Repeat Permdel No. 78.

1. I had an interesting talk late yesterday with Rusk on the program which might be followed in dealing with the Korean situation. He began by saying that the State Department would welcome three-cornered discussions with the British and ourselves designed to work out a course of action on the lines that you proposed in your speech of January 26th.²² They think that any program of this nature should not be put in the form of a resolution, as it ought to be left flexible to meet changing conditions. The only criticism made of your suggestions was that they would not be willing to bind themselves to sit down in a Far Eastern conference composed as you suggested, although they would be willing to meet with the Chinese Communists and the Russians provided that adequate diplomatic preparation by the participating friendly countries had taken place. Rusk went on to describe the general stages he thought should be followed, saying that this was not yet official policy, but was likely to become so.

2. The first stage should be a cease-fire with the 38th Parallel as the boundary line. The basis should be that laid down in the December report of the Cease-Fire Committee after discussions with the Unified Command, except that they might be prepared to forgo the creation of a demilitarized zone if this appeared to be feasible from a military point of view.²³ He thought such a cease-fire could best be discussed through confidential channels. He made it clear that what he called a de facto cease-fire would not meet their requirements, as they would not be prepared to desist from air attack in North Korea unless the arrangements had been negotiated in advance so as to ensure against a Chinese build-up; agreed methods of supervision of the execution of the cease-fire were therefore necessary.

3. The next stage would be to work out a longer range settlement in Korea itself. He said that the prospect of being able to establish a unified Korea had now become distant and that he was thinking in terms of the possible re-establishment of the situation prevailing up to June 25th. This would be tolerable, provided that it was accompanied by international commitments which would safeguard the Korean Republic from attack in conjunction with their own enlarged and re­equipped military forces. He remarked that such an outcome would simplify Korean reconstruction by confining United Nations responsibility to the R.O.K.; North Korean towns were now "sticks and stones".

4. If this stage could be successfully completed, they would then be prepared to enter into discussions on Far Eastern questions. They would wish to match the two major Chinese objectives of Formosa and seating in the United Nations with the introduction of issues affecting Indo-China, Communist penetration elsewhere in free Asia, the treatment of foreign interests and foreigners in China, and possibly Tibet. The composition of the discussion should vary according to the subject. He insisted, however, that where they were "competing claimants" (i.e., the Chinese Communists and Nationalists) they would want both of them to be represented in the talks. He thinks that any discussions of this nature would have to be strung out over a lengthy period and that the diplomatic preparation by the friendly countries should be as careful and complete as that preceding the proposed meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on European issues.

5. We then turned to discussing action under the resolution passed by the Political Committee on January 30th. He said that they were in no hurry to put proposals before the Collective Measures Committee, which ought to take its time before making any proposals for sanctions. He did not disagree when I said that the threat of possible sanctions might well be a greater deterrent or bargaining lever than any sanctions which could in fact be agreed upon. He also remarked on the complexity of the issues involved in working out selective economic sanctions. No instructions on this subject have yet been sent to the United States delegation.

6. As to the new Good Offices Committee, I told him that I understood that Rau would not be permitted to serve by Nehru and that you also would in these circum­stances be unwilling to serve. He said that as alternatives they were thinking of a Norwegian or a Swede, together with Malik of Lebanon if he were ready to act. (He said there had been a bitter dispute in Stockholm preceding Swedish abstention on Tuesday). I mentioned your view that an effective negotiator should be desig­nated by the Secretary General to act for the committee, possibly Bunche. He remarked that he doubted whether the Chinese would deal with an American citi­zen and whether Bunche would himself agree to serve on this account. He agreed, however, that the committee should have such an agent, and suggested the possibil­ity that a suitable (continental European or British) person might be selected from outside the United Nations Secretariat. He also thought that in filling Rau's and your places member should be chosen from a country effectively represented in Peking.

7. Rusk, as usual, was cool and constructive. On the military side he remarked that it was evident that the United Nations forces should not attempt to see the Yalu River again and should accept the limited objective in trying to free the Korean Republic. On the other side, it was probable but not certain that the enemy could not now expel the United Nations forces from Korea.

8. I met Franks immediately after seeing Rusk, and he took up with me the suggestion, which had been previously made to him, of three-cornered talks between the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, which he is anxious to see adopted. He thinks well of the general programme proposed by Rusk. Do you agree that I should participate in such discussions?

²² Voir le document 70./See Document 70.

²³ Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, Documents sur la crise coréenne, Ottawa, Imprimeur du Roi, 1951, pp. 21-31.
See Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on the Korean Crisis, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951, pp. 19-28.