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Documents on Canadian External Relations
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Volume #18 - 293. | |||
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CHAPTER III UNITED NATIONS | |||
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PART
4 SEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST PART, OCTOBER 14-DECEMBER 21, 1952 | |||
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SECTION
C INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANADIAN DELEGATION | |||
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SUB-SECTION
VI TUNISIA AND MOROCCO | |||
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293. |
PCO | ||
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Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet | |||
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SECRET |
[Ottawa],
October 8th, 1952 | ||
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TUNISIAN AND MOROCCAN QUESTIONS AT THE 7TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS86 | |||
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The request of thirteen Middle Eastern and Asian states to have the
Tunisian and Moroccan questions brought before the forthcoming
session of the General Assembly raises a number of delicate issues,
involving both our political relations with France and the Arab
world and the apparent conflict between the strategic interests of
the Western world and the aspirations towards self-government of
two Arab peoples in which most of the non-white world is showing an
active concern. The strong measures adopted by the French to
restore law and order in Tunisia in the early part of this year,
combined with the failure, in April, of the Arab-Asian bloc to have
the Tunisian problem inscribed on the agenda of the Security
Council, and the rejection of their request for a special session
of the General Assembly in June and July have undoubtedly served to
fan anti-French and anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East and
Asia, which the U.S.S.R. will try to exploit. On the other hand,
feeling in France as a whole and particularly in the French
National Assembly is also running high on this question. An attempt
by the United Nations to intervene or even criticism considered
unwarranted on the part of France's allies might well have serious
implications either for Europe (if the French Assembly should
thereby be led to refuse to ratify the E.D.C.) or for South-East
Asia (if National Assembly pressure should lead the French
Government to withdraw from Indochina to protect its more important
North African interests). Domestic political pressures in France
might also lead to a French walk-out from one of the committees of
the United Nations, or even a withdrawal from the General Assembly
when the North African issues are being discussed. In addition,
there are involved the complex questions of the length to which the
United Nations can or should go in dealing with problems which may
be argued to lie within the field of domestic jurisdiction, and of
the long-run effect on orderly progress in non-self-governing
territories of discussion of their political affairs by United
Nations bodies.
2. A balancing of the foregoing considerations suggests that Canadian policy should endeavour to go some way to, satisfy the Arab and Asian nations that their interest in the struggle of colonial peoples is not being ignored while at the same time preventing any action which might produce a crisis in France or seriously prejudice the possibility of continued and constructive negotiations in Tunisia and Morocco. More specifically it is suggested in the attached instructions' for the guidance of our delegation on the subject of Tunisia that the Canadian Representative should vote in favour of including this item on the Assembly's agenda, unless special circumstances would appear to require an abstention (paras. 7 and 8). While striving to avoid a hypothetical vote on the question of competence, it is proposed in general that the delegation either abstain or vote in favour of competence, (depending largely on tactical considerations), should this issue be raised in respect of specific resolutions (paras. 11-13). As to the Canadian attitude on the substantive issue, it is suggested that we might support a mild type of resolution which would note the progress which Tunisia has made under French protection and express the hope that further constitutional reforms will be worked out by peaceful co-peration between the two parties (paras. 18-21). 3. In view of the similarities of the issues involved in Tunisia and Morocco, it is proposed that our delegation adopt a similar and consistent attitude in handling the Moroccan question. 4. It is recommended that Cabinet approve the attached instructions for the Canadian Delegation as regards Tunisia and approve a similar and consistent attitude in the handling of the Moroccan question. L.B. PEARSON
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