The members of the Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC), comprised of representatives from the evaluation divisions of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), Public Safety Canada (PS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Results-Based Management Group (RBMG), in particular Mr. Werner Meier, Ms. Madeleine Guay, and Mr. Serge Fyfe, for their work in preparing this evaluation report. The ESC further wishes to extend its appreciation to the many individuals from the aforementioned federal government departments and agencies, to those representatives from the provincial and municipal police-service partners, more specifically the Sûreté du Québec, the Montreal Police Service, the Toronto Police Service and the Durham Regional Police Service, and to the representatives of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) staff, who volunteered their time and thoughts to support this evaluation. Finally, the ESC acknowledges the support and advice given by the members of the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) on the approach, findings and recommendations of this evaluation.
The Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) is the product of cooperation between Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Public Safety Canada (PS), the respective ministers of which each signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that took effect on April 1, 2006 for a period of five years through to March 31, 2011. The CPA is the management framework for the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) Program established by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and as such sets out the managerial and accountability relationships between the CPA "participants," i.e., DFAIT, CIDA, PS and the RCMP as well as the policy, procedural, reporting and financial modalities for the deployment of Canadian police. With the IPP requiring renewed policy authority before the end of fiscal year (FY) 2010-11, the CPA participants commissioned an interdepartmental evaluation of the CPA/IPP in accordance with Article 3 (Duration) of the CPA MOU.
This evaluation was conducted in compliance with the Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation (2009), which requires line departments and agencies to report on the relevance and performance of direct program spending, the findings of which will inform the future of the CPA/IPP. It was conducted by the Results-Based Management Group (RBMG) on the request of and with oversight from the four CPA participants, namely DFAIT, PS, CIDA and the RCMP.
The CPA/IPP evaluation was conducted between November 2010 and August 2011. The evaluation methodology employed mixed methods to collect qualitative and quantitative data. More than 500 documents were analyzed, and 65 key interlocutors from the CPA participants and police-service partners were interviewed. The evaluation also included a cost accounting analysis based on the available financial data provided by the RCMP.
The evaluation faced two important limitations. First, access to the RCMP's human resource (HR) and financial records to conduct an independent cost-accounting analysis proved to be problematic for security reasons, so the related findings represent a collaborative effort with the RCMP Federal Policing, Financial Advisory Services. Second, no field visits to police peacekeeping theatres of operation were undertaken, which was commensurate with the importance placed in the terms of reference on assessing the achievement of expected outcomes.
The CPA/IPP has continued Canada's international peacekeeping tradition for which it is recognized internationally by having filled an institutional and funding gap, which had previously constrained the deployment of Canadian police officers to the ever-increasing number of IPP operations. Ministerial approval of deployments has been in keeping with Canadian foreign-policy interests and consistently assessed against a wide range of other factors. The role of police officers in international peacekeeping and peace operations is still evolving, and demand for Canadian police officers is expected to increase significantly as more United Nation (UN) missions focus on capacity building and security system reform (SSR) where their training and expertise can be optimized. Responding to this ever-increasing and continued need will be challenging at the current overall funding allocation levels.
International peacekeeping has been a Government of Canada (GoC) foreign-policy priority for many decades. The nature of Canada's international engagement has evolved as the role of civilian experts has taken on greater prominence in supporting fragile and conflict-affected states (FCASs) as they meet their many challenges. In this respect, the CPA/IPP objectives are coherent with the GoC's international commitments to enhance global capacity to deploy civilian experts to peace-support operations, while its expected outcomes are aligned with participant priorities, strategic outcomes and expected results. The evaluation has noted that CIDA is the only exception, since it no longer has the lead on a peace and security programming per se, although programming in FCAS continues to be a CIDA priority. As such, CIDA continues to have an interest in the CPA, recognizing the valuable contribution that IPP operations make in creating the secure space needed to carry out its international humanitarian assistance and development mandates.
The CPA has been consistent with the participant roles and responsibilities, although new centres of competence have emerged within some departments, triggering shifts in certain roles and responsibilities between departments, i.e., between CIDA and DFAIT with respect to peace and security policy and programming. CIDA's responsibilities for the governance of the CPA, specifically ministerial approval of proposed deployments, are no longer consistent with its mandate and priorities, as programmatic accountability for the IPP rests with DFAIT and PS. As an interested party with valuable insight as to how police peacekeeping can create space for development activities and in the spirit of working as one Canada, CIDA's role as a participant observer would be more appropriate. Further, the 60/40 split between the contribution of the RCMP and other police-service partners to IPP operations proved overly optimistic, resulting in a much greater reliance on the latter to meet commitments, a reality that is not adequately reflected in the CPA design.
The CPA/IPP is a valuable foreign-policy instrument that has enhanced Canada's reputation in IPP operations, thanks to the expertise and professionalism of the police officers involved. Development results were more significant in Haiti and Afghanistan, where they have acted in concert with other civilian experts on complementary investments in SSR. While CPA governance has contributed to its operational success, strategic guidance and planning were lacking. Shortfalls in meeting deployment targets in the first few years can be attributed to the initial design and assumptions that did not take into account: 1) the challenges of creating a more robust institutional infrastructure within the RCMP; and 2) the composition of the Canadian law-enforcement community upon which the CPA now depends.
The CPA/IPP was adequately resourced to fulfill its mandate during the current time frame, however higher deployment and incremental costs will require a revision of the underlying assumptions and unit cost calculations going forward. While the governance structures and processes contributed to operational efficiencies, they did not exercise sufficient financial oversight to ensure the most economic use of the A-Base funds allocated to the RCMP. Significant one-time start-up and corporate overhead charges can be attributed to the lack of integrated financial management and reporting between Corporate Finance and the International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB). The absence of comprehensive and transparent corporate financial reporting reduced efficiency, nevertheless the CPA successfully achieved 70 percent of its deployment target with 79 percent of its allocated budget. Much of this success can be attributed to the hard work and dedication of the IPOB and the willing collaboration of many police-service partners, who, despite having little influence on the implementation decision-making processes, have become important stakeholders.
Governance Structures and Processes
That the governance structures and processes be modified to ensure better integration of police operations into Canadian SSR efforts, to strengthen strategic orientation, financial and performance oversight and to ensure greater inclusivity of key stakeholders.
Guidelines to assess requests
That the guidelines for assessing requests for Canadian contributions to peace-support operations be systematically reviewed and streamlined.
Standard operating procedures
That standard operating procedures (SOPs) be agreed upon by the key stakeholders and used by the CPA Working Group and the RCMP in managing daily operations.
The role of Canadian contingents in UN missions
That greater use of diplomatic channels be used to convey the GoC's interest in better defining the overall role and responsibilities of Canadian contingents in UN missions, with a view to optimizing the effectiveness of the high-quality Canadian police officer resources being put at their disposal.
Marketing of international police peacekeeping
That better marketing of international police peacekeeping be employed to obtain the support of provincial governments and maintain the number of participating police-service partners; a communications strategy would first be required to launch such an initiative.
Financial controllership and IPP costing model
That, with the view to updating the CPA, consideration be given to clarifying roles and responsibilities with respect to financial comptrollership and reporting and that key assumptions informing the IPP costing model be reviewed to align the same with proximate actual costs.
The Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) is the product of cooperation between Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Public Safety Canada (PS),(1) the respective ministers of which each signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that took effect on April 1, 2006 for a period of five years through to March 31, 2011. The CPA MOU sets out the principles and funding with which the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), a portfolio agency of Public Safety Canada, provides Canadian police expertise as part of the Government of Canada (GoC) contribution to international police peacekeeping and peace-support operations.
With the stable funding secured through the approval of the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) program, the RCMP has since established the IPP program to manage all Canadian police deployments to international police peacekeeping missions, international criminal courts and tribunals, as well as international commissions and inquiries. The CPA is the management framework for the IPP program, and as such sets out the managerial and accountability relationships between the CPA "participants," i.e., DFAIT, CIDA, PS and the RCMP, as well as the policy, procedural, reporting and financial modalities for the deployment of Canadian police.
With the IPP program requiring renewed policy authority before the end of fiscal year (FY) 2010-11, the CPA participants commissioned an interdepartmental evaluation of the CPA/IPP in accordance with the articles of the CPA MOU.(2) This evaluation was conducted in compliance with the TB Policy on Evaluation (2009), which requires line departments to report on the relevance and performance of direct program spending, the findings of which will inform the future of the CPA/IPP. It was conducted by the Results-Based Management Group (RBMG) on the request of and with oversight from the four CPA participants, namely DFAIT, PS, CIDA and the RCMP.
Conflict-affected countries and fragile states constitute and continue to pose a major threat to international security and prosperity. Lawlessness and insecurity internationally have a direct impact on the ability of the GoC to provide safety to Canadians and Canadian interests both at home and abroad. Meeting these challenges calls for the development of a capacity to deploy police resources internationally in order to participate in and contribute to peacekeeping and peace operations in fragile states and post-conflict situations, which typically involve law enforcement capacity building and SSR.
To this end, the RCMP renamed the International Peacekeeping Branch and established a more robust International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB) in 2006 to support and execute the GoC's IPP program. Since 1989, Canada has participated in and contributed to more than 50 IPP missions--United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), bilateral and those conducted by other international partners--in as many countries, involving more than 2,800 police officers tasked with promoting the rule of law, training and advising local police forces, ensuring compliance with human rights standards and helping to re-establish effective public institutions such as law-enforcement and judicial systems.
The goal of the CPA is to support the GoC's commitments to build a more secure world through Canadian participation in IPP operations, critical to longer-term SSR and conflict-prevention efforts. The objectives of the CPA are to:
The implementation of the CPA is supported by an interdepartmental governance structure composed of a Steering Committee and a CPA Working Group.
The CPA Steering Committee, chaired by DFAIT, is composed of Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) level representatives or designates of the participants. It was to meet at least annually, as determined by the Chair. Senior officials from the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Department of Finance and TB could also have participated as observers. Its role, as stated in the MOU, included:
The CPA Working Group, chaired by DFAIT, is composed of coordinators within DFAIT, CIDA, PS and the RCMP. It was to meet monthly, or as determined by the Chair. Representatives from DND, DOJ, CSC, PCO and other central agencies are also called upon to provide expert advice on as-needed basis. The responsibilities of the CPA Working Group, as stated in the MOU, included:
The 2006 CPA made available to the RCMP A-Base funding of Canadian (C) $36.8 million(3) annually from the International Assistance Envelope (IAE)(4) to support the training and deployment of 200 full-time equivalent (FTE) police officers annually for international police peacekeeping missions and to support the RCMP International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB) staff charged with administering the IPP program. Additionally, the CPA was allocated C$11.4 million per year for incremental costs specific to IPP program missions from the IAE via the GPSF, which is administered by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), housed within DFAIT.
Table 1 presents a summary of the funding approved by ministers on the basis of the IPP costing model developed by the RCMP in 2006 and contained in the MOU.
Table 1: Summary of Costs Based on IPP Costing Model
|HQ Reg Members||15||2,745,000||17||3,291,000||17||3,111,000||17||3,111,000||17||3,111,000|
|HQ Public Servants||15||1,635,000||17||1,879,000||17||1,853,000||17||1,853,000||17||1,853,000|
|Total HR Costs||35,623,000||38,743,000||36,329,000||36,329,000||36,329,000|
|Total RCMP Cost||36,223,000||39,263,000||36,849,000||36,849,000||36,849,000|
|Total Mission Cost||8,651,200||11,396,000||11,396,000||11,396,000||11,396,000|
|Total IPP Cost:||44,874,200||50,659,000||48,245,000||48,245,000||48,245,000|
The CPA has undergone several changes since its inception.(5) The first was initiated to allow the RCMP to recruit a greater number of police officers than initially planned from police-service partners (from provincial and municipal forces) to augment its deployment capacity; the second was a shift in the number of deployments to non-UN missions (initial ratio was 75 percent to 25 percent). Originally, it was envisaged that 34 HQ staff would be sufficient to administer the IPP program, however authority was granted by the CPA Working Group, in consultation with TB, to expand RCMP IPOB HQ staff to 54 positions by using funds from the 200 FTEs for deployment. The FY 2008-09 IPP Annual Report refers to the findings of a comprehensive evaluation conducted by a consulting firm and the 2009 Business Case for Investing in Capacity states that this "evaluation revealed that 83 positions are required to effectively manage the program."(6)
The original CPA was signed on February 5, 1997 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Solicitor General and the Minister for International Development.(7) The scope of this evaluation is limited to the fifth iteration of the CPA, which covered the five-year period between April 1, 2006 and March 31, 2011.
The objectives of this evaluation are to review CPA/IPP relevance and performance, examine the interdepartmental coordination mechanisms in place to facilitate the CPA, and identify lessons learned and opportunities for future consideration. Overall, the objectives of the evaluation as stated in the Terms of Reference are:
The conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation will be taken into consideration by divisions within DFAIT, CIDA, the RCMP and PS in the future design and administration of whatever mechanism is deemed appropriate to support the IPP program.
Several new issues emerged as a result of preliminary consultations with stakeholders, which were addressed by the evaluation.
The CPA expired on March 31, 2011. During the course of the evaluation, the team was informed that the participants had decided to move forward with the preparation and submission of foundational documents for the renewal of the CPA/IPP prior to the completion of this evaluation. A number of key supporting documents, i.e., a new MOU and IPP costing model were prepared as supporting documents for the submission. The policy coverage and funding request documents sought approval for FY 2011-16, but included a "condition" on future funding beyond FY 2011-12 "that an evaluation will have been completed and a sufficiently robust Management Action Plan be approved to address the evaluation's recommendation(s) prior to the end of March 2012." These circumstances shifted the rationale for the evaluation from one of informing the renewal decision to identifying forward-looking improvements that could be incorporated in the program, with a view to making changes before the end of March 2012. While the evaluation has taken note of the renewal documents, it was not mandated to comment on the proposals contained therein.
The roles and responsibilities of the CPA participants and the interdepartmental governance structures and decision-making process are clearly outlined in the MOU. Preliminary discussions with key stakeholders revealed an interest in assessing the extent to which the stated roles and responsibilities as described in the MOU reflect current departmental mandates for IPP program operations, as well as the extent to which they have been adequately fulfilled. Another area of evaluation inquiry that garnered unanimous support was the need to assess the effectiveness of the governance structures, i.e., the CPA Steering Committee and the CPA Working Group, in terms of financial and performance oversight and their value added to IPP strategic development and implementation decisions, including an assessment of the joint decision-making process.
The CPA participants expressed an interest that the evaluation examine the IPP program rationale, which has traditionally been anchored by Canadian foreign-policy priorities and linked to the priorities of the IAE Peace and Security Pool in support of Canada's traditional international peacekeeping role and commitments to global security primarily through participation in UN missions. It was felt by some participants that national security interests should be factored into the mission selection criteria and processes more explicitly. Consequently, the evaluation reviewed the use of the "Guidelines for assessing requests …" to determine the extent to which they were aligned with the program rationale and served as an adequate filter for selecting or rejecting requests for Canadian contributions.
The 2006 foundational documents and IPP costing model forecast that police officer deployments would be 60 percent RCMP and 40 percent from other police-service partners. At the time of the evaluation, the proportion of deployments was reversed, with the RCMP providing 30 percent and other police-service partners 70 percent. There was an expressed interest by the participants that the evaluation determine how this came about and assess its impact on IPP deployment costs.
The CPA reduced its planned person years of deployment because of increasing direct and indirect costs, such as inflation, increased administrative expenses, cost of travel, increased police officer salaries and benefits, increased use of police-service partners, increased use of higher-ranking officers, an increase in mission insurance and increased training costs. The concern expressed by some participants was whether the underlying assumptions of the IPP costing model remained valid and, if not, what would be the implications for future deployment capacity. The evaluation independently assessed the underlying assumptions and costs of the IPP costing model with a view to informing its future development.
Canada has a long distinguished reputation for providing assistance to international peacekeeping missions based on the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The CPA and the IPP operations it supports were intended to contribute to the GoC's international peace and security objective of building a more secure world by stabilizing FCASs.
As pointed out by the UN Secretary-General, it has become increasingly important "to ensure, from the outset, a holistic and coordinated approach to strengthening rule of law that results in the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities."(8) A coordinated whole-of-government approach to re-establishing the rule of law in conflict-affected situations needs to be understood within the context of an SSR approach, including not only police reform, but also judicial and corrections reform programs. Undertaking IPP operations without attention to these two other pillars in the rule of law triad will undercut the effectiveness of police-reform initiatives. Consequently, the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the selected IPP operations took into consideration the presence of strategic linkages with these other elements of an SSR process, whether supported by Canada, or otherwise.
Following a preliminary review of available documentation and interviews with key stakeholders, the evaluators developed an Evaluation Work Plan. This Work Plan, which outlined in detail the approach and methodology proposed to address the evaluation issues and questions documented in the Evaluation Terms of Reference, was reviewed by the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) and approved by the Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC) in January, 2011 - see Section 7: Management of the Evaluation. The key components of this Work Plan are elaborated in the following subsections.
An Evaluation Framework was developed based on the evaluation issues and questions contained in the Terms of Reference. It set out the evaluation issues, questions, data sources, and data-collection techniques and served as the main tool for designing the data-collection instruments and reporting on the evaluation findings. The data-collection and analysis techniques described below were designed to generate the evidence on the evaluation issues and questions as set out in the Evaluation Framework.
The evaluation design did not require a sampling strategy for collecting interview data, given the small number of governance committee members and program-related staff at DFAIT, PS, CIDA and the RCMP. Primary data collection from police-service partners and deployed police officers was focused on the largest contributors and the selected mission case studies with the intention of obtaining qualitative performance information to supplement documentary sources.
The evaluation selected three mission case studies to focus its assessment of the achievement of expected outcomes. From 2006 to 2011, the CPA deployed a total of 952 police officers to 12 countries; the majority were allocated to Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan, where deployment levels had increased steadily. A small proportion of the deployed police officers were allocated to support international criminal courts and tribunals, as well as international commissions and inquiries. While the CPA also supported other smaller missions over the course of the five years, e.g., Côte d'Ivoire and Timor-Leste, the evaluation concentrated its data collection and assessment of outcomes achieved on Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan, to which the largest number of police officers were deployed. This sample is varied in size, complexity, and includes a combination of UN missions and non-UN missions, and provided the opportunity to assess effectiveness across a spectrum of IPP operations.
The CPA participants had expressed interest in using comparative studies to benchmark the performance of the CPA/IPP program against similar initiatives by other countries. While the evaluation found one comparative study on conflict-related international policing,(9) it did not contain any usable benchmarking data.
More than 500 documents were obtained from DFAIT, PS, the RCMP and the police-service partners, as well as through Internet research. Many of these documents are very relevant and represented important sources of evidence for one or more of the evaluation criteria and questions.
Internet research was conducted to contextualize the CPA within the GoC's policy framework and international commitments to peace and security. Department-specific Reports on Plans and Priorities (RPPs) and Departmental Performance Reports (DPRs) issued between 2006 and 2010 were reviewed for references to the CPA, alignment with and contribution to strategic outcomes. The CPA foundational documents, administrative arrangements, program planning and management documents and financial costing models were referenced in terms of agreed-upon roles and responsibilities and overall performance expectations.
Governance committee meeting documents were also analyzed for evidence in relation to governance structures conducive to the efficient and effective administration of the CPA. UN resolutions, action memos, police officer deployment charts and statistics were key to understanding the application of assessment guidelines in the selection of IPP program operations. Annual plans and reports were also an important source of data on performance expectations and outcome achievements, as were related articles and evaluations on SSR initiatives in the selected countries for mission case studies.
Primary data collection from key stakeholder groups proceeded once contact lists were provided or developed by the evaluation team and security clearance issues were eventually resolved. Face-to-face interviews with DFAIT, PS, the RCMP and CIDA governance committee members, as well as with DFAIT Geographic Task Force and START staff were conducted during the first week of March 2011. Documentary research and the use of professional contacts allowed the evaluation team to develop contact lists and conduct face-to-face interviews in mid-March with police-service partners, i.e., the National Police of Quebec (hereinafter, Sûreté du Québec), Montreal Police Service (SPVM), Toronto Police Service, and Durham Regional Police Service, and soon thereafter to conduct focus group sessions with volunteer police officers who had been deployed to Haiti and Afghanistan.
Police-service partners also assisted the evaluation team in developing a list of former Canadian contingent commanders and strategic position holders, with whom telephone interviews were conducted. In late March the evaluation team travelled to New York to conduct face-to-face interviews with key UN personnel within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In early April the evaluation team was allowed to interview RCMP personnel within Corporate Finance and in the IPOB. Table 2 presents the number of individuals who participated in the above primary data-collection activities and while the overall total (65) is modest, the evaluation achieved almost full coverage of the stakeholder groups with the exception of deployed police officers.
Table 2: Number of Individuals Interviewed by Stakeholder Group and Technique
|CPA stakeholders||Face-to-face interviews||Focus group sessions||Telephone interviews||Total|
|DFAIT task forces and START||11||11|
|Deployed police officers||0||10||7||17|
|RCMP finance and IPOB||13||13|
All secondary reference documents and interview notes were converted into usable electronic file formats and loaded into Atlas/ti, a text-management software package. A closed coding structure was created to mirror the evaluation issues, questions and indicators as per the approved Evaluation Framework. The evaluation database was then mined for text segments and interview responses relevant to the evaluation questions and indicators and coded appropriately.(10) Open coding was also used to identify and compile data on additional topics of interest not originally identified in the Evaluation Framework, e.g., relations with DPKO, post-deployment support and reintegration, insurance coverage, end of mission reporting, etc. The available evidence was then systematically sorted and analyzed by code and the findings formulated with respect to each evaluation question, ensuring that multiple sources of evidence were factored into the analysis.
