VOLUME 27 - 1960 - INTRODUCTION

“Most of the major events of recent years,” Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green wrote in the foreword to his department's annual report for 1960, “have perforce had to be viewed against the background of East-West relations, and it has become customary to assess the international climate in any given period in terms of the relative degree of harmony existing between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.”¹ By this standard, Green noted, 1960 was a year of high hopes raised only to be disappointed in a dramatic fashion. The Paris summit meeting, agreed to by US President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in December 1959, was scheduled to take place in May. Though Canada was not represented at the meeting, Canadian politicians and diplomats took a keen interest in the preparations made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Early in the year, prospects for the success of the new Ten Nation Disarmament Committee also seemed highly favourable. Canada was a member of this body, established in September 1959. In March 1960, the Committee met in Geneva for an unexpectedly arduous and frustrating first session. Then it adjourned while the summit meeting took place. Canadians watched with dismay as the summit collapsed amid revelations of espionage by American planes over the Soviet Union. The Canadian ambassador in Moscow, David Johnson, was present at Khrushchev's speech announcing the capture of American pilot Francis Gary Powers. “[W]e expected a sensation,” Johnson wryly reported, “and unfortunately were not disappointed. [I]t was a great occasion for Khrushchev but not for the West” (Document 180).

The Ten Nation Committee resumed its work in June, only to collapse in its turn when the representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania walked out. The United Nations Disarmament Commission met in August, and the Canadians, led by a determined Green, pressed for an early resumption of the negotiations. However, there were no additional talks during 1960. The year’s early promise of greater international harmony was further shattered by developments in the Congo, Laos and Cuba. Each of these Cold War conflicts had important repercussions for the Canadian government.

The Congo crisis began early in July with a revolt against Belgian rule in the province of Katanga. Disagreements in the United Nations Security Council between the Western powers and the Soviet Union soon made it clear that Cold War struggles would do much to shape the course of events. Canada gave its full support to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's attempts “to remove the Congo situation and indeed all political problems in Africa from the context of the cold war” (Document 10). The government approved a contribution of $1 million in aid; Canadian technical personnel joined the United Nations force in the Congo; and Canada also shared in the cost of airlifting troops and supplies. The presence of Canadian troops in the Congo was decried by the Soviet Union, and Canadian personnel were subject to attack on two occasions. A visit to Ottawa by Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba left the impression that his “attitude as regards occidental countries and the Soviet bloc is still equivocal and warrants careful study,” and that he was personally “vain, petty, boorish, suspicious and perhaps unscrupulous” (Document 17). The instructions for the Canadian delegation to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly noted that, “Recent months have seen not only a serious deterioration in international relations, but also a disturbing resort to extreme language, irritability and rocket rattling on the part of some countries.” This, the instructions went on to say, posed “a grave challenge to the prestige and authority of the United Nations,” and it was “perhaps more than ever before, imperative to recall the high purposes and principles of the organization. It is especially desirable for the Canadian Delegation to stress Canada's strong support for the United Nations” (Document 96). At the year's end, External Affairs reviewed the situation, and again strongly affirmed Canada's commitment to the UN's peacekeeping efforts. Concerns about the organization and operation of the United Nations force were, however, tactfully expressed to Hammarskjöld by the Canadian Permanent Representative, Charles Ritchie (Documents 39 and 40).

Throughout 1959, Canada had maintained its stand that the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos should not be reconvened. Despite the ongoing turmoil in Laos, this issue remained in abeyance, so far as Canada was concerned, throughout most of 1960. In October, however, it again came the forefront of Canadian policy discussions. Canada supported efforts in the UN to have Laos and Cambodia declared neutral, but was hesitant when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once again called for the reconvening of the ICSC. Indian officials were assured that Nehru's proposal was being given “urgent and sympathetic consideration in Ottawa” (Document 534) but the Canadian conclusion was that “the reactivation of the I.S.C. in Laos at present would not appear to be practicable” (Document 539).

The impact on Canada of the situation in Cuba during 1960 was felt mainly in the area of bilateral relations with the United States, rather than in the larger fora provided by the United Nations and NATO. Canadians were eager for better relations with Latin America generally, as demonstrated by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's extremely successful visit to Mexico and Green's tour of South America. The government, fully supported by External Affairs, wished to maintain cordial relations with Cuba and to increase trade, without intending this stand as an endorsement of the Castro regime. Canadian concerns over Castro's policy of nationalization were high, and Canadian exports of military equipment to Cuba were carefully regulated. At the same time, however, Canada deliberately took a “very moderate” tone towards Cuba, in contrast to the United States, whose protests were considered by Ottawa to be excessively “vigorous and stiff.” This, it was hoped, “would leave us free to play an independent role should the situation deteriorate seriously” (Document 578).

