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DCER : Volume #20 - 503.DEA/50220-40 : MOVEMENT OF SERVICE AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE CANADA-UNITED STATES<BR> BORDER: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND TRAINING FLIGHTS

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Volume #20 - 503.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

PART 1

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

SECTION G

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND TRAINING FLIGHTS

503.

DEA/50220-40

Memorandum from Minister of National Defence
to Cabinet Defence Committee

CABINET DOCUMENT NO. D- 14-54

SECRET

[Ottawa], September 20th, 1954

MOVEMENT OF SERVICE AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE CANADA-UNITED STATES
BORDER: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND TRAINING FLIGHTS

1. At the 81st meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee 12 December 1951 the Committee approved PJBD Recommendation 51/5 regarding movement of Service aircraft across the Canada-United States border and a document based on this recommendation setting out the detailed methods of clearing flights of Service aircraft across the border. 66 This document, which was subsequently included in the PJBD Journal of March 1952, is attached as Appendix "A" to this paper. PJBD Recommendation 51/5 was given statutory effect by PC 2307 dated 17 April 1952.

2. The USAF has found that two provisions in the procedure (Appendix "A") for clearing their training flights over Canadian territory are causing difficulty. The first, sub para (j), requires that no bombs be carried in aircraft conducting camera bombing and radar scope photography over Canadian cities. This restriction limits the value of the Radar Bomb Scoring Unit at St. Hubert, P.Q., which consists of a small radar over which Strategic Air Command aircraft carry out simulated bombing missions. This unit, along with approximately fifteen others of a similar nature located at various points in the USA, makes an important contribution towards maintaining the high standard of efficiency required of Strategic Air Command.

3. The aircraft are actually over the site only a few minutes since this is only one of several exercises during a training mission which might require the same aircraft to be airborne for 20 hours and travel several thousand miles, the flight often extending over several different countries. Because of the restriction in sub para (j) the US aircraft scheduled to use the St. Hubert site must always drop their bombs at an approved bombing range first. If the weather conditions are such that the bombs cannot be dropped, the aircraft has no other choice but to land and unload its bombs before using the St. Hubert site. These conditions obtain on about three out of four Strategic Air Command missions. Thus the aircraft have to descend from high altitudes to unload their bombs and then return to operational altitude, with the result that the use of the St. Hubert site becomes an expensive and at such times, an inefficient operation.

4. The active use of the Radar Bomb Scoring Site at St. Hubert by the U.S. Strategic Air Command is of inestimatable value to the RCAF in that it provides increased bomber aircraft training activity over the main Canadian air defence area. This enables the entire air defence system in the area to be exercised under realistic conditions in that it provides practice interceptions for RCAF Fighter Squadrons and the ground controlling organization. Also, as the RCAF has no bomber force, the affiliation of these aircraft with the RCAF provides one means of keeping in touch with modern bomber techniques.

5. The second restriction, contained in sub para (k) of Appendix "A", prevents USAF aircraft from carrying, over Canada, photoflash bombs which are required for photographic reconnaissance training over isolated, uninhabited areas. Thus the USAF aircraft on long range training flights, during which these bombs are required, must circumnavigate Canadian territory. Since the aircraft are therefore often prevented from flying the most direct route to their destinations this provision has also proven uneconomical and inefficient. These photoflash bombs will not be dropped by the USAF over Canada.

6. Specialist officers of the RCAF have examined the safety procedures followed by the USAF and are satisfied that they provide adequate safeguard against possible accidents. Accordingly, the RCAF and USAF have prepared jointly a document to replace the one attached as Appendix "A" to this paper. This revision of methods of clearing training flights of USAF Strategic Air Command over Canadian territory, in addition to meeting the points referred to above, also contains a number of minor amendments which, without changing the substance, improve the form of the document.

7. The new document was discussed and approved at the July 1954 meeting of the PJBD. A copy of the new document is attached as Appendix "B" to this paper. 67

[PIÈCE JOINTE 1/ENCLOSURE 1]

Appendice "A"

Appendix "A"

Secret

MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE BORDER PART I

METHODS OF CLEARING FLIGHTS OF U.S. SERVICE AIRCRAFT
OVER CANADIAN TERRITORY


Note: Service to Service - Either of the Services may make arrangements with the interested service of the other country.
TYPE OF FLIGHT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION AND CLEARING AUTHORITY

