professional." In the next three years, it is expected (Objective No.2 ) to: "Maintain the support of MINUSTAH by the deployment of Canadian policemen (…); support the implementation of the Reform Plan of the Haiti National Police (HNP) …. and establish a better coordination between international (including MINUSTAH and UNDP) and the Haitian authorities on the Security System Reform." In this regard, the programming of the initiatives of START are particularly relevant and in accordance with Canada's country strategy for Haiti.

It should be noted that in the Police Sector, the GPSF investments are closely associated with other significant investments of the GoC. While GPSF has decided to concentrate its efforts on the most immediate needs in terms of training with the National School of Police, CIDA is involved in long-term strategy of building a new Police Academy which will progressively (with a horizon of two to three years) train senior HNP managers, and will help to ensure that HNP has sufficient human resources to manage the increased number of police cadets.

Also, the decision to invest in the construction of the Inspectorate General will support the strengthening of the highest level of control on the chain of command of the HNP. Finally, the decision to support the rehabilitation of commissariats in the Department of the South will also provide an immediate and appropriate professional environment for the cadets who are trained in the National School of Police and ensure that they are deployed with the basic infrastructure required for them to perform their duties. The South Department features prominently in all counter-narcotics efforts, which is key to stabilization of the country.

Finding 30:

GPSF programming since 2006 has supported key Haitian reforms as well as the international stabilization effort.

Since 2006 the GPSF has provided support for key Haitian reforms and international securitization efforts in which Canada participates through the deployment of both military and civilian personnel to MINUSTAH through the CPA. Canada also committed over $37 million through the GPSF to support important security system reform initiatives in Haiti, implemented by the Haitian government with assistance from MINUSTAH.36 It should be added that all these investments would not have been possible without the key participation of selected implementing partners, namely International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), Viva Rio, and the support of MINUSTAH, with various levels of efficiency and effectiveness (see below). In February 2008, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs reconfirmed Canada's commitment to advancing security system reform in Haiti with particular emphasis on leadership in police, and the five year whole-of-government Strategy emphasizes Canada's engagement in supporting police reforms as an important priority.

GPSF/START efforts relate to human resource capacity development (vetting program, training and mentoring of HNP officers) as well as physical infrastructure development (Inspectorate General, École Nationale de Police, Commissariats in the Département du Sud) are particularly relevant. They are consistent with and supportive of the priorities and objectives of DFAIT and the GoC.

GSPF/START programming in support of the HNP is appropriate and relevant in supporting other international initiatives and activities that are being taken in the Police sector in Haiti. There exists a Working Table between the UN, the MINUSTAH, the GoH and interested donors in the Police sector in Haiti which coordinates the activities of the international community in Haiti. START plays a significant and indeed a leading role in this sector. As an illustration of this catalytic role, Canada is supporting the rehabilitation of some 14 Commissariats in the Department of the South. The methodology of using a "one donor - one department" approach in regard to the rehabilitation of the police infrastructures has led to the development of a model which will be carried on by other international stakeholders throughout the country, where Spain will act in the South-East Department, the USA in Artibonite and North-West, Germany in the North, etc.

The flexible and quick responsive nature of the GPSF was greatly appreciated in the rehabilitation of the National Police School, when Canada and the US decided to share responsibilities (infrastructure vs. equipment and support to training) in close cooperation with the authorities of the National Police School.

In the context of the rehabilitation of the Inspectorate General, close cooperation among the GoH, the MINUSTAH and GPSF/START facilitated the design, conception and inception of the project under the stewardship of UNDP, although significant administrative and contractual hurdles later slowed down the expected timelines of the project.

6.1.4 Results

Finding 31:

The police infrastructure projects supported by GPSF have dealt with critical capacity deficits in the HNP, although some projects have been delayed.

National School of Police

This project took place between February and July 2008. The total value of the Canadian investment was $3,262,790 and the implementing partner was the International Organization for Migration. The project refurbished the following facilities: laundry, dining facility, restroom, classrooms, weight lifting room, student barracks as well as toilet/shower facilities. The project also undertook new construction at the school grounds (including the construction of water tanks and sewer lines, six new barracks, toilet and shower facilities, a cafeteria block, a kitchen) and provided equipment (cafeteria and kitchen equipment, beds, office and medical supplies, etc.) A 300m concrete access road to the new dormitory area was constructed and a space was constructed for generators. At the time of the field mission, construction of the National School of Police was completed.

The National School is now in a position to accommodate up to 500 recruits per promotion (graduating class) and up to two promotions a year. As an immediate output, more recruits will be hosted by the School, and the upgraded facilities will allow for training of future promotions and will lead to increased self-esteem, credibility of the police, motivation of the officers, etc.

Commissariats - Department of the South

This project, identified jointly by MINUSTAH and the GoH and implemented by UNOPS/UNDP, aimed at rehabilitating 14 commissariats in the Department of the South, as well as buying equipment and IT/office materials for 21 commissariats. The project, which was scheduled to end in June 2008, was extended until October 2008 and finally postponed until December 2008 due to the hurricane season. At the time of the evaluation, project completion was scheduled for mid-November 2008, preceding the deployment of the office and other professional equipment.

Inspectorate General

This infrastructure project was intended to provide a building for the Inspectorate General team, and provide equipment and technical assistance. It was scheduled to be completed in March 2008. However, construction was delayed by contractual negotiations and revisions, and the project was formally extended to March 2009. Construction is expected to begin in April 2009 and be completed in February 2010. In the interim, equipment and technical assistance/training have been furnished in rental accommodation.

The first budget was updated in order to accommodate temporary facilities for the Inspectorate General. Part of the equipment and logistics purchases will be made in accordance with the progressive completion of the infrastructure project, and changes in price may affect the final outputs.

Finding 32:

GPSF programming in the Police Sector has attracted support from other donors.

In addition to the rehabilitation of the National School of Police, the GPSF project was part of a larger effort that offered an important opportunity to collaborate closely with the US, an important partner in the implementation of Canada' strategy for the Americas.

The US funded the refurbishment of other parts of the police school campus not included in the project funded by Canada. In addition, the US has been providing US $1.5 million in support of operational costs for each graduating police class, and has committed to maintain this level of support for additional graduating classes. In addition, the GoH and MINUSTAH will be providing in-kind support in the form of technical expertise, specialized human resources, and land.

It appears that United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is extremely interested in cooperating with START in Haiti as the two programs complement each other on thematic approaches and sectors as well as on programmatic issues. Regular meetings through the Working Group or through bilateral meetings help to strategize the development of this cooperation, in the Police as well as in the Corrections Sectors. The complementarity and the flexibility existing between the two programs is a model of joint leadership that should occur in similar situations in other countries when common interests exist.

Finding 33:

Canadian Police Experts deployed though CANADEM remain highly regarded, but their deployment may not be the most efficient or strategic way for Canada to support the HNP.

This project is highly regarded by the MINUSTAH because of the quality, maturity and professionalism of the (retired) Canadian Police officers being deployed to MINUSTAH under the aegis of CANADEM. The officers deployed have been performing well within the positions of responsibility assigned to them within the hierarchy of the MINUSTAH, but have faced various problems that are common in this type of environment, including: bureaucratic inertia with the "host" Police, lack of experience, inadequate professional and linguistic skills from the other United Nations Police (UNPOL).

According to many respondents, Canada needs to find a niche in the police sector that could serve as a model for future interventions. The officers deployed thought that their contribution would be more valuable if it were concentrated on investigative and training skills within the Mission. Many senior Canadian as well as MINUSTAH officials raised the possibility of having a different model for Canadian police contributions that would rely on a closer bilateral partnership (e.g., police advisors within the Mission, Technical Advisors deployed on a bilateral basis within technical departments of the HNP). The report of a senior Canadian police officer in Mission to Haiti in 2008 drew the attention of decision makers in Canada to the fact that there was not enough concentration in one given area, that there was a serious lack of coordination among various international initiatives in the Police Sector. "Canada could try to capitalize on Canada's credibility in terms of professionalism and respect for Human Rights37" and "take advantage of current lack of coordination to install technical advisors that would not only train HNP but could also act as coordinators as they would have access to info from various agencies."

Other respondents proposed different programmatic options which ranged from deploying technical advisors/sectoral coordinators within the HNP to the possibility to positioning a Senior Police officer within the Embassy in order to assist the Post in answering to Police Reform Sector initiatives in a more responsive and strategic manner.

6.1.5 Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

Finding 34:

The level of efficiency varies between implementing partners which impacts on the timing, costing and quality of the deliverables.

The implementation of the National School of Police project proved extremely efficient in cost as well as time. The buildings and infrastructure of the National School of Police were completed in a very short period, thanks to the contractors' mobilization model developed by the IOM in Haiti, which allowed the project to add some facilities and still save additional money. Having been in Haiti since 1994, IOM has a significant in-house engineering capacity and has developed efficient procedures and networking, enabling it to mobilize quickly for implementation of quick impact refurbishment projects that meet the quality standards and timeframes.

The implementation of the Commissariats of the Department of the South, as well as the building of the Inspectorate General have both encountered significant delays because of various bureaucratic and administrative constraints (difficulties with UN bureaucracy and contractors, wide range of stakeholders involved, land titles, governmental decision making process).

In general terms, and based on a collateral analysis of other projects implemented by the same agencies, IOM seems to easily and quickly respond to the project requests presented to its attention, largely due to its long experience in Haiti, while UNDP Haiti has in general undertaken capacity building once projects are signed which has somewhat hampered its ability to quickly respond to donors requests.

Finding 35:

While CANADEM has proven to be an able implementing partner, some difficulties in communication and coordination among relevant OGDs resulted in some inefficiencies.

Canada had committed to furnishing MINUSTAH with 100 police experts, but was unable meet this target.38 CANADEM was engaged by START to make up for this short-fall by tapping into Canada's reserve of retired police officers that, as remarked in the preceding section, performed their duties very well and to the satisfaction of MINUSTAH.

Notwithstanding the above, CANADEM noted some difficulties faced in communications with regard to strategic thinking and experience sharing between CANADEM, RCMP and DFAIT. CANADEM's deployed police officers complained of inequalities between Canadian Police officers deployed under the CPA and themselves in regard to pay, uniforms, lack of arms (and ammunitions) as well as certain immunities and privileges allegedly enjoyed by RCMP officers. It is also to be noted that deficiencies in the contractual and financial management of the contract incurred some obvious risks for the implementing agency, which could have generated further risks for the entire project and the officers deployed. Indeed, CANADEM had to bear the unforeseen expense of procuring the arms for its deployed officers.

In terms of value for money, the estimated incremental costs (not salary or other usual employment costs) to RCMP police officers deployed to Haiti in FY 2008-09 was $3,150,000. The incremental costs in FY 2007-08 were around $3,485,131. The total cost of the placement of CANADEM International Police Officers with MINUSTAH (12 months x 20 officers) was $3,224,130, plus an extra $640,800 covering the DSA (from other sources). The CANADEM incremental costs per Police expert seem at first glance to be relatively higher than the RCMP incremental costs, but one has to consider that the CANADEM budget covers activities and budget lines that are usually part of the core and regular RCMP budget (such as training, uniforms, weapons, medical examinations, etc.).

6.2 Community Security

6.2.1 Context

The pattern of continuous insecurity and violence in the slums and poor neighborhoods of Haiti has exerted great pressure on these communities and threatened the stability of Haitian society at large. Continuous jolts in the political landscape have largely contributed to the rise in insecurity through armed violence and increased impunity. This has resulted in the disintegration of the social fabric, much more intensified in the poorer urban neighborhoods where the majority of the population has attained a critical level of vulnerability. According to the Justice and Peace Commission,39 an organization that has monitored violence in the country from July 2002 to December 2006, 2,821 deadly casualties have been reported.40

Since 15 December 2006, the efforts of the HNP, combined with those of the MINUSTAH, have secured several at risk neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince. The approach consists of maintaining a constant presence in the neighborhood while organizing targeted interventions against the main armed groups. This approach has led to the ousting of armed groups from the protective sanctuaries of impoverished neighborhoods, such as Cité Soleil. During the first quarter of 2007, 168 weapons were recovered and about 500 people arrested, including the main leaders of armed groups.

The neighborhood of Bel Air, which until recently was one of the most violent in Port-au-Prince, has seen significant improvements in security over the last three years, largely due to the efforts of a MINUSTAH battalion from Brazil stationed in the area. The relative peace that has prevailed is anchored partly in the Brazilian battalion's ability to establish good relations with the local community and to advance an innovative civil/military cooperation approach. The 100 strong Brazilian force is credited with bringing a unique perspective, which is rooted in the peacekeepers' personal experience of working/living in disadvantaged, violent and poverty-stricken communities in Brazil.

Also, in Bel Air, there is a narrow window of opportunity to consolidate recent security gains resulting from the MINUSTAH presence by facilitating a transition toward a more sustainable, locally-owned security paradigm that would focus on building trust between the residents of Bel Air and the HNP. Aware of this imperative at the national level, and encouraged by START, MINUSTAH, in cooperation with the HNP and the National Police School, has developed a community policing training module, which was initiated in the Jacmel in the South of Haiti. MINUSTAH agrees that the time is right to expand the program to Bel Air and begin transition from the military MINUSTAH security paradigm toward the HNP/community-led security.