The evaluation was designed and implemented in accordance with the Terms of Reference and the approved Work Plan and took into consideration the constraints contained therein. Most notably was the absence of field visits to police peacekeeping theatres of operation, which was commensurate with the modest importance placed on assessing the achievement of expected outcomes. Consequently, this report presents valid qualitative data collected from deployed police officers and some documentary evidence from annual reports and related evaluations. However, the evidence-base is not considered robust, and Finding #17 should be understood with this in mind.
The Terms of Reference also placed considerable importance on the cost-accounting component of the evaluation, with a view to assessing the extent to which the available funds were used in an economical and efficient manner. Access to the RCMP's HR and financial records to conduct an independent analysis proved to be problematic for security reasons. Nevertheless, the evaluation team prepared a "Preliminary Cost Accounting Analysis" using the format of the IPP costing model based on available financial files and data (FY 2006-07 to FY 2009-10) obtained from other sources. This served to open a dialogue with the Federal Policing, Financial Advisory Services, which collaborated thereafter to prepare the final "Cost Accounting Analysis" file,(11) which supports Findings #21, #22 and #23. Consequently, the Cost Accounting Analysis is based on the first four years of the CPA.
The evaluation was managed by an ESC composed of the Heads of Evaluation of the CPA participants, i.e., DFAIT, CIDA, PS and the RCMP, or their delegates. The ESC reviewed, commented on and approved all of the evaluation deliverables, including the final draft evaluation report. The evaluation also benefited from the advice of the EAC composed of representatives of the line departments charged with administering the CPA, namely: START/DFAIT, the Strategic Policy Directorate/CIDA, IPOB/RCMP, and the Policing Policy Directorate/PS. It was convened to discuss and comment on the Evaluation Work Plan, the preliminary findings and the draft evaluation report.
Specific roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholders were as follows:
Stakeholder: DFAIT lead project authority
Stakeholder: External consultant
Stakeholder: Departmental program units
Further details on the roles and responsibilities of the CPA participants with regard to the governance and management of the evaluation are documented in the MOU for the undertaking of the CPA/IPP evaluation.
The most important challenge to implementation was the need for additional security clearance imposed by the RCMP in order to provide the evaluation team with access to RCMP files, documents, data and personnel.(12) This caused significant delays in launching the evaluation, and necessitated a number of "work-arounds" to adequately complete the planned data-gathering activities. Police-service partner interview and focus group contact lists were independently established, and third-party financial files and figures used to prepare a "Preliminary Cost Accounting Analysis" for discussion purposes. While access to RCMP premises and personnel was eventually granted, the evaluation did not obtain copies of some requested key documents.
The initial assumptions about the strategic value of international policing in peace-support operations as described in the CPA policy framework are still valid today as peacekeeping and peacebuilding remain an area of concern to the international community and IPP demand continues to increase.
The CPA builds on Canada's founding role and long experience in international peacekeeping with the objective of building a more secure world. The strategic value of international police peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is based on the still valid assumption that stabilizing FCASs is critical to creating the conditions for peace and security, development and eventually poverty reduction. The linkages between acute poverty, state failure, regional and global insecurity have been well documented in recent years. This has prompted the G-8 and the GoC to call for more vigorous, concrete and targeted efforts with robust stabilization and reconstruction assistance for FCASs.
At the 2004 Sea Island G-8 Summit,(13) the G-8 members committed to an action plan to expand global capability for peace-support operations, including the development of a "common doctrine and common operational standards for employing carabinieri/gendarme-like forces in peace-support operations." Shortly thereafter, the world's leaders agreed to take action on establishing a "new standing police capacity for UN peacekeeping operations" at the 2005 World Summit.(14) At the 2010 Muskoka G-8 Summit, G-8 leaders also committed to strengthening the availability of civilian experts to support rule of law and SSR. With respect to policing, specific reference is made to "mentoring, training and, where appropriate, equipping police, including new formed police units (FPUs) for duty on UN and African Union (AU) peace operations."
In 2009, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, reiterated the continuing need for more civilian police officers in UN peacekeeping operations and encouraged member states to continue to contribute. He noted that although the number of police officers involved had risen from 2,400 to 10,629 between 1999 and 2009, there was a need for specialists and for female police officers.(15) Confirming this trend the DPKO Police Division staff estimated its global IPP mission deployment needs at 17,000 police officers (9,000 FPUs(16) and 8,000 individual) from its 86 partner countries Interview data also point to a continued increase in IPP demand since the deployment of police officers is a very important pillar of the SSR process, and especially as the UN moves toward preventive capacity-building missions in fragile states. DPKO staff were all consistent in their interview responses, stating that more Canadian police officers in UN missions would be welcome.
The creation of the IPP program in 2006 provided stable funding for peace-support operations where only ad hoc funding had existed before, facilitated the establishment of the RCMP's IPOB which, in turn, led to the expansion of police deployments to peacekeeping and peace operations. While some procedural and human resource constraints affected the timely deployment of police officers, emerging program support and incremental cost constraints have more recently limited mission selection and Canada's deployment commitment levels.
In the 2005 Budget, the GoC restructured the International Assistance Envelope (IAE) into five pools for: 1) development, 2) international financial institutions, 3) peace and security, 4) crises, and 5) development research. It was designed to facilitate interdepartmental coordination to Canada's international assistance and introduce a transparent process for the allocation and use of new financial resources. The IPP costing model (2006) identified two types of costs: 1) RCMP A-Base costs to build a standing capacity of police officers for international peace-support operations and to hire recruits to backfill positions vacated for international deployments, and 2) the incremental costs directly incurred in the deployment of police officers. The RCMP's A-Base funds were obtained through transfers from the IAE Peace and Security Pool from CIDA and DFAIT reference levels.
Incremental costs specific to IPP operations were also funded by the IAE Peace and Security Pool via DFAIT's GPSF. The signing of the 2006 MOU renewed the managerial and accountability relationship between the participants defining their respective roles and responsibilities for the policy, governance, operational, financial and performance oversight for IPP operations. These institutional and funding arrangements were instrumental in ensuring a stable funding base for IPP operations by fully compensating the RCMP and police-service partners for the hidden costs incurred when releasing police officers for deployment.
Establishment of the RCMP IPOB with a current complement of 54 FTEs has played an instrumental role in the expansion of IPP operations, thereby enhancing the GoC's ability to fulfill its international commitments in a responsive manner. The IPOB has built an electronic database containing the profiles of 1,800 police officers with police-service partners, added a pool of 150 retired police officers, deployed police officers equivalent to 681 FTEs through the CPA and another 50 FTEs in rapid response to the Haiti earthquake secured through the IAE. With the exception of Haiti, new IPP operation deployments tended to take four to six months, due primarily to approval delays, the eight weeks required to complete the health-services screening process and the extended pre-departure training required for some operations, e.g., Afghanistan. In 2008, the IPOB was to have conducted a study on how the health-screening process could be shortened.(17) DPKO staff were nonetheless unanimous in acknowledging that the CPA had developed the capacity to deploy the required number of police officers for approved UN missions in a timely manner.
Although DFAIT is to receive all requests for Canadian assistance, pursuant to the MOU, the IPOB was reported to have received a variety of requests directly to deploy police officers. Interview data also indicate that the IPOB has become a recognized source of information and expertise for other Canadian federal government departments and agencies on different aspects of deploying Canadian civilians abroad to work, such as pre-departure training, health screening, insurance coverage, equipment procurement and transportation, working with provincial and municipal partners, etc. The 2006 CPA broke new ground for funding, organizing and deploying civilian police, and serves as a template/model for other civilian deployments with expertise in corrections, border services and justice.
However, there are several references regarding human-resource capacity constraints in CPA Working Group meeting minutes between December 2005 and December 2007; DFAIT/Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group (IRP) confirmed that C$4 million of the C$11.4 million GPSF envelope for incremental costs in FY 2007-08 had to be reallocated because of the shortfalls in police-officer deployment numbers--see Section 8.5 for details. Subsequent to the signing of agreements for a standby capacity with the SPVM (50 police officers) and with START funding of CANADEM (30 retired police officers), additional French-speaking police officers were available to meet UN mission needs in Haiti, as well as Côte d'Ivoire and other francophone countries, e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Similarly, deployment levels to Afghanistan increased significantly as the Durham, Ottawa and Toronto police-service partners made available additional police officers and authorized deployment commitments more than doubled. The HR capacity constraints in terms of numbers of available police officers eased in FY 2008-09 when deployment numbers increased year-over-year by approximately 40 percent to 140 FTEs.(18) At the same time, the HR capacity constraints in terms of specialized expertise had eased with the successful deployment of senior officers with experience in investigations (Haiti and Lebanon), in police reform (Kyrgyzstan) and in training of FPUs.
Financial resource constraints arising from the RCMP A-base budget for deployment, program support and incremental costs were experienced only in FY 2009-10 when total police-officer deployment reached an all-time high of 177 FTEs. As a result of these financial pressures, police officer deployments beyond those engaged in the priority countries of Afghanistan, Sudan and Haiti remained small. The Afghanistan mission was cited in interviews as an example that comprises four separate deployments (Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team [KPRT], European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan [EUPOL], Kabul Embassy, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan [CSTC-A]) and entails the use of between 50 percent and 60 percent of the IPOB's HR while representing less than a third of all CPA deployments.
Based on content analysis of CPA Working Group meeting minutes in 2009, a number of smaller ongoing missions were either closed or reduced in size, e.g., Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and new requests refused, e.g., Guinea-Bissau and Burundi. Given the available financial resources and the available pool of police officers with the requisite expertise, requests for additional deployments and renewals from the Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan missions were given priority and then requests for other ongoing mission commitments were addressed in small numbers, e.g., EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (COPPS) - Palestine Authority, Kosovo, and the DRC.
In FY 2010-11 the IPP program found itself fully committed with its deployments in Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan and under pressure from rising IPOB program support costs and deployment-related costs, e.g., pre-departure training, airfares, insurance, etc. Many of the deployment discussions during the CPA Working Group meetings revolved around individual placement of Canadian police officers in high-level positions in UN and non-UN missions, e.g., United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nation Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Canada's Permanent Mission in New York (PRMNY), the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), etc.
The current dual funding mechanism that supports IPP operations is still necessary.
The 2006 IPP created A-based funding for RCMP/IPOB program support so as not to affect domestic policing needs through the permanent transfer of CIDA and DFAIT reference-level allocations from the IAE Peace and Security Pool. The source of funds and amounts were set out in the foundational documents as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: RCMP A-Base IPP Source of Funding
|DFAIT - Vote 1 Ops||213,821||(14,933,000)||(12,519,000)||(12,519,000)||(12,519,000)||(52,276,179)|
|CIDA - Vote 35 G&C||(18,436,821)||(24,330,000)||(24,330,000)||(24,330,000)||(24,330,000)||(115,756,821)|
Since the reference-level transfers were permanent, the former mechanism by which the RCMP sourced its A-base funding became redundant. However, a reference-level budget of at least approximately C$36.8 million is still needed if the 200 FTE deployment target is to be achieved.
DFAIT was able to allocate approximately C$11.4 million annually from the GPSF to pay the incremental costs specific to IPP operations. The CPA provided the required framework for management and payment of incremental costs since it required the RCMP to provide forecasts in the annual report, submit invoices to DFAIT, and provide quarterly financial reports.(19) The evaluation's assessment of the related files and interview data indicate that this funding mechanism was not without its challenges, imposing a significant administrative burden on the RCMP/IPOB and required continued re-profiling by DFAIT of the GPSF draw down. Nevertheless, it ensured close coordination between DFAIT/IRP and the RCMP/IPOB, since the availability of both A-base and incremental cost funding was an important consideration when the CPA Working Group assessed requests for Canadian police contributions to peace-support operations.
The CPA is aligned with international practice for peace-support operations and deploys Canadian police officers who are well trained and who demonstrate a high standard of professionalism in conformity with both UN and EU principles and standards.
The 2004 Sea Island G-8 Summit Action Plan for expanding global capability for peace-support operations encouraged G-8 members to work in close cooperation with the UN in conformity with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (S/RES) and in accordance with UN technical standards. The evaluation thus assessed CPA deployments with respect to three areas of alignment with international practice: conformity with UN resolutions and UN and EU technical standards. The extent to which the CPA uses similar governance structures and deployment mechanisms as other countries involved in peace-support operations was explored in most of the interviews conducted. Since there are few known comparative studies on bilateral approaches to international police and peace operations, the evaluation presents the available data and findings later in this report--see Section 8.5.6 International Comparisons.
The evaluation found that the original CPA deployments to UN missions were contiguous in time with the initial UN S/RES, including the KPRT deployment, which is a non-UN mission. Authorizations for increases in deployment levels also closely followed subsequent S/RES of importance. Further analysis of the role of the Canadian police officers in these IPP operations indicates close alignment with the UN mission mandates as described in the initial and subsequent S/RES.
Furthermore, with regard to gender equality, S/RES 1325 on Women Peace and Security (2000) drew attention to the differential impact of conflict on women and girls, and requested member states to take actions to protect them, to integrate a gender equality approach in all aspects of peace-support operations, and to provide training in this regard to all deployed personnel; subsequent resolutions adopted in 2009 (S/RES 1820 and 1888) provided strong provisions to protect women and children against sexual violence, while S/RES 1889 (2010) proposed specific indicators which member states could use to measure and monitor their own performance in implementing these resolutions. Canada's Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, to which the CPA participants contributed,(20) sets out clear, deliberate and sustained action in each of the four thematic areas of prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery, as well as a series of related indicators.(21)
The UN Police Handbook: Building Institutional Police Capacity in Post-Conflict Environments (October 2005) described the role of DPKO, its divisions, the function and structure of the Police Division, as well as the principles and standards of performance for UN police officers. In April 2007, the CPA Working Group discussed a proposal to create a police liaison position within PRMNY to better align and coordinate Canadian police peacekeeping with DPKO. The Senior Police Advisor position was created and filled by April 2008, reporting to the Permanent Representative and is the liaison on all police support operations issues.
All police officers deployed to UN peacekeeping operations must be trained and of the highest professional calibre and abide by the principles and standards as set out in the UN Police Handbook with regard to the working language of the mission, driving competency, firearms proficiency, cultural awareness, personal habits, gender sensitivity, etc. Interview responses from DPKO staff were unequivocal in their opinions that CPA deployments were in accordance with DPKO standards and that the Canadian police officers deployed were well trained and demonstrated a high standard of professionalism. Furthermore, the CPA was commended in several interviews for the relatively high number of female police officers being deployed. The high esteem in which Canadian police officers have long been regarded by the DPKO was evidenced in its 2006 request to assist in improving the quality of member state police peacekeepers through pre-selection and training; the CPA has, since December 2006, permitted the deployment of up to five police officers to participate in UN Selection Assistance Teams.
The EU-Canada Agreement on Crisis Management (2005) included provisions for the secondment of Canadian police officers to EU crisis-management operations in conformity with the Joint Action framework,(22) mission operation plan and implementing measures. While CPA involvement in EU crisis-management operations is few in both number and deployment levels, they fulfilled the terms and conditions of the Agreement, strengthened Canada-EU relations and supported the actions taken by other key allies.
The consistent use of guidelines and summary assessments for each proposed IPP operation provided assurance that resources committed were well aligned with assessed needs, Canadian priorities and capacities.
The CPA MOU includes guidelines for assessing requests for Canadian peace-support operations. The factors to be assessed include: Canadian foreign-policy interest, nature and source of the request (official, multilateral organization), authority (of the operation as a whole), mandate, purpose, agreement of the parties (parties to the conflict), potential role of Canadian personnel, expected results of Canadian involvement and of the mission, safety and security of the police officers, logistics and funding, capacity and duration, and exit strategy. It also specified that DFAIT was responsible for coordinating and preparing the assessment for each proposed operation against the guidelines, while the other participants contributed.(23) DFAIT was also responsible for preparing a Deployment Approval Summary that was to be appended to each memorandum (action memo) to the ministers of the contributing departments (i.e., DFAIT, PS and CIDA) justifying the recommendation and requesting their deployment authorization.
Based on a review of the action memos and relevant CPA Working Group meeting minutes, the evaluation found that CPA deployments responded to official requests from international and regional organizations or institutions, e.g., UN, EU, but also from fragile state governments directly seeking assistance with SSR, e.g., Guatemala. In most cases,(24) these requests are received by DFAIT/IRP/IRC and brought to the attention of the CPA Working Group. DFAIT/IRP generally engaged in a consultative process in advance of the CPA Working Group meeting with appropriate geographic and functional divisions, the START Secretariat and its division directors, missions abroad, as well as with PCO when necessary. The requests were presented by DFAIT to the CPA Working Group and were subsequently assessed based on the guidelines and factors, thus ensuring alignment with assessed needs, Canadian priorities and capacities. The recommendations were made on the basis of the joint assessment and the action memos prepared by DFAIT, which formed the basis for the memorandums prepared by each participant representative requesting ministerial authorization.
The assumption that a deployment capacity of 200 police officers composed of 60 percent RCMP and 40 percent police-service partners could be established within the allocated deployment and incremental cost budget and within the planned time frame proved to be overly optimistic, which in turn undermined assumptions informing the unit costs of deployments.
The original design assumption in establishing the current CPA/IPP was that a pool of 600 trained police officers (composed of 60 percent RCMP and 40 percent other police-service partners) would be required to ensure the timely deployment of up to a maximum of 200 at any one time. Despite disbursing more than C$7.2 million in start-up costs in the first two fiscal years to create the standby pool,(25) interview data indicate that the RCMP experienced internal recruitment shortages and had difficulty in meeting the growing demand from priority IPP missions in Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan. Based on the evaluation's review of CPA Working Group meeting minutes, it was not until 2008 with the signing of a new series of partnership agreements with large police-service partners, i.e., Sûreté du Québec, the SPVM and the Toronto Police Service, that the CPA was able to secure sufficient deployment commitments to attain and then increase the authorized deployment levels for the same priority IPP missions.(26)
By 2010, the RCMP had signed partnership agreements with 23 police-service partners, which have contributed approximately 70 percent of all the police officers deployed through the CPA in the last two fiscal years--a proportion roughly inverse to what was originally envisaged. The cost implications of this development are discussed later in this report--see Section 8.5.2 Efficient and Economical Delivery Instruments. Furthermore, despite the expanding pool of police officers available for deployment, the CPA has not yet reached its targeted maximum capacity of 200 police officers deployed at any given time. The financial and human-resource constraints that have affected mission selection and authorized deployment commitment levels are discussed later in this report--see Section 8.5.3 Adequacy of Financial and Human Resources.
The CPA/IPP has demonstrated flexibility in its ability to support the GoC global security commitments and its domestic security interests in the selection of peace-support operations, and recently made effective use of the rapid deployment capacity to more fully assess all facets of Canadian foreign-policy interests to inform decision making.
The GoC acknowledged the important role of police peace-support operations in enhancing global security well before 2006, when the current iteration of the CPA was launched. It has supported multiple G-8 Summit declarations over the years to enhance the global capacity of member states, the DPKO and countries contributing FPUs. It has strengthened its relations with the UN, the EU and other allies through formal agreements and joint operations. Its commitment to employing a whole-of-government approach in a few selected countries also predates the current CPA/IPP and has been incrementally consistent over the years. The GoC's engagement in Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan has been substantial, reflecting their importance as foreign-policy priorities. Some of the key GoC commitments for peace-support operations to enhance global security over the years are listed below.
The CPA management framework is in itself a whole-of-government partnership between the four departments and agencies involved, each contributing their complementary expertise and/or resources. It also draws on Canada's own law-enforcement community composed of police services from three levels of government--federal, provincial and municipal--bringing a new dimension and meaning to the whole-of-government approach. The CPA is squarely focused on the government's priority countries for international engagement, with police peace-support operations in Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan, which collectively represent 75 percent of the police officers deployed through the CPA. Although smaller in numbers, the CPA has also deployed officers to EU police-support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan and West Bank and Gaza in support of its agreement with the EU.
While foreign-policy considerations were the principal rationale for Canada's engagements in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan, the former two locations also featured links to Canada's domestic security. For example, Afghanistan is the source of heroin for North America, and Haiti is a known conduit for narcotics into Canada. Canada's foreign policy is underpinned by the principle that a just and lasting peace is the key to resolving political, humanitarian and human rights crises. The CPA focus on Sudan is, in part, informed by this principle, but also by the concern for potential regional instability in neighbouring countries due to the availability of small arms and light weapons, and the potential for escalation in armed violence with future repercussions on global and domestic security.
The view that IPP operations should have a more obvious "domestic security benefit" has been raised by PS and RCMP governance committee members and noted in the meeting minutes since 2006, and more recently in interviews conducted by the evaluation. The CPA Working Group deliberations over how to respond to requests received from the DRC and Guatemala for Canadian assistance was symptomatic of this unresolved debate. However, the use of the CPA rapid deployment capacity to assess Canadian interests and priorities in these countries proved critical to resolving the issue, and the decisions made provide evidence of the CPA's flexibility to support Canada's global security commitments and domestic security interests as the needs and priorities of the GoC evolve.
As described in the MOU, the CPA included a rapid deployment capacity with an RCMP A-Base budget of C$500,000 annually to allow the RCMP to deploy its staff to join an integrated assessment or a fact-finding mission to a country where Canadian interests and priorities had been identified. In 2006 the CPA Working Group reviewed the terms of reference and confirmed that this capacity would support an early assessment team that could be done with partners or solo prior to seeking ministerial approval for an IPP operation. While the draft was to be submitted to the Steering Committee for approval, the evaluation was unable to find any related references or decisions in the Steering Committee meeting minutes, although subsequent CPA Working Group minutes noted the "approval with minor changes."(28)
Most of the governance committee members and RCMP staff interviewed either had no recollection of the rapid deployment capacity having been used as intended, with the exception of the 2010 assessment missions to the DRC and Guatemala. However, based on CPA Working Group meeting minutes, several other assessment "reconnaissance" missions were proposed and/or undertaken by the RCMP in the following countries: Jordan (2006), Lebanon (2007), Sierra Leone (2007), Haiti (2007), the West Bank and Gaza (2008), Sudan (2008), Afghanistan (2008) and Kosovo (2008). There is only one reference to a written assessment mission report, i.e., for Sudan, having been tabled for review by the CPA Working Group, although a verbal debrief was also noted for Kosovo. The lack of official reporting on the findings of assessment missions was a source of dissatisfaction among some governance committee members. Nevertheless, the 2010 assessment missions to the DRC and Guatemala were circulated to the CPA Working Group members and did inform their discussions and decision-making process with regard to the recommendations made to approve these IPP operations.