 
1. Strategic Air Command Training Flights. Service to Service - Cleared annually in advance by the Chief of the Air Staff with the following restrictions on flights:
(a) Comprehensive Visual Photographic Flight Logs and Radar Scope Logs be completed for all photos taken over Canada and supplied to the RCAF in 5 copies.
(b) The RCAF be supplied (upon request) with any photographs listed in the logs;
(c) The RCAF receive one print of all photographs of Canadian territory taken north of sixty degrees North;
(d) When photography is obtained over established radar bomb scoring sites, paras (a) and (b) will be complied with for the initial flights only. Comprehensive logs of photography obtained on subsequent missions will be provided to the RCAF when coverage not included on the initial flights is obtained;
(e) When photography is obtained by aircraft in formation or by individual aircraft following the same flight path, the film strip of the best quality will be selected for processing in accordance with paras (a) and (b) above.
(f) All photographs taken over Canada will be given a high security classification and none will be distributed without prior reference to the RCAF HQs.
(g) While performing camera bombing and radar scope photography over Canadian cities, aircraft will fly at a high altitude and no more than one aircraft should fly over a Canadian city at a time.
(h) The number of planes participating in any single flight over Canadian territory should not exceed 25.
(i) RCAF will be provided a flight plan of missions at least 24 hours prior to take-off. (Action copy to RCAF Air Defence Command; information copy to HQs RCAF).
(j) No bombs will be carried in the aircraft conducting camera bombing and radar scope photography over Canadian cities.
(k) No bombs filled with other than inert material will be carried.
2. Air Defence Exercises. Service to Service - Cleared by Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command (subject to certain qualifications imposed upon him by the Chief of the Air Staff such as restrictions on mock bomber attacks similar to those imposed upon Strategic Air Command Training Flights, as appropriate).
3. Scientific and Experimental Flights:
(a) involving only Canadian Dept. of National Defence.
(b) involving other Canadian Govt. Depts.

(a) Service to Service. Pre-arrangement

(b) State Dept-External Affairs. Pre-arrangement.

4. Normal Transport, or administrative flights. Flight plans filed with Canadian Dept. Transport through Civil Aeronautics Administration. Normal customs and immigration regulations only. In the case of VIP flights, appropriate advance notification will usually be made through service to service or diplomatic channels.
5. Weather Stations Re-Supply of Arctic. Service to Service-by pre-arrangement.
6. Operational units in Transit. Flight plans filed with Dept. of Transport through Civil Aeronautics Administration under normal airways procedures. If conventional weapons are carried, the following safety precautions will apply:
(a) guns to be rendered safe by such protective devices as inserted a breech T/Piece or 4 dummy rounds;
(b) bombs, if carried, to be in an unfused condition with fuses removed.
7. Combined Exercise other than Air Defence Exercises. State Dept-External Affairs pre-arrangements.
8. Search and Rescue. Arrangement in force as a result of ICAO Agreement. Customs and immigration covered by Canada-U.S. Search and Rescue Bilateral Customs and Immigration Agreement of Jan 1949.
9. U.S. Interception Flights in Canada. Service to Service. Chief of the Air Staff. Pre-arrangement.
10. Any type not specifically mentioned above. State Dept-External Affairs.

[PIÈCE JOINTE 2/ENCLOSURE 2]

Appendice "B"

Appendix "B"

Secret

MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE BORDER

PART I

METHODS OF CLEARING FLIGHTS OF U.S. SERVICE AIRCRAFT OVER CANADIAN TERRITORY


Note: Service to Service - Either of the Services may make arrangements with the interested service of the other country.

TYPE OF FLIGHT

CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION AND CLEARING AUTHORITY
1. Strategic Air Command Training Flights. Service to Service - Cleared annually in advance by the Chief of the Air Staff with the following restrictions on flights:
(a) RCAF will be provided a flight plan of missions at least 24 hours prior to aircraft penetrating Canadian Territory (Action copy to RCAF Air Defence Command; information copy to HQ's RCAF).
(b) Instrument flight rule flight plans will be filed on all flights into or over Canadian Territory.
(c) The number of aircraft participating in any single flight over Canadian Territory should not exceed 25.
(d) While performing camera bombing and radar scope photography over Canadian cities, aircraft will fly over at a high altitude and no more than one aircraft should fly over a Canadian city at one time.
(e) No bombs other than practice or bombs filled with inert material will be carried in aircraft carrying out radar bombing on radar bomb scoring units in Canada. When such bombs are carried, all prescribed safety precautions are to be taken.
(f) Photo flash "bombs" may be carried as required for the completion of photographic reconnaissance missions. When carried, prescribed safety precautions must be followed, including those covering the emergency dropping of these items.
(g) When other types of armaments are carried normal safety precautions as practised in the US will apply.
(h) Comprehensive Visual Photographic Flight Logs and Radar Scope Logs be completed for all photos taken over Canada and supplied to the RCAF in 5 copies.
(i) The RCAF be supplied (upon request) with any photographs listed in the logs.
(j) The RCAF will receive one print of all photographs of Canadian territory taken north of sixty degrees north.
(k) When photography is obtained over established radar bomb scoring sites, (i) and (j) will be complied with for the initial flights only. Comprehensive logs of photography obtained on subsequent missions will be provided to the RCAF, when coverage not included on the initial flights is obtained.
(l) When photograph is obtained by aircraft in formation or by individual aircraft following the same flight path, the film strip of the best quality will be selected for processing in accordance with para (i) and (j).
(m) All photographs taken over Canada will be given a classification of confidential or higher and none will be distributed to another agency without prior reference to the RCAF.
NOTE: Paragraphs 2-10 (inclusive) of the document now in effect (Appendix "A") remain unchanged.

66 Voir/See Volume 17, Document 755.

67 Le Cabinet a approuvé les recommandations de la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense le 12 novembre 1954:
"it being understood that the revisions would make it clear that the regulations did not cover the carrying of nuclear weapons or components."
    Cabinet approved the PJBD's recommendations on November 12, 1954:
"it being understood that the revisions would make it clear that the regulations did not cover the carrying of nuclear weapons or components."



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