6.2.2 GPSF Programming in Support of Community Security Sector

As of November 2008, START, through the GPSF, had disbursed CDN $2,101,698 in support of the implementation of three Community Security projects accounting for approximately 9 percent of all GPSF disbursements to Haiti since 2006. These projects, the quantum of funds in support thereof, the implementing agency, disbursements to date, and current status, are summarized in Exhibit 6.2 below.

In August/September 2008, a strategic review of the Community Security Project led to the decision to stop the project with the current implementing partner, UNDP. In November 2008, DFAIT was still to finalize the closure of the account with UNDP and to decide if, and how, to reallocate the balance of the funds remaining.

Exhibit 6.2 GPSF Projects in Community Security Sector

Table 3: GPSF Projects in Community Security Sector
Project TitleImplementing PartnerCommitment $CNDDisbursedStatus
Total $5,146,837$2,101,698  
1 Early December 2008, after deciding to close the project, DFAIT was to finalize the final disbursement to UNDP.
2 GPSF Database Report - Basic project report, September 2008.
Negotiating DisarmamentCentre for Humanitarian Dialogue$145,230$145,230Closed
Community Security in Haiti through strengthening conflict management and SALW controlUNDP$4,655,338$1,782,6421Closed
Bel Air Community SecurityViva Rio$346,305$173,8262On-going

Athough these projects all relied on a community based approach, they did not share the same methodological perspective and there were significant differences in their organizational and activities management. A brief description of each project is presented below.

Negotiating Disarmament - $ 145,230 (Committed) - Project Number 06-164

This project, implemented by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, aimed at generating a set of products designed to offer guidance to those involved in peace negotiations on various aspects of weapons controls, disarmament, and violence reduction in communities. The main output of this project was a publication on the phases and types of disarmament and weapons control activities. Activities included: commissioning background and briefing paper, the facilitation of discussions among experts from various sectors and disciplines with a view to identifying areas for action and research, and conducting country level interviews to inform analysis and recommendations. The project took place between 21 December 2006 and 20 March 2007.

Community Security in Haiti through Strengthening Conflict Management and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control - $ 4,655,338 (Committed) - Project Number 06-252

This project, implemented by UNDP, aimed at supporting the Haitian National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) as well as developing Community Violence Reduction and Development Committees (CPVD) in selected urban "Red Zones" throughout Port-au-Prince and other cities in the country. Once constituted, the CPVD would in turn decide and prioritize key community security initiatives that would strengthen security and living conditions in their neighbourhoods. However, as noted above, the project was cancelled in August 2008 following a strategic review conducted by START.

Bel Air Community Security - Number 07-048 - Planned budget $346,305)

This project, implemented by Viva Rio, had two purposes. The first was to document the lessons learned from the Brazilian experience in Bel Air in order to develop a training package that would benefit future peacekeeping deployments to Haiti (by Brazil and others). The project aimed to produce a training manual and a video documenting the experience of the Brazilian MINUSTAH battalion in Bel Air, organize seminars for trainers at the Centre for Training in Peace Operations (CIOPAZ) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and disseminate training materials to other troop-contributing peacekeeping nations in Latin America as well as the UN.

The second purpose was to support the implementation of the HNP community policing training doctrine in Bel Air, one of the former Red Zones identified by the GoH and the international community as being one of the most critical in regard to security. The project aimed to consolidate the security gains resulting from the MINUSTAH presence by facilitating a transition toward a more sustainable, locally-owned security paradigm that would focus on building trust between the residents of Bel Air and the HNP.

6.2.3 Relevance

Finding 36:

START/GPSF programming in the Community Security sector is consistent with the approach developed by many international stakeholders in Haiti.

The community security sector projects in Haiti are a key component of security sector reform, as an early warning system to detect and resolve security problems before tensions become inflamed or manipulated by spoilers. The Government and the international donors, since the arrival of the MINUSTAH, have selected the Red Zones where massive investments in policing and community security should be developed. A Community Policing concept has even been developed by MINUSTAH and is part of the Haitian National Reform Plan and should lead the further deployment of the HNP within the Red Zones.

Community security is a double edged concept. Although it seems and appears to support the strengthening of local community leadership in the most critical areas, it also sends the initial message that the national state is no longer, or not yet, in a position to support security in the concerned urban neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince and other important cities. As such, community security needs to be framed in a particular calendar and timeframe in consultation with local, national and international stakeholders, and designed in parallel with the progressive deployment and reintegration of the HNP in the sensitive zones.

There exist a good number of community security initiatives in Haiti, led by IOM, UNDP, and/or the MINUSTAH's Community Violence Reduction (CVR) program and other similar models of community based rehabilitation and/or development projects (World Bank, IOM). Although the Secrétariat d'État à la Sécurité publique is in charge of the security of the people and the management of the HNP progressive deployments, the Commission nationale de Désarmement, Démantèlement et Réintégration (CNDDR) also plays a key role in making sure that immediate negotiation, dismantling, reintegration initiatives with former gangs are implemented in order to prevent further "gangsterization" of the most critical areas of Port-au-Prince and other cities.

In the long term, most of the success of re-establishing security in the Red Zones will rely on the transition towards a more sustainable, community-centred and local-led security paradigm, coupled with socio-economic investments aimed at providing alternatives to criminal activity. In coordination with the HNP and the National Police School, MINUSTAH established and mobilized Community Policing Coaching teams aimed at training local HNP contingents on an approved doctrine for proximity policing (adopted in 2007).

Finding 37:

START/GPSF programming in the Community Security sector has opened the door for an effective whole-of-government synergy in targeted communities.

Armed gangs have flourished in Haiti due to the absence of state authority at the municipal level. Armed groups control their territories through violence and fear, but at the same time offer protection and other services to the local population. Canadian support in these areas targets policies and initiatives focused on the community as the primary agent of change, and seeks to address both security and development needs, including policing, mediation and reconciliation, disarmament and reintegration, conflict prevention, job creation, and access to services.

The investments of GSPF/START in this sector have used two different channels of intervention: one through a grass roots initiative working with community leaders through mentoring (led by Viva Rio, a NGO from Brazil experienced in the management of similar "bottom-up" situations in its country), and another initiative through a more "top-down" approach through a Community Security project (CSP) developed by UNDP Haiti.

The Haiti Envelope Concept Paper for FY 2008/09 stated that "START support in this area will be guided by the need for a quick seed funding for a specific initiative and a focus on shorter term, peace-building initiatives that will provide important 'peace dividends' to the communities providing foundation for an effective longer-term development programming to take root."

The Bel Air Community Security project, implemented by Viva Rio, was highly relevant to the stated approach, and produced quick results. It also demonstrated a whole-of-government approach through its close work with CIDA on a complementary project in Bel Air. The project supported by CIDA, "Appui au développement de la zone de Bel Air" will concentrate on access to basic services (waste management, health and sanitation) with a special emphasis on youth and women. The continuity of funding and support between the community security initiatives led by Viva Rio and the further investments being supported financially by CIDA offer a good model of integration between an operation of immediate stabilization within the communities and a short- and mid-term social and economic rehabilitation/reconstruction plan in favour of the local communities.

On the other hand, the failure of the Community Security Project, implemented by UNDP, proved that heavy institutional mechanisms geared to implementing traditional community development frameworks of intervention had more difficulties in delivering long expected local peace dividends to communities.

Finding 38:

GPSF programming in peacekeeping training (Viva Rio and CIOPAZ) has led to the development of a unique model of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) that could support the capacity of other peacekeeping forces and nations.

Viva Rio is a Brazilian NGO founded in 1993 with the general objective of overcoming violence in Brazil's underprivileged urban neighborhoods through the implementation of an integrated program of security, development, and humanitarian actions. The relative peace that is now prevailing in Bel Air is anchored in the Brazilian battalion's ability to establish good relations with the local community and to advance an innovative civil/military cooperation approach. The 100 strong Brazilian contingent is credited with bringing a unique perspective, which is rooted in the peacekeepers' personal experience of working/living in disadvantaged, violent and poverty-stricken communities in Brazil. By focusing on civil/military relations and trust building between residents and the HNP, the project fills an important rule of law niche and contributes to a comprehensive strategy to support Bel Air's transition from nascent stability to long-term security.

The training materials developed by Viva Rio and the CIOPAZ (Brazilian Army Centre for Training in Peace Operations) will potentially assure that future Brazilian and other Latin American peacekeeping deployments benefit from the Brazilian experience and increase their capacity to deal with community members and institutions in the conduct of peacekeeping missions. The successful transfer of experience and capacity building will depend on the development of a longer-term vision that ensures a handover/sustainability plan, exit strategy, and dissemination strategy are in place.

6.2.4 Results

Finding 39:

The UNDP Community Sector Program (CSP), which suffered from significant delays and problems in the context of its preparation, implementation and coordination with the National Commission of DDR (CNDDR) of Haiti, led to few tangible results.

The Contribution Agreement (CA) between the GoC and UNDP for the CSP was negotiated, signed, and started before the National DDR Commission (CNDDR) had a strategy in place, and as a result, some project components could not be implemented or implemented within agreed time frames. Two of the three targeted interventions of the CSP (reinsertion of the victims of violence, and support to the development of a legal framework for arms) failed to deliver any tangible outputs.

In the absence of an inter-agency consensus on how and with whom to work in the "Red Zones," the theoretical model developed by UNDP (Committees for the Prevention of Violence for Development (CPVD)) could not be implemented effectively. The CPVD were developed and administered in parallel to local forums, structured and organized around the local municipal and CNDDR representatives, which contributed to mistrust between UNDP and CNDDR as well as to significant delays in implementation. After 18 months, only four of the intended nine "Violence Reduction Plans" had been finalized.

Finding 40:

Viva Rio programming in peacekeeping training for the Haitian police has proved that alternative national and culturally adjusted training tools are efficient.

The peacekeeping training initiative, which is part of the START/Viva Rio Contribution Agreement, led to the production of a training manual which will be translated into various languages; a video produced and translated into Portuguese, Spanish, French and English; as well as simulation exercises to train future contingents deployed within the MINUSTAH. The training materials have been approved by CIOPAZ (Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center in Rio de Janeiro) as well as the MINUSTAH and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, New York (DPKO-NY). As a potential outcome of this training production initiative, future Brazilian and other Latin American peacekeeping deployments will benefit from the Brazilian experience and will have an increased capacity to deal with community members and institutions in the conduct of peacekeeping missions in Haiti, particularly in poor urban communities.

The Viva Rio project will contribute to strengthening international peacekeeping practices by documenting and disseminating lessons learned from the effective and innovative experience of a MINUSTAH battalion that succeeded in bringing stability to Bel Air. In line with Canada's Americas Strategy, particular emphasis is reported to be placed on encouraging adoptions of lessons learned by other Latin American troop contributing countries.

Finding 41:

Viva Rio community-based methodology delivered quick and effective peace dividends to youth, families and community leaders.

Viva Rio has been active in Bel Air since December 2006. It has contributed to mediation of peace accords among rival youth groups based on educational and professional incentives, and has developed a strong network of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in security and development in the area, including the GoH and the command of MINUSTAH's Brazilian contingent in Bel Air.

Two peace accords have been signed with the Community Leaders of Bel Air and the Commission nationale pour le Désarmement, le Démantèlement et la Réinsertion (CNDDR). Viva Rio provides incentive rewards if the peace accords are respected on a monthly basis (i.e., no deadly casualties of violence). These include scholarships to students in Bel Air, and professional rewards to older youth. In addition, the leaders of the community, who are deemed co-responsible for maintaining a peaceful environment, receive incentives in recognition of their work. Exhibit 6.3 below shows the degree to which the peace accords were respected in Bel Air for a six-month period in 2008 ("Yes" means that the community or leaders were rewarded for maintaining peace; "No" means that there was at least one deadly casualty of violence in that month.)

Exhibit 6.3 Incentive Rewards achieved through Peace Accords in Bel Air (2008)

Table 4: Incentive Rewards achieved through Peace Accords in Bel Air (2008)
MonthsCommunity RewardsLeader Rewards
1 Incentive mechanism for leaders had not yet been set up.
MayYesN/A1
JuneYesYes
JulyYesYes
AugustYesYes
SeptemberNoNo
OctoberNoNo

As a result of the peace accords, more than 300 scholarships for young children have been granted, as well as rewards for RARA (Haitian music bands) and Hip Hop musicians. In addition, Rio Viva organized a Hip Hop competition and six major cultural events (Peace Celebrations) with the participation of rival groups.

These community incentives have limited violent death provoked by micro political conflicts. A victimization report presented by Viva Rio has shown a significant reduction of violence in Bel Air since a peak in 2004/2005. In the same vein, the participation of Bel Air in the riots of April 2008 was rather contained, in contrast to the violence in other neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince.

As a result of the Viva Rio project, the area of intervention has grown in number of projects (supported through CIDA) as well as in geographic scope. This combination of law enforcement, incentives, and development actions is an innovative strategy in community violence reduction that warrants further discussion and evaluation.

6.2.5 Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

Finding 42:

As a result of disagreements between UNDP and the CNDDR over the methodological framework and implementation of the CSP, UNDP proposed alternative implementation mechanisms.

The alternative mechanisms proposed by UNDP completely excluded the CNDDR and relied on the idea that the project could proceed as usual. Nor did UNDP's proposal take into account that the amounts to be spent were far in excess of the original budgetary lines that Canada had devoted for assisting the communities and delivering tangible results in support of the reintegration process.

Finding 43:

The lack of transparent monitoring and progress reporting on CSP from UNDP hindered the analysis and interpretation of project results and obstacles to implementation. The lack of formal review mechanisms impeded the ability of different stakeholders to consider redesigning or transforming various components of the project.

