2. The first information, evaluated at about the lowest level of reliability, was obtained from a young USAF fighter pilot who had had a few too many drinks. G/C McNair discussed this report with me and said he would try to check the information. Fortuitously, one of the three RCAF fighter pilots attached to USAF F86 Jet Squadrons in Korea came in and gave the further information in the second report.

3. G/C McNair tells me that these border crossings were not individual instances of short extensions of flights over the border by lone pilots. He says that the crossings have been made in organized formations penetrating ten to fifteen minutes' flying time over the border in aircraft flying 500 miles an hour.

4. G/C McNair has pointed out the serious implications of these reports. They reveal an irresponsible disregard at the Group level or higher in the USAF for U.S. undertakings that U.N. Command planes would not cross the Chinese border except in very special circumstances. The special circumstance discussed was the possibility that a large-scale Chinese air raid might be brought down on U.N. positions in Korea, making it militarily desirable to strike back before consultation with other U.N. contributors could be arranged. This circumstance bas not existed in this case and there is considerable military doubt as to the actual value of these fighter sorties over Manchuria. This is borne out by the information contained in the second report which states that orders have recently been issued that pilots should not fly north of a line somewhat south of the Yalu River, in the hope that CCAF planes would fly south again in sizeable formations. It is serious that these border crossings should have been taking place about the time that the Panmunjom military armistice talks were being brought to a head. It is rather ominous that the Chinese have said nothing about these border crossings. They may have been waiting to shoot down a plane to get actual proof. If that plane had had a RCAF pilot in it, it would have been embarrassing for Canada.

5. I thought that I should draw these reports to your attention. Since orders have apparently now been issued that the border should not be crossed in some groups, you may wish simply to leave the matter for the time being. You will appreciate, I am sure, the necessity for handling this information with great delicacy lest the Canadian pilots who are getting most valuable jet operational experience in Korea should have their position questioned and lest it be suspected by the USAF that G/C McNair is the source of this information and they decide to freeze him out of contact with USAF personnel. I consider it most important that neither the position of our pilots nor that of G/C McNair should be in any way prejudiced in the handling of this information.

6. I should be grateful if you would let me know in due course the consideration given to this report in the Department and what, if any, action is taken.

ARTHUR MENZIES