Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

international.gc.ca

Common menu bar

• Français
• Home
• Contact Us
• Help
• Search
• canada.gc.ca

Breadcrumb

1. Home
2. >
3. About the Department
4. >
5. Accountability

Final Report on the Administrative Review into the Security Incident Reported By Maxime Bernier:

Classified documents left at a private residence

July 16, 2008

1. Introduction

On May 26, 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxime Bernier, resigned from his portfolio after acknowledging that classified documents had been left at a private residence. In his letter of resignation, the Minister indicated that he had asked Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade officials to conduct a thorough review of the situation.

On May 27, 2008 the Clerk of the Privy Council instructed the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to conduct a comprehensive review into the incident. The review was to include an assessment of injury to the national interest based on a careful examination of the documents left unattended and the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Clerk of the Privy Council Office asked that DFAIT work closely with the Director of Security Operations, Privy Council Office.

The Departmental Security Officer undertook the review, engaging the services of two professional consultants from BMCI Investigations and Security Ltd. to assist given the scope, complexity and volume of work.

2. Scope and Objectives

2.1 Initiation of an administrative investigation by a professional firm that would examine both the circumstances concerning the classified documents left by Maxime Bernier at the residence of Ms. Julie Couillard and the adequacy of procedures within the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the protection of classified information.

2.2 An assessment of the injury to the national interest arising from the failure to safeguard classified information involved in this incident.

2.3 Recommendations for mitigating the risk of a similar occurrence in future.

3. Methodology

3.1 Administrative Investigation – Conduct Comprehensive Interviews with individuals who may have handled the documents. Examine comments received from various secondary sources during meetings and briefings.

The investigation involved interviews in Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto of 14 officials of interest working in DFAIT and the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In addition, Ms. Couillard’s lawyer was contacted on two occasions to request that she agree to be interviewed by the investigators, but her lawyer declined on her behalf.

DFAIT assisted the investigation by conducting a forensic review of e–mail mailboxes of officials of interest to determine if anyone had knowledge of the loss of the documents, at what point in time, and the extent of that knowledge.

3.2 Damage Assessment of the Documents Left Unattended – the purpose of this action was to determine the potential degree of injury to the national interest or other interest that may have resulted from the unauthorized disclosure of these documents.

3.3 Review of Procedures/ Corrective Measures/ Recommendations

Make recommendations on the findings of the review, to minimize the likelihood of a similar incident in the future.

4. Administrative Investigation – Observations/Conclusions

The Department has accepted the principal findings of the investigation, the main elements of which are described below.

4.1 A timeline of key events related to this review is attached as Annex A.

4.2 Circumstances concerning the classified documents left by Maxime Bernier at the residence of Ms. Julie Couillard:

• it appears that Minister Bernier was in possession of the NATO Summit Conference Background briefing materials by 15:00 Monday March 31, 2008 and the remainder of the briefing materials on Tuesday, April 1 prior to his departure.

• it appears that the Minister carried the NATO Summit Conference briefing materials with him in his carry–on luggage in an unlocked briefcase from the time he left his office on Tuesday, April 1 until his arrival in Bucharest on April 2, 2008.

• it appears that the NATO Summit Conference briefing material remained in the Minister’s unlocked briefcase in his hotel room in Bucharest for the duration of the conference.

• it appears that the Minister was in possession of the NATO Summit Conference briefing materials when he arrived at Ms. Couillard’s residence on the evening of April 4. He was unaware they were no longer in his briefcase when he left on the morning of April 5, 2008.

• it appears that when the Minister was informed that Ms. Couillard had government documents in her possession she wished to return, the Minister genuinely had no idea what documents she was referring to, and only recognized the documents were the briefing notes prepared for the Summit when he opened the package conveyed to him by a staff member on the evening of May 25, 2008.

Since investigators were not able to interview Ms. Couillard, the investigation could not determine the circumstances by which she came into possession of the classified documents.

4.3 The adequacy of procedures within the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the protection of classified information.

• it appears that Minister Bernier was duly briefed with respect to the receipt, handling, storage and transmission of classified and protected information of a sensitive nature.

• it appears that the Minister and staff in his office complied with existing policies, guidelines and procedures relating to Cabinet Documents and sensitive information relating to National Security that was classified as “Top Secret” or higher.