CPA/IPP expected outcomes adequately and reasonably reflect the performance expectations of the CPA participants for IPP operations. The development-oriented results are well aligned and relevant to both DFAIT and CIDA mandates to support fragile and conflict-affected states, while PS and the RCMP consistently identified their participation in the IPP/CPA as key objectives and results in their respective RPPs and DPRs.
DFAIT's strategic priorities, expected results and countries of focus have been very consistent during the time frame of the current CPA, which the interview data suggest has facilitated the alignment of performance expectations. DFAIT's 2006-07 RPP included as a priority "a more secure world for Canada and Canadians, safer from the threats of failed and fragile states, terrorism, transnational crime and weapons of mass destruction," while related expected results refer to more timely, coordinated, whole-of-government responses to international crises, improved stability of FCASs that have an increased capacity to counter terrorism, corruption and transnational crime. The countries of focus included then, as they do now, Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. Peace-support operations and peacebuilding continued to be important sub-activities in the 2009-10 RPP. In support thereof, START has taken on greater importance in supporting Canada's priorities, such as rule of law, good governance and human rights.(29) The CPA's expected development outcomes, as stated in the FY 2006-07 Annual Plan, continue to be directly aligned with these GoC priorities.
The CPA is well aligned with the CIDA mandate and priority on supporting FCASs. As reflected in the Agency's respective RPPs and DPRs since 2005, there has been a redefinition and focusing of roles and mandates in these complex contexts, with the lead for peace and security programming progressively being passed from CIDA to DFAIT. However, CIDA maintains the lead on humanitarian and longer-term development assistance, including governance, health, private-sector development, education and environment programming. Approximately 25 percent of all CIDA expenditures, and 40 percent of all CIDA bilateral programming go to FCASs, which is a program activity under the Agency's RPP. CIDA has been involved in four priority FCASs: Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan and West Bank/Gaza. For CIDA, the CPA expected outcomes are therefore very relevant, since they would contribute to a more secure operating environment for its personnel to undertake humanitarian emergency relief and development activities. The leadership for ensuring that this happens remains, however, primarily with DFAIT and the RCMP.
Public Safety Canada's 2006-07 DPR cites the government's approval of the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Program in support of Canada's foreign policy. The related expected outcome under the Law Enforcement Policing Policy sub-activity refers to the creation of "a permanent program within the RCMP to allow for an appropriate capacity of police officers to deliver international peace operations abroad."(30) The 2009-10 RPP describes the law enforcement program activity as contributing "to the building of a safe and resilient Canada by working to ensure that Canada has safe communities and effective policing."(31) It was noted by the evaluation that the national security program activity has leadership responsibility for supporting whole-of-government priorities, like Afghanistan, and is better aligned to the relevant GoC outcome area, i.e., "Safe and secure world through international cooperation."(32)
The 2006-2007 RPP had five strategic priorities, two of which involved international policing to reduce the impact of organized crime and terrorism on Canada. Police peacekeeping and peace operations were described in the 2008-09 DPR as a benefit to Canada through the disruption of terrorist and criminal activity. The CPA/IPP is currently aligned with the RCMP's strategic outcome for "quality federal policing" and is referred to under the federal and international operations program activity designed to improve the security of Canadians through international policing and peacekeeping. In the 2009-10 RPP, the CPA/IPP as a component of the international policing program sub-activity and contributes to the achievement of expected results that are domestic focused; the most relevant being "enhanced national and international partnerships to maximize domestic security."(33) This is accomplished by reducing the threat and impact of organized crime and terrorism on Canada through the involvement in police peacekeeping and peace operations in FCASs such as Afghanistan and Haiti.
Recommendations to approve IPP operations contained in memorandums to ministers were justified using the guidelines with summary assessments for each, attached as an annex in all but five cases. This indicates a high level of consistency in the application and use of the assessment guidelines, while pressures to reduce the length of ministerial memos explain the more recent exceptions. What the evaluation did not find in the available documentation was a similarly well-documented justification for the rejection of requests for Canadian police and peace operations support.
Documentary content analysis of the action memos revealed that the recommendations to approve IPP operations were justified using the guidelines and factors, and in all but five cases, the summary assessments for each were attached as an annex. Some of the exceptions are noteworthy, especially for the recent recommendations and approval of IPP operations in the DRC and Guatemala in 2010. What the evaluation did not find in the available documentation, particularly in the CPA Working Group meeting minutes, was a similarly well-documented justification for the rejection of requests for Canadian police and peace operations support.
For example, in May 2008 the CPA Working Group had declined a request for Canadian assistance to the DRC in relation to the purported massacre in North Kivu for reason of other pressing priorities. In July 2008 the CPA Working Group also declined a request for assistance from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (ICIG), again for reasons of other priorities at that time. Subsequent CPA Working Group decisions to recommend deployment to both of these countries suggest that either the selection guidelines do not provide an adequate filter for rejecting or perhaps accepting requests for assistance, or they are being applied in an inconsistent manner.
Interviews conducted with CPA governance committee members indicate a general recognition among the committee members that the selection guidelines and assessment factors are so numerous and broadly formulated that they could be used to justify almost any decision.(34) While a review of the selection guidelines and perhaps an incorporation of the criteria from PS's international strategic framework for assessing international engagement priorities were proposed, the CPA Working Group meeting minutes did not include a corresponding action point. Although the guidelines have been updated, the evaluation found no evidence of a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the guidelines to ascertain their continued relevance and effectiveness as a strategic selection tool.
The federal government policy context has evolved considerably since 2006, resulting in some important shifts between and within the CPA participants in the centres of competence and capacity related to peace and security, SSR and international policing.
The IPP program is a foreign-policy instrument of the GoC designed to contribute to global security and, as such, DFAIT has the lead role in coordinating government-wide efforts on critical international security issues, including responses to natural disasters; stabilization and reconstruction efforts in FCASs; counterterrorism; counter-narcotics; and transnational organized crime. DFAIT/START was created in September 2005, and coordinates whole-of-government policy, program engagements and responses to crises, peace operations, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. To fulfill its role and ensure government-wide cohesion, the START Secretariat works collaboratively with a wide range of federal partners through a multi-tiered governance structure. The START Advisory Board, chaired by the START Secretariat Director General, includes representatives from CIDA, DND, PCO, the DOJ, PS and some PS portfolio agencies. It is an information-sharing body that provides a forum for structured consultations on priority-setting, including the review of the Fragile States Prioritization Exercise recommendations. The aim is to endorse strategic policy objectives for a whole-of-government response and engagement in crises and fragile states, including the review of GPSF Country Strategic Planning Frameworks.
The START Secretariat manages the GPSF, which funds the IPP program incremental costs and provides urgent contributions to crisis response operations, e.g., the Haiti earthquake, as well as much-needed project funding that complements CPA/IPP operations to strengthen SSR.(35) It is a well-documented fact that international police peacekeeping operations alone are ineffective without this complementary programming in justice and corrections to complete the SSR triad. START's use of the GPSF to support IPP operations and to implement a Canadian SSR approach, particularly in Afghanistan and Haiti, as well as convening a new interdepartmental working group on SSR, demonstrates the intellectual leadership role it is playing in Canadian peace-support operations.
As previously mentioned in this report, peace and security programming had been an important CIDA strategic priority working collaboratively with DFAIT, PS and the RCMP on an ad hoc basis prior to the current version of the CPA/IPP. CIDA no longer has a peace and security mandate per se, with responsibility for this area of policy and programming having been largely assumed by DFAIT. However, much capacity resides in country-specific programming units, with policy cohesion and coordination provided by the Strategic Policy and Performance Branch (SPPB). As such, the SPPB's Strategic Policy Division now represents CIDA on the governance committees in the absence of any other centre of program competence, and consults with country programs in providing technical advice.
Public Safety Canada is the acknowledged policy lead for public safety, which is not delimited by geopolitical boundaries or borders. Canada's national security requires PS to examine international peace and security issues, e.g., transnational drug trafficking and organized crime operating in different regions of the world. It leads on the coordination of input from the agencies within its portfolio on specific aspects of SSR and IPP operations. The CPA is consistent with the PS mandate and priorities to enhance national security by supporting whole-of-government initiatives such as in Afghanistan, where personnel from the RCMP, CSC and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) have been deployed. However, responsibility for national security and whole-of-government initiatives, such as Afghanistan, fall under the Strategic Policy Branch, International Affairs Division accountability.(36)
A review of PS's 2010-11 Work Plan and confirmed during staff interviews revealed that the Strategic Policy Branch, International Affairs Division, has a strong international orientation and mandate; in comparison, the Strategic Policing Policy and Events Division, Law Enforcement Branch, which represents PS on the CPA governance committees, does not have an express international orientation and mandate.(37) While the evaluation acknowledges the effective role that the latter has played in the past, it would appear that the Strategic Policy Branch, International Affairs Division would have expertise and an interest in international policing that is very relevant to the CPA, given that it is responsible for the following activities: 1) Advance SSR by providing leadership and coordination on behalf of its portfolio agencies at whole-of-government committees responsible for developing international SSR projects; 2) Shape the Afghanistan mission up to 2011 and post-2011 by providing support to Minister, Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister Afghanistan committees; 3) Implement the PS International Strategic Framework (ISF) by assessing international opportunities, reporting on the alignment of activities and advising the minister and senior management.
On July 21, 1988 an Order in Council was approved by the Governor General to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act giving it the mandate to employ police officers outside of Canada. More specifically, Section 4 of the RCMP Act provides that "[T]he Force may be employed in such places within or outside Canada as the Governor in Council prescribes."(38) The RCMP's mandate includes preventing and investigating crime; maintaining peace and order; enforcing laws; contributing to national security; ensuring the safety of state officials, visiting dignitaries and foreign missions; and providing vital operational support services to other police and law-enforcement agencies within Canada and abroad. This globalization of public safety and security has required collaboration with its domestic and international partners at all levels toward common purposes, shared values and priority initiatives. To address this challenge the RCMP adopted an Integrated Policing model, which has been the defining model for implementing its mandate over the past decade.(39) It is characterized by shared strategic priorities, free flow of intelligence, interoperability, seamless service delivery and economies of scale. Figure 1 captures the various elements of the model, including partners and stakeholders, program activities and strategic priorities.
Figure 1: RCMP Integrated Policing Model
Challenges of international policing require partnerships and relationship building and, as the model illustrates, provincial and municipal police services are important partners with whom the RCMP has had a history of collaboration. The CPA has benefited from this collaboration as the increased participation of these police-service partners has contributed significantly to expanding the pool of available police officers for deployment on IPP operations and consequently enhancing the GoC's ability to fulfill its international commitments. In fact, the proportionate participation of RCMP and partners' police officers over the last two years reflects the law-enforcement community in Canada, with 30 percent RCMP and 70 percent other police-service partners.
While the evaluation has not been able to obtain documented evidence that provincial and municipal police-service partners have legal mandates to be employed outside of Canada, interview data suggest the CPA is consistent with their mandates and capacity, although there is some variability in this regard. For example, the involvement of some police-service partners has been interrupted or reduced over the years due to changes in provincial and municipal government views on the added value of the deployment experience of police officers involved and the subsequent improved quality of domestic police services. It was also noted by some police-service partners that they do not have redundant capacity that they can use to backfill for police officers released to participate in IPP operations, and that the additional cost in times of fiscal constraint cannot be supported. Nevertheless, police-service partners have demonstrated that they have the interest and competencies required to participate, and have played an instrumental role in the evolution of the CPA, contributing to its effectiveness over a short few years.
The CPA participants have, for the most part, fulfilled their responsibilities as stated in the MOU with a few important exceptions, leaving the RCMP to assume more managerial responsibility, ownership and accountability than was originally envisaged. CIDA has worked to refine its role within the CPA to better reflect its accountabilities and the roles of partner departments; something that is now reflected in the renewed MOU signed by the three concerned ministers, which took effect in March 2011.
The 2006 MOU, which defines the managerial and accountability relationships between the signatories, sets out in considerable detail the respective roles and responsibilities of the participants. Some of these responsibilities were general in nature and common to all the participants, such as liaising and coordinating with each other, providing advice to participants' ministers, and providing substantive input to Steering Committee and CPA Working Group discussions. The other responsibilities followed the typical program management cycle, with each participant identified as either primarily responsible or a contributor, depending on their respective overall roles. While the general consensus among the governance committee members interviewed by the evaluation is that the interdepartmental relationships were cordial and all participants generally fulfilled their roles as expected, there are some noteworthy exceptions that the evaluation has identified as the source of some discord.
For example, the Annual Plan was to be prepared by DFAIT with contributions from the other participants. DFAIT fulfilled this responsibility until 2008-09 when it prepared its last "Canadian Police Arrangement Annual Plan." The following year, the RCMP IPOB prepared the "Annual Strategy Plan for International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations" and has continued to fulfill this responsibility. Similarly, the CPA Annual Report was to be initially prepared by the RCMP with contributions from all participants and finalized by the CPA Working Group. This appeared to be the case up to the "Canadian Police Arrangement Annual Report 2007-2008" when thereafter the RCMP IPOB took greater ownership and produced the "Annual Report 2008-2009 for International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations." Based on governance committee interview data, the recent annual plans and reports have been prepared by the RCMP without much input from the other participants, and presented each year to the Steering Committee without too many questions.
The CPA MOU specified that DFAIT was responsible for coordinating and preparing the assessment of requests for proposed IPP operations against the assessment guidelines, as described previously in this report. Although a very important stage in the program-management cycle, there were no specific guidelines or operational procedures defined as to how this was to take place and what the respective roles of each participant would be in the assessment process. DFAIT generally received the requests for Canadian assistance and consulted internally beforehand on their pertinence, so was better prepared to assess the requests than the other participants. Concerns regarding respective roles and responsibilities in applying the assessment guidelines were raised by CPA Working Group members in 2010. While the following clarifications were communicated, subsequent CPA Working Group meeting minutes were not available to the evaluation in order to assess whether there was agreement by the members or whether there was further need for clarification or definition of roles and responsibilities in this regard:
An Operational Plan for each IPP operation was to be developed by the RCMP consistent with the content of the Action Memo and subsequent to ministerial approval. DFAIT was to prepare the expected foreign-policy results and CIDA the expected development results.(40) The evaluation found evidence of one such Operational Plan having been completed for Afghanistan in 2009; however neither DFAIT nor CIDA was involved in defining the expected results. Monthly Operations Reports for each IPP operation were to be prepared by the RCMP, submitted to PS for review and analysis, and transmitted to the CPA Working Group. Based on a review of the reports and interview data, the evaluation found that contingent commanders were delegated the responsibility and the reports were submitted monthly to the RCMP and subsequently disseminated to the CPA Working Group members without review, revision or analysis by the PS; this was confirmed by the interview data. The evaluation also found no evidence of final assessments on the expected results having been completed upon the termination of an IPP operation.
While the CPA MOU sets out the respective responsibilities of DFAIT and the RCMP for financial management and reporting, it also required that they execute a side agreement that would include additional detail on the following: the opening of another government department (OGD) suspense account to pay for incremental costs; information on the details and timing of payments; responsibility for overseeing reporting on results by the recipient; monitoring, audit and evaluation arrangements; and a reference and organizational code. The evaluation found no evidence that this side agreement had ever been executed and attributes this oversight with the subsequent misunderstandings and issues that have arisen with regard to financial management and reporting. While IPP operations and deployment costs (both A-Base and incremental) were reported annually, the evaluation found no evidence that "an annual consolidated financial report of the A-Base program"(41) was ever produced by the RCMP,(42) forwarded to PS for review and analysis, or presented to the CPA Working Group as stipulated in the MOU. Based on RCMP interview data and content analysis of the governance committee meeting minutes, there was apparently no awareness among the participants that this responsibility had been overlooked. In fact, the subject of RCMP A-Base costs was first officially raised during a CPA Working Group meeting held in July 2010, when the RCMP reported a shortage of CPA funds and proposed possible spending cuts.
The evaluation also assessed the extent to which CPA participants continued to have relevant roles in the CPA, and the unanimous interview response was positive for all currently involved. As described above, each participant, with the exception of CIDA, has enhanced and/or created new centres of competence relevant to the CPA. Content analysis of the governance committee meeting minutes also revealed that in November 2007 CIDA questioned whether it was necessary to have its minister sign-off on new deployments, first proposed to withdraw from the CPA in April 2008 and repeatedly thereafter until September 2010. Nevertheless, all governance committee members felt that CIDA should remain involved because of its important presence in the countries where IPP operations were supported by the CPA, the potential for synergy between its development strategies and initiatives with IPP operations, and to remain informed of the evolving security conditions and efforts to create the space needed to provide humanitarian and development assistance. However, the interview data suggest that fulfilling this role in the future would be served by a more direct and systematic engagement of country program staff during CPA Working Group discussions on specific countries or new deployments.
The initial assumption of a 60/40 split between the contribution of RCMP and other police-service partners to IPP operations did not materialize, resulting in a much greater reliance on the latter to meet commitments, a reality that is not adequately reflected in the CPA design. As a consequence, police-service partners are feeling disenfranchised by the decision-making processes in which they have little input.
Given the evolution of the CPA and the current proportion of police officers from police-service partners being deployed on IPP operations (70 percent), the evaluation sought their opinions as to whether they felt they had relevant roles in the CPA. Albeit small in number, but representing major police-service contributors, these officers' opinions are important and unanimous on the following points: they are insufficiently integrated into the decision-making processes of the CPA, and treated by the RCMP as service providers as opposed to partners. The evaluation has noted that annual general meetings of police-service partners were organized by the RCMP IPOB in April 2006 and October 2008, however the feedback from police-service partners was that these were information sessions rather than consultations. It was also noted that the police-service partner planning and management of the available police officers for deployment is challenged by a reported lack of timely consultations with the partners on operational decisions that affect them.
The CPA/IPP has become a Canadian model for a whole-of-government approach to civilian deployment because of its standby capacity, relative speed and flexibility in responding to the needs of FCASs. IPP operations could benefit from better coordination with complementary SSR initiatives in justice and corrections to enhance their effectiveness.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 10 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (Text Box 1) included the capacity to act quickly and flexibly when responding to the needs of FCASs. The CPA has demonstrated a capacity to plan and develop rapid and coordinated whole-of-government responses to requests for Canadian contributions. Its strength derives largely from the establishment of flexible administrative and service delivery processes, e.g., contractual, candidate selection, health screening, training, equipment, etc., elements that facilitate the deployment of police officers when needed.
According to the 2008 Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund, significant challenges were identified in developing cost-effective arrangements to engage civilian expertise from within OGDs and civil society organizations. Despite what was then a lack of a whole-of-government management framework for civilian deployment,(43) Canada deploys approximately 300 full-time civilians per year, of whom two thirds are police officers deployed through the CPA. As the report pointed out, "replicating this [CPA] model, or some variant thereof, with other OGDs (e.g., Elections Canada, Corrections Canada, etc,) remains a work in progress and developing capacities within OGDs and financial compensation arrangements to facilitate expert deployments is critical to the realization of the mandate."(44) A similar stable funding framework as provided by the CPA is needed to support the effective engagement of other civilian experts, i.e., corrections officers, justice and border officials, in SSR activities.
The interview data from DPKO staff in New York indicate that the CPA has demonstrated its capacity to respond to UN requests and deploy police officers for approved UN missions in a timely manner and in accordance with DPKO standards.(45) The selection criteria and requisites to deploy a police officer are as follows: aged between 25 and 62, five years of experience, one year of driving experience, basic computer skills.(46) The DPKO interview data indicate that Canadian police officers achieved very good performance in meeting the guidelines on peacekeeping operation assignments, as evidenced in the following statement: "Canadians are really well trained, well prepared, well equipped, and all Canadian mechanisms are put in place for pre-deployment training, medical examination and to allow disbursement of monthly salary allowance (MSA)."
Based on DPKO interview data, approximately 86 countries are deploying police officers for three to nine months to UN missions for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and capacity-building missions. While DPKO staff noted deployment delays for all countries, Canada's delays range from a minimum of around three months (Haiti) to around six months (Sudan), which is comparable to France and United States. Long deployment delays, however, are more often due to external factors beyond the RCMP's control. For example, in FY 2010-11 there was a five-month delay in deploying police officers into Sudan as they awaited visas. A wide range of interview data with CPA participant representatives indicates that CPA deployments are generally done in a timely manner. Despite some organizational difficulties and some services that still remain to be developed and/or improved (see Section 8.5.3 Adequacy of Financial and Human Resources), RCMP IPOB staff estimate that it has taken an average of two months to deploy to the 18 IPP operations carried out between 2006 and 2011.