Early in July, President Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to Diefenbaker, stating that “We are facing a serious situation in the Caribbean which is obviously inviting Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere in Cuba” (Document 582). Eisenhower asked that Green discuss the matter with American officials at the annual meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence, held that year in Montebello, Quebec. The discussions (Documents 302, 586, 587) served only to highlight the differences between American and Canadian appraisals of the situation. Arnold Heeney, Canada's ambassador to the United States, later identified the Montebello meeting as a crucial turning-point in Canada-US relations during the Diefenbaker years.² A joint attempt at mediation by Canada, Mexico and Brazil was firmly rejected by Washington. In October, the Americans imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba. From Havana, Canadian ambassador Allan Anderson expressed his “concern over [the] position gradually emerging in which Canada begins to appear as ‘the fair haired boy’ in high favour with [the] Cuban Government.” Anderson's fears were well founded: by December 1960, American resentment of Canada's continued and growing trade with Cuba was high.

As Green pointed out in his foreword to the annual report, despite the intensification of East-West conflicts in all parts of the globe, events during 1960 “fell short of a full-scale revival of the cold war. Contacts with the Soviet bloc, though reduced, were not entirely abandoned.” Canadian politicians and diplomats strove to keep channels of communication open. Shortly before the summit, Minister of Trade and Commerce Gordon Churchill travelled to Moscow to sign an extension of the 1955 trade agreement with the USSR, and reported in glowing terms on the friendly reception he received (Document 504). Even after the failure of the Paris conference, Ambassador Johnson had cordial conversations with Soviet leaders (Documents 505, 506), in which he expressed Canada's hope for expanded trade and cultural relations. The issue of Russian-born Canadian citizens who had returned to the USSR and been detained there against their wishes was at least partially resolved.

In a rather ironic contrast, Canada's relations with its chief Western ally, the United States, showed a marked deterioration during 1960. Bilateral political discussions between the two countries were dominated by the issue of nuclear weapons. In Canada, opinions on the matter differed sharply. Green, supported by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson, was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces, while Minister of National Defence George Pearkes and Clerk of the Privy Council Robert Bryce favoured continued close co-operation with the Americans on military matters. In January 1960, diametrically opposing arguments were presented by Bryce and by D. B. Dewar, also of the Privy Council Office. According to Bryce, “prompt action” should be taken, and would be welcomed by the Canadian public (Document 242). Dewar, on the other hand, argued that the country was “going through a period of uncertainty about its defence policy and programmes. This uncertainty has not perhaps reached the point where we could be said to have a crisis about defence policy, but there is not much likelihood that the problem will grow smaller in the coming months and years. The doubts and dissatisfactions are too deep to be dispelled quickly and coming events may very well intensify them.” He pointed to claims by “editors, teachers, students, and citizens at large” that the Canadian government had too easily accepted “a United States defence policy which is characterized as being sterile at best and provocative at worst” (Document 304). Diefenbaker, despite his contempt for impractical “long-hairs talking in favour of there being no nuclear defences” (Document 110), shared Dewar's assessment of the public mood. The Prime Minister expressed his concerns over growing anti-American sentiment in Canada to Heeney, and these concerns were passed on to and discussed with high American officials (Documents 228-235).

As a result of these contradictory assessments, progress on an agreement concerning the storage of nuclear warheads at leased American bases in Canada was painfully slow. The text of notes authorizing the presence of warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Bases was unofficially agreed on in July. But the draft agreement was not endorsed by Cabinet during 1960, despite Pearkes' emphatic assertion that it was “difficult to justify any further delay” (Document 254). Negotiations on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces proved even more tortuous. An ambiguous public statement by the Prime Minister on January 18 left American authorities unsatisfied and indeed “deeply disturbed” (Document 265) by the lack of clear direction in Canadian policy. In June, Pearkes pointed out to Diefenbaker that Canada was being placed in the “unhappy position” (Document 270) of paying for expensive BOMARC and Honest John missiles without any arrangement being put in place to arm them with the required nuclear warheads. It was left to Bryce to finally spur the government into action late in the year. He orchestrated the drafting of a document that allowed Cabinet to authorize negotiations based on the principle of joint control of American nuclear weapons assigned to Canadian units. In late December, Douglas Harkness (who had replaced Pearkes as Minister of National Defence in October) circulated the text of a draft agreement (Document 277). At the same time, however, Green prevailed over his pro-nuclear colleagues when he secured Cabinet's permission for Canada's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly to vote in favour of an Irish resolution against the spread of nuclear weapons (Document 111). Most of the other members of NATO abstained on this vote, but Green wished to give clear proof of Canada's commitment to the cause of disarmament. It was stipulated that if no progress was made on disarmament in the near future, Canada might then acquire nuclear weapons.