• it appears that the Minister did not:

  1. appoint a senior single point of contact within his office to coordinate security–related matters;

  2. seek advice from the DSO with respect to other security requirements under the Government Security Policy;

  3. adhere to the Government Security Policy relating to the safeguarding and transportation of classified information.

• it appears that security briefings to the Ministers’ staff should emphasize the need to protect all classified–protected information. They should be made aware of the need to use security equipment such as locked containers to ensure its integrity while in transit. The use of secure telephones and faxes should be emphasized, not just for Cabinet and “Top Secret” Documents, as now appears to be the case.

• it appears that the Government Security Policy should be reviewed in order to clearly articulate the DSO’s responsibility vis a vis both the Minister and his Staff, addressing those instances where the DSO’s advice is not sought.

• it appears that:

  1. the existence of the requirement in the Departmental Manual of Security Instructions to number all versions of the Briefing Books was not widely known amongst DFAIT or Ministerial staff;

  2. there was no requirement to account for the classified Briefing Book material and it was left up to the individual recipient to dispose of it as they saw fit;

  3. the DFAIT instructions for the preparation of Briefing Books did not reflect the need to either number or track all versions of the documents;

  4. existing DFAIT policy relating to Documents Requiring Special Handling Measures was not adhered to;

  5. the DFAIT Guidelines on Briefing Books – Post Delivery Instructions (June 2008) guidelines should address the above–noted deficiency;

  6. while adherence to the current policy relating to post delivery would not by itself have prevented the unauthorized disclosure it would have alerted the Minister to fact that the briefing material was missing when he returned to the office in Ottawa on April 7, 2008. Immediate steps could have been taken to attempt to locate the material and mitigate the impact of its inappropriate safeguarding.

4.4 Overall Conclusions

The Department has accepted the principal conclusions of the investigation team, the main elements of which are summarized below:

4.4.1 Circumstances concerning the classified documents left by Maxime Bernier at the residence of Ms. Julie Couillard:

Pursuant to the following facts:

1. Ms. Couillard had, on at least two occasions, the opportunity to alert the Minister that she was in possession of government documents and did not do so;

2. Ms. Couillard’s absence of providing any explanation as to how she came into possession of the classified documents and why it took so long to return the documents to the government;

3. Relevant details in the Minister’s statement provided to investigators are corroborated, in part, by the Chief of Staff and other office personnel; and

4. No empirical evidence was obtained, including witnesses interviewed coming forward, to refute Mr. Bernier’s version of events.

Consequently, it is concluded that:

1. Minister Bernier would have remained at all times responsible for safeguarding sensitive information under his control and has acknowledged that responsibility by his resignation.

2. Minister Bernier did bring the NATO Summit Conference briefing material into Ms. Couillard’s residence and left without them.

3. In the absence of evidence to refute the Minister’s version of events and based on a balance of probabilities, the Minister did not, at any time after the NATO Summit Conference, remove the briefing materials from the briefcase. He was unaware that the materials were unaccounted for until such time as he opened the envelope at 22:00 on the evening of Sunday, May 25, 2008.

4. Ms. Couillard may have put herself in potential jeopardy of having contravened a provision of the Security of Information Act.

4.4.2 The adequacy of procedures within the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the protection of classified information.

It is concluded that:

1. the Minister was briefed on the Government Security Policy governing the proper safeguarding and transportation of classified information.

2. the Minister and his staff in his office complied with existing policies, guidelines and procedures relating to Cabinet Documents and sensitive information relating to National Security that was classified as “Top Secret” or higher.

3. the Minister did not adhere to the Government Security Policy governing the proper safeguarding and transportation of classified information. The NATO Summit Conference Briefing materials were not adequately safeguarded. The material was left unattended in the Minister’s unlocked briefcase in a hotel room in Bucharest, Romania and private residences in Laval and La Prairie, Quebec.

4. No policy requirement exists to account for and dispose of the classified briefing material by individual recipients.

5. DFAIT policy governing Documents Requiring Special Handling Measures was not adhered to. The requirement to number and control all versions of Briefing Books was not followed by DFAIT officials.