The CPA has proven to be a very flexible tool for the participants, allowing for the reconciliation of their respective priorities and interests, particularly between the DFAIT and PS. DFAIT's priorities included economics, security and diplomacy: greater economic opportunity for Canada, with a focus on growing/emerging markets, U.S. and the Americas, Afghanistan, including in the context of neighbouring countries; and asserting Canadian leadership in emerging global governance. PS priorities focus on national security: emergency management, crime prevention and corrections policy. Each request for IPP assistance was assessed against the 12 factors in the Guidelines for Assessing Requests for Canadian Contributions to Peace-Support Operations, as outlined in the CPA policy framework. The justification and intended results of proposed IPP operations were incorporated into the memorandums to participants' ministers as part of the approval process. Content analysis of these "Action Memos" reveals that selection and deployment approvals reflect GoC foreign policy, international assistance, as well as national security interests.(47)
The IPP operations in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan were accordingly assessed as strong priorities in terms of Canadian foreign-policy interest and domestic-security interest. Haiti is considered to be central to Canada's engagement in the Americas, and is the largest bilateral program in the region. Canada's objective in Afghanistan, the single largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid, has for the past 10 years been to help build a more secure, stable and self-sufficient Afghanistan that will no longer be a safe haven for terrorists. Canada's involvement in Sudan is consistent with Canada's core values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and in support of previous G-8 commitments to peace and stability in Africa.
As defined in the Canadian Guidelines for Security-System Reform: "SSR involves core law and security entities as well as their oversight mechanisms. These may include military and police forces, police commissions, the criminal justice sector, correctional services, border management agencies, intelligence agencies, executive bodies (including relevant ministries), parliament, financial management bodies, etc.(…) Civil society also has a role of oversight in a holistic security system, through the participation and the expertise of professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy organizations, religious organizations, and community groups."(48)
IPP operations are critical to longer-term security-system reform and conflict-prevention efforts, but are known to be more effective when undertaken in conjunction with other SSR initiatives: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs; small arms and light weapons control; transitional justice initiatives and institutional reform; and correctional system reforms, etc. Based on DPKO interview data, Canadians are contributing to SSR in UN missions when enhancing national police-force capacity, but the SSR approach is actually difficult to implement as internal and external factors have often prevented effective delivery. For example, in Afghanistan - Kandahar, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan, open conflict and armed violence present a serious security risk that limits the mobility of civilian experts. The SSR approach was abandoned by the UN in Côte d'Ivoire because of the ongoing civil war, while in Sudan it is also not being fully applied because of the severe security risks that civilians face. For example, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) implements some capacity-building programs, but the mission is focused primarily on maintaining security and the rule of law among civilian populations.
In MINUSTAH, the SSR approach was given more importance with the arrival of the Canadian Police Commissioner, who restarted and further developed the Haitian National Police (HNP) Reform Plan. This involved, among others things, the reform of the legislative system for two to five years. The long-term challenge for UN missions, compared to bilateral programs, is to preserve continuity in the application of the SSR approach, despite the rotations of strategic position holders and police officers. Despite these difficulties in SSR implementation, the UN is dedicated to implementing the approach, evidenced by the fact that the SSR Unit reports directly to the Assistant Secretary-General and the DPKO Police Division has seven police officers who work on SSR issues to ensure coherence between police, justice and correctional reform activities.
Although the Canadian SSR Guidelines are recent, the value of the approach has long been recognized by DFAIT's START, which uses the GPSF to support the policing operations and other SSR initiatives. While CPA facilitates the rapid deployment of police officers, other civilian experts--approximately 100 per year--are also deployed to the same FCAS. Out of the 10 CPA missions in progress in 2010, the Afghanistan and Haiti missions account for the majority of other civilian experts deployed, including correctional services and/or diplomatic and development personnel. Figure 2 charts the deployment numbers as of December 2010: the Canadian mission in Haiti deployed 10 soldiers, 132 police officers and 17 correctional agents; the Afghanistan mission numbered 2,830 soldiers, 39 police officers, 4 correctional agents, 46 diplomatic agents and 26 development agents. As confirmed by the interview data, it appears that the opportunities for deploying other Canadian civilian experts are much improved when the overall Canadian engagement is relatively significant and the contingent of soldiers and/or police officers sufficiently robust to create the secure space within which civilian experts can operate.
Figure 2: Canadian Government Personnel Deployed to International Peace Operations
Nevertheless, even in larger UN missions such as Haiti, the deployment of police, corrections, justice and border personnel is perhaps not as strategic and coordinated as it could be. A 2008 study based on 70 confidential interviews with key informants concludes that the integration of SSR experts, their cooperation and communications has been flawed and that "After two and a half years, UN SSR action in Haiti has made limited progress."(49) While the CPA has ensured a whole-of-government approach among the Ottawa-based participants, coordination of country-level programming in SSR remains a challenge, as described in a 2009 DFAIT Briefing Note:
Similar observations have been found in the more recent literature on the UN mission in Haiti(51) and by strategic position holders interviewed by the evaluation. So, while to date no comprehensive SSR approach has been adopted by the UN mission, the interview data and project documentation provided to the evaluation also attest to the fact that there are some aspects of SSR being undertaken, primarily through START and funded through the GPSF.
The role of SSR was initially intended to provide an enabling environment for economic and social development, the rule of law, and political stability in FCASs. It has been viewed for almost a decade as a key strategy in international efforts at stabilization and reconstruction to assist conflict-affected states at transitioning from war to peace. More recently, the literature on SSR has also explored the links between international and domestic security interests.(52) The Canadian SSR Guidelines point out the important role of SSR in combatting transnational organized crime, especially when states do not have the resources to do it effectively themselves.
If the SSR concept has come to be seen as a crucial tool to stabilize FCASs and facilitate transitions to peace, the value of SSR is no longer limited to its capacity to provide an enabling environment for development programming in impoverished and fragile states. IPP operations are an essential component of the SSR approach and can play a key role in mitigating the export of security threats from those unstable countries to Canada and its allies. To be implemented, SSR and IPP operations have to be understood as a holistic process that affects every sector of the security system. The Canadian SSR Guidelines note, for example, that undertaking police reform without taking appropriate legislative steps or ensuring reforms and adequate resourcing so that the court and correction systems can respond to newly created demands will undercut the effectiveness of police reform, thereby undermining the credibility of the wider political process itself. Canada's engagement depends on the level and type of contributions of other donors, as well as on the expressed interest of the host state. Police reform--building the capacity of local police institutions through training and mentoring as well as supplying infrastructure and equipment--should be undertaken to help states reform their security system, thereby benefiting the local populations and enhancing Canada's domestic security.
The CPA/IPP has positioned Canada as a respected and reliable contributing country to international police peacekeeping and peace-support operations, particularly in UN missions. While the Canadian police officers deployed are well trained and demonstrate a high standard of professionalism, they are relatively few in number in all but a handful of missions, and are sometimes assigned positions that are not commensurate with their expertise. Until now, the Canadian contribution to enhancing international capacity is more fully realized in a small number of missions with a relatively large Canadian contingent along with some strategic position holders.
Since 2006, the CPA/IPP has established Canada as a stable contributor with a proven expertise pool for international policing and peace-support operations. Canada is ranked 16th out of the 103 country contributors of UN Police Officers (UNPOL) with 159 Canadian police officers deployed on UN missions as of March 2011; it is in 22nd place if Formed Police Unit (FPU) deployments are taken into account.(54) Most G-8 and industrialized countries do not deploy FPUs, although 14 countries do so, among which are Jordan, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. However, Canada is the leader among G-8 member states and industrialized countries deploying the most individual police officers to UN missions.
The Canadian deployment included 16 women in March 2011, which is the 17th largest provider of women police officers in the UN missions, and the first, among the industrialized countries. Australia follows with about 13 women police officers. This contribution is very well appreciated by the UN in consideration of the low proportion of women among United Nations peacekeeping staff at the headquarters and on the field. The Special Committee continues to urge the DPKO and member states to take all required measures to increase the participation of women in any aspect and at any level of peacekeeping operations to promote gender equality and empowerment of women in IPP operations.(55)
In total, DPKO is currently deploying a 7,027 UNPOL force, composed of about 6,000 men and 1,000 women, and 7,676 FPU force for a total number of 14,703 police officers. This compares to total UN authorized deployments of 17,303 within the framework of 11 UN missions around the world: six in Africa (Sudan, Darfur, Côte d'Ivoire, LiberiaDemocratic Republic of the Congo and Western Africa), one in the Americas (Haiti), one in Europe (Kosovo), and three in Asia (Afghanistan, West-Timor and Cyprus).
The DPKO staff noted a gap of 2,600 police officers, representing 15 percent of the DPKO police deployment authorized as of March 2011. For instance, there still exists a need for 1,311 police officers to fill UNAMID, a gap of 20 percent of the authorized number, a need for six police officers for UNAMA, a gap of 75 percent of the authorized number, and a need for 813 officers for MINUSTAH, a gap of 20 percent of the authorized number.
Compared to the total number of deployments the DPKO has to coordinate, Canada deploys a very small share of the UN peacekeeping operation deployments. As of March 2011, Canada was deploying about 3 percent of the total number of UNPOL and primarily into five UN missions, e.g., MINUSTAH in Haiti and MONUSCO in the DRC. Only Democratic Republic of Congo, ONUCI, in Cote d'Ivoire, UNAMID, in Darfur and UNMIS in Sudan (See Table 1). Generally, Canada deploys very in Haiti, where the CPA deployed 10 percent of the total number of the UNPOL, does the Canadian contingent represent more than 1 percent to 2 percent of the UN mission deployment total, as presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Data on Canadian Police Deployment in UN DPKO Missions
|UN DPKO Missions||CAN|
|ONUCI (Côte d'Ivoire)||0||5||5||19||325||344||2||0||952||1,296||1,350||4|
Since 2000, the increase around the world in the number of UN peace operations, including police peacekeeping components, led to an increased and expanded role for the DPKO Police Division. The situation was discussed during the last meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which "recognizes the growing need to build institutional police capacity in post-conflict environments."(56) DPKO interview data from the Police Division and the DPKO Strategic Policy and Development Section indicate an expressed concern with the growing gap between the demand and availability of police officer resources, especially those that could be deployed into French peacekeeping missions, which are becoming more and more numerous. Unlike the military, police officers interact more with civilians and the knowledge of the national language is indisputably an important asset for UNPOL.
According to DPKO staff, the scarcity of French-speaking police officers is all the more disconcerting given the quality of Canadian police officers. In fact, Canadian police officers are distinguished from the other international police officers upon their arrival at the UN mission, be it by their preparation, their ethics, their polyvalence, their expertise or leadership. According to DPKO interview data, Canada has made a tremendous contribution to building the capacity of the HNP because of the deployment numbers, but also because of their language skills and professionalism. Canadian police officers are well known for their expertise and their way of policing, particularly their community-based policing. This approach is highly relevant, according to many observers, in all countries, even in South Sudan where the ongoing violence and security risks are such that there are few opportunities to demonstrate this approach through mentoring Sudanese counterparts.
The Canadian added value is harder to observe in the UN missions where the CPA sends small contingents, like in Cote-d'Ivoire, especially if the positions assigned to the police officers are not strategic and are unrelated to their competencies. Canadian police officers who participated in the evaluation focus group sessions had remarked that they had held various positions during their deployment, some of them taking the initiative to apply for key positions after having initially been assigned to a position unrelated to their area of expertise and competence. Some Canadian police officers were eventually assigned to strategic positions, others became technical advisors to the senior management of the national police forces (e.g, Jordan and Haiti), while others became informal leaders of their units, like in Afghanistan, during dangerous patrol missions on the streets of Kandahar. Nevertheless, the attribution of results to small contingents with only a few strategic position holders is challenging unless documented on an ongoing basis.
As noted in a Performance Review of the Canadian Police Arrangement (2002), the UN Policy Framework for assigning police officers to positions adheres to a "policy of national balance" among all contributing countries.(57) This means that a UN mission does not always manage to assign Canadian police officers to duties where their specialized expertise is required. This consequently has an impact on the performance of the Canadian resources invested and the effectiveness of the UN mission.
Lately, the UN Special Committee acknowledged the necessity to intensify dialogue among member states and the Secretariat on ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Regarding UN police capacities, the Special Committee recognized "the need to recruit qualified personnel for police components of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations (…)."(58) The view was that police officers should be matched with positions that make the best use of their specific areas of expertise. UN mission police commissioners are encouraged to carefully review résumés and assign police officers according to their expertise, and while an "effort is made to comply" according to DPKO staff, the proper representation of police from troop-contributing countries into strategic positions remains an important consideration.
"Opportunities for Canadian leadership" is often used as a justification for deploying small contingents of police officer to countries where Canada's overall engagement is less significant, as evidenced in this statement in the CPA 2006-2007 Annual Plan:
While some deployments to strategic positions can be cited, the evaluation found no systematically collected data to support the view, held by some CPA participants, that Canadian police officers hold a relatively higher percentage of strategic positions in UN missions than other contributing nations. In fact, the interview data indicate that progress is still slow and Canadian police officers are sometimes under-employed, i.e., their skills and competencies are not optimized through the current UN position-assignment process.
"The single, most important staffing challenge facing the policing component is obtaining qualified police officers who have the requisite linguistic, informatics and policing skills to assist the PNH in their work. Before even these fundamental skills can be hoped to be obtained, significant hurdles must be overcome regarding the lack of qualified drivers in the mission."
Since the 2002 CPA evaluation, it has been observed that getting influential positions for Canadian police officers in UN missions is not being facilitated through representations and lobbying.(60) As noted in a broad range of interview data, there is a need to better define the Canadian contingent's role in a UN mission and within the context of Canada's overall investment in the country. For example, to develop a more strategic approach to deployments of Canadian police officers within MINUSTAH to ensure that their expertise is being used to address the needs and priorities for the reform of the HNP includes identifying a more precise niche for Canada's engagement, e.g., community policing.
Roles and responsibilities for making representations and lobbying could be more strategic and better defined between the CPA participants and with the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, according to the interview data. In 2008, the CPA created a Canadian Police Advisor position (PRMNY) at the Permanent Mission in New York who liaises with DPKO and advises the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations on police issues, especially in terms of UNPOL deployment and the work of the Strategic Police Advisory Group (SPAG).(61) The Canadian Police Advisor position holds considerable promise for two-way communication of the strengths and weaknesses of Canadian contributions to UN peace-support operations.
In the 2009 Review of Conflict-Related International Policing,(62) it was pointed out that failing to deploy police officers with the right skills and experience to fulfill specific roles is seen as a key problem. Most UNPOL contributors identified the lack of expertise as the most important capacity gap--skills and experience in mentoring, advising, consulting and analysis. In its description of the CPA, the study also points out that the use of general job requirements largely based on UNPOL models has not succeeded to ensure that competency requirements are always met during the recruitment and selection process, and suggests that "new competency-based selection and management tools are required."(63) The evaluation interview data corroborate the report findings and also indicates that IPOB must continue to perfect its recruitment and selection processes so as to choose the appropriate candidates for the position requirements, whether it's the role of Police Commissioner, senior advisor, staff trainer or mentor. DPKO interview data also pointed out the need of more ranked police officers from Canada in order to fill some key positions. "We noticed that UN requests for senior leaders are not answered all the time. Canada has to address senior leadership issue and provide candidates with the right qualifications."
While the design of the CPA contributed significantly to its performance, it did not take fully into account the RCMP institutional and human resource capacity constraints, or the important role that police-service partners would assume.
The CPA in design contributed to the achievement of stated objectives of strengthening the GoC's ability to plan and develop rapid and coordinated whole-of-government responses to international crises and fragile states in support of Canadian foreign assistance priorities and enhancing international capacity to promote the rule of law. As pointed out in Section 8.4.1, the CPA mechanism has become a model for other Canadian agencies deploying civilian experts and has provided a stable pool of police officers to EUPOL and UN missions since 2006. The stable funding, operational governance committees, IPOB institutional infrastructure and the PRMNY liaison position to DPKO have all contributed to the performance of the program.
It should be noted, however, that the CPA design and its underlying assumptions did not take sufficiently into consideration the challenges of establishing a permanent IPP operations program where only ad hoc arrangements previously existed. For example, the institutional capacity building that had to take place within the RCMP to establish a more robust organizational structure in IPOB was not factored into the deployment performance targets. The RCMP had to put in place all the mechanisms, procedures and services required to send police officers abroad, such as health services and contract management services to facilitate the involvement of provincial and municipal police-service partners. In 2011, IPOB had to negotiate new partnership agreements with the 28 police-service partners whose increasing involvement in the IPP program as contributors and stakeholders had not been factored into the design of the 2006 IPP costing model, which has since resulted in some cost-accounting issues.(64) Nevertheless, the RCMP IPOB has adjusted to the unplanned circumstances and built a huge network all over Canada with police-service partners in order to be able to reach the objectives of the program.
The CPA governance structures have been effective in addressing operational management challenges, which the CPA mandate required, but not in responding to the strategic opportunities to consolidate and expand the CPA and communicate its successes.
The implementation of the CPA/IPP represented significant challenges for the participants. They had to build a standing capacity to provide IPP support in a timely manner where one did not exist before, meet the ever-growing demand for Canadian IPP support, establish the organizational structures and administrative capacities to address these challenges, and then manage the allocated financial and HR efficiently and effectively. The CPA Working Group has played an instrumental role over the years in addressing some of these challenges.
For example, in 2006 the CPA Working Group discussed the role of municipal and provincial partner police forces under a new CPA, and encouraged the RCMP, despite their reluctance, to continue the involvement of police-service partners in order to expand the pool of officers and skills upon which to draw.(65) Negotiations with the larger police-service partners were challenging due to requirements from their governments and unions and reluctance to give delegated authority to the RCMP to assign their members to IPP operations. By March 2008, it was brought to the attention of the Steering Committee that a large number of deployed police officers came from provincial and municipal police-service partners. This was a necessary and welcome development that relieved the CPA of some of its capacity constraints due to the RCMP's involvement in the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and other high-profile commitments.
Another example of addressing operational management challenges occurred in April 2007 when, under pressure to double the Canadian contingent in Afghanistan, the CPA Working Group accepted the RCMP proposal for shortened rotations from 12 to 6 months, which allowed additional RCMP officers to be released from domestic assignments and contributed to achieving the authorized deployment level. Also, in 2010 shortly after the Haiti Earthquake, the RCMP requested the police-service partners for 1.5 times the number of committed deployments, which allowed it to ramp up the Canadian contingent from 100 to 150 within a few short months.
The challenges of increasing and maintaining deployment levels from one rotation to another are further complicated by decisions over which the CPA had sometimes little control and only some influence, such as the MINUSTAH order that police may carry arms only when on duty and in uniform; the multiple delays encountered in obtaining visas permits for the new and larger deployment to Sudan; or the ever-evolving competency profile and rank requirements for deployment to the KPRT. Other administrative challenges of Canadian origin that remained unresolved or not fully resolved at the time of writing included such matters as:
The CPA participants and the CPA Working Group have done what they can to obtain the necessary authorities that would improve efficiency and effectiveness of international police and peace operations in the future.
The Steering Committee may have missed some opportunities to expand or stabilize the CPA and communicate its successes. For example, subsequent to approval of the 2008 Assessment of the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Program, it was proposed that the participant's ministers make a Cabinet presentation to expand the program, but this never happened. Despite early 2009 reminders to the CPA Working Group and then a briefing note in November 2009 to the Steering Committee regarding the policy issues and timing for CPA/IPP renewal, the governance structures did not respond to ensure the timely completion of the present evaluation prior to submitting the foundational documents. Seeking conditional approvals for renewal in times of fiscal constraint does carry some unnecessary risk, which could have been avoided. Content analysis of the 2010 G-8 Muskoka Summit Accountability Report on Peace and Security found no references to the CPA, the RCMP International Police Peace Operations Program or the GPSF as Canadian contributions to fulfilling Canada's international commitments for global security. On the other hand, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) was cited five distinct times for its contribution.
Canadian police officers deployed to police peacekeeping and peace-support operations contributed to the achievement of development results by maintaining peace and security and ensuring adherence to the rule of law, especially in Haiti and Afghanistan where the Canadian contingents are of significant size and an integral component of a Canadian security system reform strategy. While police officers acknowledge the benefits of their involvement in peace-support operations, both personally and professionally, there is little recognition and reinvestment of their newly acquired skills, abilities and expertise by their police-service employers.
The original CPA/IPP foundational documents reviewed by the evaluation team contained no logic model or explicit references to expected results for the overall 2006-2011 funding period. However, the first CPA Annual Plan for 2006-2007 identified the following expected development outcomes for the CPA/IPP, which the evaluation used in this assessment:
As set out in the approved Work Plan, the evaluation assessed the extent of achievement of these development outcomes in three country case studies: MINUSTAH (Haiti), the KPRT Mission (Afghanistan), and UNMIS/ UNAMID (Sudan). They were selected because of their importance in terms of Canada's current overall engagement and the relatively high deployment levels in comparison to IPP operations in other countries. The assessment of outcomes achievement was based primarily on relevant past evaluation reports, interview data with contingent commanders, strategic position holders and previously deployed police officers, and supplemented whenever possible with data drawn from CPA annual and monthly reports, which were more activity rather than results-oriented. Deployment statistics for the three countries are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Deployment of Canadian Police Officers to Haiti, Afghanistan and Sudan
"I was pampered in being assigned to the survey for drug trafficking control during my mission in Haiti: this is precisely my field of expertise.
It was not easy; I had first to win the confidence of the responsible Haitian police officer who had had bad experience with the United States, and had kept a very bad opinion of their work in mind.
We managed to move ahead, and we put under arrest four important dealers of a group from Cite Soleil who took as hostages the inhabitants of both Port-au-Prince suburbs. Those who were aiming at making those territories extended plantations of marijuana… We finally destroyed more than 20,000 plants."
The CPA deployed about 115 police officers a year to MINUSTAH forming the largest UNPOL country contingent since 2004 and accounting for 18 percent of MINUSTAH UNPOL. Since 2006, the cost of deploying Canadian police officers to Haiti has amounted to approximately $45 million, which is a small share of Canada's overall engagement of over $1 billion for the 2006-2011 period, making Haiti Canada's largest development recipient in the Americas, and the second largest in the world after Afghanistan. A One-Canada or whole-of-government approach characterizes the GoC's engagement, drawing on the resources of several departments and agencies in addition to the CPA participants, in order to maximize the added value of Canada's contribution, including DND, CSC, and more recently the CBSA. In fact, Canada plays a leadership role in international efforts to combat organized crime and re-establish security and stability in Haiti.
