The Challenge of Exotic Weapons

Exploitation of Loopholes: The future of international treaties.

Scientific and technical advances which have furthered the research and development of exotic weapons of varying types, raise questions as to not only what the dangers are by use of the weapons on human beings, but also how such weapons could change the dynamic of multilateral arms control and disarmament. Two examples of the implications of these weapons advances can be understood by looking primarily at new uses for chemicals and biology.

Chemistry and Biology

The development of some technologies using non-lethal mines, chemical or biological substances for use by law enforcement or the military will upon initial examination, raise concerns and elicit an emotional response. It is necessary to examine new developments and assess the possibility of how the strong support for using nonlethal weapons could complicate or test existing disarmament treaties.

Among the numerous hypothetical scenarios used by John Alexander, one in particular provokes curiosity and possibly concern. The scenario depicts a Russian mafia member bent on releasing a biological agent into the water system of a major U.S. city; unaware he is under surveillance by American counter terrorist forces. Before the terrorist is about to release the agent, he is overcome by command activated “Volcano” mines which deploy polymer fibre nets that have electrical wires running through them. The objective of the technology is to not only ensnare the perpetrator, but to emit shocks which interrupt his neurological functions. Another counter-terrorist team member has an epoxy projector that is fired and grasps or encapsulates the BW container in the terrorist’s hand. Totally disabled and offering no resistance, the terrorist is subdued.⁴¹ On the surface, a terrorist attack involving the loss of thousands of innocent lives is averted. The authorities have successfully used non-lethal technologies, including nonlethal land mines.

The mines in the above scenario are apparently not meant to maim or kill. However, does this mean that there is a new definition and acceptance for a weapon that has been traditionally viewed as lethal? How do international disarmament fora deal with separating traditional weapons and weapons systems from their lethal forbearers? Does this not dilute the effectiveness of existing treaties? It is assumed that the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and Landmines Convention are intent on eliminating entire categories of weapons. These questions are raised on the assumption that there are always possible exemptions and loopholes. Exotic weapons, be they acoustic weapons or chemicals used for supposed non-lethal or anti-material applications are raising this dilemma presently.

Chemistry

Vigorous debates were carried out for decades regarding the issue of non-lethal agents and incapacitants, notably riot control agents (RCA’s). Arguments have also been made since the end of the First World War over the issue of whether certain types of lethal weapons, such as poison gas offered more humane methods of warfare or could reduce casualties.⁴² This is a debate that is reemerging from some sectors of the security and defence community.⁴³ Use of an aerosolized form of the opiate Fentanyl, was used in a Russian Special Forces attack on a Moscow theatre in October 2002.⁴⁴ This incident has given the use of “non-lethal” agents a high profile, reinforcing the issue of the lethality of weapons categorized as non-lethal. It could also mark a sea change in the norms prohibiting some forms of CW. Some argue that political acceptance of new chemical options is the core issue.⁴⁵ The new complexity is that:

New materials are constantly being developed for a wide range of purposes. Some have potential military applications. It is unrealistic to believe they will only be employed for peaceful purposes. Possibly, they may save lives when used as weapons, so opponents of chemical weapons assume an illogical position and argue in favour of more killing and brutality.⁴⁶

The types of uses envisioned for chemicals would be for anti-material attacks. One example would be super acids to degrade tires on armoured vehicles. Development of agents that weaken the strength of polymer bonds (catalytic depolymerization) would utilize agents that are so powerful, that only a small amount is needed to destroy a target.⁴⁷ It is argued that use of precision munitions would mitigate concerns over safety. Other possibilities are agents that degrade petroleum, be it oil or gasoline. It is argued that these options are not tenable because of the emotional reactions to the notion of a chemical agent. There are indeed numerous concerns here, in that the advocates of these technologies appear to be seeking to exploit the weaknesses of multilateral treaties such as the CWC. Alexander even suggests that one way of delivering aggressive chemicals is to use the “binary system.”⁴⁸ The mere premise of using a system that was advocated for the U.S. CW agents in the 1980’s arouses some suspicion and concern over what this would do to the collective faith of the international community regarding the already beleaguered CWC, regardless of whether the intention is non-lethal or anti-material.

Biology

The same arguments that have been made for developing anti-material chemicals unrestrained or unaffected by provisions of the CWC, are being made for anti-material biological organisms, with the promise by its advocates that the particular “agents” in question would not harm humans. The complaint by experts who see the potential of “non-lethal,” anti-material BW is that the BWC restricts research and development. “Current doctrine even restricts the definition of biological warfare to ‘the use of disease to harm or kill an adversary’s military forces, population, food, or livestock.’”⁴⁹ Critics of multilateral conventions argue that this does not address the entire breadth of the BW threat. Interest seems to revolve around naturally occurring organisms and not those created by biotechnology. The complexity of dual use organisms is an alarming factor, where for example, the deadly agent ricin is being engineered to fight leukemia because of granulocyte macrophage colony stimulating factor (GMCSF) has been cross-linked to ricin by protein conjugation.⁵⁰

Promising research into degrading chemical bonds using fungus like aspergillis to attack plastic polymers is another area where the argument for anti-material biological weapons is being made. Part of the effort to pursue such options is made by bringing attention to research carried out by biochemists to solve environmental challenges involving organisms that may also be a threat to national security. One example of the biological paradox is the research into organisms able to reduce the amount of refuse stored is a possible threat and that “only the intent of the user changes.”⁵¹ What other intents might emerge apart from adopting such suggestions for anti-material warfare and possible indiscriminate effects are an important issue that requires careful review in the context of multilateral agreements.

The trend in research could possibly threaten existing treaties. One of the potential areas of research is outlined by Captain James Campbell of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory who states that “the next step may be to develop biomimetic chemical systems that reproduce specific degradative capabilities, but without the requirement for living organisms.” Because there are no living organisms involved in such methods, the agents would not be subject to existing treaties.⁵² Such scientific and technical trends, if translated into actual policy would be problematic for treaties that took decades to evolve and help eliminate weapons and their use. These threats to multilateral instruments are in addition to ongoing matters of verification, technical and substantive non-compliance that continue to be faced by state parties friendly to the international treaties. The ability of the international community to maintain the robust aspects of the CWC and BWC is constantly being challenged by scientific developments. Proponents of new exotic technologies are not apt to suggest that the treaties adapt to new developments, lest those multilateral instruments interfere with a new program of producing chemical or biological substances that offer promise as anti-material weapons. It might be feared, particularly in the present context of international affairs that some critics advocate their countries exercise the right to withdrawal from the treaties.

⁴¹ Alexander, 4-5.

⁴² Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997, 66, 71, 158.

⁴³ Lynn Klotz, Martin Furmanski, Mark Wheelis, “Beware the Sirens Song: Why ‘Non-lethal’ Incapacitating Agents are Lethal. Federation of American Scientists. March 2003. Online. March 6, 2003. Available: http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/sirens_song.htm

⁴⁴ The Guardian. “Moscow siege gas ‘may have been opiate.’” October 29, 2002. Online. March 24, 2003. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/chechnya/Story

⁴⁵ Alexander, 71.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 75.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 76.

⁴⁹ Alexander, 116.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 116.

⁵¹ Ibid, 121.

⁵² Ibid, 122.

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