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DCER : Volume #24 - 437.DEA/50359-A-40 : U.K.-U.S.A. CONVERSATIONS

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Volume #24 - 437.

CHAPTER III

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

PART 7

RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

SECTION A

UNITED KINGDOM

SUB-SECTION II

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN TO OTTAWA, OCTOBER 24-26, 1957

437.

DEA/50359-A-40

Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Ambassador in United States

TELEGRAM K-188

TOP SECRET. PRIORITY.

Ottawa, October 30th, 1957

U.K.-U.S.A. CONVERSATIONS

Repeat London, NATO Paris, Candel New York (Information).
By Bag Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Oslo.

The United Kingdom Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and the officials who accompanied them to Washington visited Ottawa from the evening of October 24 to the afternoon of October 26. The following is an account of a meeting held of U.K. and Canadian Prime Ministers, Ministers, and senior officials on October 26. Essentially the meeting was occupied with a description of the Washington conversations.

  1. Macmillan began with a general account of the conditions governing the Washington talks. They were not intended to pursue details or reach specific agreements. The object was to arrive at a general understanding between the two governments on the central issue. That issue was to coordinate the strength of western countries as security against the growing Russian strength, particularly in the scientific field; and to counteract Soviet influence in uncommitted countries.

  2. The time was opportune for such a conversation. There had been a degree of American complacency and consequent unreadiness for full cooperation; but this atmosphere had been changed materially by recent Russian successes. American dependence on their own resources had been accompanied by rigidity on secrecy. Such a view had never been shared by the President but at Washington in contrast with his attitude at Bermuda98 Dulles threw his powerful influence toward a changed relationship.

  3. Opportunity existed therefore to carry forward the process begun at Bermuda and to produce results more tangible than at that meeting.

  4. The mood now was one of inter-dependence, not construed as exclusive bilateral relations between the two countries but broadened to include partners in NATO, the Bagdad Treaty, etc. Close if private cooperation between London and Washington could only be helpful, but the policies contemplated in general terms were to apply to wider groupings.

  5. Such was the psychological base for action. The essential character of the meeting is reflected in the communiqué issued in Washington on October 24.99

  6. We shall now describe the substance of the meeting under the main headings:
    1. Cooperation in Scientific Research and Development. Macmillan said that the United States now accepted in full the principle of cooperation between allies in relation to the combination and sharing of resources in the scientific field. (Communiqué, Section II, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3). No attempt had been made to work out arrangements in detail before the Congress had approved the executive action proposed. Macmillan stated that what they had sought to avoid was a situation in which only a few privileged members of the Alliance would possess atomic weapons. Such a situation would have a damaging effect on the Alliance. The importance of the December NATO Council Meeting was stressed and the desirability of Heads of Government being present.100detailed schemes had been examined for the purpose of extending scientific cooperation to the production and development fields.

    2. The Fourth Power Problem. Macmillan reported a change in the U.S.A.'s approach toward the availability to Allies of atomic weapons. Not only has Russia broken the U.S.A. monopoly but scientific advances necessitated a reassessment of earlier concepts. Nuclear weapons are no longer only for massive destruction; a wide range of nuclear weapons has become available and these increasingly resemble conventional ones. The best guarantee that these weapons will remain in responsible hands lies in some plan of joint partnership. Selwyn Lloyd thought that the French would welcome any proposal which would avoid their having to produce nuclear weapons. Headded that the U.S.A. are still opposed to the development of nuclear weapons by fourth countries.

    3. United Kingdom Cooperation with Europe. Arising out of a question by a Canadian Minister on possible misunderstanding of a sentence in paragraph 8 of the communiqué (the one concerning the relation of the European free trade area and the European Common Market), the U.K. Ministers made a positive statement. They denied any validity in the rumours that they were weakening in their decision to exclude agriculture from the proposed free trade area agreement. Following on this remark they spoke of the impossible position which would arise for the United Kingdom if an industrial union of the Six Powers (with possible additions) were not accompanied by a wider free trade area. The U.K. Government could not go on maintaining four divisions on the continent if at the same time France and Germany, in concert with their partners, were seeking to destroy U.K. industry. Under such a situation NATO would collapse and a great victory would be achieved by Russia.

    4. Middle East. Reference to the Middle East was incidental. The U.K. Ministers reported that they and the Americans discounted the possibility of unilateral action on the part of Turkey without consultation.

    5. Nuclear Tests. It was learned that the policy aspects of nuclear tests had not been examined in Washington but experts had had some discussion on possible joint facilities. Macmillan pointed out to us that a wider exchange of information would make it unnecessary for the U.K., for example, to continue its tests if the data sought was made available from U.S.A. tests.

[J.] LÉGER


98 Voir le volume 22, les documents 734 à 736./See Volume 22, Documents 734-736.

99 Pour le texte de la Déclaration d'objectif commun, voir United States, Department of State, Bulletin, volumeXXXVII, no.959, November11, 1957, pp.739 à 741.
For the text of the Declaration of Common Purpose, see United States, Department of State, Bulletin, VolumeXXXVII, No.959, November11, 1957, pp.739-741.

100 Voir la 4 partie, chapitre II./See Chapter II, Part 4. No



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