UNDP did not provide timely information on the implementation of the CSP project that might have allowed START to conduct a review of the program at an earlier stage. It was only in June 2008 that UNDP invited Canada to consider other implementation mechanisms for the project, without consideration for a proper assessment to validate the feasibility of these mechanisms. To its credit, START commissioned a strategic review of these options in August 2008, concluded that the project was not salvageable, and recommended that remaining funds be reallocated for the same purpose but through other channels and implementation mechanisms.

Finding 44:

Viva Rio programming with the HNP on the implementation of a community policing methodology in Bel Air supports the transition from MINUSTAH to HNP.

Community policing, as laid out in the police reform paper, involves encouraging HNP officers to patrol on foot and maintain regular contact with citizens. In the current phase of implementation of the project, Community Security Committees (CSC), comprising members of local HNP detachments and community leaders, are being established. In anticipation of further deployments, and based on the National Police School curriculum, MINUSTAH teams will provide practical coaching sessions for HNP detachments before deployment.

In a focus group organized by the evaluation team it was evident that there is good communication and willingness on both sides to slowly integrate the HNP into the management of local security issues, and that the HNP is making efforts to properly implement and resource the community policing methodology.

The Viva Rio methodology offers an entry point into communities where typically interventions had been difficult. In addition, this newer approach to community policing is included in the HNP Reform Strategy which is a priority of both MINUSTAH and the Haitian Government.

Finding 45:

Formal coordination in the Community Security Sector in Haiti appears to be lacking within the local and international community.

Among stakeholders involved in the community security sector in Haiti, there does not seem to be a common understanding and willingness to share a common methodology, operational objectives and guidance, or implementation and monitoring procedures. Despite over $40 million in programming, only recently, and under the management of OCHA, is a G10 donor working group being formed. The lack of harmonization among multiple stakeholder policies has led to a certain degree of confusion on the best practices to be deployed in community security, and lack of coordination with national authorities has led to some inefficiency (e.g., UNDP Community Security Project). There is evidence that the most dynamic models and initiatives relied on the quick implementation of Peace Dividends initiatives for the populations and areas concerned (Viva Rio, IOM, MINUSTAH). A comprehensive strategic review of the sector could generate lessons learned to support harmonization and coordination of investments.

6.3 Prison Sector

6.3.1 Context

The dilapidated state of the correctional system in Haiti is one of the most challenging issues that the country is facing.

Average floor space allocated per prisoners41
  • American Correctional Association Standard - 7.4 m² (80 ft²)
  • European average - 4.5 m²
  • Israel - 2.9 m²
  • Haiti National Penitentiary - 0.5 m2

According to data from the Haitian National Prison Authority (DAP, Département de l'Administration pénitencière) and corroborated by the report of the Secretary General (SG) of the UN to the Security Council,42 at 1 August 2008 there were 7,530 inmates in Haiti (of whom 325 are women) held in 17 prisons across the country. Conditions in Haitian prisons are inhumane: in the national penitentiary in Port-au- Prince, for example, 3,793 detainees occupy 1,995 m2 of living space, which is a little more than 0.5 m2 per prisoner, significantly below the international norm of 2.5 m2 per prisoner.

The National Prison Authority faces enormous challenges. Physical infrastructure is in a dilapidated state,43 overcrowding is endemic and the DAP is faced with increasing rate of incarceration, at a pace of 150 detainees/month. At this rate, it will require space for 16,000 detainees by 2012.

Prisoners are the forgotten elements in a long chain of priorities in the Haitian administration for at least three broad reasons:

  1. The last two centuries of Haitian politics have been dominated by military regimes. As such, prisoners have been the responsibility of the military forces and prisons have always been located inside military caserns. In addition, the local culture has easily associated prisoners with individuals to punish rather than individuals to rehabilitate.
  2. Affecting the correctional system in Haiti is the weakness of the judicial system. Haiti has 700 Magistrates, but this number would need to be practically double to address the trials pending. As a result, more than 83 percent of detainees nationwide continue to be held in pre-trial detention. This, in spite of the work of the Consultative Commission on Prolonged Pre-trial Detention, which recommended the release of 800 prisoners in the past year.44 The reopening of the School of Magistrates is still pending, although its overall curriculum and internal rules were finalized, and a training session for justices of the peace (the first to take place since 2004) began on 7 July 2008, with 25 participants, including two women.
  3. Haitian police officers are increasingly able to arrest criminals and delinquents, leading to an overcrowding of prisons. Ironically the increase in arrests of gang members and serious crime convictions risks further aggravating prison overcrowding. The most dangerous offenders are not separated from petty criminals for lack of space. And although the justice and police reforms could fail if prison infrastructure is not immediately improved, until recently neither donors nor the government had taken adequate account of the correctional element of security sector reform. The International Cooperation Framework of 2004 identified basic commitments, but the response has so far been minimal.

The National Prison Authority has made strong major inroads since 2007 and, based on testimonies of G-10 group representatives and our interviews with Senior Officials from the Authority, the prison sector is one of the sectors in Haiti where a clear vision has been shaped. A Strategic Plan (2007-2012) has been developed, complemented by a one-year Operational Plan (2008-2009). These plans focus on four dimensions of the corrections system, notably:

  • improvement of infrastructure;
  • procurement of necessary equipment;
  • training of personnel; and
  • enhanced treatment of detainees.

The Prison Working Group, in which START participates, is actively involved in supporting the Haitian government in implementing the Strategic Plan and the 2009 Action Plan. Although some progress has been made in the implementation of the plans, much remains to be done.

6.3.2 GPSF Programming in Support of the Prison Sector

As of September 2008, START, through the GPSF, had committee CND $4,149,637 in support of four projects in the prison sector. In the absence of data on disbursements for one of the Prison projects we can say nevertheless that the commitment to the Prison sector represents roughly 12 percent of all GPSF commitments since 2006.45 These projects, the quantum of funds in support thereof, the implementing agency, disbursements to date, and current status, are summarized in Exhibit 6.4.

Exhibit 6.4 GPSF Projects in the Prison Sector46

Table 5: GPSF Projects in the Prison Sector
Project TitleImplementing PartnerCommitment $CNDDisbursedStatus
Total $4,149,637$2,641,426  
1 As of 4 April 2008, other disbursements were planned for the year but there is no evidence they were made.
Placement of Canadian Corrections Officers with MINUSTAHCANADEM$640,745$632,396Closed
Deployment of Correctional Service Canada (CSC) Officers to MINUSTAHCANADEM$1,919,663$892,7851On-going
Renovation of the Cap Hatien Prison, Phase IPADF$89,229$89,229 Closed
Improving detention conditions and prospects for reintegration at the Cap Haitien Prison, Phase IIPADF$1,500,000$1,027,016On-going

Placement of Canadian Corrections Officers with MINUSTAH - $640,745 (Committed) - Project Number 06-219

The objective of this project were to recruit, train and deploy eight corrections officers to MINUSTAH to work as consultants with penal authorities in Haiti in the implementation of MINUSTAH and Haiti's prison support program. Key activities included training and mentoring of Haitian corrections personnel to ensure they uphold ethical and human rights standards in the exercise of their duties, and strategic briefings about benchmarks to ensure that the Canadian corrections officers are as effective as possible. One week prior to the deployment, DFAIT was informed by CSC that it would not be granted the leaves of its serving corrections officers (which numbered five of the eight corrections officers recruited by CANDEM for this project). As such, four CSC officers withdrew from the project, and one CSC officer decided to take early retirement in order to participate. In the end, four officers, rather than eight, were deployed to MINUSTAH as part of this project. This project was implemented by CANADEM from 7 March 2007 to 31 May 2008. A two month extension was approved in order to allow a debrief of officers and fill critical gaps in rotation.

Deployment of Correctional Service Canada Officers to MINUSTAH - $1,919,663 (Committed) - Project Number 07-012

This project aimed to increase the capacity of the Haitian prison system through the deployment of eight CSC officers to MINUSTAH. Keys activities included: advising and mentoring national prisons/corrections personnel in all aspects of correctional management including the redevelopment of the prison system infrastructure. Other activities include: supporting assessments of the needs of the prison system; contributing to the development of bilateral aid proposals; and supporting the development and implementation of training initiatives, including a national training framework and programs for prison staff. This project is being implemented by CSC over the two year period from July 2007 to July 2009.

Renovation of the Cap Haitien prison, Phase I - $89,229 (Committed) - Project Number 07-024

The mandate of this quick impact project was to refurbish four cells in Cap Haitien Prison in order to segregate men, women and minors. This project, implemented by the Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF) began on 1 September 2007 and ended on 1 March 2008.

Cap Haitien Prison Rehabilitation, Phase II - $1.5 million (Committed) - Project Number 07-181

This project, entirely financed by GPSF, is intended to improve detention conditions in the Cap-Haitian prison through refurbishment and expansion of prison facilities and improved treatment of the detainees. Keys activities include the rehabilitation of 11 cells and addition of 8 new cells; rehabilitation of water system and sanitary block; security walls; and creation of a common area for training and other programs for prisoners; provision of equipment to the kitchen and the infirmary; provision of support to prisoners through implementation of social programs provided by civil society groups. This project is being implemented by the Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF) from May 2008 to October 2009 following an amendment to the Contribution Agreement with PADF.

6.3.3 Relevance

Finding 46:

The GPSF has aligned its activities with the priorities identified by the National Prison Authority and these activities are appreciated and valued.

As remarked earlier, the ICF of 2004 identified basic commitments to prison reform but the response had been minimal. Canada has been one of the few donors to invest in construction, maintenance and modernization of prisons in Haiti. The GPSF portfolio of projects in the prison sector is closely aligned with the four priorities of the DAP's Strategic Plan identified above (infrastructure, equipment, training, and treatment of prisoners). The GPSF program has invested close to $3.0 million in the prison sector, focusing first on infrastructure rehabilitation. START rehabilitated the Cap Haitien prison, building four new cells and refurbishing some of the common areas. A phase II for the Cap Haitien prison is planned, but START is also engaged in a $1.5 million Phase II of the Cap Haitien prison which will include building of sanitary areas, training / literacy centre, improved kitchen areas, and will allow the separation of male teenage inmates from adults.

These efforts reinforce the GoH's overall efforts to address the unsustainable situation. In Port-au-Prince, where overcrowding is most acute, START is about to approve a multi-million dollar project aimed at constructing a prison at Croix des Bouquets near Port-au-Prince. Further progress in this area is essential, and will depend on the provision of bilateral funds and on prioritization by the Haitian leadership.

START has invested in strengthening the capacities of correction officers (including administrators of detention centres, prison guards, clerks), which, according to the Director of the DAP, is a necessity that the GoH has just begun to address. The staffing of the prison system was increased by about 50 percent, with the graduation in July 2008 of 227 new corrections officers. These officers, the first to be trained since 2001, bring the staffing of the corrections system to 742 which represents a ratio of approximately one staff member per 10 inmates, a figure that still falls far short of international standards.

The operational support and capacity development provided by START in Haiti consisted of formal training with a curriculum that was developed by and for Haitian correction officers. Mentoring, coaching and problem-solving with prison guards were planned but, as will be discussed in the following section, this aspect of the project work was less successful. Canada is a key participant in the Working Group on Prisons, a sector where other donors have been noticeably absent. Some respondents interviewed in Haiti have argued that the international community isn't interested in prisons, preferring to build hospitals or schools.

Reported Results - Prison Infrastructure

Better quality and space per prisoner

Signal to other donors that the prison sector is worth investing in

Signal to the Haitian population that some quick results are being achieved - thus gradually increasing the average citizen's level of trust towards the correctional reform

Increased dignity of prisoners

Sources: Summary of interviews and focus groups with stakeholders

6.3.4 Results

Finding 47:

In the prison sector, GPSF infrastructure projects have led to positive results.

Among the infrastructure projects completed in the prison sector, expected results have been achieved and Haitian authorities and direct beneficiaries are reporting a high level of satisfaction with the outputs and the approach put forward by the Canadians.

The physical infrastructure rehabilitation of the Cap Haitien prison was a modest project of less than $400,000 which allowed for the construction of four new cells and the refurbishment of some common areas (painting of hallways, cleaning staircase, etc.). Visits to Cap Haitien prison confirmed significant improvement of the infrastructure as compared to existing cells, although the new cells were as crowded as the old cells given the escalating number of arrests.

Not surprisingly, a project of such modest size has led to modest improvements in the life of detainees. However, these efforts are seen by all as a step towards a better future anchored in the Phase II of the project that began in November 2008.

While in Haiti, the evaluation team had an opportunity to meet with the PADF implementation team and with the contractors who were awarded the construction contract for Phase II. Phase II of the Cap Haitien rehabilitation is a promising project with plans based on the principle that prisoners deserve to be detained with dignity while minimizing risks of physical and sexual assaults, abuse of minors, and health issues. Phase II will triple the space allocated to each inmate, build a separate building to detain minors, use building materials that will diminish the dampness of the cells, and will include three distinct new areas: a small library, a training centre, a dispensary. Although modest, these additions will transform the prison into a rehabilitation centre - whereas up until now the prison played essentially a detention function. The Administrator in charge of the prison sees these changes as a major step forward, while recognizing that if the number of inmates continues to increase these efforts will have limited effects.

Finding 48:

The Cap Haitien prison projects (Phase I and II) have had a multiplier effect since many donors are now interested in investing in this sector.