Other items on the continental defence and security agenda were also marked by slow progress. In June, Canadian ministers grudgingly approved the staging of a NORAD exercise, Operation Sky Shield. This replaced Operation Sky Hawk, scuttled by Ottawa the previous year. Negotiations began to acquire American interceptor aircraft to replace the ageing CF-100. This issue was fraught with political problems stemming from the Diefenbaker government's controversial cancellation of the Avro Arrow in 1959. The details of a possible agreement finally began to emerge in June, involving the reciprocal purchase of Canadian CL-44 transport planes by the US in exchange for a Canadian purchase of 66 American F-101 fighter jets. During a meeting with Eisenhower in September, Diefenbaker strongly urged American acceptance of the deal. However, the US rejected it in December, suggesting instead that the F-101s be given to Canada in return for the Canadian takeover of the Pinetree radar network.

In contrast to these sometimes acrimonious debates, and in spite of irritants such as new US balance of payments regulations and the dominance of American periodicals in the Canadian market, economic relations with the US during 1960 were, on the whole, marked by a spirit of good will. Returning from the meeting of the Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, held in Washington in February, Finance Minister Donald Fleming reported on a “frank and friendly” discussion that was “the best and most constructive” (Document 314) of all such meetings he had attended. In no area was Canadian-American co-operation more evident than in the negotiations over the development of the Columbia River. Space limitations allow for the printing of only a small fraction of the voluminous archival records on this subject. The documents in this volume provide an overview of the key events leading to a breakthrough in the formerly deadlocked negotiations. In June, Minister of Justice E. Davie Fulton reported that “no insuperable problem” (Document 344) remained; in September, a progress report was released, outlining the key elements of the treaty signed in January 1961. However, though federal government negotiators in both countries were satisfied, the government of British Columbia remained “consistently suspicious” (Document 351) of Ottawa's actions and intentions.

The Commonwealth remained a key area of Canadian concern during 1960. The prospect that the United Kingdom might join the European Economic Community was distinctly unwelcome to a Conservative government eager to maintain economic as well as emotional ties with the mother country. In June, Canadian officials requested “a firm assurance that the United Kingdom had not embarked on a changed policy and that there would continue to be very close consultation with Canada” (Document 389). After discussions between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in August, Ottawa was informed that a change in economic relations with Europe was being contemplated, since “[t]he United Kingdom must be economically strong if we are to be able to continue to play our full part in the economic development of the Commonwealth and in trying to maintain world stability.” The British intended to “start from the assumption that there is broad agreement among Commonwealth countries that it will be desirable for the United Kingdom to enter into a form of closer association with Europe provided that certain essential requirements can be met (Document 391). Ottawa's response was that “[t]he United Kingdom should not be left under any illusion that Canada could acquiesce in any arrangements which they make in Europe at the expense of Canada's trade” (Document 392).

Along with this determination to preserve ties with the “Old Commonwealth” went an equally strong, if not stronger, resolve to maintain good relations with the “New Commonwealth.” The focus of Canadian concerns was South Africa, where race riots and violence occurred early in the year. George Glazebrook of the Commonwealth Division wrote a memo on the subject in March, intended “to hint delicately that there is room for an act of high statesmanship within the Commonwealth” by Canada (Document 356). Canada, Glazebrook suggested, could benefit both the Commonwealth as a whole and, in the long term, South Africa itself, by making the policy of apartheid a subject for discussion at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in May. The talks in London were inconclusive, but thanks in part to Diefenbaker's efforts, the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting affirmed that the Commonwealth was a multi-racial association. In July, Bryce reported concern among officials of Asian and African Commonwealth countries “at the possibility of a split between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ members ... over ... South Africa.” One such official “thought it would be much better if there were at least one old white member on the black new side, and that this made Canada's position of particular importance” (Document 386).

