You will see from paragraph 8 of despatch No. 174 of January 21, 1953,? from London, that the High Commissioner believes that we should give some thought to what our attitude would be:
1. if the United States accredits a delegation to the High Authority and is invited to send (congressional) observers to the ECSC Assembly;
2. alternatively, if we were requested concurrently with the United States to send a delegation to the High Authority.
This problem is largely theoretical at the moment, but the High Commissioner suggests that we might later be faced with the necessity for a rapid decision.
2. Relations between the ECSC and non-member countries have recently become more clearly defined. The following appears to be the position at the moment:
(a) The United Kingdom has established a formal permanent delegation to the High Authority, and a Joint Committee, presided over by M. Monnet1 himself, has been set up in Luxembourg to increase cooperation. The United Kingdom also wishes to have official parliamentary observers in the ECSC Assembly, with the right to speak. M. Schuman feels that such observers should only be allowed to speak when questions such as GATT, overseas trade, or the question of relationship between the High Authority and non-member countries are under consideration. M. Monnet, in contrast, views the ECSC Assembly as a sovereign federal parliament in which foreign observers would be quite out of place. At its recent meeting, the ECSC Assembly accordingly voted to exclude British and other foreign observers from any official part in its deliberations. M. Monnet stated that the opening of the common market (February 10) might provide the opportunity for a specific definition of the association between the United Kingdom and the ECSC, and indicated that this would open the way for fixing relations with countries that wanted association and with those that wanted observers. In this connection, you will remember that M. Spaak2 earlier expressed his views that countries such as the United Kingdom who wished a close working relationship with the ECSC would have observers with the right to speak but not to vote; and purely consumer countries, such as Ireland and Iceland, would have non-speaking, non-voting observers.
(b) The United States has not yet clearly defined the nature of its representation to the High Authority. At present it has an "Acting Representative at the seat of the High Authority", who, however, is not permanently stationed there. More formal arrangements will be made in the near future; probably the delegation will have a status similar to that of the United Kingdom.
(c) Sweden has decided to appoint a delegation (of which one member will be permanently stationed in Luxembourg) "to make contact with the High Authority". The press release on the subject was rather vague on the precise nature of the relationship, but our Minister in Stockholm expects it to be of a rather informal character. The delegation was merely to hold a "watching brief' until the setting up of the common market. Sweden will maintain a cautious attitude towards the ECSC until it has proved itself capable of carrying out its functions; in the meantime Sweden will rely upon its normal competitive position in the market to dispose of Swedish products.
(d) Mr. Spierenburg, the Dutch member of the High Authority, expects shortly to conclude similar arrangements with Norway. The Danes have appointed their Permanent Delegate to the OEEC, as "Liaison Officer" to the ECSC. Denmark may conceivably join the Community as a full member later on. Norway has decided to send a permanent delegation to Luxembourg.
(e) Mr. Spierenburg also contemplates some kind of unpublicized representation from Austria.
(f) Switzerland has to be represented although there are indications that she views the Community with distinct mistrust.
(g) Turkey is not likely to establish liaison with the ECSC in the near future, despite the recent increases in production of crude steel and iron ore in that country. The MSA mission believes that Turkey is not yet an exporter of these commodities to an extent which would justify such a liaison.
(h) Mr. Spierenburg stated to the wife of the Canadian Minister in Stockholm, but not to the Minister himself, that he hoped Canada would at a later date become associated with the High Authority in some manner. It is only in this extremely devious manner that the question of Canada's relationship to the ECSC has come up at all as yet.
3. You will remember that in a memorandum of November 20, you expressed the opinion that no decisions on strictly commercial aspects of the ECSC of interest to Canada would be taken in December in the United States or United Kingdom Joint Committees. Your opinion was fully justified by events, as in fact, the US-ECSC Joint Committee has not even been set up as yet. You also stated that Canada had some interest in the economic implications of the ECSC, and that some form of liaison in order to follow economic developments might be desirable in the future.
4. You will also observe from letter No. 1 of January 21, 1953, to Paris-NATO from the Ambassador in Bonn? that he believes the activities of the body should be of interest to Canada both from the political and economic points of view.
5. Our tentative view at present is that:
(a) The activities of the ECSC Assembly, as distinguished from those of the High Authority, are not for the present of sufficient importance politically3 to justify our sending observers, parliamentary or otherwise. Moreover, it is liable to be some time before the twin sister of the ECSC Assembly, the "Ad-hoc" Political Assembly, is endowed with real powers. Until that time its constitution-making activities are liable to be conducted under conditions of intense publicity and public debate which would render an on-the-spot Canadian observer largely unnecessary, unless it was clear that secret negotiations were taking place there about which information could be obtained by an observer.
(b) We believe that the High Authority is not liable to carry on political activities of any importance until a European Political Community is on the point of coming into being. This does not seem likely for some time.
(c) Thus a formal Delegation to the High Authority would seem to be quite unnecessary from a political point of view. It would probably be quite easy to decline gracefully an invitation to accredit such a delegation, particularly in view of the smaller European countries who have resorted to more informal methods of association with the ECSC.
(d) A less formal type of representation at the seat of the High Authority could be considered, either on a basis of occasional visits or of permanent residence. Such representation would be useful but definitely not vital at present in gathering political information.
6. The problem of liaison with the ECSC, as far as this Division sees it, therefore, resolves itself almost exclusively into the question of Canada's long-range economic interest (e.g., Labrador iron ore, Canadian capital investment in Europe, etc.) in the Community. This Division believes, accordingly, that the decision whether or not to recommend the establishment of liaison with the ECSC is primarily the concern of your Division.
Jean Monnet, président, Haute Autorité, Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier. Jean Monnet, President, High Authority, European Coal and Steel Community.
Paul-Henri Spaak, président, Assemblée commune, Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier. Paul-Henri Spaak, President, Common Assembly, European Coal and Steel Community.
Note marginale:/Marginal note: for Canada