Since the completion of the Cap Haitien Prison rehabilitation, other donors (including USAID, START, the EU and Norway) have indicated their willingness to support the rehabilitation of existing prisons and the construction of four new prisons. START will support the construction of the Croix des Bouquets, located slightly outside of Port-au-Prince. At this stage, the GoC has created a momentum among the G-10 in a sector where the needs are great, the seriousness of the GoH to tackle the issues is real, and the plan for action is clear.

Finding 49:

GPSF operational support and capacity development projects have met their intended objectives in terms of the number of officers deployed. Intended training to Haitian correctional officers was limited due to distance between various prisons.

GPSF's involvement in Haiti's prisons, and indeed the very security and stability of the country, goes beyond the physical infrastructure. Through the Canadian contribution of about 110 civilian personnel and soldiers to MINUSTAH, GPSF is providing operational support and capacity development to Haitian correctional staff.

Reported results - Operational Support and Capacity Development

Positive results:
  • Increased value given to the profession
  • Better treatment of prisoners
  • Dignity of prisoners
Limitations:
  • Lack of resources (insufficient number of officers deployed given the number of prisons)
  • Local culture which is not supportive of a rehabilitation approach to Correction

Source: interviews with CSC officers posted in Haiti

Eight serving and retired officers from Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) are working with Haitian correction officers on the challenging job of humanizing the country's wretched prison system. Interviews with these officers suggest that the engagement of START in operational support and capacity development is crucial. The eight officers are part of a 16 officer team, deployed across the country. Their roles and responsibilities include the development and delivery of formal training, as well as ongoing daily supervision, mentoring, and coaching of Haitian correction officers.

The training provided through START has been well received. Its content was developed by Haitians - coincidentally correction officers trained by Canada between 1995 and 2001, which supports the notion that this training has been sustainable - and is jointly delivered by Haitian and Canadian correction officers. Although the officers interviewed complained about the absence of adequate training facilities, overall the training was and continues to be a good return on the investment.

Canadian officers responsible for mentoring and coaching their Haitian counterparts have reported a lesser degree of success. Although the needs are great and the collaboration with the Haitian officers is generally positive, CSC officers deployed in Haiti have only been able to fulfill their mentoring role in a partial way, often describing it as essentially a supervisory role. A couple of factors were cited for these limited results:

  • On average each officer has to travel 3-4 hours to get to a given prison, thus spending at best a couple of hours with local staff before heading back. In such a short period of time, coaching or mentoring is nearly impossible and the job performed is reduced to a supervisory function.
  • UN mission in Haiti is not an "executive" one, meaning that UN staff can make suggestions but cannot give orders. Ultimate responsibility rests with their Haitian counterparts. As such, real change can only occur if the local officers truly wish to change their behavior.

For me the training received as a clerk is very useful. As a result of learning with the Canadians I am able to maintain more accurate records of detainees and also understanding what should and should not be recorded.

Working with the Canadian officers has been beneficial for me because I took this job because there was nothing else to do. I know now that this is a real profession (…) however, it is sometimes difficult to apply what (the Canadians) they teach us because we don't think like they do and sometimes it is difficult to apply in Haitian prisons what they suggest

Source: Representative comments from interviews with Haitian correction officers (translated from Creole)

In summary, although the deployment of Corrections Officers is in itself a good initiative, it is a slow and long-term process which requires significant and long-term investment. The oversight role is an important one, but there have been few opportunities for real mentoring. Officers also mentioned specific needs which could greatly enhance the effectiveness of their daily work, for instance the assistance of an architect specialized in prison construction, the deployment of health, education and vocational training experts, as well as more adequate and dedicated space to deliver the training. START is investigating options for deploying CSC corrections experts with specific subject matter expertise and exploring the possibility of bilateral mechanisms to deploy officers for longer periods in direct support of Canadian investments in the prison sector.

6.3.5 Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness

Finding 50:

In the prison sector, START and PADF have worked well together and their collaboration has supported an efficient project implementation.

As national and international NGOs are increasingly important as intermediaries between international development assistance agencies and the Haitian government, START has found a true match in its partnership with PADF. PADF has a long experience in creating public-private partnerships to assist the least advantaged people in Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the key success factors of PADF's collaboration with START and the GoH is its approach to engaging the GoH and private contracting firms towards a common project.

Stakeholders interviewed used two key words to describe the approach used by START and PADF:47 participation and empowerment, two key themes of the project's process and outputs. The rehabilitation of the Cap Haitien prisons was done through a transparent process of call for tenders, and the selection of a local Cap Haitien firm increased the credibility of the process.48 As such, the rehabilitation of the Cap Haitien project led not only to its intended outputs but also initiated a process leading to sustainable results in the sector and a second phase in which tangible benefits can be expected.

The collaboration between START and PADF was based on a participatory management structure and durable relations with the GoH and the private sector community. One should note that in spite of the volatility of the political and economic environment, the project was completed within budget and within the planned time frame. Some suggestions for improvement were noted. For instance, there is a need for greater oversight of contracts given the size of future contracts.

Finding 51:

Canadian corrections officers conveyed some frustration over conditions relating to their deployments that are reputed to adversely impact on morale and performance.

As remarked in section 6.3.4 of this report, Canadian corrections officers deployed to Haiti have, in large measure owing to the wide geographic areas they are obliged to service, been unable to perform some of the roles that were expected of them, which has adversely affected morale. Corrections officers further conveyed frustration over the lack of decision making authority they are able to exercise with respect to the work they perform. Like Canadian police officers deployed to Haiti, deployed corrections officers are subject to MINUSTAH directives that may not fully exploit the competencies of CSC personnel.

Another factor reported to adversely impact on the morale and performance of corrections officers is the different benefits accorded to them against those reputed to be enjoyed by the RCMP. RCMP officers deployed in support of MINUSTAH are reported to enjoy both Foreign Service Directive (FSD) 58 benefits as well as United Nation Mission Substance Allowances (MSA) benefits whereas corrections officers receive only the latter. The matter of parity in benefits has been raised with DFAIT, though a resolution of this issue remains outstanding.

6.4 Border Security

6.4.1 Context

Haiti's borders consist of 1,811 kilometers of coastline and a 362 kilometer frontier shared with the Dominican Republic (DR). Decades of political turmoil combined with a decline in state resources committed to border management have seriously undermined GoH's ability to secure and supervise its own frontiers. Law enforcement authorities charged with security and customs control find themselves bereft of virtually all of the basic resources and tools needed to effectively execute their mandates, thus rendering Haiti's borders and border communities highly vulnerable to unauthorized infiltration and cross-border crime.

Haiti's largely unsupervised borders, weak judicial infrastructure, and reported high susceptibility to corruption,49 has rendered Haiti the favoured transit point in the Caribbean for drug traffickers.50 Haiti has also become both a destination and transit point in the illicit trade in weapons. Most of the estimated 170,000 illegal weapons in circulation in Haiti are smuggled into the country through its porous land and sea borders.51 These weapons empower criminal elements within the society who in turn pose a direct challenge to state authority.

Haiti's weak capacity to control its borders has further rendered it a source, transit, and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for purposes of commercial and sexual exploitation. The Organization for American States (OAS) estimates that up to 30,000 children a year are smuggled into the DR where they are forced to work for little or no wages or as child prostitutes.52 The largely unrestricted flow of Haitian migrants seeking to escape the poverty of their homeland to the DR and other Caribbean countries has further contributed to tensions between Haiti and its neighbours, thereby threatening the stability of the region as whole.53

Furthermore, it is estimated that inadequate customs controls result in an annual loss of customs revenue to the GoH in the order of US $200 to $240 million. Losses of this magnitude seriously weaken the state's capacity to provide basic services to its citizens, hinder access to international credit, encourage corruption, and perpetuate Haiti's dependence on foreign aid to balance its budget, all outcomes which undermine the authority of Haiti's fledgling democracy.

Recognizing the untenable state of Haiti's border management infrastructure, the GoH created, in 2001, a Presidential Commission on Border Development (hereinafter the Commission) under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. Although originally created by presidential decree to manage a fund for border development, which never came to fruition,54 the Commission has since focused attention on establishing a framework for improved coordination and cooperation among relevant stakeholders, first among line ministries within the GoH, and secondly among the international donor community.

Notwithstanding that the Commission has been in existence for some seven years, progress in forging an integrated approach to border development and management has been slow, frustrated in large measure by the absence of a legal framework to effect cooperation among relevant line ministries within the GoH and a historical lack of donor interest in this sector. Recent developments, however, provide cause for optimism. The establishment of a Border Management Working Group by the Commission in November 2007 provided a much needed forum around which donors could convene and discuss approaches and contributions to address Haiti's pressing border needs.

The change in MINUSTAH's mandate in October 2007 to include border patrols, effected in large measure by Canadian diplomatic efforts, also significantly increased the profile and importance of Haiti's borders and its challenges.55 In March 2008, in response to this new mandate, MINUSTAH created a Border Task Force chaired by the principal deputy special representative of the UN Secretary General. Together with MINUSTAH's political affairs, police, military, civil affairs, logistics and administrative divisions, the Border Task Force began to develop its own internal border management strategy in support of the Commission. This strategy included the development of a legal and policy framework for integrated border management which, at the time of the field mission, was reported to be near completion.

A further recent development is the expected creation of the Conseil National de Coordination et de Gestion de la Frontière (National Council for Border Coordination and Integration), which will replace the Commission. The mandate of this new ministerial-level body is broader than that of the Commission, encompassing border development writ large, and will include all specialized agencies working on the border, such as the HNP, the Autorité Portuaire Nationale (National Port Authority), the Autorité Aéroportuaire Nationale (National Airport Authority), the Administration Générale des Douanes (General Customs Administration) as well representation from Haiti's immigration, agriculture, public health, and transport authorities.

At the time of the field mission, the evaluation team was presented with a border development plan, entitled Priorités d'Interventions de la Commission de Développement Frontalier, developed by the Commission. The document outlines an ambitious agenda, including not only the rehabilitation of Haiti's existing four official border posts, but also a plan to develop the transportation and telecommunications infrastructure both within and between these posts. The plan also includes a community economic development component, focusing on the provision of services in support of health, education, and local business development. To this end, the plan calls for the creation of a Fond Développement Frontalier (FDF), an incarnation of the original border development fund envisaged for the Commission in 2001.

6.4.2 GPSF Programming in Support of Border Security

As of November 2008, START, through the GPSF, had disbursed CND $8,609,803.00 in support of six projects in the border security sector, accounting for roughly a third of all GPSF disbursements to Haiti since 2006.56 These projects, the quantum of funds in support thereof, the implementing agency, disbursements to date, and current status, are summarized in Exhibit 6.5.

Exhibit 6.5 GPSF Projects in the Border Security Sector

Table 6: GPSF Projects in the Border Security Sector
Project TitleImplementing PartnerCommitment CND$Disbursed CND$Status
Total $12,807,121$8,609,803 
Seminar on Human TraffickingOAS$41,007$36,557Closed
Counter Trafficking in PersonsIOM369, 928$396,928Closed
Capacity Building in Migration ManagementIOM$2,472,705$2,472,705Closed
Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative, Phase 1PADF$2,400,000$2,250,065On-going
Refurbishment of Facilities at MalpasseIOM$503,431$453,548Closed
HNP Coast Guard Base - South DepartmentUNDP$7,020,050$3,000,000On-going

Most of the aforementioned projects are a mix of physical infrastructure development and rehabilitation, equipment supply, technical assistance, and training components. A brief description of each project is presented below.

Seminar on Human Trafficking - $ 41,007 (Committed) - Project Number 57

This seminar, which was organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) in conjunction with the IOM, brought together GoH officials from Haiti's security forces; the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Social Affairs, and Women's Affairs; as well as representatives from Haitian civil society, to discuss human rights, best practices, and national and international legal frameworks related to trafficking in persons.

Counter-Trafficking in Persons - $ 369, 928 (Committed) - Project Number 06-269

This initiative, which focused on the development of a new law that would render trafficking of persons a criminal offence, was complemented by the provision of training to police, judicial, and immigration officers on counter-trafficking techniques and the provision of equipment in support thereof. The project further supported dialogue between the GoH and the GoDR and regional countries on issues related to human trafficking.

Capacity Building in Migration Management - $2,472,705 (Committed) - Project Number 07-279

The Capacity Building in Migration Management project involved a review of Haiti's legislative and policy frameworks with respect to migration management along with the refurbishment of immigration check points, the provision of equipment (telecommunications, vehicles, power generators, information technology, travel document scanning equipment), and training in the use of the foregoing in 12 ports of entry.58 Vocational training (human resource management, performance management, negotiations, airport security, and security systems management) was also provided to personnel within the Technical Support Unit (TSU) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Centre of Information and Joint Coordination (CICC), and the Ministry of Immigration. This project also supported the hosting of two regional conferences, the first of their kind, on travel document fraud and visa policy and security measures.59

Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative, Phase 1 - $2,400,000 (Committed) - Project Number 06-287

The Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative, Phase 1 involved the reconstruction of a border post and the construction of a shelter and processing centre for repatriated migrants in the border community of Belladère. In addition to physical infrastructure, the project includes training of border officials on human rights, as well as a public awareness program designed to educate municipal governments and communities on both sides of the border on migration issues and migrant rights.