As preparations for the 1961 Prime Ministers' meeting began in the fall of 1960, it became ever more evident that in order to maintain harmony with the “New Commonwealth,” Canada might have to oppose the British policy of avoiding any discussion of member countries’ internal politics. In November, Diefenbaker stated to Basil Robinson, his liaison with External Affairs, that without some concessions by the South African government on its racial policies, “he could not possibly … adopt at the next meeting an attitude as tolerant of South Africa as he had before and during the last meeting” (Document 378). Diefenbaker accordingly notified Macmillan of his decision (Document 380). In response, Macmillan sent an impassioned letter, arguing that if South Africa were expelled from the Commonwealth, “[w]e should be condemning the country to further years of apartheid and ever-growing bitterness.” Macmillan claimed that Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of Malaya, who was held in particularly high esteem by Diefenbaker, was “very much alive to the possibly disastrous effect on the whole Commonwealth structure of the beginning of a break-up now” and so would agree not to “force the issue, at any rate for the time being” (Document 382). From London, however, Canadian High Commissioner George Drew sent a different account of the Tunku's views (Document 383). The stage had thus been set for a clash between Canadian and British policies on this issue in 1961.

There were few changes in the Department's senior personnel at home and abroad during 1960. Howard Green and Norman Robertson remained in their posts throughout the year, as did Arnold Heeney in Washington, George Drew in London, Pierre Dupuy in Paris, Chester Ronning in New Delhi, Escott Reid in Bonn, Jules Léger at NATO headquarters in Paris, and Charles Ritchie at the United Nations. David Johnson left Moscow in November, and was replaced by Arnold Smith in January 1961. In Ottawa, George Glazebrook and George Ignatieff joined A. E. Ritchie and E. W. T. Gill as assistant under-secretaries. Marcel Cadieux was appointed deputy under-secretary, a post left vacant by the departure of R. M. Macdonnell in 1959. John Holmes left the Department of External Affairs at the end of the year. At the Cabinet level, George Hees replaced Gordon Churchill as Minister of Trade and Commerce, while Douglas Harkness took up the post of Minister of National Defence in place of George Pearkes. Both these appointments were made in October 1960. Ellen Fairclough and Donald Fleming retained their portfolios as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Finance.

Documents in this volume were selected primarily from the records of the Department of External Affairs and the personal files of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, held at the Diefenbaker Canada Centre in Saskatoon. Additional documents were chosen from the files of the Privy Council Office, the Department of Finance, the Department of Trade and Commerce, and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, as well as from the private papers of Cabinet ministers and senior government officials. In preparing the volume, researchers were given unrestricted access to the files of the Department of External Affairs and generous access to other collections. A complete list of the archival sources consulted to prepare this volume is found on page xxix.

The selection of documents for Volume 27 has been guided by the general principles outlined in the Introduction to Volume 7 (pp. ix-xi), as amended in the Introduction to Volume 20 (p. xxiii). The series continues to attempt to provide a self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, by concentrating on Canada's most important bilateral and multilateral relationships and on the major international issues that directly involved Cabinet members and senior bureaucrats in substantive policy decisions. Some passages and names have been omitted in accordance with the provisions of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. These deletions are indicated in the documents.

The editorial apparatus employed in this volume remains identical to that described in the Introduction to Volume 9 (p. xix). A dagger (†) indicates a document that is not printed. Editorial excisions are shown by an ellipsis (...). The phrase “group corrupt” indicates decryption problems in the transmission of the original telegram. Words and passages that were struck out by the author, marginal notes, and distribution lists are reproduced as footnotes only when important. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that documents have been read by the intended recipient. Proper and place names are standardized. The editor has silently corrected spelling, capitalization, and punctuation. All other editorial additions to the documents are indicated by the use of square brackets. Documents are reprinted in either English or French, depending on their original language.

In carrying out the research for this volume, I had the able assistance of Jennifer Anderson, Alexandra Clark, Dr. John Clearwater, Virginia Miller, and Dr. Jeff Noakes. Dr. Michael Stevenson did a substantial part of the editorial work for Chapter III, and prepared the index. As always, staff at Library and Archives Canada gave invaluable help and advice, as did Rob Paul at the Diefenbaker Centre. Ciuineas Boyle and Herb Barrett facilitated access to Privy Council Office records. Aline Gélineau typed and formatted the manuscript with her usual efficiency and attention to detail. Gail Kirkpatrick Devlin produced the list of persons and proofread the volume, with the assistance of Christopher Cook. The Translation Bureau at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada provided the French versions of footnotes and other ancillary texts. Dr. Greg Donaghy, the general editor of the series, read the manuscript in its entirety, and offered many constructive suggestions. My other colleagues in the Historical Section, Dr. Hector Mackenzie and Mary Halloran, provided support and advice. The series would not be possible without the support of Ariel Delouya, the director of the Policy Research Divison. I remain solely responsible for the final selection of documents.

Finally, I would like to thank my son, Ben Cavell, for his humour and positive attitude during a year that we will both remember.

JANICE CAVELL

¹Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1960 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961), p. v.

²Arnold Heeney, The Things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant, ed. Brian D. Heeney (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 162-63.