Elections for the three non-permanent seats of the Security Council which will become vacant at the end of this year when the terms of Brazil (Latin American seat), New Zealand (Commonwealth seat) and Turkey (Eastern European seat) expire, were held at the General Assembly meeting of October 14. As you know, a member state may not succeed itself on the Council; voting is by a secret ballot and a two-thirds majority is required. Cuba and Australia were elected on the first ballot, but five more ballots on the third seat were taken without decisive result. Three further ballots on October 19 were equally inconclusive.

2. The ballots on this third (Eastern European) seat resolved initially into a deadlock between Poland and the Philippines and then, on the fifth ballot, between Yugoslavia, as a substitute candidate, and the Philippines. The vote was close, on the last ballot (ninth) Yugoslavia getting 27 and the Philippines 31 votes and thus both falling short of the required 39 (attached is a list? of the votes on each ballot).

3. The Canadian view is that it would be undesirable to upset the geographical convention on the Security Council seats by electing a member from another region to this Eastern European seat. This might cause East-West controversy by completely breaking the Gentleman's Agreement regarding the Eastern European seat and, in terms of self-interest, would establish a precedent which might endanger the Commonwealth seat. It was considered that, of the possible Eastern European candidates, Poland should have our support, in order to avoid the friction which might develop if the Russian Satellites' claim to a turn in this seat were rejected and which would be unfortunate in the light of the present international situation. If Poland's chances turned out to be hopeless, it was held preferable to support Yugoslavia as second choice in order to keep the seat in Eastern Europe, and only as a last resort to switch our support to Burma or the Philippines, in that order of preference. In the latter event, it would be necessary to make it known we do not construe an election of an Asian member as implying a permanent transfer of the seat to Asia. We believe the separate question of additional representation for Asian countries should not be solved at the expense of a European seat.

4. The Assembly Delegation was accordingly instructed to vote initially for Poland and, failing Poland's election, for Yugoslavia, if it stood as a compromise candidate. If it became apparent that Yugoslavia in turn stood no chance of election, the Delegation would then support Burma or the Philippines (see memorandum approved by Cabinet September 16). ¹⁷ As it turned out, Burma refused to stand and Yugoslavia, having entered the race, has been able to hold its own in the deadlock with the Philippines. The Delegation voted for Poland on three ballots, switching to Yugoslavia on the remaining ballots, after it had been made known by the Soviet Bloc that the candidature of Poland would be dropped and Yugoslavia would be a substitute candidate.

5. We kept the Old Commonwealth countries informed of our intentions, as well as the Americans, both in Washington and New York. Most recently, on October 12, the Delegation was instructed to reply to Mr. Lodge's representations by informing him that its instructions had been confirmed and that it would vote only as a last resort for the Philippines, re-iterating the reasons for our vote. ¹⁸ While it does not appear possible to make an exact analysis of the votes, it is known that the Benelux and Scandinavian countries initially supported Poland and intended to shift their vote to Yugoslavia because "they were strongly opposed to having a European seat transferred to Asia". The United Kingdom and New Zealand also switched their votes from Poland to Yugoslavia, but Australia has continued throughout its support of the Philippines. India indicated earlier that it would initially support Poland, but it seems that both the Asian and the African votes are divided on this issue. It is at least clear that the Philippines do not have unqualified support from their region as the candidate of the Asian countries.

6. This issue remains a point of friction for the current session of the Assembly and is likely to be interpreted as yet another aspect of the cold war. It is nevertheless much to expect, given the present two candidates, that the supporters of either should back down. There appear to be no eligible and acceptable alternative candidates in Eastern Europe (Turkey can not be re-elected, Greece is not acceptable to the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia, Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine are not likely to be more acceptable to the United States than Poland). Moreover, in view of the heavy commitments of the Americans to the Philippines on the one hand and the protagonists of Yugoslavia on the other, it seems clear that a fresh alternative candidate must be sought on which both groups can agree. As far as our vote goes, it might be impolitic, on this matter of principle, to shift it to the Philippines at this stage. A possible solution to the stalemate might be found in Sweden. It is a neutral country which could command some support from the Soviet Bloc, and would also have merit from the United States point of view. While it is not an "Eastern" European country, its election would at least keep the seat in Europe and might provide a convenient way out of the present deadlock to all concerned. The Swedes might not be too eager themselves to be drawn into this controversy but, if both groups were willing to accept them they might be prepared to be "drafted". We have asked our Delegation in New York to explore the reaction of friendly delegations to this possible solution. ¹⁹

JULES LÉGER