The important contribution that the CPA has made to MINUSTAH efforts to modernize the HNP was confirmed in the interview data with key DPKO staff. It is expected that by the end of 2011, a number of key outcomes of the HNP Reform Plan will be achieved or within reach, i.e., 14,000 police officers trained, HNP certification process established, and HNP capacity to provide essential police services established throughout the country. Since 2007, between 700 and 1,200 police cadets have graduated each year from the Haitian National School of Police, 12 percent of whom are women.(66) Basic cadet training is supplemented by bilateral initiatives, like START's GPSF, which provide on-the job training, specialized courses and scholarships. In addition to the HNP training, MINUSTAH implemented a joint vetting process that provided the basis for police certification. CPA-deployed police officers played a key role in the vetting process through documentary research and investigations, which ensured that new recruits and long-time police officers maintained the highest level of professional conduct.(67)
The CPA contribution to the HNP Reform Plan has also reduced community violence in Haiti's troubled urban neighbourhoods by engaging community leadership and integrating services in a community policing approach.(68) Recent MINUSTAH surveys found that the public's view of the police has improved since the HNP reform process began: in 2008, 58 percent of the population perceived a positive change in the work of the HNP; in 2009, 72 percent were more confident in the work of the HNP. Significant progress has since been made, led by MINUSTAH and the HNP, in dismantling armed gangs through the arrest and imprisonment of several prominent gang leaders, as well as more than 700 other gang members. In 2010, there were 21,494 crimes recorded and 19,698 related arrests made.(69) This has enabled the Government of Haiti to regain access to the areas of the capital, such as Cité Soleil that were previously controlled by gangs. These positive findings were also confirmed in a 2010 OECD Country Report on Haiti, which characterized the HNP reform as an example of successful state building that resulted in significant improvements in security.(70)
The interview data reflect the common view among Canadian police officers that their work contributed to improved security and respect for human rights in Haiti. Canadian police officers interviewed remarked that, prior to the 2010 earthquake, the social conditions were increasingly secure for the general population, referring to indicators like: calmness among the population, street cleanliness and the quality of Haitian police work. Moreover, the control exercised over organized crowds during civilian demonstrations sensitized the population to the role of the HNP, supported by a long-term UN presence. Canadian police officers had established a new command structure in the MINUSTAH Crowd Control Unit, in addition to training the FPUs in ensuring peaceful security during the elections. Following the earthquake, the impact of the Canadian contingent was also notable, be it for securing camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), or the search for prison escapees. Moreover, the links established by Canadian police officers with local police stations and with Port-au-Prince management permitted the launch of projects to enhance respect for human rights in the local prisons.
Some Canadian initiatives served as a catalyst for systemic changes. For example, Canadian police officers proposed a new organizational structure to MINUSTAH to improve patrolling and security for vulnerable populations in the IDP camps. Seven joint HNP-UNPOL community police stations were set up in the seven biggest IDP camps of Port-au-Prince, in addition to the establishment of six joint mobile teams to patrol IDP camps outside of the capital, with two mobile teams totally devoted to the protection of women. A former MINUSTAH deputy police commissioner credited Canadian police officers with this initiative, which increased from one to 10 the number of UNPOL police officers totally dedicated to women's protection (see Women, Peace and Security).
Despite the progress, the interview data point to serious problems that still affect the Haitian security sector, i.e., accusations of brutality and complicity in crimes (related to drug trafficking and kidnapping), understaffing of local police stations, lack of equipment, poor preparation of files sent to the court, as well as a dysfunctional judicial system to track or punish absences. The OECD Country Report on Haiti(71) also raised concerns about improvements that did not benefit all parts of the country, and that were not matched by a strengthening of the judicial system. International agencies have been working with the HNP for 14 years, while support for the justice system began only in the past year. A report by a senior Canadian police officer on mission in Haiti in 2008 drew attention to the lack of concentration of effort by the Canadian contingent, and that there was a serious lack of coordination among various international initiatives in the security sector, a critique that is echoed in the literature on Haiti.(72)
A 2009 DFAIT briefing note suggested that Canada needs to find a niche in the police sector that could serve as a model for future interventions.(73) Some deployed officers thought that their contribution would be even more valuable if it were concentrated on investigative and training skills within the MINUSTAH structure. Many senior Canadian as well as MINUSTAH officials raised the possibility of having a different model for Canadian police contributions that would rely on a closer bilateral partnership (e.g., police advisors within the mission and technical advisors deployed on a bilateral basis within technical departments of the HNP). While GPSF support to the police sector through MINUSTAH has been highly valued, Canada could possibly enhance its impact with more targeted assistance that better optimizes Canadian competencies, through either a better defined mandate within MINUSTAH or direct bilateral arrangements between the RCMP, CSC and their respective Haitian counterparts.
Canada's engagement in Afghanistan has evolved since 2002 when it had a Canadian Forces (CF) contingent of 850 as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Chief Civil Command. It has become a One-Canada or "whole of government" effort integrating military and civilian experts from DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, PS, CSC and CBSA. In 2005, the GoC decided to assume responsibility for maintaining security in the province of Kandahar, including the multi-disciplinary KPRT, which brings together military, civilian, political and development experts to help the Afghan government extend its authority and provide services to its citizens. As of December 2010, there were 2,830 military, 46 diplomatic, 39 police and 26 development personnel in the country (Figure 3). Since 2006, the CPA/IPP has deployed a total of 155 police officers (Table 5) at a cost of $14 million. In comparison, the total Canadian investment in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011 is estimated at $11.3 billion.(74)
In 2001, Afghanistan found itself without anything resembling a civilian police force, and public order at this time was largely enforced by armed militias allied to local warlords. Only in 2003 was the Afghan National Police (ANP) formally constituted under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, with the support of contributing countries.(75) According to OECD, the initial phase of reforming the police (2002-2006) fell short of creating a police force that was trusted by the general population. Political interference with appointments, and the use of the police as a supplementary fighting force in many parts of the country, have exacerbated local tensions and generated mistrust in institutions. The conflicting visions (and subsequent support strategies) of donors about the role of the police and the institutional changes required, as in the case of the justice institutions, obstructed the path to significant change and progress. However, the subsequent review of the reform, accompanied by a stronger and more coherent commitment by European donors along with the appointment of a new minister of the interior, were viewed as positive in 2010.(76) Representatives of the Afghan military and security establishment repeatedly asserted the need to increase training support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP.
"Before I arrived, the patrols (U.S. Military Police) I was twinned to mentor Afghan National Police lost 19 Afghan police in six months...
Now, I can say that my greatest achievement is that I lost only three guys during my mission... Afghan police officers were showing up each morning to go work, and were very motivated.
(...) We can say that I became an informal leader for them, but also for the U.S. Military Police - they were so young, around 19 years old -. I taught many things as various as ethics, community-based policing, management, logistics etc."
The CPA deployed police officers to the KPRT mission, which contributed to more robust and professional police services for the citizens of Kandahar in a manner that is consistent with Canadian and international policing standards. The recent GPSF Afghanistan case study evaluation found that Canadian support to the ANP not only enhanced the operational effectiveness of its units but also the reputation and standing of the ANP within the community by demonstrating greater professionalism and respect for human rights.(77) The services provided by Canadian police officers as trainers and advisors cum mentors, deployed through the CPA or through the GPSF, have demonstrated their value in advancing ANP reform. They have been the only civilian police mentoring ANP officers (accompanied by military police) while on mounted and dismounted patrols.(78) Mentoring took place at all of Kandahar's substations and checkpoints in the city (as well as in the Dand district toward the south) and has added value to the cadet training by providing instruction to graduates while applying what they have learned in the classroom to "real-life" situations. The patrols are extremely hazardous, especially given that the ANP is a prime target for criminal and insurgent attacks, which have thus depleted their ranks.(79)
"I was told that I would not be able to work in Afghanistan, but I got the respect of everybody and we, women officers, became a model for the Afghan people...
What we did? So many things, like training 20 Afghan police officers in gender and human rights in Kandahar from a train the trainers perspective. It was an innovative approach because the Afghan police then went into schools to teach gender and human rights."
The ANP cadet training program, previously only delivered in Kabul, was established in Kandahar City for the first time in November 2010. Based on statistics provided by the RCMP IPOB, more than 2,105 ANP officers followed the cadet training program, which involved many Canadian police officers as instructors. Upon graduation, the cadets are considered to be capable of conducting basic law and order operations, with occasional assistance from an international advisor or police mentor team. The police officers deployed in Afghanistan who were part of the focus group session considered that the teaching of ethics and integrity of the police officer strongly influenced Afghan police officers' behaviour, be it by encouraging them to keep their position, or in discipline, knowledge, ethics and professionalism. A broad range of interview data confirms that the work of the Canadian police officers in Kandahar city, mainly the training and mentoring, permitted the ANP to better meet security needs, respond to emergency requests, and initiate surveillance and place people under arrest. These actions improve security and increase the population's trust in the ANP officers.
Canada's engagement in Sudan has also been significant, particularly in contributing to the resolution of the conflict in Darfur and in support for the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It has been less of a whole-of-government approach than the Haiti and Afghanistan missions involving primarily military, police and development personnel (Figure 3). Nevertheless, since 2004 Canada's financial investment, including peacebuilding efforts, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects and international peacekeeping missions has amounted to over $761 million. As part of this effort, the CPA deployed a total of 56 police officers between 2006 and 2010, approximately a third and a tenth of the deployments to Afghanistan and Haiti respectively, with disbursements of approximately $5 million.
There are two UN missions in Sudan to which the CPA deploys Canadian police officers: the 2005 UNMIS and the 2007 UNAMID. UNMIS has an authorized strength of 715 UNPOL and a mandate to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, protect the civilians and help reorganize the police service in Sudan. UNAMID is the largest UN mission in the world, with an authorized strength of 2,894 UNPOL and a mandate focused upon safety and security in Darfur, especially within the camps for IDPs. According to DPKO staff interviews, neither mission has been able to reach its full strength due to deployment shortfalls each year since 2007.
Although the CPA has ministerial approval to deploy up to 25 police officers, it has only reached a maximum of 20 on one rotation, and generally falls short of this target. While there have been difficulties with the Government of Sudan that have caused delays in obtaining visas, the interview data and documentary evidence suggest that the consistent shortfalls can be attributed to financial constraints and other priorities, e.g., Haiti, Afghanistan, etc. The common view supported by the documentary evidence indicates that the deployment levels are not high enough "to make a difference" to enhance peace and security, the rule of law or adherence to international human rights standards in Sudan.
The challenging circumstances which Canadian police officers face has also affected the achievement of these expected outcomes, which was acknowledged by a broad range of interview respondents and documented extensively in the 2008 GPSF Evaluation - Sudan Case Study.
In South Sudan where the majority of Canadian police officers have been deployed, UNAMIS works in close collaboration with the Government of South Sudan to build local ownership and strengthen the capacity of the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS). The Security Sector CPA Working Group, chaired by the Ministry of the Interior, meets regularly to discuss programming gaps and overlaps, and a nascent capacity to design and implement a Security System Reform plan is emerging. DFAIT's START has used the GPSF funding effectively to support about a dozen security-sector projects that complement the police and peacekeeping operations in collaboration with a variety of partners such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Habitat and other organizations.(81) However, Darfur is still a conflict zone, and while South Sudan is technically considered a post-conflict region since the ceasefire was declared, there is considerable armed violence among civilians, resulting in thousands of deaths. The level of armed violence has restricted police mobility and reduced the frequency and regularity of joint patrols with the SSPS.
Canadian police officers are recognized for their expertise in community-based policing that has considerable relevance in South Sudan. However, the ongoing violence and security risks are such that there are few opportunities to demonstrate this approach by mentoring SSPS counterparts while on patrol. The first generation of demobilized soldiers that have become the corps of the SSPS also have low education and literacy levels, which make communication and training a challenge; furthermore, they "do not welcome monitoring visits to stations and prisons to ensure the application of standards and respect of human rights."(82) Since UNPOL, including Canadian police officers, do not have executive authority, i.e., cannot conduct investigations and make arrests, etc., their effectiveness is further limited.
Under these circumstances Canadian police officers' contributions to enhancing security, human rights and the rule of law has been mostly indirect through capacity building and training activities; the establishment of the Rajaf Training Centre is a good example of how this is accomplished. The interview data do make reference to the leadership qualities of Canadian police officers, especially with regard to suggesting improvements in the quality of the UN training packages or other training issues.
The RCMP is part of the Canadian stakeholders who support Canadian and UN efforts to implement the UN S/RES on Women, Peace and Security.(83) Canada's Action Plan is organized into thematic areas, and presents a number of key issues that should be addressed with a set of indicators for: prevention, participation, protection and relief, and recovery.(84)
As noted in Section 8.4.2 (Contribution to Enhancing International Capacity), Canada is the top contributor among the industrial countries that deploys female police officers to UN missions. This participation of Canadian female police officers is appreciated by DPKO staff and by contingent commanders in the Haiti and Afghanistan missions for their leadership. For example, a Canadian woman established the two MINUSTAH patrol units composed exclusively of female police officers to ensure the protection of women, children and elderly people in IDP camps. In Afghanistan, it was also a Canadian woman who worked closely with the Ministry of the Interior in Kabul to create positions for women police officers, such as a specific unit staffed by women for women who wish to lodge complaints or report incidents of harassment in police stations. The initiatives also included a sensitization program for police officers so that they could better serve women, and an intervention service for women experiencing problems.
In terms of prevention, IPOB plans to reinforce the implementation of the UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security in the pre-deployment training courses, since few of the related topics were covered in the curriculum that was used between 2006 and 2011. In 2011, online courses were included in the distance-education modules; the Code of Conduct course now addresses the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. This decision will help Canadian police officers to better fulfill their duties in accordance with the S/RES on Women, Peace and Security.
Although the documentary evidence is limited, the interview data and focus group testimonials by police officers are rich in detail with regard to the benefits of their involvement in international policing and peace operations. The personal and professional benefits of participation in CPA-supported IPP operations can be summarized as follows: i) increased awareness of international problems and challenges; ii) improved skills, abilities and expertise; iii) improved experience and capacity in dealing with cultural and ethnic communities; iv) opportunities created to share their experience with other Canadians in their communities; and v) enriched personal and professional lives.
- "At the professional level, my mission permitted me to acquire new computer and management skills due to the work required by the UN."
- "My stay in Haiti permitted me to learn a bit of Creole; this is surprising to a number of people in Montreal, during the meetings that gather several members of the Haitian community and when the issue is to calm the crowd down…"
- "My mission in Haiti permitted me to better understand the difficult situation of Haitian originating families in Montreal, especially when there has been a problem with their adolescents. We are more patient."
- "After being appointed to the surveillance unit for four years, I patrolled in the Soleil district and the Boston sector, two turbulent areas of Port-au Prince. This experience made me come out of my comfort zone and taught me a lot. I even hesitated before going back to my surveillance position in Canada, which is my field of expertise."
A 2009 Sûreté du Québec study(85) identified 21 competencies acquired by police officers as a result of participating in IPP operations (Text Box 6). According to the Sûreté du Québec, in addition to developing these professional competencies, police officers while deployed have daily exchanges with police officers from all over the world, thereby building a valuable international network that serves them after they are back in their countries. The SPVM, the CPA's most active partner, also assessed the benefits for domestic police services and found that police officers come back from missions with improved knowledge and skills in terms of ethno-culture that allows them to improve their interventions with the population. For example, all police officers who participated in the peacemaking mission in Haiti have learned Creole to various degrees, which facilitates communication with the Haitian population in Montreal. Police officers returning from missions are often invited to hold conferences or give presentations in schools, thus becoming ambassadors with the youth in various cultural communities and encouraging them to become interested in police-service careers.
During the focus group sessions, police officers offered their own testimonials attesting to the personal and professional benefits of their international policing and peacekeeping experience. Many were required to operate outside of their usual comfort zone, doing unfamiliar tasks or patrolling in risky areas of the "Soleil" district, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti or in Kandahar, Afghanistan. They returned to domestic police service with a greater aptitude to empathize and to manage work-related stress. Some of them were also disappointed by the lack of recognition from senior management in their police-service organizations for the contributions they made, and lack of appreciation for the new competencies they acquired. In fact, participation in IPP operations is viewed by some of the higher-ranking officers among the police-service partners, including the RCMP, as "a career killer". One police officer claimed that he missed a promotion back from a mission because he was "unknown to senior management".
According to police officers interviewed who have served overseas, the lack of recognition and appreciation of the benefits of the international policing experience is apparently common among many police-service organizations, such as the Australian federal police, the Scottish police college or the British police forces. The acquired competences are not sufficiently exploited during the reintegration phase, and whatever work the police officers carried out while on mission, which is often exceptional, they don't appear to get the visibility they deserve from their domestic police service.
The interview data collected from police-service partners indicate a common willingness to better take into account and value the newly acquired competences in the reintegration of police officers returning to domestic duty. Some police-service partners have already taken actions in this direction. For example, the SPVM drafted an action plan that identifies four qualities that benefit the police service--resilience, attitude, tolerance and service--and aims at making them known throughout the organization and community. It has instituted the wearing of a special coat of arms on the normal uniform to acknowledge their police officers' contribution to international police peacekeeping. The coat of arms is a gesture of public appreciation and creates opportunities to talk about international police peacekeeping with the public. SPVM also asks its returned police officers to share their experiences during interviews, seminars and conferences with police-service staff, Canadian and international peacekeeping organizations.
While the RCMP, Sûreté du Québec and other police-service partners promote participation in IPP operations as a professional and personal internship, few have implemented a structured reintegration program for police officers returning from international police peacekeeping duties. To derive the maximum benefit, and ensure the long-term continuity of participation, the international policing experience has to be a favourable factor when considering a request for transfer to specific positions or during competitions for a promotion. Such permanent institutional recognition of the benefits for domestic police services would require the agreement of the trade unions, management services and provincial governments. According to the U.K. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing, a better understanding of the domestic benefits of involvement in international policing through more research and a communications strategy is needed to raise awareness and increase the number of participating police-service partners and overall deployment numbers to meet current targets.(86)
The most significant unintended outcome of Canadian police officer involvement in IPP operations was the increased access to intelligence about transnational drug trafficking and organized crime. In at least one known case, the in situ intelligence was of considerable value to an ongoing investigation in Canada.
Based on interview data from police-service partners, international police peacekeeping operations contributed to the carrying out of international surveillance mandates outside of Canadian borders. In fact, the experience acquired by police officers during their deployment, i.e., new knowledge, new relationships established with the local community or with other international police officers, allowed them to make the link between Canadian domestic safety and international crime.
"We met with some objectives of the mission but sometimes in so many unexpected ways…
As this time when we had the idea to buy two ink cartridges in Canada that could not be found in Haiti. We brought those cartridges to the person responsible for the prison escapees' files and he could then print out and share all the names and faces of the people wanted at a national level."
(Focus Group, March 2011)
The SPVM and Sûreté du Québec were able to solve crimes related to gangs and car theft traffic by locating 50 stolen Canadian cars in Cap Haitian. Important surveillance cases were also facilitated, like the 2009 Shark operation, at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border thanks to links established by Canadian police officers in Haiti. The Shark operation was one of the most extended police operations carried out in Canada and abroad against organized crime.(87) The strong Canadian presence in Haiti also gave Sûreté du Québec the idea to deepen those links with Haiti, and start bilateral relationships with its own police missions jointly with SPVM. The objective would be to put forward three mandates for the police officers involved: sexual tourism, car theft and drug trafficking.
Other unexpected positive outcomes were described by police officers during the focus group sessions and documented in the monthly mission reports. For example, small parallel volunteer projects to help the population, such as, the woman police officer who was so involved with orphanage work that she became its ambassador and encouraged other Canadian police officers to volunteer for the organization. Other police officers took children under their guardianship by paying for school fees, or chose to support associations for the feeding of children in the street, or took young people under their supervision by facilitating their entrance to police academia, etc. The humanitarian spirit and generosity of the police officers involved have generated many small and largely unnoticed but nevertheless important unexpected outcomes for those concerned.
The CPA Working Group provided financial oversight on incremental costs and operational oversight to ensure that deployment commitments, rotations and timing were managed efficiently and effectively. The evaluation, however, found little evidence of the Steering Committee having provided strategic policy guidance or performance and financial oversight.
The CPA MOU set out in considerable detail the composition and roles of the interdepartmental Steering Committee and CPA Working Group. It also stated under the heading of "joint decision-making" that the participants were equal partners in decision making, presumably in the context of these governance structures. The evaluation administered a self-assessment questionnaire to governance committee members during interviews to determine their level of satisfaction with which their committee fulfilled its responsibilities. The individual answers were compiled by CPA participants, and the evaluation considers them representative, given the long tenure of most of the individual respondents.
The CPA Steering Committee was chaired by DFAIT and composed of ADM-level representatives or designates of the participants. Based on content analysis of the available meeting minutes and interview data, it met on average once per year for a couple of hours to review and approve the past year's annual report and next year's annual plan presented by the RCMP. Only DFAIT and RCMP ADMs attended regularly, while the responsible PS and CIDA ADMs sent their designate most, if not, all the time. As one long-time Steering Committee member put it, "ADMs vote with their feet, so you could judge their interest in the governance of the program by who attended the meetings." Questionnaire responses indicate that the majority of the members were satisfied that the Steering Committee fulfilled its responsibilities related to reviewing and approving the annual reports/plans and with their role in making recommendations to their respective ministers for the extension of the CPA.(88) On the other hand, the majority of participants were either unsatisfied or highly unsatisfied with how the committee fulfilled the following responsibilities:
The evaluation did not come across any documentary evidence or collect any interview data that would suggest that the Steering Committee had put in place appropriate governance processes and mechanisms for performance and risk management, to ensure financial oversight or to provide strategic policy-planning guidance to the CPA Working Group. Based on the interview data collected, Steering Committee members were generally briefed prior to the meeting, and since no issues were raised, they assumed thereafter that the annual plans and reports were compliant with the CPA requirements. The discussions were described by interviewees as "sterile" and the process as "rubber-stamping".