Rehabilitation of the Border Post in Malpasse - $503,431 (Committed) - Project Number 08-019

The Rehabilitation of the Border Post in Malpasse project involved the reconstruction of an abandoned facility at the border post and the construction of a bypass route and parking lot to divert commercial traffic from the main road jointing Haiti to the DR.

HNP Coast Guard Base - South Department - $7,020,050 (Committed) - Project Number 07-026

This project is the first phase of a two-phase $10 million initiative, implemented by UNDP, aimed at improving the infrastructure, coverage, and public image of HNP, by providing the HNP Coast Guard with a new base in Les Cayes and improving regulation of Haiti's customs and borders, which will support trade activities in the region. Phase I involves the construction of a seaport and HNP Coast Guard base in the Southern Department of Les Cayes between March 2008 and July 2009. Phase II includes the procurement and provision of 5 naval vessels at the approximate cost of CND $3 million to enhance security and surveillance capabilities of the HNP contingent assigned to the post.60 This project is part of a project aiming at deploying MINUSTAH and HNP personnel to the ten principal ports of the country. The assignment of new HNP officers to the boats of the MINUSTAH is scheduled to take place when they graduate in early 2009.

6.4.3 Relevance

Finding 52:

GPSF programming in the border sector is responsive to a material and pressing need for stabilization which has been identified and affirmed by both the GoH and now the broader international community.

The GPSF's suite of interventions in support of the border sector in Haiti is highly relevant to the country's overall stabilization and reconstruction program. As stated at the outset of this chapter, Haiti's long neglected and dilapidated border infrastructure renders the country acutely vulnerable to drug trafficking, smuggling, and other illegal and predacious activities that undermine the authority of the state and deprive the same of much needed revenue. The GoH for its part has openly acknowledged the link between the country's largely unprotected borders, organized crime, community violence, and corruption61 and has, accordingly, identified border rehabilitation as a key element in its security system reform strategy.62

The UN Security Council Resolution 1743 in October 2007, wherein donors were requested to assist the Haitian government in addressing cross-border illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, has done much to raise the profile of Haiti's enormous border management challenges, the threat Haiti's fragile borders pose to both its own security and stability and that of the security and stability of its neighbours, and the pressing need for the international donor community to rally to meet those challenges. In short, GPSF support to the border sector is consistent with and supportive of the priorities of both the GoH and now the broader international community.

Regarding GPSF's choice of interventions in support of this sector and their respective designs, they too align well with the priorities of the GoH and the international community. For example, the document produced by the Commission cited earlier entitled the Priorités d'Interventions de la Commission de Développement Frontalier, clearly identifies the refurbishment of the physical infrastructure in Haiti's four official border posts as a top priority. Four of the five projects supported by the GPSF involve significant physical infrastructure development components, two of which respond to the infrastructure development needs of two of the border posts identified by the Commission for immediate attention.63

The document alluded to above further remarks on the need to complement physical infrastructure development with the provision of technical assistance, equipment, and training to render the facilities identified for refurbishment operational. Again, barring the project in Malpasse (which is strictly a physical infrastructure initiative), the projects that have been supported by the GPSF include equipment, technical assistance, and training components. The incorporation of these components into the design of these projects not only responds to urgent needs, but establishes the basic preconditions for operational effectiveness.

Another highly significant component of START's strategy of engagement in this sector is the emphasis placed on the regional dimensions of the problem. Combating the illicit trafficking in goods, narcotics, and people, and the role these activities play in feeding corruption, cannot be effectively waged without improved cooperation between Haiti and its neighbours. Absent such cooperation, the efforts of the GoH and MINUSTAH will almost certainly fail.64 In this regard, START's support to the Counter Trafficking in Persons and Capacity Building in Migration Management projects, both of which involved the hosting of international meetings, the former between the GoH and the GoDR on human trafficking issues, and the latter between the GoH and four other Caribbean countries on travel document issues, is highly relevant to the overall stabilization effort.

Finding 53:

GPSF programming in the border sector is consistent with and supportive of the GoC's interests in and priorities for Haiti and the region as a whole.

Being situated within the Americas, Haiti is among the three geographic priorities identified by the GoC for DFAIT support. More specifically, Canada's strategy for the Americas calls for a "pro-active engagement with the Caribbean to promote stability" and expressly identifies Haiti as an important country impacting on the security and stability of the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

As noted throughout this chapter, Haiti's largely unsupervised borders, and the criminality associated therewith, constitutes a direct threat to both its immediate and more distant neighbours.65 Indeed, during a visit to Haiti in February 2008, the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressly identified border reform as integral to the stabilization efforts of Canada and the international community in the country, and reconfirmed Canada's commitment to those efforts. GPSF support to the border sector is evidence of that commitment as well as evidence that GPSF investments are aligned with a declared GoC priority.

GPSF support to the border sector in Haiti also reinforces another on-going departmental priority: that of advancing the principles of freedom, security, the rule of law, and human rights. All of the projects supported by the GPSF in the border sector are expressly designed to enhance security and, in doing so, freedom from the threat of criminality associated with a lack of security. Moreover, GPSF support to the development of legislation, policy and doctrine in accordance with international norms pertaining to border management and migration contributes to strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights. In this regard, GPSF support to the Counter-Trafficking in Persons project and the Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative warrants particular mention.

Finding 54:

Canada has adopted a whole-of-government approach to programming in the border sector which responds to most of the priorities expressed in the annual plans on Border management developed by the GoH.

START's primary GoC partner in the border sector in Haiti is CIDA, which has assumed responsibility for programming in support of customs and taxes - a serious capacity deficit which, as noted at the outset of this chapter, currently deprives the GoH of vital revenue it needs to finance its ambitious security system reform agenda.66 CIDA programming in this domain, focused primarily on support to the customs administration, thus neatly complements, and indirectly supports, the programming of START, as does START's programming in this sector complement, and indirectly support, CIDA programming.67 This is solid evidence of whole-of-government coordination, as well evidence of the benefits of synergistic programming.

Notwithstanding the above, the GoH's border development plan envisages not just the refurbishment of border management facilities, but a plan to refurbish and develop the physical and institutional infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecommunications, access to potable water, sanitation, as well access to other essential services, such health and education) of the communities around these border posts. The plan further envisages the provision of economic and business development assistance to border populations.

The emphasis the GoH has placed on community and local economic development in its border development plan is not without merit. It is the poverty of these border communities, and the despair associated therewith, which encourages people along the frontier to engage in criminal activity, in particular smuggling, which is a primary source of employment and revenue for border populations. As remarked by the ICG in a recent publication, Haitian "authorities need to make greater efforts to establish a permanent state presence in the border areas and encourage alternative income generating projects, in agriculture production and tourism."68 Without such investments, Haiti's borders will never be fully secure, irrespective of the existence of a more robust security presence along its frontiers.

Interventions in support of community and local economic development fall squarely within the mandate of CIDA. While CIDA investments in public health, education, agriculture, transport, energy, and business development in Haiti are substantial, investments in these sectors are reported to be light in the border regions, particularly around those border posts indentified by the GoH as priorities for development.

No single donor, of course, can afford to be at all places at all times - hard choices must be made - but it is significant that the GoH sees the apparent lack of donor investment in community and local economic development in the border regions as a gap in programming which urgently needs to be addressed. Notwithstanding that CIDA is represented at the Border Management Working Group, its participation in this forum is alleged to be confined to customs, which the GoH sees as a missed opportunity for Canada.

6.4.4 Results

Finding 55:

GPSF interventions in support of the border sector have contributed and continue to contribute to laying the foundations for border rehabilitation and future development.

GPSF results cannot be assessed fairly without reference to the limitations of its mandate. START cannot, and should not, be held accountable for any failure to achieve higher-end goals, such as bringing stability and prosperity to a country, within some arbitrarily established time frame. The requisite elements to achieve end states of this order are simply beyond the control of any one donor, much less a project or suite of projects. At best, one can assess the contributions of interventions towards these end states.

It is also well understood and accepted by stakeholders that Haiti's journey to recovery and stability will take many years (perhaps decades) and this may very well be true for the rehabilitation of Haiti's borders and border communities. GPSF interventions are intended to be of a quick impact nature, with expected catalytic spin-off results, and it is against this criterion that success ought to be measured and judged.

As noted in the preceding section, projects supported by the GPSF in the border sector have been targeted and designed to address urgent capacity deficits (including policy, legislative and doctrinal deficits, physical infrastructure deficits, equipment deficits, and human resource/training deficits) identified by the GoH and its international partners. These interventions, as defined in the Envelope Concept Paper: Results-Based Performance Framework, are expected to "increase the capacity of Haiti's border management services to provide security and services along Haiti's land and maritime borders."69

At the time of this evaluation three of the six projects supported by the GPSF in the border sector (Seminar on Human Trafficking, Counter-Trafficking in Persons, and Capacity Building in Migration Management) had been completed, with another two projects close to completion (Refurbishment of the Facilities at Malpasse, and the Haitian Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative, Phase 1). The HNP Coast Guard Base - South Department project is currently at an early stage of implementation.

Based on a review of project outputs to date, both documented and obtained from interviews with partners, all are contributing to an enhanced GoH capacity "to provide security and services along Haiti's….borders." Haiti's migration and human trafficking challenges, for example, cannot be addressed absent a legislative and policy mandate. GoH officials charged with enforcing the law cannot do so absent adequate doctrinal and operational instruction any more than they can do so absent adequate physical shelter, equipment, and training in the use thereof. Nor can Haiti's border challenges be addressed absent the cooperation of its neighbours. GPSF interventions are addressing all these deficits.

Project outputs are varied and numerous and include, among others, a comprehensive review and needs assessment of Haiti's 22 ports of entry; a draft law on counter-trafficking; a review, complete with recommendations for revision, of Haiti's immigration legislation; the establishment of an Anti-trafficking Investigation Unit with the HNP; the development of policies and procedural manuals for GoH personnel on counter trafficking of persons and document fraud detection; the provision of vocational training to 130 mid-management level officials within the Ministry of the Interior; the refurbishment of 13 immigration checkpoints, along with the refurbishment of the border complexes at Malpasse and Belladair; the provision of equipment (vehicles, radio communications, power generators, computers, and document scanning instruments) to many of Haiti's ports of entry; and, the hosting of two regional consultations meetings on visa security and travel document fraud.

The aforementioned outputs, which are by no means exhaustive of all the outputs generated by these projects, are, in the least, powerful enablers in the sense that they lay the foundations for institutional and operational capacity development. In this respect, GPSF interventions in support of the border sector can be said to have contributed in a tangible way to the enhancement of Haiti's capacity to provide security and services along its borders.

Finding 56:

START's interventions in support of the border sector in Haiti are highly regarded and appreciated by stakeholders.

Interviews conducted during the field mission with senior GoH officials involved with border management confirmed a high level of satisfaction with the support that START has provided to the sector, remarking specifically on the importance START has placed on ensuring that projects selected are aligned with GoH priorities, the role it has performed in fostering donor coordination, and the speed with which it has been able to disburse resources. These remarks were echoed by implementing partners and other bilateral donors engaged in the sector.

The evaluation team also observed a high level of satisfaction among direct beneficiaries with the outputs generated by the projects supported by START. During the field mission the evaluation team had an opportunity to speak with GoH officials on-site as well as with a sample of people from the communities directly affected by the projects supported by START.70 In Cap Haitien, the evaluation team was shown the new equipment (power generators, radio-communications, vehicles, etc.) furnished by the GPSF, and now being used by local officials, which, in the words of one senior official at the Ministry of Immigration, "enables us to act." Discussions with immigration officers in receipt of equipment and training in document fraud detection, again courtesy of the GPSF, similarly remarked on their enhanced capacity to execute their jobs more efficiently and effectively, evidenced by a reported increase in the level of document fraud detection.

Local immigration officers interviewed during the visit to Malpasse conveyed not only their appreciation for the new facility, which will relieve traffic congestion and enhance their capacity to regulate the flow of people and goods crossing the frontier, but also remarked on the positive impact the new facility has already had on morale. The new facility is in short a source of pride, not only to the border officials who will soon occupy the facility, but to the community at large. Although anecdotal in nature, remarks of this kind provide some indication of the positive impacts being generated by START's intervention in this sector.

Finding 57:

The achievement of immediate and intermediate outcomes is dependent on a range of factors outside the control of any given project authority.

As relevant as START's projects are to the border sector, the achievement of both immediate and intermediate outcomes is dependent on a host of capacity deficits being addressed which are beyond the control of any particular donor. The new border facility in Malpasse is a case in point. Although construction of the facility itself is, for all practical purposes, completed, thus fulfilling START's commitments to the project, rendering the facility operational will depend of the provision of other infrastructure components (water and sewage, road reconstruction, telecommunications and transportation equipment, etc).71

Even were the aforementioned components provided, the entire investment is at risk owing to the rising waters of Lake Azuei which lies adjacent to the border post at Malpasse.72 Water levels in Lake Azuei were once regulated by two nearby canals which, following years of neglect, have become clogged with sediment and trash. Dredging these canals, which would facilitate drainage, is an urgent necessity lest the border post, along with START's investment in its refurbishment, be lost. The GoH is reported to have earmarked US $2 million to this endeavour, although completing the task will take many more millions which will have to come from donors.

Though a dramatic example of how the positive impacts of an otherwise excellent project can be placed at risk, the principle that immediate and intermediate outcomes of interventions can be held hostage to or derailed by factors exogenous to the project is by no means unique to Malpasse. Operational effectiveness of virtually all START's investments in the border sector is contingent on a variety of capacity deficits being addressed.

