Reference: Your despatch No. 774 of March 9, 1955.?

The arrival of your despatch under reference coincided with a request from the United States Embassy here that we express ourselves in the NATO Council in favour of the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The United States Government expects that the Pact will shortly be presented formally to the Council at which time the United States will welcome it warmly and express the hope that other Middle East states will either join the Pact or otherwise direct their policies toward its aims.

2. The United Kingdom representative on the Council should also welcome the Pact. The United Kingdom apparently participated in the drafting of the agreement and is expected to accede to it; at the same time the United Kingdom will conclude a supplementary agreement with Iraq concerning the air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba.

3. Thus far little has been heard from France on the subject of the Pact. The French probably resent that their interests in Syria and Lebanon have not qualified them for a greater share in the informal consultations which have accompanied the negotiation of the Pact. It will be interesting to see how the French representative reacts when the Pact is presented to the NATO Council.

4. We believe that the Turco-Iraqi Pact is a modest beginning in what may be a tortuous development toward a system of collective security in the Middle East and that the Turks should be given credits for the initiative they have taken. Consistent with the attitude we adopted last July toward the Balkan Treaty, we regard the Turco-Iraqi Pact as advantageous to NATO but since the area concerned is even farther removed from our main defence interests than the Balkans we would wish our words of welcome to be reserved in tone and to leave no doubt about our continuing understanding that none of these treaties or pacts in any way involves an automatic extension of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

5. At the same time it would be a mistake to read too much into the Pact as it stands or to ignore its potentially disruptive effects. Until the defence organization begins to take shape, by the accession of further states to the Pact and the conclusion of specific military agreements, it is hardly likely to produce stability in the area. The signing of the Pact has already driven Egypt and some of its followers further away from the path of cooperation with the West, to some extent reversing the trend which the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base began.⁴⁰ In time, however, the breach between Iraq and Egypt may be bridged and the latter be better disposed to work for the aims of the Pact.

6. Perhaps even more important has been the increased sense of isolation which the Pact and particularly the annexed exchange of letters have produced in Israel. The Israelis have stressed their belief that the Pact will serve to harden Arab resistance to negotiating a peace in Palestine, because psychologically the Arabs will now be encouraged to believe that the West will support them against Israel. The Israelis also have expressed fear that Turkey will support the Arabs in their attempt to secure the implementation of United Nations resolutions which Israel regards as obsolete and impracticable. The resulting anxiety and frustration in Israel are likely to produce pressures upon the Government to take independent action to solve its difficulties. The Gaza incident is perhaps a sample of that kind of action.⁴¹

7. We are not sure that Turkey can provide the kind of leadership which the situation in the Arab world demands, even if she can rely on the support of Iraq and Pakistan. The likelihood of further Arab accessions to the Pact appears remote at the moment. On the other hand, Iran will probably join either the Turco-Iraqi Pact or the Turco-Pakistan Pact,⁴² once its Government succeeds in stabilizing the domestic situation.

8. Perhaps most important for Canada is the fact that the Middle East lies outside our real defence interests and the commitments we would be willing to accept. However much we might welcome on general security grounds a widening of the defence associations of the free world, we should not like to encourage others to believe that our attitude toward these developments implied a willingness to extend Canada's own commitments. The opposite is true and our statements on the subject should leave no doubt about it.

9. In the circumstances which this telegram summarizes we should be prepared to offer words of welcome to the Turco-Iraqi Pact when it is formally submitted to the Council. We propose to tell the United States authorities that we shall do so. You may associate yourself with the remarks of other representatives who see the Pact as adding strength to the defences of the free world and who wish to acknowledge Turkey's contribution to this aim. If you think it appropriate you might accord some recognition to the difficulties which still have to be overcome before collective security can be effectively organized in the area, particularly in view of Arab-Israeli relations. You should include a tactful reference to our understanding that the Pact does not involve automatic extensions of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

10. We hope that this telegram will provide you with sufficient material to deal with this matter when it is raised in Council or during informal conversations among the NATO delegations. If further information is required please let us know.⁴³