The CPA Working Group was chaired by DFAIT and was composed of director and deputy director level representatives with often two or more representatives for each participant attending meetings; PS, RCMP and DFAIT also enjoyed good continuity in representation and meeting attendance. The CPA Working Group met almost every month and, based on available meeting minutes and interview data, was very focused on complex operational and deployment issues and worked on a consensual basis. Questionnaire responses indicate that all the members were satisfied that the CPA Working Group fulfilled its responsibilities related: agreeing on the selection and timing of new police peace-support initiatives; preparing deployment approval memos; ensuring day-to-day management of the CPA framework; and, consulting with other stakeholders involved in international police activities. On the other hand, the participants were split between satisfied and unsatisfied in their opinions on how the group fulfilled the following responsibilities:
Content analysis of the CPA Working Group meeting minutes however found multiple references to proposed assessment or fact-finding(89) missions by the RCMP to eight different countries prior to 2010, which indicates a reasonable level of consultation. It did not, however, find any references that suggest that the group discussed the performance of ongoing IPP operations in terms of results achieved, nor did it appear to have discussed the quality of the monthly or annual reports in this regard. What the evaluation did find was that evergreen deployment charts and incremental costs were a regular agenda item, but consolidated financial reporting on the A-Base program budget only became an official topic for discussion in 2010 when the IPP program funds were fully committed. Strategic policy and operational issues arising, such as responding to the DRC and Guatemala requests for assistance, were not referred to the Steering Committee for advice even though an impasse was created when participant positions had become fixed. It was noted by several Steering Committee members that some of the decisions made by the CPA Working Group to recommend new deployments, or conduct assessment missions, even though authorized to do so, ought to be made by the Steering Committee.
The RCMP's IPOB produced 70 percent of the planned deployment outputs (FTEs deployed) for 2006-2011 at an aggregate unit cost of 10 percent to 15 percent higher than was estimated. While this demonstrates reasonable efficiency and economy overall given the challenging mandate, the short time frame, the constraints encountered, and the IPOB institutional capacity building required, there were two specific areas in which performance was poor: no documented evidence of international training outputs having been achieved, and; Corporate Overhead was not prorated to the actual number of FTEs, which resulted in an estimated $3.7 million in One Time Start-Up Costs and an approximate $6.9 million in excess Corporate Overhead, which was charged against the program, thereby increasing the unit cost of FTEs.
As previously mentioned (see Section 8.3.2 - Appropriate Roles and Responsibilities), the RCMP did not produce an "annual consolidated financial report of the A-Base program" in accordance with the approved IPP costing model as set out in the MOU.(90) Based on the interview data, the RCMP financial-management system could not accommodate the customized financial reporting required by the IPP costing model.(91) In the absence of relevant financial statements with which to conduct the cost-accounting component of the evaluation, the evaluation team worked closely with the RCMP's Federal Policing, Financial Advisory Services Unit to produce a cost-accounting report on the total RCMP A-Base costs and total incremental costs for the five-year period. This cost-accounting report serves as the basis for the following analysis and the related findings.
The IPP program was composed of five components, each described in the foundational documents and each identified as a separate cost-accounting component in the IPP costing model (Table 1): 1) a sustainable deployment capacity of 200 police officers to IPP operations, 2) RCMP IPOB Program Support capacity of 34 employees, 3) the equivalent of five police officers assigned to international training, 4) a rapid deployment capacity, and 5) an online training course. In total, a little more than three-quarters (78 percent) of the RCMP A-Base budget was disbursed over a period of five years, leaving the cumulative amount of $40.6 million unexpended (Table 6). The interview data suggest that the annual unexpended funds, with the exception of legal contingency funds in the amount of 6.3M, were carried over to the following fiscal year and reallocated to other RCMP programs.
Table 6: IPP Program Component Disbursements for 2006-2011
|RCMP A-Base Costs||Budget Planned||Budget Disbursed*||Variance||Percentage Disbursed|
|Police officers deployed||$154,856,000||$111,022,435||$43,833,565||72|
|RCMP program support||$24,442,000||$40,111,745||($15,669,745)||164|
|Rapid deployment capacity||$2,500,000||$254,778||$2,245,222||10|
|Online training course||$180,000||$290,507||($110,507)||161|
|Total RCMP A-Base costs||$186,033,000||$151,679,465||$34,353,535||82|
Police Officers Deployed: Between 2006 and 2011, C$111.0 million was disbursed to deploy police officers, representing 72 percent of the C$154.9 million budget for this component. This amount included disbursements based on the estimated number of RCMP police officers deployed, i.e., one-time start-up costs and corporate overhead(92) and legal contingency.(93) These charges amounted to C$17,724,943 and represented 16 percent of the disbursements for this program component.
RCMP IPOB Program Support: IPOB program support costs amounted to C$40.1 million against the planned budget of C$24.4 million representing 164 percent of the budget being disbursed, which can be attributed to the increase from 34 to 54 FTEs in the third year of the IPP program to reflect the increase in efforts of the HQ support functions. Again, the IPP costing model prorated additional costs, i.e., one-time start-up costs, corporate overhead and legal contingency, based on the estimated number (34 FTE) of RCMP staff to be employed in IPOB. These charges amounted to C$9,888,113 and represented 25 percent of the disbursements for this program component.
Initial costing assumed 34 resources would be sufficient to support the IPP Program. In 2008-2009, management determined that current resourcing was insufficient to support the level of deployments. The mid-program report highlighted to TBS and CPA partners the need to increase the number of resources to adequately support the Program. As a result, program support costs increased significantly, beginning in FY 2008-2009 and then FY 2009-2010 at approximately $1.6 million and approximately C$3 million respectively. As the Program did not have authority to permanently staff the additional 20 positions, temporary resources were engaged. The most important share of these additional O&M expenses were charged to the professional services account item, representing professional fees paid for the secondment of other Canadian police-service personnel to work in IPOB (Table 7). A significant portion of the increased IPOB program support costs can thus be attributed to the secondment of additional personnel to work in IPOB.
Table 7: Use of O&M Professional Services Account (RO 219 - GL 0474*)
|Canadian Police Service||2006-2007||2007-2008||2008-2009||2009-2010||2010-2011||Total|
|Halifax Regional Police Service||$90,312||$46,268||$98,392||$234,972|
|Ontario Provincial Police||$20,356||$109,562||$110,761||$228,263||$46,879||$515,821|
|Ottawa Police Service||$390,182||$944,695||$347,038||$1,681,915|
|Gatineau Police Service||$98,952||$25,603||$124,555|
|Montreal Police Service||$30,610||$251,125||$281,735|
|Toronto Police Service||$133,981||$133,981|
|United Way of Ottawa-Carleton||$65,703||$119,001||$184,704|
|Fredericton Police Service||$63,871||$63,871|
International Training: The CPA foundational documents and MOU clearly describe the purpose of this component. A-Base funding of C$995,000 in the first year and C$765,000 thereafter was available to mobilize five FTEs for international police training assignments, i.e., short-term training provided abroad. International police training was not limited to FCASs and could be delivered in other countries to cover the full range of capacity building offered to foreign police officers, such as investigative techniques, drug interdiction, the use of force, administration, forensic procedures, etc. CPA Working Group meeting minutes indicate that the RCMP was delegated full responsibility for this activity. The decision was made within the RCMP to assign these resources to the Canadian Police College to design, develop and deliver training courses in international policing and peacekeeping. Although the funds were transferred to the College during each of the first four FYs, the evaluation found no record of training activities having taken place or funds disbursed in support thereof.(94) These internal transfers were discontinued and the entire budget allocation lapsed.
Rapid Deployment Capacity: Again, a description of this component can be found in the CPA/IPP foundational documents and the CPA MOU. The rapid deployment capacity was allocated C$500,000 annually to facilitate the deployment of RCMP IPOB program support staff to undertake a fact-finding mission or join an integrated assessment mission team abroad where Canadian interest and priorities have been identified. The interview data indicate some confusion among the participants as to the use of this allocation, and apparently no agreement was developed to establish the assessment mission approval procedures. The evaluation noted references in the CPA Working Group meeting minutes to terms of reference having been approved and to fact-finding missions undertaken by the RCMP. However, the associated costs were charged against the RCMP IPOB program support O&M travel accounts, which can be attributed to some degree the above-noted program support cost overruns. Table 8 was prepared with the assistance of the RCMP Financial Advisory Services based on closer examination of the expenses charged to O&M travel accounts.
Table 8: Rapid Deployment Capacity Disbursements 2006-2011(95)
Online Training Course: An online training course was to have been developed in FY 2006-2007 at a cost of $100,000 and then maintained and updated each year thereafter at a cost of C$20,000 annually. Interview data and recorded disbursements indicate that course development actually began in FY 2009-2010 and training modules delivered thereafter at a total cost of C$290,000. The course offers information modules on the operation of the UN, NATO and EUPOL, on peacekeeping missions and what is expected from peacekeeping agents. It was piloted with deployments to Sudan, Haiti and Cote-d'Ivoire and, since August 2010, has been accessible for all current deployments. The IPOB Health Services Unit intends to improve the computer aids and integrate additional modules, such as a section on learning and development.
As noted above, approximately C$28 million (C$9.8 million for IPOB program support and C$18.3 million for police officers deployed) was charged in one-time start-up costs, corporate overhead and legal contingency. The evaluation found that these amounts were based on the planned deployment of 200 police officers, employment of 34 IPOB staff and mobilization of five international training staff, as provided in the 2006 foundational documents. The difference between planned and actual figures for deployment and employment of RCMP police officers was never taken into account when these additional charges were levied.
For example, corporate overhead is calculated at 17 percent of all RCMP FTE salary and benefits costs. The RCMP charged the IPP program approximately C$13.9 million in corporate overhead based on the planning figures, i.e., 120 RCMP officers deployed annually (60 percent of 200), 34 IPOB staff and five international training staff. However, when based on the actual RCMP FTEs deployed and employed, i.e., an average of approximately 40 RCMP officers deployed annually, 54 IPOB staff and zero international training staff were deployed. The charge should have been approximately C$7 million, resulting in excess corporate overhead charges of C$6.9 million.
Similarly, the IPP program was charged approximately C$7.2 million in one-time start-up costs based on the planning figures, i.e., a pool of 200 RCMP police officers, 34 IPOB staff and the full time equivalent of five international training staff. However, when based on the actual RCMP FTEs deployed and employed, i.e., a pool of 50 RCMP officers, 54 IPOB staff and zero (0) international training staff, the charge should have been approximately C$3.5 million, resulting in excess charges of approximately C$3.7 million
Legal contingency funds were set aside from the RCMP A-Base allocation each year as a contingency for settlements and judgments in liability cases emanating from IPP operations. This amount was calculated on the basis of financial involvement of past liability cases divided by the number of officers in the program (152 in FY 2006-07). An amount of C$6,600 per FTE was estimated and the RCMP accumulated a total of $6.3 million over a five-year period. These funds were set aside in the RCMP's reference levels as a frozen allotment and as such were not made available for program use within peacekeeping. To date there have been no expenditures incurred against the legal contingency. However, the actual number of police officers deployed never reached the planning figures. Table 9 illustrates funding that could have been made available for program uses were it not for the frozen allotment.
Table 9: Legal Contingency Calculations
|Actual FTEs deployed||111||100||140||177||154||682|
|Legal contingency based on actual FTEs||732,600||660,000||924,000||1,168,200||1,016,400||$4,501,200|
|Legal contingency based on planned FTEs (152 and 200 ongoing)||1,003,200||1,320,000||1,320,000||1,320,000||1,320,000||$6,283,200|
IPOB produced 70 percent of the outputs planned for FY 2006-11, i.e., police officers deployed, at unit costs 10 percent to 15 percent higher than estimated, a result that demonstrates reasonable efficiency and economy overall, given the very challenging mandate, the short time frame, the constraints encountered, the higher costs to missions, and the IPOB capacity building required during the period. Between 2006 and 2011, CPA deployed 682 police officers on an overall planned figure of 952 police officers, (152 in FY 2006-07 and 200 until 2010-11); this represents 72 percent of the projected target, or 70 percent between 2006 and 2010 (estimated figures of 2011 excluded).
The IPP costing model estimated that the RCMP would deploy 120 RCMP officers per year (60 percent of 200), employ 34 IPOB staff at HQ (17 public servants and 17 RCMP regular members) and five full time equivalent international training positions. The actual number of deployed and employed FTEs was quite different, as reflected in Table 10. Since the first FY 2006-07, the RCMP deployed 30 percent while police-service partners deployed 70 percent of the total number of police officers to IPP operations. In the first two years of operation, 100 police officers were deployed, which was half of what was planned. In FY 2008-09, IPOB intensified its deployment efforts to meet the demand in Afghanistan, and reached 140 police officers. In FY 2009-10, 177 police officers were deployed, especially French-speaking police officers in Haiti, attaining 89 percent of the annual deployment target of 200 FTEs.
Table 10: Police Officers Deployed and HQ Staff Program Support 2006-2011
|Fiscal Years||2006-2007||2007-2008||2008-2009||2009-2010||2010-2011||Total FTEs|
|RCMP FTE deployed||33||30||42||50||46||201|
|Partner FTE deployed||78||70||98||127||108||481|
|Total Police Officers deployed||111||100||140||177||154||682|
|% RCMP officers deployed||29.7||30.0||30.0||28.2||29.9|
|% Partners’ officers deployed||70.3||70.0||70.0||71.8||70.1|
|IPOB HQ RM employed||15||17||26||26||26||110|
|IPOB HQ PS employed||15||17||28||28||28||116|
|Total IPOB program support||30||34||54||54||54||226|
Table 11 presents, from left to right, three sets of unit costs for FY 2006-07 to 2009-10(96) to independently assess the underlying assumptions and costs of the IPP costing model. The salary and benefits unit cost to deploy a police-service partner police officer was higher than that for an RCMP police officer, 40 percent more costly on average, meaning C$148,042 in comparison to C$105,709. The IPP costing model unit costs however included other charges, i.e., corporate overhead, one-time start-up expenses and legal contingency. Including these other charges, the difference in the actual unit cost to deploy an RCMP versus a partner police officer diminishes significantly. When actual unit costs including other charges is compared to the IPP costing model estimate of C$153,000, RCMP and police-service partner police officers were both 3 percent less than estimated. Analysis of the unit costs for salary and benefits for both the RCMP and the police-service partners indicates a high degree of fluctuation from one fiscal year to the next with no clear trends.
Table 11: Estimated and Actual Unit Costs of Police Officers Deployed for 2006-2010(97)
|Police Officers Deployed||2006-2010 Actual Salary and Benefits||2006-2010 Actual Other Charges Included*||IPP Costing Model Expenses Included*|
|FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost||FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost||FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost|
Incremental costs are specific to IPP operations and are billed by the RCMP to DFAIT. They include seven items: allowances in accordance with Military Foreign Service Instructions (MFSI), travel, uniforms/equipment for the operation, security for officers, vehicles/ telecommunications, shipping, and mission-specific health costs. These costs are calculated on the basis of whether the operation falls under the UN or non-UN sponsorship. A distinction is made because certain allowances are paid by the UN and certain costs (e.g., security costs) can be incurred for non-UN operations, which would be calculated in accordance with the MFSI.
Table 12 presents the incremental unit costs for UN and non-UN missions. The evaluation found that the actual incremental unit cost for UN missions was half that of non-UN missions, although considerably higher than originally estimated. The incremental unit cost for UN missions was C$50,935 compared to the estimated C$36,942, an increase of 38 percent, while unit cost for non-UN missions was C$98,831 which is about the same as the C$97,363 estimated. At the same time, the proportion of deployments to UN missions was 74 percent higher (Table 14) than was originally estimated at 66 percent. Consequently, the higher proportion and actual incremental unit cost of UN missions can be attributed with the overall pressures on the incremental cost budget. The combined average incremental unit cost incurred between FY 2006-07 and 2009-10 was C$62,087 which was 10 percent higher than the estimated C$56,980.
Table 12: Estimated and Actual Incremental Unit Costs for 2006-2010(98)
|Mission Type||Total Actual|
|IPP Costing Model|
|FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost||FTEs||Cost/year||Unit Cost|
These unit costs for RCMP IPOB Program Support were estimated in the IPP costing model at C$183,000 for regular members and C$109,000 for public servants. The analysis of the IPOB salary and benefit costs revealed little difference with these estimates, at C$180,658 and C$110,558 respectively. However, the IPP costing model included other charges, i.e., one start-up cost, corporate overhead and legal contingency. When these other charges are included, the actual unit cost calculations were much higher than estimated, at C$235,000 and C$143,000 respectively, or 17 percent and 28 percent higher.
Total RCMP A-Base unit costs (deployed and HQ support) and total CPA unit cost (A-Base and incremental costs) were more costly than planned, by 10 percent to 15 percent between FY 2006-07 and FY 2009-10. For that period, a police officer cost around C$276,000 to deploy, all other charges included, and C$214,000 if the incremental costs are excluded.
Table 13: Estimated and Actual Aggregate Unit Costs for 2006-2010(99)
|Aggregate Costs||Actual Disbursements*||IPP Costing Model||% Cost Overrun|
|FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost||FTEs||Cost||Unit Cost|
|Total RCMP A-Base Costs||528||$113,078,809||$214,164||752||$144,220,800||$191,783||12|
|Total CPA Costs||528||$145,860,597||$276,251||752||$187,060,000||$248,750||11|
A review of planned versus actual disbursements identified that $40.6M of the RCMP A-Base allocation had lapsed over the 5 years of the Program, including $6.3M from the legal contingency fund that was not accessed. Under the IAE Management Framework, lapsed funds from the Peace and Security Pool were to remain within IAE programs. However, no Special Purpose Allotment was created and those funds lapsed by the RCMP, excluding the legal contingency funding, were included as part of the RCMP's operating budget carry forward and subsequently reallocated for other purposes.
The cost accounting analysis conducted by the evaluation reveals that the IPP program has significant unexpended funds in the first three FYs attributable primarily to the shortfalls in police-officer deployments. The following RCMP A-Base cost surpluses were incurred in the first three years: C$17.2, C$12.1 and C$5 million. By FY 2009-10 when deployment levels peaked at 177 FTEs, the unexpended A-Base allocation had fallen off to approximately C$1.8 million. The evaluation identified the total unexpended RCMP A-Base allocation to amount to C$40.6 million over the 5 years of the Program. However, since the $6.3M legal contingency fund had not been accessed and is still available to the IPP the actual lapsed funds amounted to $34.3M. The documentary evidence and interview data indicate that at the end of each fiscal year, the RCMP carried forward the unexpended $34.3M of A-Base funds and subsequently reallocated them to other programs.
The TB Manager's Guide to Operating Budgets "permit(s) an automatic carry forward to the next fiscal year of up to 5 percent of the department's Main estimates Operating Budget, based on lapses reported in Public Accounts." However, when funds originate from the IAE, as was the case of the RCMP A-Base allocation from the IAE Peace and Security Pool, they were to be used only for their intended purpose, i.e., the IPP, as stated in the foundational documents. The spending of $34.3M in lapsed funds in a manner contrary to their intended purpose was therefore not in line with the IAE Management Framework. Based on the interview data, the RCMP was unaware that funds originating from the IAE were not to be carried forward, reallocated, or used for other purposes. Further, no measures were put in place (e.g., the establishment of the Special Purpose Allotment or process to return the lapsed funds to the IAE), and the lapsed IAE funds came to form part of the RCMP's operating budget carry forward.
The CPA participants are adequately resourced; DFAIT, PS and CIDA have allocated sufficient human resources to fulfill their responsibilities, while the RCMP received adequate A-Base funding to support an IPOB. While the underlying assumptions of the IPP costing model have not remained valid as the program evolved, leading to higher deployment and incremental costs, the RCMP A-Base program support budget is sufficient when inflation and extraordinary O&M expenditures are taken into account.
Starting in 2006 from scratch, and after two years of institutional capacity building, IPOB was under pressure to meet its mid-term deployment targets. The interview data indicate that IPOB only became fully operational in FY 2008-09, after it received approval to increase its staff allotment to 54 FTEs in the third year of the IPP program to reflect the increase in efforts of the HQ support functions. Other CPA participants had allocated between 0.5 and 2 FTEs to ensure fulfillment of their responsibilities. IPOB managed to consistently increase the overall deployment levels by drawing on police-service partners' resources. It was not until FY 2010-11 that the RCMP lowered the projected deployment numbers to 154 FTEs due to the projected constraints in the incremental cost budget; a budget managed by DFAIT for all mission-specific costs, including travel, allowances, pre-deployment training and equipment. "If there is no extra incremental money, the number of deployments is restricted and salary money cannot be fully used."(100) This position seems to be incongruent with the RCMP A-Base allocation projected surplus of C$9.5 million for 2010-11, or even the C$3.6 million actual reported in the 2010-11 annual report.(101)
Few of the underlying assumptions of the IPP costing model had remained valid: human and financial requirements turned out to be more costly because of the evolution of the program and unexpected charges, e.g., the IPOB institutional capacity building required, higher proportion of police-service partner officers deployed with higher unit costs, numerous small non-UN missions (13) compared to UN missions (5) requiring more administration to manage MFSI allowances, and RCMP corporate financial-management practices. While it is true that police-service partners' unit costs are higher when only salary and benefits are compared to RCMP unit costs, there is no significant difference between the RCMP and service partner unit costs when all other charges are included, i.e., corporate overhead, etc. (Table 11).The higher proportion of deployments to UN missions (74 percent instead of 66 percent) and the 38 percent higher actual incremental unit cost of UN missions, i.e., C$50,935 versus C$36,942 (Table 12), can be attributed with the overall pressures on the incremental cost budget.
