KOREA

The basic guidance for the Delegation on this subject remains the memorandum approved by the Cabinet on October 9, 1952, which is included in the Commentary. Since that date, the Cabinet has taken no decisions which alter these instructions.

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2. Since the Assembly recessed on December 22, 1952, the most important development, from the Canadian standpoint, has probably been the lengthy debate on Far Eastern questions which has recently taken place in the House of Commons. During the course of this debate the Minister re-stated our position on Korea (and related subjects) in considerable detail. These policy statements will provide useful guidance to the Delegation and, accordingly, excerpts from the Minister's statements of February 11, February 16 and February 17 are attached as Appendices "B", "C" and "D" to this present note. ?² On February 5, the Minister made a special statement on Formosa, with regard to the action taken by President Eisenhower in modifying the original order to the Seventh Fleet in that area. The Minister's statement on this subject is attached as Appendix "E".?³ (References to Formosa will also be found in some of the other attached excerpts from the statements by the Minister). It seems quite possible that President Eisenhower's actions regarding Formosa will be discussed at the resumed Assembly, and this statement should be useful to the Delegation.

3. Just before the Assembly recessed in December, the League of Red Cross Societies transmitted, by telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a resolution adopted by them in Geneva on December 13, 1952, calling for the immediate repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners "in accordance with the appropriate articles of the Geneva Conventions". This resolution of the Red Cross was distributed by the Secretary-General on December 22, and no action was taken on it at the first part of the Assembly. We have been in touch with the US and UK authorities as to how they consider this resolution might be handled when the Assembly reconvenes. It should be noted that the United States Government has now issued instructions to their liaison officers at Panmumjom, authorizing them to advance once more the proposals previously made by the UNC for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners. The renewal of these proposals by the UNC will no doubt be related to the resolution of the Red Cross mentioned above. Any action taken by the Assembly on this matter will, of course, depend considerably on the reply made to these proposals by the Communist side. The United Kingdom is apparently thinking tentatively of a resolution which might note the rejection by the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities of the Indian resolution; and include an appeal calling for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners. The US is apparently not too enthusiastic about a resolution in the Assembly regarding sick and wounded prisoners (or, for that matter, any other resolution). In discussion on this subject with officials of the Department on February 17, the Minister gave his preliminary opinion that it might be preferable to separate the humanitarian question of the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners from any other resolution which might be required concerning the rejection by the Communists of the Assembly's proposal of December 3. He added the comment that, "if any new Korean resolution is to be introduced surely a humanitarian one ... would cause maximum embarrassment to the Soviet".

4. The general attitude of the US authorities on Korea at the resumed session of the Assembly appears to be that they are not persuaded that there is much purpose in having any further resolution adopted, and that the Assembly should rest on the Indian resolution passed on December 3, 1952. Our information is that the Americans are not planning to advance a resolution calling for further economic sanctions against Communist China (or for any other additional measures of a political or military nature). They have now apparently dropped the idea they once had of a proposal for a continuing committee of member states to consider the provision of additional military assistance in Korea.

5. The information contained above is very preliminary. Indeed, the general impression left by our discussions up to date with the US and UK authorities is that their tactics for handling the Korean question at the Assembly have not yet been fully considered. Both Governments also seem rather inclined to take the position that, as they do not themselves wish to have a "political" discussion on Korea at the resumed Assembly, the majority of other delegations will think likewise. A memorandum from the Department to the Minister of February 18 expressed the view that such an attitude on the part of the two leading western powers might well have the effect of placing the democracies on the defensive when the debate on Korea is resumed.⁴ For example, we have yet no information regarding the intentions of the Soviet Delegation, but it seems quite likely that they will raise the question of Formosa. If this issue is raised, it may well prove to have a very decisive effect between the United States and the non-Communist Asian countries. It is obvious that it might also cause some difficulty between the United Kingdom and the United States. This point does not, however, seem to have been given much attention by the two governments mentioned.

6. We have no information that India is planning to take any further initiative at this session of the Assembly, but there have been some reports that Indonesia may advance a proposal for a political conference on Far Eastern problems. According to this information, the Indonesian Delegation recently suggested to a caucus of Arab-Asian states that the next step in breaking the deadlock in Korea should be to refer not only the prisoners of war question, but other issues such as Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations, to a political conference consisting of the Big Five and a group of Asian states. This proposal would be intended to go a good deal of the way toward the Soviet proposal for an eleven-power commission, which the Assembly rejected at its first session. Our information is that this Indonesian proposal did not receive an encouraging response from the other Arab-Asian states. It was opposed by Thailand and both the Indian and Pakistani Delegations indicated that they were not intending to take an active role on Korean matters at the resumed session.