For example, one of the indicators of progress in START's Results-Based Performance Framework for Haiti is evidence of "cooperation between border agencies along the frontier." Physical infrastructure projects, like those in Malpasse and Belladère, certainly facilitate and contribute to this outcome, as do the supply of communications and transportation equipment, but cooperation is ultimately dependent on a legislative and institutional framework being in place to both encourage and compel inter-ministerial cooperation - a framework which is currently in the nascent phase of development.73

The lesson of Malpasse and other projects supported by the GPSF further highlights the critical importance of donor coordination in this sector. No single donor, much less a project, can hope to realize its goals without the complementary inputs of other partners. On this score, recent developments, in particular the constitution of the Border Management Working Group, are encouraging. However absent a comprehensive multi-year strategy for border development, which the ICG has identified as an urgent necessity, it will be difficult for donors to align programming with GoH priorities.74

Finding 58:

START has demonstrated leadership in the border sector in Haiti and has attracted interest and resources to the sector.

START, through its representative in the UN, lobbied forcefully for the expansion of MINUSTAH's mandate to include borders, which, as stated earlier, has had a significant impact on raising the profile of Haiti's border challenges. While the US has assumed the lead in rehabilitating Haiti's maritime borders, Canada has successfully carved out a niche for itself in the rehabilitation of Haiti's land borders.75 In recognition of the leadership that START has demonstrated in the rehabilitation of Haiti's land borders, and in supporting dialogue between the GoH and its neighbours on border management issues, it was awarded the position of chair of the Border Management Working Group.

Over the last two years, Haiti has witnessed an increase in donor interest in and commitment of donor resources to the border sector. There are now four bilateral donors represented at the Border Management Working Group, with other donors conveying an interest in participating. These developments can, in no small measure, be attributed to the efforts of START. In short, START can legitimately claim to have performed a catalytic role in this sector.

6.4.5 Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

Finding 59:

GPSF projects in the border sector have been implemented, for the most part, in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

At the level of project implementation, the evaluation issue of efficiency and cost-effectiveness really speaks to the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of START's implementing partners, of which there are three in the border sector: IOM, PADF, and the UNDP. As regards the IOM, which has had stewardship of three of the five projects supported by the GPSF in the border sector, their performance has been nothing short of exemplary. Both the Counter Trafficking in Persons and the Capacity Building in Migration Management projects were executed within budget, with all outputs delivered on schedule.

In the case of the Refurbishment of Facilities at Malpasse, the facility and adjacent parking lot was constructed on time and below budget - a feat all the more remarkable given that the new facility and parking lot include features which were not budgeted for in the original project design.76 IOM has established something of a best practice with respect to contract management, mitigating risk by engaging a plurality of contractors on any particular project. Although this approach increases transaction costs, it is an approach which has nonetheless proven efficient and cost-effective in the context of Haiti where reliable contractors on construction projects are in short supply.

In contrast to the projects administered by the IOM, the Border Stabilization and Human Rights Initiative project, administered by PADF, has suffered significant delays in implementation as well as cost overruns. Originally scheduled to be completed in March 2008, the end-date for this project has been extended to February 2009. At the time of the field mission in November 2008, the new facility in Belladère was reported to be only 50% complete, with a request for an additional CND $500,000 in order to deliver on outputs not envisaged in the original project proposal.77 PADF is reported to have had significant problems with its contractors as well as some disagreement with the Commission.

As regards the HNP Coast Guard Base-South Department, which is administered by the UNDP, it too has suffered delays in implementation, owing to challenges in establishing legal title to the land on which the facility will be built, and the impact of hurricanes which have disrupted construction.

Finding 60:

START has adopted a risk mitigation approach to project implementation which holds promise.

As remarked earlier in the chapter, START has made great efforts to ensure that its projects in the border sector are aligned with GoH priorities and that there is adequate GoH buy-in. Although a cardinal principle in programming in fragile states, it is a principle more frequently "honoured in the breach than in the observance," often with serious consequences for project implementation. Many donor projects, even well designed projects, have met their demise due to inadequate consultations with local authorities. While relations between START's implementing partners and the GoH have not been without incident - PADF and the Commission is a case in point - relations have for the most part been good, thus satisfying an important precondition for smooth and effective implementation.

Another challenge facing donors is the paucity of reliable implementing partners. There are simply very few local and international implementing agencies with a proven track record in Haiti, particularly in the area of infrastructure development which constitutes a significant component of GPSF programming in the border sector. START has obtained excellent results from IOM, but IOM's capacity to absorb more projects may be reaching its limits, thus compelling START, as well as other donors, to chance partnerships with less seasoned and tested implementing agencies.78 In an effort to diversify its implementing partners, and thus mitigate risk, START has been soliciting the participation of private sector entities in the delivery of certain project components. START's engagement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) in the supply of boats and equipment to the HNP Coast Guard Base - South Department project, is a case in point.

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7.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

For more than four decades Canada has played a leadership role in Haiti and is a valued partner of the GoH. The generally successful implementation of the GPSF during the period examined confirms the important role and contribution made by the GoC in Haiti. The fund is highly relevant to Haiti and is appreciated by both the GoH and donors. It provides an effective way for Canada to respond rapidly to crises in Haiti, and covers the space not filled within the mandates of other Canadian government departments.

The GPSF program in Haiti has achieved results on several fronts. First, it has used intervention approaches that are innovative or that have challenged existing programming paradigms in Haiti. In the Prison sector, for example, GPSF is helping the GoH move from a correction system that has been strictly punitive to one that now supports rehabilitation and human dignity. In the Police sector, the GPSF is contributing to the modernization of the HNP and in the Community Security sector partnership with Viva Rio has tested a novel approach to community policing which has yielded peace dividends. In the Border sector, the GPSF has assumed a leading role in addressing Haiti's border management challenges.

GPSF programming is aligned with the OECD's principles for engagement in fragile states, most specifically in terms of focusing on projects that can be implemented rapidly and that respond to the priorities of the government. To ensure the sustainability of projects, it has implemented capacity development projects that support the sustainability of its infrastructure projects (rehabilitation or refurbishing). In most sectors (Prisons, Police, and Border Management) GPSF has attracted other donors for subsequent investments, thus ensuring some form of sustainability. However, an effective transition mechanism between GPSF and CIDA has not yet been sufficiently developed, and an overall transition strategy for the GPSF has not fully been thought through.

Overall, the GPSF has conducted planned activities and achieved planned targets within budgets in all four sectors. GPSF's strategic planning systems and instruments at the country level are robust, but need to be better developed at the sector level, particularly from a whole-of-government perspective. Conversely, GPSF's whole-of-government coordination mechanisms work reasonably well at the policy level, but coordination at the level of programming remains a challenge.

START's decision to place a local GPSF representative in Haiti has proven to be a strong contributing factor of success in the implementation of the program. However, given the volume of work undertaken, START's in-country representation is understaffed - which puts the continuing quality of the portfolio and performance monitoring at risk.

Notwithstanding recent enhancements to START's financial and program data management system, data integrity remains vulnerable and the system is underutilized which poses a risk to project management and corporate memory retention.

Performance monitoring and results reporting for GPSF could be improved at all levels (project, country, and whole-of-government), and could also benefit from greater resources allocated in support of performance monitoring at the country level.

In conclusion, the summative evaluation of the GPSF in Haiti is very positive. And while there is work to be done to improve specific elements, the GPSF has shown very encouraging results in an extremely challenging context.

7.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

START should reflect upon the types of projects appropriate to the short to medium-term mandate of the GPSF with greater weight being placed on the catalytic potential of its interventions. In line with the foregoing, START should further adjust its performance metrics to reflect this aspect of its programming and develop and incorporate into its planning instruments transition strategies to ensure longer-term sustainability.

The GPSF, designed as a quick response mechanism, has successfully responded to the critical peace and security needs of Haiti, and in accordance with international best practice with respect to fragile state engagement. However, outstanding questions remain regarding how the short-term, in/out, model of GPSF interventions fit within the capacity building frameworks for longer-term sustainability. Addressing this is particularly pertinent in a country such as Haiti where the crisis is protracted requiring a sustained and long term-effort.

Given the mandate of the GPSF (or any program with similar characteristics), arguably greater attention and weight should be placed on the enabling role of GPSF interventions and the potential catalytic impact in both project selection and results reporting. Within this paradigm, the issue of transition or hand-off assumes critical importance. Although the GPSF has attracted other donors in most sectors, thus ensuring some form of sustainability, a formalized and effective transition mechanism between GPSF and its OGD partners, particularly CIDA, has not yet been sufficiently developed.

Recommendation 2:

START should review staffing requirements to ensure that these are aligned with the size of the portfolio and with the exigencies of current and future programming.

Given the complexities of the country, the number of projects, and the requirements for selecting and supervising projects, combined with the demands of a political officer, the workload of the START field representative is significant. As a result, the representative has been unable to devote the amount of time arguably required for effective monitoring and trouble-shooting. Accordingly, START should review staffing requirements at post to ensure that resources are aligned with the size of the portfolio. Furthermore, consideration should be given to augmenting local capacity in the areas of procurement and contract management.

Recommendation 3:

START should review and continue to develop its financial and information management systems to enhance program stewardship, corporate memory, performance monitoring and results reporting.

Notwithstanding refinements to existing systems, START continues to rely on financial and information management systems that have not been fully adapted to the exigencies of programming, thus placing program management and corporate memory at risk. The risk is compounded by the uneven use of the systems that are in place. While no major incident has been reported, these deficits call for management's attention.

Recommendation 4:

START should take proactive measures to strengthen the coordination of OGDs at the sector level, particularly with respect to planning.

While procedures and fora have been put in place to support whole-of-government coordination, coordinated planning at the sector level in Haiti remains largely uneven and ad hoc. As GPSF interventions in sectors of choice mature, and the challenge of sequencing and transition assume prominence, there will emerge a concurrent need to more actively involve OGDs in strategic planning to both identify opportunities for OGD involvement and to support longer term sustainability of GPSF interventions.

Recommendation 5:

START should reflect on the merits of a needs assessment of community security in Haiti with the view to identifying gaps in the security/development nexus suitable for GPSF support.

Restoring law and order to Haiti's many troubled urban communities will, ultimately, depend on the success of efforts to reintegrate these neighborhoods into the formal economy and raise living standards, efforts that are fundamentally developmental in orientation which are not strictly within the purview of the GPSF. The GPSF, however, does have a role to play in community security through interventions that contribute to the creation of a security space within which community development can occur. How to create this space in the temporary absence of a conventional police presence is not well understood and needs to be explored further in cooperation with relevant stakeholders (the police, community leaders, GoH, NGOs etc.) with the view to ascertaining how the GPSF can best add value to this area of programming.

Recommendation 6:

START should explore the feasibility of providing direct bilateral support to its GoH counterparts in the Police and Prison sectors as a complement to its current support to MINUSTAH.

While GPSF support to the Police Sector and Prison sectors through MINUSTAH has been highly valued, arguably Canada could enhance its impact with more targeted assistance that capitalizes on unique Canadian competencies through direct bilateral arrangements between the RCMP, CSC and their respective Haitian counterparts.

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Appendix I: Management Response

1.0 Introduction

In the summer of 2008, consistent with departmental and Treasury Board requirements, DFAIT commissioned a summative evaluation to report on the achievements of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) in Haiti through an assessment of the different projects it has implemented since 2005. The evaluation also examined the extent to which GPSF initiatives have complemented efforts made by other government departments (OGDs) of Canada as well as by other bilateral and multilateral donors working in Haiti. START management has reviewed the recommendations formulated by the evaluation team, and the following management response outlines proposed actions for follow-up.

The START management team welcomes the report's conclusions pointing to the high degree of relevance of GPSF programming in Haiti and the positive and encouraging results achieved in this challenging context. The results of the evaluation, including the "smart practices" and lessons learned identified will help inform future GPSF programming in Haiti, as well as other priority program areas covered by the GPSF.

At the same time, START management wishes to emphasize that several findings in the report are of a broader, corporate nature and beyond the scope of the START Bureau alone, in particular those related to information, financial and risk management. A comprehensive and effective response to Recommendation #3 79 therefore depends on engagement by branches across DFAIT that provide support to the International Security Branch.

Nevertheless, START management agrees that acting on Recommendation #3 has the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of GPSF program delivery and our Bureau will continue to collaborate with other parts of the department, including through the FMA pilot, to secure the resources and engagement necessary to enhance the departmental financial infrastructure to address GPSF program needs. START has therefore elected in this management response to identify commitments that it as a Bureau has the authority to directly implement, including the GPSF database.

A final general comment relates to the locus of responsibilities for follow-up. We have opted to use the new START Bureau organizational structure to identify responsibility centres for the actions proposed in this management response. This new structure is meant to be implemented in the summer of 2009.

2.0 Start Management Response - By Recommendation

Recommendation 1:

START should reflect upon the types of projects appropriate to the short to medium-term mandate of the GPSF with greater weight being placed on the catalytic potential of its interventions. In line with the foregoing, START should further adjust its performance metrics to reflect this aspect of its programming and develop and incorporate into its planning instruments transition strategies to ensure longer-term sustainability.

START Comment:

As noted by the evaluators (e.g. findings 8, 9, 32 and 48), GPSF programming in Haiti has succeeded in engaging other donors, notably in the policy and prison sectors. This has resulted in contributions by other donors to complement efforts supported by Canada, and their commitment to remain engaged as initiatives evolve toward their next phases, thereby enhancing the sustainability of results. The partnership with USAID in the police sector is an example of how the GPSF has leveraged its catalytic potential and capitalized on complementarity between programs. START, in collaboration with OGD counterparts, will explore the potential to replicate these best practices in other contexts.