It should be noted, however, that the number of small non-UN missions has increased the administrative workload on IPOB program support. Table 14 presents the percentage of police officers deployed to each type of mission for the FYs of the CPA/IPP: 74 percent to five UN missions(102) and 26 percent to 13 non-UN missions.(103) The multiple non-UN missions with small deployment numbers certainly increased the IPOB staff workload to address the many different allowances and benefits requirements. As noted in a 2007 business model validation analysis, the allowance and benefits guidelines issued by TB and DND have to be customized to fit the individual mission requirements. This approach "duplicates efforts and produced unacceptable work practice that should not be allowed to continue."(104) It was recommended that IPOB immediately develop standard allowance and benefits guidelines for deployed police officers to reduce the workload associated with managing the allowances and benefits requirements and improve workload efficiency. IPOB has not been able to simplify these policies and establish standard allowance and benefits guidelines for police personnel abroad, as these are currently controlled by TB and DND.
Table 14: Police Officers Deployed in UN and non-UN missions 2006-2011
|Mission Type||2006-2007||2007-2008||2008-2009||2009-2010||2010-2011||Total FTEs|
IPOB is still evolving and developing new systems and processes to improve the organization's efficiency to properly address its mandate, e.g., develop internal services, identify appropriate job classifications, define a framework of roles and responsibilities, improve coordination of resources and allocation of work, develop performance-based management framework (develop indicators to measure the outcomes), and reinforce financial oversight and accountability within the branch.(105) These issues will have to be addressed before additional HR are allocated.
Based on the interview data and the evaluation's observations, IPOB managed its salary and O&M relating to its staff and officers deployed but did not manage corporate resources outside the IPOB. The evaluation has already identified weaknesses (see Findings #20 and #21) related to the lack of integrated financial management and reporting. The decision to reduce the FY 2010-2011 deployment targets to 154 FTEs which generated an actual $3.2M (A-base and incremental) budget lapse is indicative of the financial management issues associated with this model that negatively affected the cost-efficiency of the program.
The CPA objectives are well understood by the police-service partners and while they have accepted the implementation modalities, they do not feel adequately consulted during the decision-making process leading to their formulation, especially considering their proportionate contribution to the number of police officers deployed.
Between 2006 and 2010, IPOB negotiated administrative agreements with 28 partners, among which were with the Sûreté du Québec, the SPVM, the Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police. Combined, these police-service partners have deployed 481 police officers since 2006, representing 70 percent of the total. Based on the interview data collected from police-service partners, the agreements reflect the CPA objectives and implementation modalities. In fact, each police-service partner negotiated its own unique terms and conditions with the RCMP in view of the nature of the deployments of their police officers. The agreements define the modalities related to deploying police officers to international peacekeeping missions, but are not yet standardized, and certain police-service partners do negotiate more favourable terms than others, according to their experience and the importance of their deployment numbers. All of the agreements, however, define the roles and responsibilities of both parties concerning: i) the deployment of skilled police officers to approved peacekeeping missions; and ii) the establishment of a reserve list to permit the replacement of deployed police officers in case of need. Police-service partners, however, are not engaged in the development of strategic guidelines, implementation planning or operational issues. Some consider the agreements in this respect to be incomplete--many elements could in fact be improved--in addition to not always being respected.
Of particular concern is the fact that certain clauses in the agreements had been amended without notice. For example: the duration of the deployments (which was changed from 9 months to 12 months), the duration of pre-departure training courses, the cancelling of training related to the use of firearms, the provision of weapons to be provided by police-service partners instead of the RCMP, restrictions relating to the deployment of surveillance officers who are more costly than constables, and the FY 2010-11 downward revision of deployment targets. Many terms and conditions have changed without consultation and without necessarily taking into account their impact in terms of planning, management and additional costs incurred by police-service partners. Some of these issues have been addressed in the latest round of negotiations to renew agreements with police-service partners.
Although the evaluation was unable to obtain substantiating documentation, based on the interview data, the participation of police-service partners in the CPA has come at a higher cost than what the agreements had established, causing them to resort to internal deficit funding. More staff was needed to liaise with outbound and inbound police officers, and more costs were incurred to provide long-term post-mission psychological counselling services, especially for high-stress missions like Afghanistan and Sudan, or after the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The evaluation interview data indicate that few police-service partners are informed of the existence of a legal contingency fund for settlements and judgments in liability cases related to physical or mental injury resulting from IPP operations.
Communications between the RCMP and police-service partners appear to be ad hoc and strained, especially during emergency events. For example, communication with family members during a crisis was considered insufficient, and the accompaniment of a seriously ill police officer not established as per the RCMP's Crisis Response and Major Incident Contingency Plan.(106) The annual general meeting of police-service partners has not been held annually and was characterized as an information session, rather than a debriefing consultation. While some improvements were also noted in the interview data in terms of financing and insurance coverage, certain areas still need improvement and police-service partners expressed their dismay at not having had the opportunity to discuss potential solutions to operational issues within the forum of the CPA Working Group. However, IPOB does not seem to perceive the need for more involvement of its Canadian police-service partners, except perhaps within the framework of the annual general meeting "to report and look for feedback".
The manner in which international police peacekeeping and peace operations are undertaken varies considerably from one contributing country to another, making any comparative analysis challenging. In the only available comparative study found, the CPA was compared favourably with other countries' models, specifically for its funding mechanism, budget ownership and systems of physical health-care support. The Australian model, commonly thought to be similar, is significantly different in too many respects to serve as a benchmark. This said, among the G-8 member states and other industrialized countries, Canada has the highest number of deployed police officers to UN missions, which reflects the CPA's focus on enhancing the GoC's ability to fulfill its international commitments.
According to the U.K. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing, the CPA model has brought more structure, transparency and coherence to the governance and control over Canadian contributions.(107) It has permitted Canada to establish its position as the leader among G-8 member states and industrialized countries for individual police-officer deployments (UNPOL) based on the deployment statistics in Table 15.
Table 15: UNPOL Deployment by G-8 Member States and Industrialized Countries
|Subtotal G-8 Member States and Industrialized Countries||572||499||73|
|Total All Countries to UN missions||8,643||5,967||1,060|
The U.K. study compared the CPA/IPP favourably with other countries' models, specifically for its funding mechanism, budget ownership and systems of physical health-care support. According to the study, the CPA/IPP funding mechanism, which combines stable funding for the RCMP with mission specific funds, supports "the development of more durable delivery structures and long-term strategic planning to increase and improve capacities".(108) Budget ownership would be another step in increasing the police service's core responsibility for conflict-related policing, as it is done in Canada, but also in Australia and Norway. The study also refers to the Canadian model as an example of good management practices, stating that the "strengthening of systems of physical health-care support, to also cover psychological, welfare, counselling and peer-support services for officers and their families (as in the Canadian model) will help ensure that the country select officers who are well suited to work in this nature and capable of dealing with challenges they will face throughout the deployment cycle."(109)
In the context of increasing demand and complexity of conflict-related policing missions and operations, contributing countries and international and regional organizations(110) try to improve their model for more effective support. As the study pointed out, best practices include: increasing police ownership and building new capacities in deployment planning and management; funding models to provide discrete budgets for delivery structures allocated to, and paid from, the overall budgets of the bodies responsible; improving staff generation by offering police leaders additional incentives to release staff; improving HR management of the officers deployed, and; developing national standing and standby executives.
According to the U.K. survey, Australia is one of the few countries that has established a standing capacity for conflict-related international police deployments, the International Deployment Group (IDG). The IDG, a department within the Australian Federal Police (AFP), should be considered as having been developed primarily within a regional context: to respond rapidly and in a joined-up response across government departments to the increasing number of crisis situations within its Asia Pacific sphere of influence (Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Bali bombing and Indonesian tsunami). The Australian model obviously distinguishes itself through its allocated resources (a total of 750 staff on an authorized 1,200), its standing force (500 members), a training centre, a strong reintegration program for officers back from missions. It has also established an Operational Response Group, with a capacity to deploy rapidly up to 40 members within 24 hours up to a further 40 members within 72 hours and the remainder within seven day to any situation--including high-risk environment--to provide stabilization. Very expensive indeed, $28 million per year, this unit also has a domestic role in case of emergency events.
In comparison, Canada operates like the U.K. or Germany, under the pattern: "recruit and deploy", far from the Australian standing capacity model. In fact, few countries operate a standing capacity, a model that is widely praised for its capacity and deployment speed, but that is very costly (approximately $500 million from 2008 to 2011) with an important permanent staff providing support to missions at a ratio of 1:3; as previously noted, the CPA ratio is also 1:3. Higher ratios are, however, found among countries with more similar models to the CPA, like the U.K., Norway or Sweden. U.K. support staff to deployed staff has varied between 1:10 and 1:20 over the last five years.
Table 16: Ratio of IPOB Program Support to Deployed Police Officers
|FTEs by Category||2006-2007||2007-2008||2008-2009||2009-2010||2010-2011||Total|
|IPOB HQ Regular members||15||17||26||26||26||110|
|IPOB HQ Public servants||15||17||28||28||28||116|
|Total IPOB Program support||30||34||54||54||54||226|
|Total police officers deployed||111||100||140||177||154*||682|
In Norway and Sweden, the ratios are respectively 1:14 and 1:5. They have a single police service and do not have a standing capacity, but recruit volunteers from across the police service on an annual basis. They aim to deploy 1 percent of the police service for international duties but actually deploy less, approximately 70 officers in Norway (from a force of 8,500) and 100 in Sweden (from a force of 18,500). Norway managed a dedicated Civilian Police Unit with five permanent staff funded from the regular police budget, as in Sweden, which has 18 support staff.
The following conclusions were derived from evaluation findings for each evaluation issue as follows.
There is a continued need for the CPA/IPP, the involvement of the current participants and the international police and peace operations it supports.
The CPA/IPP has continued Canada's international peacekeeping tradition for which it is recognized internationally by having filled an institutional and funding gap that had previously constrained the deployment of Canadian police officers to the ever-increasing number of IPP operations. Ministerial approval of deployments has been in keeping with Canadian foreign-policy interests and consistently assessed against a wide range of other factors. The role of police officers in international peacekeeping and peace operations is still evolving, and demand for Canadian police officers is expected to increase significantly as more UN missions focus on capacity building and security-system reform where their training and expertise can be optimized. Responding to this ever-increasing and continued need will be challenging at the current overall funding allocation levels.
The CPA/IPP continues to be closely aligned with the Government of Canada's priorities and reflects Canadian interests and values.
International peacekeeping has been a GoC foreign-policy priority for many decades. The nature of Canada's international engagement has evolved as the role of civilian experts has taken on greater prominence in supporting FCASs in addressing their varied challenges. In this respect the CPA/IPP objectives are coherent with the GoC's international commitments to enhance global capacity to deploy civilian experts to peace-support operations, while its expected outcomes are aligned with participant priorities, strategic outcomes and expected results. The evaluation has noted that CIDA is the only exception, since it no longer has the lead in peace and security programming per se, although programming in FCAS continues to be an Agency priority. As such, CIDA continues to have an interest in the CPA, recognizing the valuable contribution that IPP operations make in creating the secure space needed to carry out its international humanitarian assistance and development mandates.
While the roles and responsibilities of the federal departments and police-service partners in the CPA remain consistent with their mandates, they have also evolved significantly since 2006, requiring some adjustments going forward.
The CPA has been consistent with the participant roles and responsibilities, although new centres of competence have emerged within some departments triggering shifts in certain roles and responsibilities between departments, i.e., between CIDA and DFAIT with respect to peace and security programming. CIDA's responsibilities for the governance of the CPA, specifically ministerial approval of proposed deployments, are no longer consistent with its mandate and priorities. As an interested party with valuable insight as to how police peacekeeping can create space for development activities and in the spirit of working as one Canada, CIDA's role as a participant observer would be more appropriate. Further, the 60/40 split between the contribution of the RCMP and other police-service partners to IPP operations proved unfounded, resulting in a much greater reliance on the latter to meet commitments, a reality that is not adequately reflected in the CPA design.
The CPA/IPP has achieved its objectives and significant expected outcomes in the theatres of intervention examined in this evaluation.
The IPP program is a valuable foreign-policy instrument that has enhanced Canada's reputation in IPP operations thanks to the expertise and professionalism of the police officers involved. Development results were more significant in Haiti and Afghanistan, where they have acted in concert with other civilian experts on complementary investments in security-system reform. While CPA governance has contributed to its operational success, strategic guidance and planning was lacking. Shortfalls in meeting deployment targets in the first few years can be attributed to the initial design and assumptions that did not take into account: 1) the challenges of creating a more robust institutional infrastructure within the RCMP; and 2) the composition of the Canadian law-enforcement community upon which the CPA now depends.
While the CPA/IPP did not demonstrate economy in the use of available resources to support output production, it was nevertheless efficient in its achievement of output targets.
The CPA/IPP was adequately resourced to fulfill its mandate during the current time frame, however higher deployment and incremental costs will require a revision of the underlying assumptions and unit cost calculations going forward. While the governance structures and processes contributed to operational efficiencies, they did not exercise sufficient financial oversight to ensure the most economic use of the A-Base funds allocated to the RCMP. Significant one-time start-up and corporate overhead charges can be attributed to the lack of integrated financial management and reporting between Corporate Finance and the International Peace Operations Branch. The absence of comprehensive and transparent corporate financial reporting reduced efficiency, nevertheless the CPA successfully achieved 70 percent of its deployment target with 79 percent of its allocated budget. Much of this success can be attributed to the hard work and dedication of the IPOB staff and the willing collaboration of many police-service partners, who, despite having little influence on the implementation decision-making processes, have become important stakeholders.
The following recommendations are derived from the evaluation findings and conclusions. They take into account a long-term perspective that international police peacekeeping and peace operations will continue to play an important role as an instrument of Canada's foreign policy.
Governance Structures and Processes
That the governance structures and processes be modified to ensure better integration of police operations into Canadian security system reform efforts, strengthen strategic orientation, financial and performance oversight and ensure greater inclusivity of key stakeholders.
Supported by Findings #12, #13, #16, #19 and #23
The added value of the ADM-level Steering Committee was not evident and its governance role was not of sufficient importance to warrant regular meeting attendance by most of its appointed members. Reinforcing the oversight role of the Steering Committee, calling upon it to provide strategic policy guidance and advice on the integration of police operations into Canadian security-system reform efforts, as well as advanced meeting planning and documentation on issues for discussion may improve its functioning and overall contribution. The evaluation also recommends the creation of a director general-level operations committee to approve deployment recommendations to ministers, exercise financial and performance oversight on quarterly and annual plans and reports, and identify any strategic policy or procedural impasses experienced at the CPA Working Group level. While the director-level CPA Working Group should continue to manage ongoing day-to-day operational issues, it should also take steps to ensure that police-service partners are consulted in a meaningful way prior to making decisions that may affect the terms and conditions of their continued participation. Consideration should be given to revising CIDA's responsibilities as a CPA participant to better reflect its devolving role from funder to one of "interested observer" for deployments in countries where the Agency has a presence. Under these circumstances, consideration should be given to having the Minister of International Cooperation's concurrence, rather than approval, for IPP operations, which would be more aligned with programmatic accountabilities.
Guidelines to Assess Requests
That the Guidelines for assessing requests for Canadian contributions to peace-support operations be systematically reviewed and streamlined.
Supported by Findings #5, #7, #9 and #10
Federal government policy guidance on Canada's engagement in FCAS, the role of international policing in a security-system reform with links to national security has evolved since 2006, while the guidelines for assessing requests for Canadian contributions to peace-support operations remained the same until March 2011. With the addition of the recent efforts by the CPA participants to guide Canada's engagement in fragile states, the revised guidelines now include a total of 23 major factors to consider, with a combined 61 review questions to answer.(111) A systematic review in light of recent GoC and CPA participant policies, guidelines and priorities would ensure continued policy alignment and coherence going forward. The review should make recommendations that would streamline to a reasonable number the factors and questions that have to be addressed, indicate relative importance of the factors, and establish decision rules, while maintaining the necessary flexibility to respond to unique requests and circumstances.
Standard Operating Procedures
That SOPs be agreed upon by the key stakeholders and used by the CPA Working Group and the RCMP in managing daily operations.
Supported by Findings #2, #9, #11, #19, #20 and #22
The establishment of the CPA/IPP with stable funding has required mutual understanding among the stakeholders of respective roles and responsibilities, the RCMP's institutional capacity building, and the development of formal systems and management practices. While considerable progress has been made, this organizational development process was unfinished by March 2011. The renewal of the CPA is an opportune time for the participants to finalize the SOPs, in consultation as appropriate with key police-service partners who deploy the majority of police officers.(112) The SOPs should include procedures for: 1) receiving, disseminating and assessing requests for Canadian contributions, 2) preparing, circulating and forwarding memorandums to ministers when seeking approval for new/renewal of IPP operations and expert police officer deployments, 3) overall deployment management, including pre-departure training and post-deployment debriefing, recognition and post-mission support, 4) using the rapid deployment capacity, 5) implementing a performance-measurement strategy, including respective roles and responsibilities, and, 6) exercising due diligence on financial and narrative plans/reports, including compliance with agreed-upon accountability and management frameworks.
The Role of Canadian contingents in UN missions
That greater use of diplomatic channels is used to convey the GoC's interest in better defining the overall role and responsibilities of Canadian contingents in UN missions with a view to optimizing the effectiveness of the high-quality Canadian police officer resources being put at their disposal.
Supported by Findings #14 and #17
"The CPA Working Group will work to see that Canadians will continue to play significant roles in each of the missions."(113) Roles and responsibilities in this matter should therefore be strategic and well defined between the Canadian stakeholders and with PRMNY. Canada's police advisor, posted by the CPA at the Permanent Mission in New York since 2008, is well positioned to raise Canada's profile within DPKO and to lobby for Canadian interests. Efforts have been made over the last 18 months to pinpoint the added value of Canadian police expertise, identify certain niche areas and specific positions within UN missions that are of strategic importance to Canada. Key to the police advisor's role is to advise the Canadian Ambassador to the UN on police issues, especially in terms of UNPOL deployment and the work of the Strategic Police Advisor Group (STAG), which is a group formed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, among others, to lobby the UN on policing issues. The use of diplomatic channels to advance Canadian interests should be reinforced with the goal to ensure better dialogue with the DPKO, better positioning for Canadian contingents, and better use of Canadian investments. While the evaluation acknowledges that there may be some policies that diplomatic influence cannot change in the short term due to the structure of the UN and its policies on geographic balance, age restrictions, and educational requirements, continued efforts to effect change are still warranted.
Marketing of international police peacekeeping
That better marketing of international police peacekeeping is employed to obtain the support of provincial governments and maintain the number of participating police-service partners; a communications strategy would first be required to launch such an initiative.
Supported by Finding #17
The CPA has had a positive effect on Canadian police officers who participated in international police peacekeeping missions, but the added benefits to the police service are still relatively unknown and under acknowledged. Additional policy research and marketing of the domestic benefits would be advisable to secure the support of provincial governments, maintain the participation of police-service partners, and increase the involvement of ranked police officers with specialized expertise. Acknowledgement of the contribution of police officers and formal recognition of the competencies developed when considering professional advancement would be key messages in a communications strategy for a better marketing of international police peacekeeping.
Financial Controllership and IPP Costing Model
That, with a view to updating the CPA, consideration be given to clarifying roles and responsibilities with respect to financial comptrollership and reporting, and that key assumptions informing the IPP costing model be reviewed to align the same with proximate actual costs.
Supported by Findings #11, #20, #21 and #22
The importance of financial controllership of IAE funds allocated to the CPA should receive additional attention as the foundational documents are revisited for the future renewal of the IPP operations and the MOU among the participants beyond fiscal year 2011-2012. There is a need to possibly incorporate into the body of the MOU elements of the DFAIT-RCMP side agreement that was not executed, e.g., opening of an OGD suspense account to pay for incremental costs, invoice and payment schedules, responsibility for overseeing reporting on results, as well as specifying the responsibilities and administrative procedures for returning unexpended IPP program funds to the IAE Peace and Security Pool. The original underlying assumptions of the IPP costing model should also be revised in light of the findings of this evaluation, i.e., 1) the proportionate contributions of the RCMP and other police-service partners to police officer deployments; 2) their respective deployment unit costs; 3) the differential in incremental costs between UN and non-UN mission deployments; 4) the rationale for an RCMP 17 percent corporate overhead charge; and 5) the basis of calculation for RCMP corporate overhead and the legal contingency fund.
Governance Structures and Processes
That the governance structures and processes be modified to ensure better integration of police operations into Canadian security system reform efforts, to strengthen strategic orientation, financial and performance oversight and to ensure greater inclusivity of key stakeholders.
Associated Findings: #12, #13, #16, #19 and #23
Management Response & Action Plan
1. Improvements have been made to MOUs negotiated from 2011 onward, effective February, 2011. To the extent possible, the MOUs have been standardized (for example, with regard to administrative fees) so that each police service is fairly compensated for its participation. The new standard MOUs allow RCMP/IPOB's relations with its police partners to be more consistent and efficient. Changes to the standardized MOUs will be made as required and will reflect future changes to the IPP Program.
Responsibility Centre : RCMP
Time Frame: Completed
2. As part of the renewal of the IPP Program and the CPA MOU agreement, a DG-level Advisory Committee has been added to CPA governance in order to increase strategic orientation and financial performance oversight. The committee held its inaugural meeting in June 2011 and is to meet on a quarterly basis.
