During our discussions last week with Mr. Beeley of the U.K. Mission to the United Nations, we ran over most of the principal subjects at the forthcoming Assembly. When we came to the subject mentioned above, I expressed the strictly personal opinion that the U.K. would find itself this year in a more satisfactory position vis-à-vis the Assembly than it had previously because it had put forward proposals²⁰ which should gain a good deal of sympathy in the Assembly. It seemed to me that the concessions made in these proposals in the direction of self-government should appeal to the more responsible Asian and African countries. The Indians, for instance, had never taken a strict anti-colonial line on Cyprus and Krishna Menon had in fact been helpful with compromises. It seemed to me that some of these countries might be even more disposed to support the British position now as it did seem to most people that it was only through some compromise of this kind that any progress could be made in Cyprus. I asked Mr. Beeley if he thought a resolution in the Assembly which gave general support to the U.K. initiative would help them in persuading the Greeks and the Turks to cooperate. He said he thought that it would.

2. It seems to me that the most constructive thing that the Assembly might do this year, and one on which it might be not too difficult to get a two-thirds majority, would be a resolution which gave general blessing to a solution along the lines the British are proposing. It would be unwise, of course, to attempt to get the Assembly specifically to endorse the British plan. There are a number of delegations which could be persuaded that a compromise of this kind was the only hope for a solution but whose prejudices or political problems would prevent them from patting the British on the back too obviously. It seems fairly clear that the British would now be prepared to take almost any step which would solve the Cyprus problem and that it is not they, but the Greeks and the Turks who have to have pressure put upon them by world opinion. It would certainly not help if we tried to marshal the forces against them in such a way as to humiliate them but if their faces could be considered in the process, we might in the Assembly be able to help create a propitious atmosphere for negotiations. Much, of course, would depend on what transpires between now and the time this is debated in the Assembly but if the situation has not changed very much, then a debate along these lines would be helpful. In fact, if some initiatives were taken shortly to prepare the way for such a resolution in the Assembly, the Greeks and Turks might thereby be induced to talk more gently and act more reasonably in order to avoid the Assembly's wrath.

3. It would clearly not be advisable for the U.K. themselves to take any initiative along these lines. I don't think it would be advisable either for the Americans or most other members of NATO to do so. Canada might not be the best open sponsor of such a move but our position vis-à-vis the Asians and Africans is such that I think we might try sounding some of them out. We might even persuade the Indians to take the initiative. The trouble in the past too often has been on issues of this kind that the British and Americans and their friends have prepared an initiative and a resolution and then asked Krishna Menon to join them. The only way to get Krishna behind any such move is to let him take hold of it at the beginning. The end result will not be exactly what we would have designed ourselves, but we at least have Krishna working on our side rather than against us.

4. Last year, you will recall that we worked very hard to secure a resolution on Algeria that won Mr. Pineau's gratitude in the end although the French Delegation viewed our activities with some suspicion enroute. We were then asked to do a similar job on Cyprus, but we were reluctant to do so because we had already exhausted our reputation as a mediator. The request for help came too late and the result was not very satisfactory. There might be something to be said, therefore, for our choosing Cyprus in advance as a field in which we might play a role and making adequate preparations rather than being caught in the eddy of last-minute manoeuvres. From the point of view of our general policy, furthermore, I think there is something to be said for working to help the United Kingdom in a good cause thereby seeking to prove to them that neither we nor the United Nations are as hostile as some of them sometimes think.

J.W. H[OLMES]

²⁰ Pour un compte rendu des efforts déployés par le Royaume-Uni afin de régler le problème de Chypre dans le cadre de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, voir le chapitre II, 7^e partie.
For an account of United Kingdom efforts to solve the Cyprus issue within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see Chapter II, Part 7.