Addressed External WA-1677, repeated Permdel New York No. 235.

1. This question was raised at a meeting this morning at the British Embassy with Lord Alexander and Mr. Lloyd. The meeting was attended by Ambassadors of Commonwealth countries with forces in Korea.

2. None of those present had received an advance warning of the operation except Lord Alexander, who said it had been mentioned to him when he was talking to General Bradley yesterday. He thought that, although the plans for the operation had probably been prepared for a considerable period, the decision to launch the attack had been taken only a short time ahead. There had been no discussion of such an operation when he was in Japan and Korea. Bradley told him this morning that reports received today about the results were highly favourable. Lord Alexander thinks it likely, however, that much of the damage will probably be quickly repaired.

3. There was some discussion about whether this action was in accordance with agreed policy, with Spender in particular questioning its propriety without prior consultation. Lloyd was troubled about the effect on opinion in the United Kingdom, particularly as it took place when Alexander and he were in Washington; it would be assumed by many that they had been consulted and had given their assent either when they were here or when they were in the Far East.

4. I have not yet had time to check our records so as to form an opinion whether there was any understanding that consultation would take place before the installations were bombed. I believe, however, that, since the matter was last discussed a good many months ago, the circumstances, both military and political, have changed considerably. The installations are, of course, a legitimate military target and the power they produce is certainly being employed for munitions making and other military purposes in both North Korea and Manchuria.

5. Confirming the information given by Ignatieff by telephone, the State Department's comments, as given by Alexis Johnson, are:

(a) That the State Department knew that the attack was going to take place, but did not tell any of the other governments concerned in Washington as they regarded the attack within existing policy, Le., not to extend air attack of Korea with exceptions known to us;

(b) That the attack was based upon existing military directives, and

(c) That the attack was based upon purely military considerations and did not have any direct political implications. He admitted that it might have some political effects upon the discussions at Panmunjom, but these should be regarded as by-products.

6. It seems to me that Johnson under-emphasized the probable effect on the armistice negotiations. I think it likely that this attack at this particular juncture was intended to show the Communists how vulnerable they would be to retaliation if they sought to stage a massive air offensive; such a demonstration of air power might bring about a disposition to meet us on the issue of prisoners of war.