START has found that the nature and timeframe of projects varies depending on the context. In the case of Haiti, programming with a medium-term approach has proven most effective to support the achievement of sustainable results. However, START agrees there is merit to addressing the question of the point at which GPSF's short to medium-term time horizon yields to longer-term capacity, as a means to maximize the impact of the program, and to minimize the potential for overlap with OGDs.

As found by the evaluators, the close collaboration maintained by DFAIT and CIDA has ensured that GoC initiatives in Haiti have been complementary and that duplication of efforts has been avoided. Nevertheless, START has taken note of the observation pointing to instances where a clear rationale appeared to be lacking for decisions on why both CIDA and DFAIT may have been engaged in a given sector or thematic program area. Recognizing that the nature of the needs in some sectors are complex and may make it difficult to clearly delineate distinct foci and engagement strategies for CIDA and DFAIT, START will continue to strive to minimize the potential for overlap through ongoing dialogue with CIDA. In part, the finalization of the CIDA-DFAIT draft agreement on roles and responsibilities should help provide guidance on the programming focus of each department in key sectors, and revisions have been made to the agreement to incorporate lessons learned. A DM meeting, scheduled for June 2009, is intended to provide the opportunity to finalize the agreement.

START has already incorporated into its program planning instruments the need to consider transition strategies to promote long-term sustainability, and the importance of promoting effective coordination with OGDs and other donors. Multi-year strategic frameworks will be used to plan GPSF engagement in key geographic and thematic priority areas for the period up to 2013. Currently in advanced draft formats, the Multi-Year Frameworks for all sub-program envelopes will be presented to the Program Planning Committee in June and July of 2009.

Reflection on the nature, scope and timeframe of interventions supported by the GPSF with a view to ensuring that these are best suited to deliver on the program's mandate is important and ongoing. The upcoming Program Planning Committee meetings to review annual and multi-year strategic frameworks will address the issue of transition/exit strategy and catalytic potential. START will also seek to promote such reflection through the START Advisory Board over the course of the fiscal year. It should be noted, however, that the existence of a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy for Haiti would facilitate greater clarity in terms of transition strategies and long term sustainability.

At the project selection stage, issues related to sustainability and engagement of other donors and partners are already being addressed. These considerations are specifically addressed in the proposal sheet, and are evaluated as part of the project review process. START will ensure that the redesigned business process continues to include these considerations at the project review stage, and that clear guidelines are communicated to project officers with respect to how these can be effectively addressed. START is reviewing the template used for annual results and achievements reporting with a view to more effectively capturing the catalytic potential of GPSF interventions.

Way Forward:

Table 7: Way Forward
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Discussions related to type of programming appropriate to short to medium-term mandate of the GPSF in Haiti and to transition strategies in Haiti will be held at PPC in the context of considering multi-year frameworks and annual plans.Q2 of 2009-10 for PPC meeting andSTART DG
START will share this recommendation with the Haiti Task Force, to assess the feasibility of developing a Government of Canada strategy for Haiti.Q4 2009-10START DG
START will review project-level reporting templates and annual envelope/sub-program level (results and achievements) templates with a view to enhancing the capacity to report on the sustainability and catalytic potential of GPSF interventions.Q1 2009-10START Secretariat (IRD)

Recommendation 2:

START should review staffing requirements to ensure that these are aligned with the size of the portfolio and with the exigencies of current and future programming.

START Comment:

As noted in the evaluation, while the presence of a permanent representative in Port-au-Prince has had greatly benefited GPSF programming in Haiti, the volume of work is taxing the capacity of this individual. In START's ability to effectively monitor projects. In this context, and in line with the existing transformation process in the department and the "Re-START process" at the bureau level, START human resources are being streamlined at headquarters and in missions abroad. To increase the sustainability of the technical support in the field, START will create through CORA a one-year term LES position to support GPSF programming in Haiti, with potential renewal if the size and complexity of the programming portfolio continues to require such a resource. The START team, comprised of one CBS and one LES, could be supported by consultants, on an as-needed basis, who would provide engineering expertise to support effective monitoring of infrastructure projects. 2008-09, START recognized the need to augment human resource capacity in the field, and as a result hired a locally engaged consultant in June 2008. The consultant has since been providing technical support to the START officer at the Embassy. While this support has proven valuable, it is not a sustainable approach, with the consultancy is ending soon. In addition, given that several GPSF projects in Haiti consist of infrastructure rehabilitation and construction, the ability to access the services of professional engineers could further enhance

Way Forward:

Table 8: Way Forward in Port-au-Prince
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Develop term of references for the creation of a term LES position through CORA.Q2/2009-10START Programming Division
Staff LES term positionQ2/2009-10START PRNCE

Recommendation 3:

START should review and continue to develop its financial and information management systems to enhance program stewardship, corporate memory, performance monitoring and results reporting.

START Comment:

The International Security Branch (IFM) has invested considerable resources toward the development of an MS Access database that would enable it to fulfill immediate needs related to project tracking and reporting, in the expectation that a corporate solution would eventually be developed and deployed that would provide a comprehensive project management system integrated with IMS. As noted by the evaluators, a departmental/corporate solution remains outstanding. As a result, despite recent upgrades, the GPSF database remains a tool with limited capability to support program reporting and tracking.

Under the START Bureau's re-organization (or "Re-START") launched in summer 2008, the START undertook a reorganization with a view to strengthening the policy and programming functions, streamlining the project approval process, increasing reliance on the GPSF database, and placing greater emphasis on monitoring of project effectiveness. Significant progress has been achieved with the development of upgrades to the GPSF database that, once fully implemented, will considerably enhance its ability to support program planning, project tracking, performance monitoring, and results reporting.

It should be noted that the enhancement of program stewardship and corporate memory is achieved not only through the implementation of information and financial management systems. For instance, the development of multi-year frameworks and annual plans, as well as the preparation of annual results and achievement papers, provide effective means to track key aspects of programming such as successes, lessons learned, and innovative approaches.

Way Forward:

Table 9: Way Forward The International Security Branch
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Implement upgrades to financial module of the databaseQ2/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division
Assess capabilities of database on performance reporting and identify necessary upgradesQ4/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division
Develop and deliver training to GPSF officers on use of the databaseQ3/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division

Recommendation 4:

START should take proactive measures to strengthen the coordination of OGDs at the sector level, particularly with respect to planning.

START Comment:

Sector-wide approaches (or SWAps) have been employed by development agencies as a useful tool for coordinating in-country efforts on various priority development sectors with varying degrees of success. Some work has been conducted on exploring the applicability of SWAps to situations of violent conflict. For example, in 2004 Sarah Bayne published "Integrating conflict sensitivity into sectoral approaches" in which she outlined a logical but untested and normative approach to integrating a conflict perspective into the development and implementation of sectoral approaches. Unfortunately, few concrete examples exist of this or any other conflict-related advice in application. The guidance and experience in this area is extremely limited, and no guidance is available on the applicability of SWAps to situations of fragility.

Strengthening coordination and collaboration across all government activities related to fragile and conflict affected situations, not limited to sectors, is a current preoccupation of Canada and many other OECD members. Sector planning is likely important, but requires broader contextualization, including a robust situational analysis, whole-of-government planning, and collaborative governance mechanisms in which to situate the sectoral planning.

Whole-of-government approaches to situations of conflict and fragility emerged in 2003 as part of the aid effectiveness agenda. It has since become an international priority, and the topic of much sustained dialogue and debate, although to date no DAC member has been able to declare success in implementing a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to analysis, planning and project implementation. Canada is recognized as an innovator on whole-of-government approaches to situations of conflict and fragility, and the Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce together with its Global Peace and Security Fund are frequently referenced as examples of important steps towards achieving joined-up government. START is currently leading a process with CIDA and DND to review ad refine a whole-of-government strategy on fragile states. This process is exploring these issues and is expected to make preliminary recommendations by Q2. As progress is made in understanding the Canada's current capacities and gaps in analyzing, planning and implementing whole-of-government approaches, effective means for engaging OGDs in sector level planning should become more clear.

In terms of coordination within the specific context of Haiti, START is chairing the Haiti Security Working Group whereby issues pertaining to planning, monitoring and implementation of START and OGDs activities related to Security System Reform (Police, Prison and Border Sectors) are discussed. This forum also provides an opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned from Canadian engagement in the Security Sector in Haiti. START also participates in the Haiti Governance Working Group (chaired by CIDA) and is a key stakeholder in the overarching Haiti Steering Committee which is co-chaired by DFAIT's Haiti Task Force (FCGE) and CIDA. In the Haiti Steering Committee, START is able to share information with OGD partners on issues of mutual interest and enhance the linkages between its programming and that of other OGDs such as CIDA (Governance, Justice), DND, CSC and RCMP (Deployment of Canadian Experts in MINUSTAH).

Way Forward:

Table 10: Way Forward for Sector-wide approaches
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Complete the initial WoG Fragile States Review with partner departments, and make recommendations for strengthening OGD coordination on fragile states.Q2 2009-10START DG
Through the Fragile States Review, outline critical components of a recommended WoG strategy for fragile states, in conjunction with partner departments.Q3 2009-10START DG
Review preliminary recommendations from Fragile States report and draft an action plan to address recommendations that relate directly to START.Q3 2009-10START DG

Recommendation 5:

START should reflect on the merits of a needs assessment of community security in Haiti with the view to identifying gaps in the security/development nexus suitable for GPSF support.

START Comment:

START has been implementing two projects in the community security sector. One project, implemented by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio, has been praised by the evaluators as being very successful. Following an external independent strategic review80, the other project, implemented by the UNDP, had to be terminated early due to suboptimal mid-term results and diverging views on strategic aspects of the project between the implementing agency and the national counterpart. The review of the latter project provided START with an in-depth analysis of the challenges that exist in Haiti's community security sector. In view of the challenges identified, START does not foresee being in a position to invest additional resources in this sector over the short-term. START will enhance its monitoring of the current Viva Rio project, so as to gain further insight into opportunities for engagement in the community security sector. Upon completion of this project, START may reconsider undertaking a more formal assessment, should there be indications that GPSF interventions have the potential to have a sustainable impact.

Way Forward:

Table 11: Way Forward for community security in Haiti
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Enhance monitoring of the ongoing Viva Rio project through field visits.Q2/2009-10START Programming Division and PRNCE

Recommendation 6:

START should explore the feasibility of providing direct bilateral support to its GoH counterparts in the Police and Prison sectors as a complement to its current support to MINUSTAH.

START Comment:

Over the course of 2008-2009, START, together with the RCMP, agreed on the need to explore opportunities for direct bilateral deployment of police experts with the Haitian National Police. A GPSF pilot project was conceived in this regard (08-177 Needs Assessment for the deployment of Police Experts to Haiti). The proposed 30-day assessment mission aims to contribute to the HNP Reform Plan and the professionalization of the HNP while ensuring sustained development of the HNP and promoting self-sufficiency. The assessment mission would consist of one project manager and up to six police advisors (one for each targeted area of intervention identified; namely narcotics control, major crimes investigation, border management, training management, financial management and logistics). The role of these experts is twofold; first, to familiarize themselves with the local reality of their HNP counterparts in order to establish with them a three-year action plan to develop their respective units, in line with the HNP reform plan. The second part involves acting as mentors to their HNP counterparts. The project manager would ensure efficient coordination between the various action plans. A request for approval of the pilot project is anticipated for July. If the pilot is approved at that time, selection of police advisors would take place by the end of July, with the assessment anticipated to begin late August.

START management wishes to underscore that the manner in which OGD partners support the Haitian Government, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, must be based on Canada's own capacity and comparative advantage. START will continue to collaborate closely with the RCMP and CSC to assess the appropriateness of bilateral and multilateral funding mechanisms to support deployments in Haiti.

Way Forward:

Table 12: Way Forward for direct bilateral deployment of police experts
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Conclude the needs assessment for the deployment of police experts to Haiti in collaboration with the RCMP.Q4/2009-10START Programming Division and PRNCE

3.0 Summary of Management Action Plan

Table 13: Summary of Management Action Plan
ActionTimeframeResponsibility
Recommendation 1:
Discussions related to type of programming appropriate to short to medium-term mandate of the GPSF and to transition strategies will be held at PPC and SAB meetings with a view to identifying appropriate follow up actions.Q2 of 2009-10 for PPC meeting and Q4 2009-10 for SAB meetingSTART DG
START will share this recommendation with the Haiti Task Force, to assess the feasibility of developing a Government of Canada strategy for Haiti.Q4 2009-10START DG
START will review project-level reporting templates and annual envelope/sub-program level (results and achievements) templates with a view to enhancing the capacity to report on the sustainability and catalytic potential of GPSF interventions.Q1 2009-10START Secretariat (IRD)
Recommendation 2:
Develop term of references for the creation of a term LES position through CORA.Q2/2009-10START Programming Division
Staff LES term positionQ2/2009-10START PRNCE
Recommendation 3:
Implement upgrades to financial module of the databaseQ2/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division
Assess capabilities of database on performance reporting and identify necessary upgradesQ2/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division
Develop and deliver training to GPSF officers on use of the databaseQ3/2009-10START Planning & Coordination Division
Recommendation 4:
Complete the initial WoG Fragile States Review with partner departments, and make recommendations for strengthening OGD coordination on fragile states.Q2 2009-10START DG
Through the Fragile States Review, outline critical components of a recommended WoG strategy for fragile states, in conjunction with partner departments.Q3 2009-10START DG
Review preliminary recommendations from Fragile States report and draft an action plan to address recommendations that relate directly to START.Q3 2009-10START DG
Recommendation 5:
Enhance monitoring of the ongoing Viva Rio project through field visits.Q2/2009-10START Programming Division and PRNCE
Recommendation 6:
Conclude the needs assessment for the deployment of police experts to Haiti in collaboration with the RCMP.Q4/2009-10START Programming Division and PRNCE

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Footnotes:

1 The Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) was conceived and negotiated by START and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to create a standing capacity to deploy up to 200 police officers in support of United Nations and regionally based peace operations.

