During the last few days, we had been considering, within the Delegation, whether we should not raise during an informal meeting of the Council the question of NATO's relationship to the proposed tripartite talks in Bermuda.13 On reflection, we decided against taking the initiative in this regard, partly in view of our own special ties with the United Kingdom and the United States -- we were probably kept better informed both in London and Washington than most other NATO countries -- partly in view of the great delicacy of the issues now pending between the United Kingdom and the United States and the overriding necessity of not taking any steps which might complicate the achievement of the greatest degree of unity between the two.
2. While we were clear that we should not take the initiative of suggesting a discussion on this delicate issue, we were of the view, however, that if the tripartite understanding was essential to the Alliance, it was equally important that the Big Three should not give the impression that they were prepared to meet the Soviet leaders and discuss issues affecting the security of their NATO partners without consultation with them. We discussed this matter with Lord Ismay and found that his thoughts were running generally in the same direction.
3. At the meeting of May 27, during the informal discussion, Lord Ismay enquired whether the Representatives of the Big Three could throw any light on the Bermuda Conference. The United States Representative was not in a position to say much: so far as he knew, no date and no agenda had been set yet. He agreed, however, with the Secretary General's suggestion that as arrangements were developed other NATO countries should be appropriately informed.
4. The United Kingdom and the French Representatives explained that they had no information additional to that given by their United States colleague but they took note of the Secretary General's hope that any information available would be given to the Council in secret session. He felt it was only right that the Council should be kept fully in touch.
5. I am confident that the Secretary General's discreet intervention will have its effect. It will draw attention to the need not only of keeping the Council informed of arrangements relating to the Bermuda Meeting but it may also remind the Big Three that at some stage they will have to take into their confidence their partners in the Alliance over any conclusions they may reach as to the general tactics to be followed. vis-à-vis the USSR "peace" offensive or as regards proposed negotiations on major issues such as Germany.
A.D.P. HEENEY
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La Conference des Bermudes était la réunion tripartite des chefs de gouvernement des États-Unis (le président Dwight D. Eisenhower), du Royaume-Uni (le premier ministre Winston Churchill) et de France (le président du Conseil Joseph Laniel) ; elle devait commencer le 29 juin. Elle fut retardée à cause de la maladie de M. Churchill et eut finalement lieu du 4 au 8 décembre. Dans l'intervalle, une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères devait avoir lieu à Washington à partir du 10 juillet. The Bermuda Conference was a tripartite meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States (President Dwight D. Eisenhower), the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Winston Churchill) and France (President Joseph Laniel); it was scheduled to take place starting June 29. It was postponed to December 4-8 because of the illness of Mr. Churchill. In the meantime, a meeting of Foreign Ministers was scheduled to take place in Washington starting July 10.
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