Responsibility Centre : CPA Partners
Time Frame: Completed
3. The CPA Research Group has been created to perform strategic research; early projects include the development of police peacekeeping related logic model (LM) and performance measurement (PM) strategy and quantifying the benefits to domestic police services of participating on IPP missions.
Responsibility Centre: PS Lead/CPA Partners
Time Frame: Draft LM/PM strategy completed
Domestic Benefits issue to be completed
4. CPA representatives are contributing to many DFAIT-led initiatives and working groups, such as work on the deployment of civilians to fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS), the Security System Reform Working Group and the START advisory board. Implementation of the whole-of-government Civilian Deployment Framework is intended to increase the efficiency of deployments and ensure the right people are deployed with the right training to succeed and it is drawing on lessons learned from police deployments. Subject matter experts from IPOB contribute from an operational and policy perspective by providing advice on topics such as training, insurance and health and safety.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT
Time Frame: Ongoing
5. The CPA will continue to refer to the Government of Canada SSR guidelines and to consult with the required stakeholders so as to ensure that the CPA aligns with Canadian policy and programming in fragile states.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT
Time Frame: Ongoing
6. The CPA will continue to explore current communication practices, including alternative formal structures and processes to ensure that partner police services' concerns and issues are voiced and addressed. Examples of current communication practices include a regular newsletter, Annual General Meetings and quarterly teleconferences with partners.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: By next Annual General Meeting, Spring 2012
7. Provincial policing and security officials have been engaged and updated on the IPP Program renewal through Federal/Provincial/Territorial (F/P/T) fora.
Responsibility Centre: PS
Time Frame: Ongoing
8. As of January 1, 2011, the RCMP has consolidated insurance coverage into a standardized format for all Canadian police on IPP missions in order to ensure adequate and consistent coverage for all partners.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Completed
9. Efforts are being made to improve reporting, including after a deployment, to ensure that lessons learned reflect the views of partner police services; mission reporting templates are being updated to facilitate improved performance measurement.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP-led/CPA Research Group
Time Frame: Winter 2012
10. CIDA's responsibilities as a CPA partner have been updated and codified in both the 2011 Ministerial MOU and the associated SOPs.
Responsibility Centre: CPA Partners
Time Frame: Completed
Guidelines to Assess Requests
That the guidelines for assessing requests for Canadian contributions to peace- support operations be systematically reviewed and streamlined.
Associated Findings: #5, #7, #9 and #10
Management Response & Action Plan
1. Mission selection guidelines have been systematically reviewed, streamlined, and updated as part of IPP Program renewal and CPA MOU renewal. The new mission selection guidelines are attached as an annex to the CPA MOU. The updated guidelines reflect whole of government work on fragile states, with specific reference to the Government of Canada's Guidelines on engagement in Fragile States. The new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) include a reference to the new Security System Reform Guidelines.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT-led / CPA Partners
Time Frame: Completed
2. The CPA will explore options for documenting and recording rejected requests and the rationale for their denial. A tracking table has been created to assist in tracking all requests and calls for contributions that have come to the attention of the CPA.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT
Time Frame: March 2012
Standard Operating Procedures
That standard operating procedures (SOPs) be agreed upon by the key stakeholders and used by the CPA Working Group and the RCMP in managing daily operations.
Associated Findings: #2, #9, #11, #19 and #20
Management Response & Action Plan:
1. DFAIT has prepared SOPs in consultation with other CPA partners, which were approved at the first DGs' Advisory Committee meeting. DGs commented on the need for the document to remain evergreen.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT
Time Frame: Completed
2. CPA Working Group will implement and utilize the updated SOPs in day-to-day management of the program.
Responsibility Centre: CPA Working Group
Time Frame: Ongoing
3. CPA Working Group will develop clear rationale for the use of Rapid Deployment Funds. DFAIT has drafted a discussion paper to clarify the use of training, rapid deployment and other expert deployments.
Responsibility Centre: CPA Working Group
Time Frame: March 2012
The role of Canadian contingents in UN missions
That greater use of diplomatic channels is used to convey the GoC's interest in better defining the overall roles and responsibilities of Canadian contingents in UN missions, with a view to optimizing the effectiveness of the high-quality Canadian police officer resources being put at their disposal.
Associated Findings: #14 and #17
Management Response & Action Plan:
1. CPA partners, and in particular DFAIT, will identify ways to ensure Canadian police are utilized in such a way that reflects their experience and expertise.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT
Time Frame: Ongoing
2. Greater efforts will be made to fully utilize diplomatic channels such as Canada's diplomatic mission to the UN (PRMNY) and EU and bilateral missions to address concerns and increase efficiencies.
Responsibility Centre: DFAIT and RCMP
Time Frame: Ongoing
3. Visits to policing missions will be better coordinated to ensure whole-of-government messages are delivered. The visits also serve as a mechanism to gather feedback and identify potential challenges.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP, PS, DFAIT
Time Frame: Ongoing
4. CPA partners are updating reporting templates to facilitate early identification of issues and capture lessons learned that will in turn identify areas for follow up.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Winter 2012
Marketing of international police peacekeeping
That better marketing of international police peacekeeping be employed to obtain the support of provincial governments and maintain the number of participating police-service partners; a communications strategy would first be required to launch such an initiative.
Associated Findings: #17
Management Response & Action Plan:
1. RCMP/IPOB is developing a new communication strategy for 2012/13 that builds on the successes of the previous three-year plan drafted in 2008. This plan sees a shift towards increased media activity in areas such as illustrating the domestic value of international deployments. The new plan also proposes continuing to build strong links with police and government partners.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Spring 2012
2. The development of an internal (partners and other governments) and external (media and public) communications strategy was a priority issue explored at the CPA Working Group meeting retreat of June 2011. IPOB has held a first meeting to establish a communications working group with CPA partners. Consultations are currently underway between CPA departments on priorities and way forward.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Spring 2012
3. F/P/T partners have been kept abreast of developments on the renewal of the IPP Program over the past year through F/P/T fora and through mission visits to see the work of Canadian police first hand. This will continue to be an opportunity to communicate IPP Program success and engage at other levels of government.
Responsibility Centre: PS
Time Frame: Ongoing
4. RCMP will continue to maintain a website regarding international police peacekeeping to communicate with the general public and officers interested in a deployment.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Ongoing
5. While IPOB has a high number of police partners engaged in deployments, it does need higher female participation on IPP missions within its partners. Approximately 10% of Canadian police deployed to missions are women; the UN goal is to increase the number of women police deployed to 20%, however, it currently only attains 10%. The RCMP/IPOB will promote the continuing need for higher female participation to our police partners.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Ongoing
6. The next IPOB Annual general meeting (AGM) will have domestic benefits of police peacekeeping as its theme. This will bring together all partners involved, from partner police services to Government partners.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP-led/CPA RG
Time Frame: Spring 2012
7. A new mission reporting template will seek to track trends in police personnel's use of their skills in mission and to quantify the competencies gained by police officers on deployment for police partners in order to better communicate the benefits of participation.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP-led/CPA RG
Time Frame: Winter 2012
Financial controllership and IPP costing model
That, with the view to updating the CPA, consideration be given to clarifying roles and responsibilities with respect to financial comptrollership and reporting and that key assumptions informing the IPP costing model be reviewed to align the same with proximate actual costs.
Associated Findings: #11, #20, #21, #22
Management Response & Action Plan:
1. The DG-level Advisory Committee, created to provide an additional layer of strategic and financial oversight, will be actively involved in the financial comptrollership of the Program.
Responsibility Centre: DG-level Advisory Committee
Time Frame: Ongoing
2. Financial reporting requirements have been increased to a quarterly basis. Reporting to the CPA Working Group has also increased; financial projections are now provided by the Director of IPOB at monthly meetings. Mechanism are also now in place to track key areas, such as international training, rapid deployments, and assessment missions.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Ongoing
3. New, more detailed financial reporting templates have been developed by RCMP; to be reviewed at quarterly meetings of DG-level Advisory Committee.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP; DG-level Advisory Committee
Time Frame: Ongoing
4. The IPP Costing Model was updated to more accurately reflect costs as part of the renewal of the IPP Program and the CPA.(114) Given that continuous program improvements and shifts in country priorities will result in changes to costs, the costing model will be regularly revised so that it remains up-to-date. Financial forecasts will rely more on actual costs and will be updated regularly.
Responsibility Centre: RCMP
Time Frame: Completed
5. The 2011 IPP approval documents created a Special Purpose Allotment, allowing all unexpended funds to be carried into the new fiscal year available uniquely for the same purpose.
Responsibility Centre: CPA Partners
Time Frame: Completed
1. The full legal name is the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
2. Reference here is to Article 3 - Duration.
3. All monetary figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.
4. The IAE is jointly managed by the ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and International Cooperation and is divided into five pools: development, international financial institutions, peace and security, crisis, and development research. This structure supports coherent priority-setting across all government departments participating in the aid program; transparency in the allocation of new resources; and flexibility to respond to new initiatives. DFAIT is responsible for administering the peace and security pool, and co-manages the crisis pool with CIDA, in consultation with Finance Canada, the Privy Council Office, and the Treasury Board Secretariat.
5. The evaluation team has not obtained copies of any Amendments to the MOU to reflect these changes.
6. 2008-2009 IPP Annual Report, p. 28. Investing in Capacity: A Business Case for Expansion: The Status Quo is Not Sustainable - Change is Necessary. (RCMP, 2009, pp. v, 16). The evaluation team has not been able to identify the title or obtain a copy of the evaluation report.
7. The first Memorandum of Understanding the participants signed was then and continues to be referred to as the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA).
8. Report of the UN Secretary General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, June 11, 2009, p. 19.
9. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing: Better World Better Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, March 2009.
10. The coded text segments from reference documents and interview responses are referred to as "quotations" in Atlas/ti and constitute the evidence base for the findings.
11. This is an Excel file entitled, "IPP costing model - Cost Accounting Analysis and Reporting Template (draft April 21)".
12. These requirements were in addition to those set out in the bid solicitation documents with which the evaluation team was in compliance.
13. G-8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace-Support Operations held in Sea Island, Georgia, June 10, 2004.
14. 2005 World Summit Outcome, High-Level Plenary Meeting held September 14-16, 2005 at UN headquarters in New York.
15. Ministerial meeting at the 78th General Assembly of INTERPOL, October 20, 2009.
16. A Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a cohesive team of 140 officers whose mandates, training and equipment are far different from those of conventional UN police. FPUs are armed and equipped as a unit, rapidly deployable and trained to act as a cohesive body capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies. They are self-sufficient, able to operate in high-risk environments and deployed to undertake crowd control and public order tasks. Canada does not deploy FPUs.
17. The evaluation was unable to obtain the report and there was no record in the CPA Working Group meeting minutes of it being tabled for discussion.
18. A $4 million surplus from the 2008-09 incremental cost budget still had to be reallocated due to the shortfall from the annual 200 FTE deployment target.
19. The evaluation received and reviewed numerous files related to the accounting and reporting on incremental cost disbursements which required end-of-year reallocations amounting to less than $4 million most years.
20. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Public Safety Canada (PS), Status of Women Canada and Justice Canada, as well as members of Canadian civil society, have all contributed to the development of the Action Plan.
21. Building Peace and Security for All: Canada's Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, 2010, p .5).
22. Article 2 Framework 1: Canada shall associate itself with the Joint Action by which the Council of the European Union decides that the EU will conduct the crisis management operation, and with any Joint Action or Decision by which the Council of the European Union decides to amend or extend the mandate of the EU crisis management operation, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and any required implementing arrangements.
23. The CPA MOU did not elaborate as to how the participants were to contribute, or for which assessment factors they would be responsible.
24. There is anecdotal data that some requests are received directly by other CPA participants, e.g., the RCMP.
25. The evaluation received confirmation from the RCMP that the full budgeted amount was allocated to and disbursed by the Regina depot.
26. Toronto Police Service is the largest municipal police service in Canada and second largest police force in Canada after the RCMP; the Montreal Police Service is the second largest municipal police force in Canada with 7,197 employees.
27. Canada's International Policy Statement - Development, 2005 p. 9.
28. CPA Working Group Meeting Outcomes November 9, 2006.
29. The 2009-10 DFAIT Report on Plans and Priorities, p. 16.
30. 2006-07 Public Safety Canada Departmental Performance Report, p. 42.
31. 2009-10 Public Safety Canada Report on Plans and Priorities, p. 21.
32. 2010-11 Public Safety Canada Report on Plans and Priorities, p. 11.
33. 2009-10 RCMP Report on Plans and Priorities, p. 22.
34. The relative importance of the factors is not defined.
35. The evaluation has documented the growing number of collaborative SSR projects with the Department of Justice Canada and Correctional Service Canada in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan.
36. The Strategic Policy Branch plays a strategic and a coordination role for the department and its portfolio agencies.
37. The Law Enforcement Branch currently has responsibility for RCMP policy including the day-to-day management of the IPP program.
38. Consolidation of the RCMP Act, Chapter R-10, March 24, 2011, p. 2.
39. 2006-07 RCMP Departmental Performance Report, pp. 19-20.
40. Interview data suggest that the RCMP is now fully accountable for defining and achieving the expected results of IPP operations given the permanent nature of the reference-level transfers from DFAIT/CIDA to the RCMP A-Base.
41. The IPP costing model includes deployment, RCMP HQ A-Base costs in this total.
42. The CPA MOU sets out the following RCMP responsibility: "8.2.12 preparing an annual consolidated financial report of the A-Base program and incremental costs of Canada's contribution to IPP operations in accordance with the approved IPP costing model;"
43. DFAIT/IRC, in partnership with numerous OGDs, has developed a government-wide Civilian Deployment Framework, which was endorsed by deputy ministers in the fall of 2010. The evaluation did not receive a copy of this document.
44. Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund, 2008, p. 53, http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2008/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm08.aspx?lang=eng
45. Guidelines for UN police officers on assignment on peacekeeping operations, June 29, 2007, UNDPKO.
46. Other complementary skills desirable: map reading, land navigation, use of global positioning systems, basic negotiation, interviewing techniques and basic first aid.
47. National security interests as a separate assessment factor were not included in the 2006 CPA Policy Framework, but have been explicitly incorporated in the assessment guidelines in the 2011 CPA MOU.
48. Government of Canada, Canadian Guidelines for Security System Reform, 2010, p. 4
49. Mobekk, E., 2008, "MINUSTAH and the Need for a Context-Specific Strategy: The Case of Haiti", in Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo, eds. H. Hänggi & V. Scherrer, DCAF, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 113-168.
50. DFAIT IRC, Briefing Note - Canada Support to Policing in Haiti, 2009.
51. Meharg, S. and Arnusch, A., 2010, "Haiti: Police and Law Enforcement", Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, pp. 73-96.
52. SSR & the Domestic-International Security Nexus: The Role of Public Safety Canada. Mark Sedra & Geoff Burt (August 2010).
53. Canadian Guidelines for Security-System Reform, 2010, p. 10.
54. The FPU consists of a team of 140 police officers who have been trained together and work as a cohesive, specialized unit. They act in situations of serious threats to peace or public order, and are armed with non-lethal weapons (but capable of using lethal weaponry, if required). UNDPKO, UN Police Handbook, p. 50.
55. UN Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 substantive session (February 22 - March 19, 2010) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-fourth Session Supplement No. 19, p. 31.
56. UN Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 substantive session (February 22 - March 19, 2010) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-fourth Session Supplement No. 19, p. 23.
57. Performance Review of Canadian Police Arrangement: Final Report. CIDA Partnership Branch, March 2002, p. 19.
58. United Nations Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 substantive session (February 22 - March 19, 2010) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-fourth Session Supplement No. 19, p. 23.
59. Canadian Police Arrangement, Annual Plan 2006 - 2007, p. 9.
60. Performance Review of Canadian Police Arrangement: Final Report. CIDA Partnership Branch, March 2002, p. 10.
61. STAG is a group formed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, among others, to lobby the UN on policing issues.
62. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing: Better World Better Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, March 2009.
63. Ibid., p. 24.
64. In 2006-2007, the first year of the CPA/IPP, the deployment ratio was already 30 percent RCMP and 70 percent non-RCMP.
65. The CPA Working Group meeting minutes of November 2006 note that RCMP senior management was considering an assessment of the continued need for police-service partner forces.
66. Summative Evaluation of START's Global Peace and Security Fund - Haiti, Final Report. April 2009, pp. 34.
67. Richard Warren, Police Reform in Haiti, Presentation Deck, April 2011.
68. Summative Evaluation of START's Global Peace and Security Fund - Haiti, Final Report. April 2009, pp. 42-43.
69. Richard Warren, Police Reform in Haiti, Presentation Deck, April 2011.
70. Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, Country report 4: Haiti. OECD 2010, p. 10.
71. Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, Country report 4: Haiti. OECD 2010.
72. Meharg, S. and Arnusch, A., 2010, "Haiti: Police and Law Enforcement", Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, pp. 73-96.
73. DFAIT IRC, Briefing Note - Canada Support to Policing in Haiti, 2009.
74. $9 billion for DND, $1.64 billion for CIDA, $514 million for DFAIT and $220 million for Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). (Costs for Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the RCMP are included in DFAIT calculations http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2010/2010_07_09.aspx?lang=eng (April 29, 2011)
75. U.S., whose responsibility was to rehabilitate the Afghan National Army (U.S. later launched its own Police Assistance Program (PAP) transferred to the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan -CSTC/A), Italy, the Afghan judiciary; the U.K., counter-narcotics; and Germany, the police (later transferred to EUPOL).
76. OECD, Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010 p. 29.
77. Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund: A case study of Afghanistan, Appendix H. DFAIT February 2010.
78. As reported in GPSF Evaluation, "Mentors serve as both a comfort to officers on duty, insofar as they function as a back-up when their confidence fails them, and also as a reminder of their duties as police officers. Mentors perform an important oversight role, ensuring that at least while in the mentor's company, their conduct is subject to third-party scrutiny. This latter point is significant, given the ANP's reputation for engaging in abusive practices." (p. 19).
79. Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund: A case study of Afghanistan, Appendix H. DFAIT, February 2010.
80. Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund: A case study of Sudan, Appendix F. DFAIT, February 2010, p. 27.
81. The evaluation received documentary evidence in the form of project lists, descriptions etc.
82. Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund: A case study of Sudan, Appendix F. DFAIT, February 2010, p. 27.
83. DFAIT, DND, CIDA, PS, Status of Women Canada and Justice Canada, as well as members of Canadian civil society, have all contributed to the development of Canada's Action Plan.
84. Building Peace and Security for All: Canada's Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Government of Canada, October 2010, p. 4.
85. Ferland, M, Isabelle, L., Évaluation des compétences acquises et développées par les policiers déployés au sein d'une opération de paix de l'ONU, Direction des relations internationales et du protocol, Sûreté du Québec, September 2009.
86. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing: Better World Better Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, March 2009, p. 24.
87. Shark put 156 sympathizers of the Hells under arrest, among whom 111 formal members (full patch), meaning almost the total Quebec members. Suspects were also arrested in New Brunswick, France and in the Dominican Republic. The "bunkers" of the five chapters of Quebec organization were also seized as well as arms and important quantities of illicit drugs. The operation was launched after three years' work by about 200 surveillance officers.
88. The two ADM respondents suggested that this was not a good use of their time.
89. CPA Working Group meeting minutes refer to "reccee" missions prior to and during deployments to assess security conditions, interdepartmental coordination, etc.
90. RCMP responsibility 8.2.12 reads as follows: "preparing an annual consolidated financial report of the A-Base program and incremental costs of Canada's contribution to IPP operations in accordance with the approved IPP costing model."
91. Disbursements for International Training, Rapid Deployment Capacity and the Online Training Course were not tracked separately, so any actual disbursements identified were extracted from among the RCMP IPOB program support O&M accounts charges, but may not represent all of the expenditures against these components.
92. The RCMP financial management practice is to charge 17 percent corporate overhead on the salary and benefits of RCMP officers assigned to externally funded programs, such as the estimated 120 (60 percent of 200) CPA deployed RCMP officers.
93. Legal contingency fund charges were to be calculated based on the number of police officers deployed at $6,600 per FTE.
94. While the evaluators obtained information from PS of RCMP personnel participation in various conferences and workshops abroad, very few of these activities were determined to be consistent with what was contemplated for the international training component of the CPA and, in any event, no charges were made against the IAE in relation thereto.
95. Fiscal year 2010-2011 disbursements used as reported as of February 28, 2011.
96. The 2010-2011 data were excluded from this analysis as they were estimated as of February 28, 2011.
100. Additional information on International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) Program IAE Funding Request. RCMP 2011, p. 2.
101. The evaluation did not receive the actual disbursement figures for the entire fiscal year and thus estimated the surplus which has since been reported to be $3.6 million in the 2010-2011 annual report.
102. UN missions: in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Sudan (UNAMID, UNAMIS), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Leban (UNIIIC).
103. Non-UN mission: in Afghanistan (KPRT, CSTC, EUPOL and Embassy), Bosnia, Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine, Kosovo and The Hague.
104. IPOB RCMP Business Model Validation Analysis. DBS International, 2007 p. 40.
105. Ibid. p. 40.
106. January 2009 guidelines (which updated version and translation in French are not available.
107. Review of Conflict-Related International Policing: Better World Better Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, March 2009, p. 121.
108. Ibid., pp. 28
109. Idem, pp. 28.
110. Such as the UN, the EU or the OSCE.
111. The evaluation received a draft CPA MOU for 2011 to 2016, which contained "Guidelines for Assessing Requests for Canadian Police Contributions to Peace-Support Operations."
112. The evaluation received an incomplete draft copy of the Standard Operating Procedures in March 2011.
113. Canadian Police Arrangement, Annual Plan 2006 - 2007, p. 9.
114. The financial information contained in the Evaluation Report is based on the IPP costing model established in 2006. Also, some of the actual costs in the report do not take account 2010-11 year end reconciliation. It should also be noted that a new IPP costing model was established in 2011 with the renewal of the IPP Program.