2 Cited from the GPSF Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF), 2006.

3 The GBP replaced the Human Security Program in 2007.

4 Divisions outside START which administer a funding envelope include GHS, GHH, JLH and ICT.

5 IRC/IRP/ICT/RLH Roles and Responsibilities in Haiti GPSF Programming (2008).

6 Ibid

7 Ibid

8 Retrieved from CSC's website, Organization

9 This amount only takes into consideration 24 projects.

10 Haiti: A Challenge Benefitting Canadian Leadership and Interest February 2008

11 Ibid., p. 23

12 Two projects that were initially considered had to be dropped for specific reasons. The project 06-252 "Support to National Commission and MINUSTAH/ UNDP DDR program" had already undergone a strategic review. Secondly, the project 06-251 "Support to the Inspector General's Office" was not near completion due to long delays.

13 An OECD-DAC report highlighted the importance of Canada, and START's work specifically, in increasing coordination and cooperation among all actors involved in Haiti - see Peer Review: Review of the Development Co-operation Policies and Programs of Canada, (OECD-DAC, 20-September- 2007)

14 Haiti: A Challenge Befitting Canadian Leadership and Interests (February 2008) at p. 7

15 Stakeholders consulted within DFAIT may vary from year to year but regularly include, the FGCE, Embassy of Canada to the Dominican Republic (SDMGO), Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York (PRMNY), the MHS, the ICT, the GHH, the United Nations, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Section (JLH), and the Environmental Policies and Sustainable Development Division (MDS).

16 The GPSF funded only two projects in FY 06/07, both under the GBP. These included the Seminar on Human Trafficking project, which involved the staging of a seminar to raise the profile of human trafficking issues on the island of Hispaniola (CND $36,7.00), and the Mission du Group des Femme Parliamentaire, which involved fielding a group of experts to establish a program to encourage women to participate in parliamentary elections (CND $19,683).

17 Strategic objectives articulated in the 07/08 Concept Paper for Haiti included: 1) increasing security and the re-establishment of the rule of law through targeted programming in areas identified as priorities by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1743; 2) reinforcing Canada's position as a leading partner in Haiti based on whole-of-government engagement; and, 3) enhancing the capacity of the international community to deliver results by leveraging Canada's influence among donors and in supporting donor coordination. The latter two objectives are, essentially, START objectives in so far as they focus on processes, both within Canada and abroad, in support of programming.

18 Although the evaluation team was advised that START is working on a multi-year strategic planning framework for Haiti and other countries of GPSF engagement, the question of at what point GPSF's short to medium term time horizon yields to longer-term capacity development remains unresolved.

19 The evaluation team was advised that IRP is apparently working on developing a whole-of-government security system reform strategy for Haiti, though questions remain whether such a strategy ought to be developed within the context of a inter-departmental forum, such as the existing Working Group.

20 It is of interest to note that the CBSA raised questions regarding its potential contribution to institutional capacity building in Haiti - see Meeting Minutes: Haiti Security Working Group (May 30, 2007)

21 An example of the former is the engagement of DND to assist in the delivery of emergency aid furnished by CIDA in response to crisis following the hurricanes of September and October 2008. An example of the latter is the efforts of the Canadian Embassy in Santo Domingo to encourage dialogue between the GoDR and the GoH on issues relating to border management.

22 A case in point was the supply of equipment (including protective vests and side-arms) to retired police officers deployed to MINUSTAH through CANADEM. Protective vests for retired officers were initially furnished by the RCMP with an expectation that side-arms would similarly be supplied by the RCMP. Lengthy delays in the supply of the vests and a refusal by the RCMP to supply side-arms to non-commissioned officers forced CANADEM to procure the weapons themselves. Although CANADEM presumed these problems to be a result of a lack of communication and coordination between DFAIT and the RCMP, the truth of the matter was that the RCMP could not deliver the side-arms by law, a fact confirmed by a legal opinion sought by DFAIT.

23 The engagement of CSC in the prison sector as well as recent negotiations with the CBSA in the border sectors are cases in point.

24 The evaluation team was advised, for example, that CIDA personnel at the embassy do not have the authority to make programming decisions which may be of benefit to the GPSF, but can only make recommendations to headquarters. Moreover, at the time of the field mission in November 2008, the evaluation team was advised that there was no interface between the project databases of CIDA and START, thereby depriving the two of potentially valuable programming information.

25 The Performance Management Agreement (PMA) of the Canadian Ambassador in Port-au-Prince currently functions as a proxy framework for whole-of-government performance and results reporting, since supporting whole-of-government action is among the responsibilities of the Ambassador. The PMA, however, is a performance report personal to the Ambassador, and thus protected.

26 Some GPSF projects reviewed, such as those implemented by CANADEM and CSC, have not always proceeded rapidly due to a variety of delays (e.g., delays in meeting MINUSTAH requests, delays in signing cooperative agreements with CSC and CANADEM to allow deployments to get underway, delays in assistance on equipment issues, and delays in payments).

27 The projects in question are the Strengthening the Capacity of the Inspector General (valued at CND $5,000,000) and the Construction of a New Base for the HNP Coast Guard Base at the Southern Region (valued at CND $3,000,000)

28 The database is fed by three sets of books (Access Database, Financial Officer's Spread Sheets, and Divisional Spread Sheets) which must be manually inputted and reconciled.

29 The challenge in locating files was compounded by the high turnover in staff experienced by START and IRC, as well as the relocation of personnel within the office, leading to confusion about the location of files.

30 Secretary General report on the MINUSTAH, S/2008/586, p. 7

31 ICG, Reforming Haiti's Security Sector, 38 September 2008, Interviews conducted from April - May 2008

32 ICG, ibid, p. 30

33 Data not available.

34 The RCMP figures at the end of 2008 showed that under the CPA, the RCMP had deployed 95 police officers to MINUSTAH, but it is expected that 300 will be deployed between January and the end of March, 2009.

35 The mandate of the MINUSTAH (see MINUSTAH Mandate) states that in order to develop a secure and stable environment, the Mission needs to (b) assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the HNP.

36 GPSF Concept paper for FY 2008/09.

37 Haiti Assessment Visit, June 2008, Ppt. Presentation by Inspector André Durocher, RCMP International Peace Operations Branch, presented to DFAIT, September 30, 2008.

38 The RCMP figures at the end of 2008 show that under the CPA, the RCMP has deployed 95 police in Haiti but expect to have deployed 300 between January and the end of March 2009.

39 The Justice and Peace Commission has simple criteria to measure the degree of violence: number of deaths in the streets. Documents sur Haïti

40 Support to the National Strategy of the NCDDR in Haiti - Community Security Project, Project Document.

41 Overcrowded jail grants each prisoner just 4.47 square meters; Search the library

42 S/2008/586

43 The Director of the Cap Haitien Prison and the prison guards indicated that some of the prison walls can be breached pretty easily, even with a simple push.

44 In response to this dire situation, the Commission, in its final report of 9 May 2008, recommended, inter alia, that the penal and procedural codes be revised to provide for alternatives to imprisonment.

45 Taken from GPSF Database Report (November 40, 2008)

46 This list was compiled based on two documents provided: the GPSF Database Report - Basic Project Report dated September 9th, 2008 and the Haiti - START project tracking updated on August 20, 2008.

47 In the prison sector PADF has been a good partner but in the Border management sector stakeholders report that the collaboration has not been as productive.

48 Observers have noted that construction contracts are often given to well-established firms from Port-au-Prince.

49 The Development Research Group of the World Bank, which publishes a bulletin on country compliance with international governance standards, ranks Haiti among the nations least capable of controlling corruption - see Governance Matters 2008, World Bank Institute.

50 While no one knows with certainty the quantum of narcotics flowing through the country, the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency reported in 2006 that 84 tons of cocaine transited Hispaniola that year, while 459 drug flights were tracked - see Latin American Drugs I: Losing the Fight, International Crisis Group, Latin American Report Number 25, (March 44, 2008) at p. 26. Canadian law enforcement agencies estimate that over 70 percent of illicit drugs entering the province of Quebec pass through Haiti.

51 Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization , and Reintegration by Robert Muggah (Small Arms Survey, 2005)

52 Cited from Human Trafficking and Modern-day Slavery

53 Haitian illegal migrants in the Turks and Caicos are estimated to now exceed the native local population.

54 This fund, which was envisaged to operate as a kind of donor trust fund, is reported to have failed due to concerns on the part of the GoH over a potential loss of control over the fund.

55 MINUSTAH now maintains a contingent of UNPOL personnel at Haiti's four official land border crossings.

56 Taken from GPSF Database Report (November 50, 2008)

57 Not in database

58 These include immigration posts in Belladère, Saint-Marc, Gonaive, Ounaminthe, Malpasse, Miragoane, Thomsassique, Les Cayes, Ile a Vache, Port-de-Paix, Port-au-Prince, and Cap Haitien.

59 These conferences were attended by senior immigration and consular officials from Haiti, the DR, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Turks and Caicos.

60 The evaluation team was advised that Phase II, which involves the provision of coast guard vessels, has been designated a separate project since it involves a different implementing partner, namely the Canadian Commercial Corporation.

61 The HNP DG is reported to have remarked that as much as 25 percent of active duty HNP are involved in illegal activities, including aiding and abetting drug traffickers - see International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for Haiti - 2006 (U.S. Department of State).

62 During the field mission, the evaluation team was advised that the DG of the HNP had announced that 500 additional HNP officers would be assigned to border patrols - 500 to the country's land borders and 500 to Haiti's maritime borders.

63 These include Malpasse and Belladère. It warrants note that the GPSF took the lead in refurbishing the border facilities in Malpasse, which is reputed to process around 57 percent of the border traffic between Haiti and the DR.

64 The ICG, which conducted an assessment of Haiti's security sector reform agenda and performance in the summer of 2008, stressed the importance of regional cooperation in addressing Haiti's border challenges, remarking that in the absence thereof, the expanded role of the GoH and MINUSTA along Haiti's frontiers "will be empty shells" - see Reforming Haiti's Security Sector, International Crisis Group, Latin American/Caribbean Report Number 28 (September 58, 2008).

65 In terms of Haiti's impact on Canada, the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEP-C) Police Services Act (PSA) identified organized crime, and in particular the illicit activities of money laundering, narcotics smuggling, and human trafficking, as the prime threat to Canadian domestic security.

66 At the time of the field mission, the evaluation team was advised that START and CIDA were holding consultations with the CBSA, Revenue Canada (RC), and CIC to explore possibilities of engagement in support of border management reform.

67 The new border facility in Malpasse, which was wholly funded by START, will accommodate both customs and immigration officials. The new administrative complex in Belladère, also funded by START, will likewise accommodate customs, immigration, and police officials.

68 Reforming Haiti's Security Sector, ICG, Latin American/Caribbean Report Number 28 (September 58, 2008). See note 55 at page 2

69 GPSF Concept Paper - Haiti (FY 08/09)v

70 On-site visits were conducted in Malpasse and Cap Haitien, where the evaluation team met with representatives from the Ministry of Immigration.

71 At the time of the site visit, the provision of a power generator, promised by the GoH as part of the project, had not been delivered, though the evaluation team was later advised that GoH had affirmed its commitment to deliver this equipment. Moreover, interviews with border officials at Malpasse highlighted the importance of securing boats in order to patrol Lake Azuei, which is a major transit area for smugglers.

72 Water in Lake Azuei has in the past flooded its banks, washing out the road joining Haiti and the DR, and rendering operation of the border post all but impossible.

73 Although the Commission has a plan for border development, a multi-year development strategy for border development remains outstanding.

74 Reforming Haiti's Security Sector, ICG, Latin American/Caribbean Report Number 28 (September 58, 2008). See note 55 at p. 22

75 This allocation of responsibilities makes sense, as only the US likely has the expertise and in particular the resources necessary to respond to the enormous challenges of securing Haiti's maritime borders.

76 These additional design features include the raising of the roof of the facility by several feet in order to increase ventilation and the construction of a canal around the parking lot in order to channel run-off water from the adjacent hills. The canal was deemed essential to protect the parking lot and facility from flooding during rains.

77 This increase in the budget is in addition to an earlier request to augment the same by CND $500,000 to make up for short-falls resulting from unexpected exchange-rate fluctuations.

78 Arguably, IOM's heavy engagement in physical infrastructure development projects is marginal to its core mandate.

79 Recommendation #5 "START should review and continue to develop its financial and information management systems to enhance program stewardship, corporate memory, performance monitoring and results reporting."

80 Yvan Conoir is the consultant who conducted the review.

Office of the Inspector General


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Date Modified:
2012-11-22