The Challenge of Exotic Weapons

Current Issues: Possible Effects of Exotic Weapons on Warfare, Intervention and Security

The development of these weapons may contribute to lowering the threshold to war. Exotic weapons, along with non-lethal systems have the capability to fulfill strategic and tactical goals of disabling or destroying critical nodes of an adversary’s military infrastructure with lower risk of collateral damage and casualties. Whether one considers exotic weapons to consist of technologies such as EMP, HMP or psychotronic weapons and in separate categories from those systems more traditionally recognized as non-lethal, there is an important commonality that both categories share. Any of these systems may make it easier for states to initiate a conflict or intervene from the outside into an existing conflict. Lowering the threshold by using standoff weapons reduces the political and military risks that have traditionally constrained the decisions for intervention in conflicts.⁵³ There could be positive consequences to intervention at early stages of a crisis. There is debate as to whether the existence of these weapons or their use represents a more effective means to manage a crisis or a “slippery slope” to more frequent intervention in areas of marginal national interest a way of escalating conflict.⁵⁴

One concern involves the Just War Doctrine, which attempts to limit or restrain the ways that states engage in war. The key tests to determine compliance are military necessity (military targets), humanity (minimize suffering), and proportionality. It is often pointed out, that the objective of non-lethal weapons is to “humanize” military conflict, and is consistent with the goals of Just War.⁵⁵ This argument could apply to the use of more exotic technologies such as EMP weapons.

It is widely agreed that in many circumstances, even non-lethal weapons can have lethal effects.⁵⁶ Each of the weapons discussed in this paper have the capacity, through science and engineering to have a range from non-lethal to lethal. There is also the possibility that that the indiscriminate effects of these weapons will change if they are designed to move from one end of this “lethality spectrum” to the other. Many systems were designed initially to be lethal.⁵⁷ This relates to the fundamental question that needs to be asked about new weapon systems and their purposes. If intents change, then weapons can also change. This is the dilemma when states design reviews or control mechanisms or encouraging other states to do likewise. Many experts have emphasized that there is abhorrence toward many weapons which caused injury as a function of their design. To be mindful of the impact on humanity, abhorrence has been directed at weapons based on the nature of the injury that they cause. This has led to the stigmatization of indiscriminate weapons such as anti-personnel landmines.⁵⁸

Proliferation is another concern, particularly among those states that have the lead in development of the technology. As with any domestically designed weapons, concerns have increased over exotic technology proliferating to hostile states and terrorist organizations. As second and third generation technologies are developed, it is anticipated that the older systems will diffuse throughout the world. Nonproliferation efforts will be difficult to institute because the technologies used are not specific to nonlethal technologies.⁵⁹ Hence, the ongoing challenge of dual-use technologies or components continues to plague the international community.

Development of exotic weapons has raised concerns about the impact of those weapons on humanity, not only in war abroad, but the threats to society at home. These threats do not necessarily pertain to the use of the weapons only, but the lack of oversight by civilian and publicly elected officials. One observer has highlighted the low level of congressional oversight in the United States with regard to these programs considering there is a tremendous amount of research funding being allocated for such projects.⁶⁰ In the United States there have been few congressional hearings held that have actually been open.⁶¹ Accountability and transparency need to be evaluated, particularly since much “oversight” is carried out within the military structure, from the early stages.⁶² One key ethical issue relates to the fact that much of the research in the anti-personnel field depends upon expertise from the medical community.⁶³

Nonproliferation, Disarmament regimes and international conventions

According to Lewer and Scholfield there are a number of declarations and conventions have some relationship with these weapons technologies (Appendix I).⁶⁴ Directed energy weapons including ground based lasers present new challenges because they do not use delivery systems and in most cases do not require a nuclear detonation. “Weapons being developed which use electromagnetic fields or variations on this theme are not well addressed in treaty agreements.”⁶⁵ This means that nuclear treaties such as the NPT have little applicability. Directed energy weapons have a close relationship with the ongoing research for National Missile Defence (NMD). In view of the abandonment of the United States from the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, new realities prevail with regard to multilateral disarmament. To what degree major powers are willing to discuss disarmament conventions which outlaw wholly new weapons categories seems to have been rendered moot. If that were an issue for discussion, some immediate problems arise.

One complexity reminiscent of the multilateral negotiations conducted for the eventual CWC, was the determination of lethality for weapons. The difficulty in determining lethality with a new weapons system such as EMP is that unlike the technology base for weapon construction widely published in open literature, lethality related issues have been published much less frequently. Calculations for electromagnetic field strength are achievable for a given radius but determining a kill probability for a given class of target under such conditions is not achievable due to variations is hardness and shielding. One other difficulty is determining coupling efficiency, which is a measure of how much power, is transferred from the field produced by the weapon into the target.⁶⁶

⁵³ Joseph Siniscalchi, Colonel, USAF. “Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy.” Occasional Paper No. 3. Online. February 18, 2003. Available: http//www.fas.org/man/dod-101/land/docs/occppr03.htm, 22.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 18.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 17.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 78.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 75.

⁵⁸ Robin Coupland. “Review of the legality of weapons: a new approach The Sirus Project. Online. March 9, 2003. Available: http://www.icrc.org?Web/eng/

⁵⁹ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁰ Telephone interview with Douglas Pasternak, U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 2003.

⁶¹ United States Congress. Electromagnetic Pulse Threats To U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Lowell Wood, Member of Director’s Technical Staff, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Hoover Institution. One Hundred Sixth Congress. October 1999, 18. Online. February 21, 2003. Available: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999

⁶² Alexander, 194.

⁶³ Interview with Douglas Pasternak.

⁶⁴ Alexander, 191. The Landmines Treaty is not cited in the list provided in Alexander’s book.

⁶⁵ Nick Begich and James Roderick. Earth Rising. The Revolution: Toward a Thousand Years of Peace. Anchorage: Earthpulse Press, 2001, 108.

⁶⁶ Kopp, 7-8.

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