The possibility of reducing Canadian forces in Korea has been under consideration for some time. The only decision that has been taken is the Cabinet decision of January 11, 1954 that the total number of Canadian military personnel in South Korea should be gradually reduced, provided that this is done consistently with Canadian obligations to the United Nations.

2. On the basis of a Cabinet decision of September 24, 1953, however, the United Kingdom Government was informed that, on the assumption that it might be possible to reduce the Commonwealth Division to an integrated brigade group pending its complete withdrawal from Korea and, so far as the Canadian forces were concerned, from the Far East, the appropriate Canadian contribution would be one infantry battalion and that a reduced Canadian naval contribution might be one destroyer or frigate. It was to be understood that no firm commitment was implied.

3. The Minister of National Defence subsequently agreed that Canada might also contribute one field ambulance at a reduced strength tailored to the field medical needs of the proposed brigade group.

4. Military representatives in London of the Commonwealth nations concerned have recently examined the stages in which Commonwealth military forces in Korea could be reduced. Their report, dated June 10, differs only slightly, so far as Canadian forces are concerned, from a directive issued by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff with the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence.

5. The report recommends that the reduction take place in two phases. In the first phase the Commonwealth Division would be reduced by the withdrawal of one brigade group. In the second phase it would be further reduced down to one brigade group. The military representatives further recommend that the Commonwealth identity of the forces remaining in Korea should be preserved, and that any suggestion that other United Nations forces be incorporated in the Commonwealth Division should be resisted.

6. It is estimated that Canadian Army strength in the Far East would be reduced in the first phase by approximately 30%, in the second phase by approximately 77%. The contribution of the Royal Canadian Navy would be reduced concurrently by the withdrawal of two destroyers during the first phase, leaving one destroyer or frigate in Korean waters. There are no units of the Royal Canadian Air Force involved.

7. The report has already been approved by the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments.

8. I recommend, with the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence, that the report be approved in principle as a basis for discussion with the United States authorities. I further recommend that approval be given for these discussions to commence as soon as the other Commonwealth Governments concerned are in agreement. ²²

L.B. Pearson