5. An Assessment of the injury to the national interest arising from the failure to safeguard classified information involved in this incident

5.1 In response to the reported security incident involving the compromise of sensitive documents held by Mr. Bernier, the Security and Intelligence Bureau reviewed the briefing documents provided to him by the Defence and Security Relations Division for the Bucharest NATO Summit.

The information provided to the Minister Bernier comprised a NATO Summit Background Book, a pocket–sized NATO Summit Program "Scenario" Book and a Media Spokesperson’s Book.

The NATO Summit Background Book was marked SECRET and comprised 26 different documents at various levels – SECRET (3 documents), CONFIDENTIAL (15 documents), PROTECTED (2 documents), UNCLASSIFIED (4 documents) NATO RESTRICTED (1 letter of invitation), NATO RESTRICTED (1 document originating in the Department, not from NATO). The NATO Summit Program “Scenario” Book was marked SECRET and comprised 22 documents which were not individually marked with a security designation. The Media Spokesperson’s Book was UNCLASSIFIED. Originators of documents must judge properly the degree of sensitivity of the information they are preparing and grade the material accordingly. It should be noted that, in some cases, the judgment with respect to security gradings is quite variable.

5.2 Assessment: Although the investigation was not able to determine whether the documents were disclosed to unauthorized persons, beyond Ms. Couillard and her lawyer, it was considered prudent to assume that they were and to prepare an assessment of injury on that basis. Our review of the documents in question concluded that their disclosure would not have caused significant injury to the national interest. No special operational information as defined by the Security of Information Act was present. No classified material from allied governments nor from NATO (beyond the nominally classified “NATO–Restricted” letter of invitation from the NATO Secretary General to the Summit) was contained in the briefing material.

The classified briefing papers were classified essentially as a function of their being prepared prior to the NATO Summit itself. Information from these briefs, if made public before the Summit, could have been damaging to the national interest to the extent that it could have complicated diplomatic relations with certain states through references to the positions of those countries regarding particular issues expected to be raised at the Summit. After the event and the public expression of allied views, these same considerations would not pertain and hence the rationale for their classification would no longer apply. As the investigators have established that the earliest date when the briefing books could have come into the possession of Ms. Couillard was at some point during the night of April 4–5, that is after the conclusion of the NATO Summit, the time sensitive aspect of the classified briefs was no longer present.

While the possible unauthorized disclosure of the contents of the classified briefing notes, would not have caused significant injury to the national interest; it has to be acknowledged that the incident itself was injurious to the national interest by tarnishing Canada's good reputation within NATO circles for safeguarding classified information. At the same time, it is considered probable that the incident will be perceived by external observers as the result of careless handling of classified information by an individual rather than a systemic failure of the Government's regime for protecting classified information.

6. Recommendations for mitigating the risk of a similar occurrence in future

6.1 Security Education and Awareness training should be enhanced, and the briefing on the Protection of Information made mandatory for all staff working in the Minister’s office.

6.2 Security briefings provided to Ministers’ Staff should emphasize the need to protect all classified–protected information. Ministers’ Staff should be made aware of the need to use security equipment such as locked containers to ensure its integrity while in transit. The use of secure telephones and faxes should be emphasized, not just for Cabinet and “Top Secret” Documents as now appears to be the case.

6.3 Implementation of security policies and procedures needs to be better monitored in the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

6.4 DFAIT should provide more training to all employees on procedures and responsibilities for the classification of information, and the handling, control and safeguarding of sensitive material. All employees should be reminded on a regular basis of the sensitivity of classified documents and the need to protect them accordingly.

6.5 Appropriate control measures should be implemented so that a strict accounting is maintained at all times for all copies of all versions of Briefing Books. An employee should be assigned the responsibility for maintaining a log of the distribution and return or destruction of each copy of the document. Each copy should be numbered, and a record maintained of the official to whom it was issued, against a signed receipt. As recommended and noted by the investigation team, a system of numbering and tracking of Briefing Books has been put into place by the Executive Briefing Services which has issued guidelines to this effect.

Departmental Security Officer
Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade

Date: 16 July 2008

Annex A – Timeline for the Returned Inappropriately Safeguarded Classified Material

(Extracted verbatim from BMCI report of July 16, 2008)

Primary navigation

Date Modified:

2012-03-09