At the request of the State Department I called today on Merchant (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs) to receive three main USA proposals with respect to the subjects indicated above. Merchant indicated that these proposals had their background in the original USA proposals of December 12, 1957 relating to the closer integration of atomic capabilities in the defence of North America (see our Telegram #2630, December 12, 1957)³⁷⁴, the meetings of consultation held in Washington November 19, 1958³⁷⁵, and the Ministerial Meetings in Paris on December 15³⁷⁶. Certain aspects of the proposals had further been discussed directly between the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. In the light of this background and these recent discussions, Merchant handed to me for consideration by the Canadian Government the following documents:

(1) Text of a revised Schedule B dealing with the movement of aircraft across the border and with methods of clearing flights of USA service aircraft over Canadian territory (Wiser procedures). The text of Schedule B is contained in my immediately following telegram.?

(2) Text of a draft USA note on the need for revision of the M.B.-1 Overflight Agreement relating to tactical weapons which is to expire July 1, 1959. The text of this note is also contained in my immediately following telegram.?

(3) Text of a USA Aide-Mémoire setting forth the interest of the USA in the early completion of arrangements for the storage of MB-1 rockets in support of the USAF squadron at Goose Bay. This Aide-Mémoire further expresses the hope that the Canadian Government will be able to respond favourably to the USA Government's Aide-Mémoire of December 12, 1957 concerning the storage of nuclear weapons at Goose Bay for SAC. Finally the Aide-Mémoire outlines what is described as an urgent operational requirement for the storage of naval nuclear anti-submarine weapons at Argentia. The text of this Aide-Mémoire is contained in an imme-diately following telegram.

2. With reference to the first two items, i.e. the revision of Wiser procedures, and the MB-1 agreement, the position as outlined to us in an informal USA document may be summarized as follows:

A. Need for Revision of XYZ Procedures Governing Nuclear Overflights of Canada by SAC

(1) The present procedures cover overflights with nuclear weapons only by SAC aircraft. We believe the arrangements should be amended to cover nuclear overflights by any US military aircraft.

(2) We believe that category "X" of the procedures, concerning overflights with non-nuclear components could be eliminated, making such flights subject to the more routine clearance arrangements of Schedule A of Order-in-Council 2307.

(3) We propose to revise category "Y" clearances to permit clearances of 6-month programs to be made at the governmental level with individual flights and any modifications to the original program to be cleared in advance between the Chiefs of Air Staff.

B. Need for Revision of MB-1 Overflight Agreement - The present agreement is of an interim nature and will expire July 1, 1959. In its present form the agreement is limited to -

(1) USAF interceptors equipped with the MB-1 rocket;

(2) overflights of Canadian territory extending only as far north as the 54th parallel, and

(3) nuclear overflights under conditions of Red or Yellow alerts.

These restrictions in effect limit the capability of USAF interceptors based in Alaska and the United States to respond effectively to an approaching hostile air attack. Therefore, we now propose to replace the present arrangement with a long-term agreement which would:

(1) continue in force for the period of operation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD);

(2) eliminate the term "MB-1 Rocket" in describing the nuclear weapon to be carried by USAF interceptors in view of the probable development of more advanced weapons with different nomenclatures;

(3) remove the present limitation on nuclear overflights beyond the 54th parallel to permit the overflight of all Canadian territory and landing and take-off rights from bases in Canada. Such landing and take-off rights would apply only to US interceptors launched from bases outside Canada and would not apply to USAF interceptors based in Canada;

(4) extend the authorization for such nuclear overflights of Canadian territory from conditions of Red or Yellow Alert to a condition of Air Defense Readiness declared by CINCNORAD. This would permit the interception of hostile aircraft before they had penetrated the North American Air Defense Zone.

3. With reference to the Aide-Mémoire on USA storage requirements on Canadian territory, no supplementary explanations were offered although two Pentagon officials were present to provide elucidation and to answer questions.

4. In view of the history of the matters raised by Merchant and the need to study carefully the new USA proposals, I said simply that they would be forwarded to you for consideration and study and that we might wish to consult with USA experts on the problems raised in the inte-rest of clarification when we had an opportunity of examining these requests carefully.

5. Your early comments on the foregoing would be appreciated. Copies of these messages are being sent for information to the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff.

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

³⁷⁴ Voir/See Volume 25, Document 26.

³⁷⁵ Voir/See Volume 25, Document 133.

³⁷⁶ Voir/See Volume 25, Document 135.