The Challenge of Exotic Weapons

Conclusion

For those states that are on the leading edge of exotic weapons development, opposition will be high to any attempt to formulate a convention that bans whole categories of weapons, let alone have a verification regime that would necessitate intrusive inspections into the very heart of secret facilities and technologies. Since it is not clear at this writing which states are the leading competitors in specific types of weapons systems, more transparency will be needed to contemplate arms control treaties. The best short-term possibilities to address the implications of the upcoming generation of weaponry are non-proliferation control regimes that are national and possibly international in nature. Concerned officials and ex-officials in the United States have recently recommended using national controls such as the “Critical List.” The motivation for making this prescription has more to do with preventing the diffusion of affordable technologies as part of weapons that are a threat to national infrastructure. Careful application of the Geneva Protocol (1949), specifically Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by national governments, would allow policy makers to ask critical questions as to the stated purpose or intent of the weapon.⁶⁷ Many states that are not yet party to Additional Protocol I have adopted procedures to ensure their weapons are subjected to this type of review.⁶⁸

The current international situation is ripe for a discussion about the paths that several governments are taking with new generation weapons, including those classed as so called “non-lethal weapons. Conducting this dialogue is a complex issue. Development of exotic weapons that have the capacity to be both lethal and non-lethal raise questions as to the actual intent of the weapon and their effects. Setting an agenda internationally on these new technologies is not simplified because of the proliferation argument or the notion that the misuse of such weapons will likely be caused by rogue states. Due to its large investments in DEW, the Russian Federation may also be a critical link to future dialogue. The issue is more sensitive because the states where dialogue should begin are friends and allies of Canada. The United States, United Kingdom and France are states that are leaders in exotic technologies. Attempts to establish some controls or regimes may also be complicated by our commitments to NATO and possibly our own future technical involvements through research and bilateral projects.

There have been enough warning signals that should propel NGO’s and concerned governments to action. Why should there be concern? What weapons systems should be the subject of prompt action? The Moscow theatre gassing in October 2002, is a significant cause for alarm. Reassessing the prohibitions in the CWC regarding calmative agents should be a start. What is even more of a concern is that the use of Fentanyl by security forces illustrates the specious nature of the argument that advocates of non-lethal weapons are making with regards to notions of reduced casualties and minimal effects to human beings. This incident should be a critical example of what necessitates Article 36 reviews and international attention. According to one U.S. military study, “Directed energy (EMP and HPM) and acoustic technologies offer the greatest near term promise for a credible war fighting capability.”⁶⁹ The Swedish designed High Energy Whirls device utilizing vortex technology is also a cause for concern regarding trauma injuries. The use of microwave technology for “area denial” applications is an operational reality in the U.S. military. If this capability is enhanced without proper reviews and transparency, the issue of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering will be a missed opportunity. Careful scrutiny of these areas is essential and urgent. In many areas however, there is not enough information on new systems and their full capabilities, particularly when programs are taken over by national militaries.

Numerous analysts studying these issues have stated that discussion is long overdue and should begin immediately, particularly with more transparency, accountability and information available to the public in several countries. The domestic and international implications of the use and misuse of several exotic weapons and nonlethal variants are serious and require a higher priority by the Canadian government and international fora.

⁶⁷ Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland and Rikke Ishoey, “New wars, new weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality of means and methods of warfare.” IRRC. June 2002. Vol. 84, No 846, 351.

⁶⁸ ICRC. “New Weapons.” Online. February 26, 2003. Available: http://www.icrc.org/

⁶⁹ Siniscalchi, 12.

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