This year's December meeting convenes during a period when the Alliance is being subjected to a number of strains. In part they have their origin in the political and financial difficulties involved in implementing the decisions in principle arrived at during the Heads of Government meeting last December. In large measure they stem from concern over certain aspects of United States policy particularly in the Far East, a growing French independence under General deGaulle's leadership, and divergent Western views on such fundamental issues as the role of Alliance in respect of global problems, disengagement and the situation in Berlin. The Cyprus issue, the U.K.-Iceland dispute and the breakdown of negotiations between the Free Trade Area and Common Market groups have accentuated internal disharmony within the Alliance. It is a time when the Soviet Union is showing a new cocksureness, when the United Nations is experiencing increasing frustrations in its attempts at agreements, when disarmament negotiations are making little headway and when the forces of neutralism are increasing their influence in many areas of the world. The situation demands a realistic reappraisal of basic positions. Perseverance and patience will be required if we are to preserve the unity and strength of the Alliance.

Military Problems

2. Traditionally, the December meeting has as its main task consideration of the Annual Review of the military programmes of the Alliance, carefully prepared and agreed beforehand at the official level. The Annual Review, however, was considerably different this year. Largely at our suggestion, it was used not merely as in the past to draw up a balance sheet of the military situation in the Alliance but also as an exercise to find out and study the reactions of countries to the financial, economic and military implications of MC 70 the recommended minimum force requirements for the period 1958-63, when the costly and complicated weapons of the nuclear age will be introduced into NATO forces.

3. To date, the Annual Review has revealed a large gap between requirements and national capacities and willingness to make the necessary sacrifices. Moreover, the time period covered has varied in different countries replies, making it doubly difficult to assess the situation. While the tactic of countries putting in low bids is obviously present, SACEUR is of the opinion that a real multilateral discussion will be necessary at the meeting if MC 70 is to be implemented adequately.

4. Because of unresolved defence problems in North America, it was not possible for the Canadian Delegation to be as forthcoming as in previous years. Moreover, the termination of the NATO air training programmes, the virtual conclusion of production of defence equipment for new and reconditioned military equipment prevented us from suggesting that we could maintain the level of mutual aid at even its present level. These proved to be the objects of some criticism from the International Staff especially since the procedure this year was (at our request), intended to project over the next 5 years. Although our defence effort compares favourably with that of other countries, it would seem appropriate for Canadian Ministers in Paris to say a few words about our position in respect to the Annual Review by way of explaining the reasons for our reticence and the immensity of our North American defence responsibilities which form an essential part of the NATO deterrent. On mutual aid, some indication of its level during 1959-60 might be given at the meeting, probably along with some explanation of the reasons for any reduction.

5. Disagreement on the Annual Review, however, will probably be of minor consequence compared to two other developments which may face the meeting. The first relates to recent French and U.K. unwillingness to go along with the NATO military recommendations concerning the integration of European air defence. If one or both of these states persist in their attitude it could well mean the end of one of the most practical ways of ensuring interdependence in the European context.

6. Similarly there are signs that France is refusing to accept the installation of IRBM's and nuclear stock piles on French territory on the terms offered by the United States. While the arguments to date have largely revolved around the financing of the common infrastructure of fixed missile emplacements, etc., there are indications that basically the French are holding out for custody and control over the use of weapons delivery systems and nuclear warheads situated on their territory. In this case the French are obviously creating a delicate situation for SACEUR. To get what they want would require special Congressional legislation to release some of the material. But not only that, it could well create an unfortunate precedent which might be taken up by other countries and thereby weaken NATO control over these weapons of mass destruction.
   
   Political Problems

7. As Mr.Léger has pointed out, the present Agenda for the meeting on the political side bears little relation to the real problems facing the Alliance. These might be summarized as follows:
   
   Berlin and the German Problem

8. The latest Soviet ultimatum on Berlin advocating the establishment of a free city for the Western part of the former German capital is clearly unacceptable. More important, however, is the dilemma facing the Western Powers in the face of the announced Soviet intention of turning over their responsibilities for the Eastern sector and communications with West Germany to the G.D.R. authorities in the event of non-acceptance. To date, the main Western Powers have displayed a divergence of views regarding a future course of action. The West German Government favours standing firm. In reply to questions at a Press conference on November 26⁹¹ (before receipt of Mr.Khrushchev's note to President Eisenhower on Berlin), Mr.Dulles indicated that there was a possibility of dealing with G.D.R. functionaries on minor administrative matters as agents of the USSR without accepting the substitution of the G.D.R. for the USSR in the discharge of the latter's obligations towards the three Western Powers. The United Kingdom is currently advocating a solution of the Berlin problem in the context of a modified version of the traditional Western plan for reunification involving an element of partial regional disarmament.

