The NATO Ministerial meeting of December, 1954, was in some ways disappointing. Perhaps this is not surprising, for underlying the meeting were two questions the answers to which would profoundly influence most of the subjects on the agenda but for which the answers could not be given at the time of the meeting. It is true the Council did settle the particular political problem, discussed below, of providing authority for the development of NATO forces in such a way as to permit them to be employed to best effect should a war break out in which new weapons were used, without at the same time formally committing NATO to a war of this type should war occur. But aside from this particular question there were in people's minds all the related problems - technical, administrative, and financial - of converting NATO forces from the conventional pattern to a pattern adapted to the possibility of such a war. While these problems will be on a scale to require many important ministerial decisions, particularly in connection with their financial implications, the data were not yet available on which such decisions would have to be based.

2. The second background question concerned the ratification of the Paris Agreements and the provision of a German defence contribution. ⁷³ With the debate in the French Assembly to open the following week, there was little that could be said beyond the expression of universal hope for ratification. Yet almost all NATO planning, military and political, was dependent on Mendes-France's (and Adenauer's) success in this matter, and at the same time such success could be regarded only as a hypothesis.

3. Hence the basis of political planning at the time of the meeting was hypothetical, while military and financial planning could not be significantly advanced without a great deal of detailed information which was not yet available. In these circumstances it is perhaps not unnatural that the positive accomplishments of the meeting were few. Nevertheless it is our impression that the work of the ministers did bring out one important fact - the meeting of minds about what NATO's general line of policy should be was remarkable. Dulles spoke with every indication of sincerity of the need for patience, co-operation, unity and restraint, while the more timid and provincial countries bravely faced the prospect of a NATO which would be committed, if war came, to fight that war with all available means and with no thought of half-way measures.

4. Reverting to the particular political problem referred to in paragraph 1 above, it is interesting to note that the Council did not in fact discuss in detail the report of the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength over the next few years, but merely approved it as a basis for planning and preparations. The main issue raised by the report regarding the use of atomic weapons by NATO was settled before the Council meeting when the Big Three and ourselves agreed on the text of the resolution which was subsequently approved in Council. ⁷⁴ The decision reached is contained in the press Communiqué ⁷⁵ and further working out of the "atomic formula" will take place in the Permanent Council through the usual consultation process.

5. The wording of the final communiqué perhaps retained the attention of the ministers to a greater extent than has been the case in the past. The French Prime Minister had given firm instructions to his representatives on the Working Group that there should be no precise reference in the communiqué to the Council's hope that the Paris Agreements would be ratified as soon as possible. The French were anxious that NATO's action in this respect should not emulate the pressure that the Soviet Government was exercising on France not to ratify the Agreements under the penalty of a denunciation of the Franco-Soviet Treaty. The communiqué therefore only refers to progress made towards the ratification of the Paris Agreements which the Council considers as an essential contribution to unification of Europe and the security of the free world.

6. Most members of the Alliance would have liked to make some reference in the communiqué to the fact that the west remained prepared to settle disputes through negotiations. In the Working Group the United States and the United Kingdom strongly opposed the inclusion of any such reference although France would have accepted a rather vague formula which would have mentioned not only negotiations on the settlement of pending disputes but would have singled out the question of limitation and control of armaments. In the Council, the Italian Foreign Minister argued strongly in favour of a paragraph on negotiations and control of armaments on the ground that it would facilitate the ratification of the Paris Agreements by the Italian Parliament. The French did not support him and both Mr. Dulles and Eden agreed that any reference to negotiations should be left out. Finally as a compromise Mr. Eden suggested that the communiqué mention the fact that the Council associate itself with the current disarmament proposals now under study in the United Nations.

7. As for the remainder of the agenda, the Secretary General's report and the military progress report gave rise to no significant new discussion. Statements on the Annual Review report fell into two categories, the first comprising pious generalities about the report as a whole or about the Annual Review process, and the second devoted to particular national comments on Country Chapters and to national planning for the future. No minister really tried, in a statement to the Council, to come to grips with the problem of the general trend towards a reduction of defence effort, a problem briefly but forcefully set out in the Secretary General's cover note.

8. In conclusion, the Council agreed that, in principle, its next ministerial session would take place in Athens next April. As this arrangement might, however, give rise to technical difficulties, confirmation and detailed planning would be left to the Permanent Council.