The Challenge of Exotic Weapons

Legitimizing Exotic Weapons

How did humanity reach a point where exotic weapons were both a choice for military arsenals and a concern for those in the arms control and disarmament community and international humanitarian law? Retired U.S. Army Colonel John Alexander provides some insight by recalling the history of the post-Vietnam period and public opinion’s resistance to military intervention and casualties.⁶ The impression made on the collective psyche of Americans and the international community in the 1960’s by constantly seeing body bags on nightly newscasts had a profound effect on public support for military engagements. There was also the added complexity of post-Vietnam doctrine which called for the use of “overwhelming force” to defeat an opponent. NATO doctrine also had a role in exotic weapons development as Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) sought to disable Soviet forces to allow time for Western forces to fall back, mobilize pre-positioned equipment and attack Warsaw Pact formations in force.⁷

Finding solutions through new technology obviously became a preoccupation for military planners and researchers. Development of precision munitions, including conventionally armed cruise missiles, was viewed as a possible solution to the combination of concerns mentioned above. Non-lethal weapons are another perceived solution. Profound changes in thinking occurred in the 1990’s with the geometric increase in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions taken on by the United Nations. Alexander cites the conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti as situations of great complexity posed for mission planning and rules of engagement. In all instances the new realities posed challenges for adjustment in philosophy and the ongoing concern for collateral damage complicated the capacity of soldiers on the ground to carry out missions. This ongoing concern can be explained by examining the conception of “economy of force.”⁸

Alexander believes that exotic weapons including non-lethal weapons are a viable, if not essential option in such new missions. This opinion was emphasized by U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni who commanded the U.S. led mission to Somalia in 1995 to extract remaining UN forces with the result of no casualties to U.S. forces or Somali militias. He stated that the use of non-lethal weapons such as “eye friendly” lasers was critical to mission success and he personally would not lead a similar mission in future without them.⁹ Such favourable perspectives for these technologies are gaining strength among U.S. security and defence policy makers. Advocates for the use of non-lethal weapons state that such capabilities would not compensate for conventional weapons, but would augment military capabilities as an option.

Another important consideration for states pursuing programs in exotic weapons seems to be the economic costs that often befall those parties dealing with post-war reconstruction. Strategic planners have paid closer attention to the costs attributed to conducting military operations of considerable scale. The traditional example of postconflict costs incurred is American and Western rebuilding of Europe and Japan after World War II through the Marshall Plan. The use of exotic weapons that are designed to be anti-material in nature, such as electromagnetic weapons, could disable electronic infrastructure such as command and control functions of an adversary but would not necessarily cause catastrophic results with traditional “bricks and mortar” infrastructure. In conventional military scenarios and even with “dumb bombs” and earlier generation precision munitions, command and control and other key military sites would have been destroyed with greater possibility of collateral damage, greater danger to aircrews, destroyed infrastructure and high monetary costs for reconstruction.¹⁰ Using modern technology such as “e- bombs,” the economic costs of post-war reconstruction, could be reduced for the forces conducting the offensive. The attractiveness of using exotic technologies to achieve these ends, appear to offer positive humanitarian and economic arguments for using such means. However, upon closer analysis, in the context of international law, serious consequences of this revolution are delineated and will be discussed later in the paper.

The reader should also conceptualize the arguments that advocate the use of particular exotic weapons and technologies in the context of a post September 11th environment. It is likely that in this environment these tools of Twenty First Century warfare have great interest among political and military elites in western democracies, be it for use abroad or domestically, both in peace or crisis-like environments. As early as 1970, future U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a professor at Columbia, highlighted the importance of technology such as electromagnetic energy as tools for the elites in what he predicted would increasingly become a “more controlled and directed society.”¹¹ Brzezinski stated that:

“Unhindered by the restraints of traditional liberal values, this elite would not hesitate to achieve its political ends by using modern techniques for influencing public behaviour and keeping society under close surveillance and control. Technical and scientific momentum would then feed on the situation it exploits.”¹²

This prediction is more important for consideration in a domestic security context and abuse of less-than-lethal technologies by civil authorities.¹³ In summary, there are a number of political, military and economic factors which help explain why the research, development and use of exotic weapons have become extremely important to the civilian and military establishments in developed countries and may be attractive to less developed countries with poor human rights records. To understand the attractiveness of exotic weapons, it is necessary to provide some detailed descriptions of particular weapons technologies and their possible uses.

⁶ John Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty First Century Warfare. New York: St. Martins, 1999, 13.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the Twenty First Century. New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1996, 278.

⁹ Alexander, 24.

¹⁰ Michael Puttré, Satellite-Guided Munitions. Scientific American. February 2003, 70-71.

¹¹ Nick Begich, Vandalism in the Sky. Online. February 23, 2003. Available: http://earthpulse.com/harp/vandalism.html, 6.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Many law enforcement agencies prefer to use the term less-than-lethal, perhaps in recognition of the possibility of people suffering injuries from some technologies. Alexander treats this topic in a chapter on law enforcement.

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