9. While we have indicated publicly our rejection of the Soviet proposals we have not as yet clarified our thinking with respect to possible counter proposals. However, the following principles could serve as guidance in formulating our position at the NATO meeting.

   1. The situation in Berlin is of direct concern to NATO as a whole by virtue of the association of the Alliance with the Tripartite Declaration of 1954;⁹² in the circumstances we should encourage substantive discussions in the NATO Council;

   2. Western deliberations should go beyond tactics to encompass longer run solutions;

   3. A realistic rather than a formalistic approach to the problems of Berlin and a German settlement would seem to be required;

   4. Too much importance should not be attached to the question of routine low level contacts with G.D.R. officials;

   5. We should advocate the avoidance or threat of the use of force in the event the USSR transfers authority to the G.D.R.
      
      

   (A memorandum outlining in more detail the Soviet proposals on Berlin and the Western reaction thereto is contained in the briefing notes for the delegation.)
   
   Disarmament

10. Arrangements have been made to keep the NATO Council informed of the talks in Geneva on nuclear tests and surprise attack, but there has been no discussion to date in the Council. It appears likely that the Secretariat will have prepared in advance of the meeting a summary of the results at the time of the opening of the Ministerial meeting. Little progress has been made on nuclear tests and the surprise attack discussions are expected to fold up shortly. Some substantive discussion will undoubtedly result in NATO although there is no specific agenda item on disarmament.

11. Briefing notes summarizing the Geneva talks on nuclear tests and surprise attack have been prepared for the Delegation. The section dealing with surprise attack contains an outline of a possible Canadian initiative at Paris. This would encompass the thesis that national, continental and NATO defence and security are not likely to be greatly increased by a system of safeguards based only on inspection, observation and reporting, without additional disarmament measures which would place restrictions on the size of armament or deployment of forces.

12. There is also a section on the recent discussions in the United Nations of outer space. The suggestion is made that there would appear to be a pressing need for giving consideration to the disarmament aspects of outer space.
    
    Disengagement

13. It is not expected that the subject will be discussed at the meeting but the concept will undoubtedly loom in the background. A memorandum summarizing the Rapacki proposals has been included in the briefing notes along with annexes which describe briefly other plans for disengagement which have been advanced from time to time. The memorandum outlines some of the main objections to the revised Rapacki proposals and suggests that we should not take the initiative in raising the subject at the meeting. In addition, it would seem desirable to avoid appearing to over-emphasize its importance by referring to the subject at press conferences or in any press communiqué.
    
    Political Consultation

14. General deGaulle's proposals to President Eisenhower and Mr.Macmillan stimulated the Secretary General to prepare a paper on political co-operation which expounds inter alia the following themes:

    1. Consultation should aim at common lines of policy and action;

    2. Because the Soviet threat is global NATO must strive towards a common policy on global issues;

    3. Consultation on global issues involves a degree of responsibility on the part of all NATO members.

15. In our commentary on the Secretary General's paper we have reached the following conclusions as a possible basis for a Canadian position at the meeting:

    1. We agree with the necessity of intensifying and expanding the scope of political consultations, but we cannot accept that a basic objective is the formation of a common policy on matters outside the Treaty area;

    2. Although consultation should be regarded as a duty between Allies we would propose in the interests of encouraging discussion that a general understanding be reached to the effect that consultations in whatever context do not imply consent or commitments beyond the military political commitments deriving from the Treaty;

    3. When member governments discuss matters of concern to the Alliance outside the NATO framework they should submit the outcome of their deliberation to further consultations within the Council.

16. In addition to the commentary on the Secretary General's report a separate briefing note has been prepared on General deGaulle's proposals summarizing the reaction in NATO capitals and the Canadian position as explained by Mr.Diefenbaker during his conversation with the French leader.

⁹¹ Voir/See United States, Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XXXIX, No.1016, December15, 1958, pp.947-953.

⁹² Voir le volume 20, les documents 272 à 274, 280./See Volume 20, Documents 272-274, 280.