The United States has proposed that the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD be given advance authority to place his forces in a state of increased operational readiness in the event of an increase in East-West tensions arising out of denial of Western access to Berlin. This request has so far been received only though military channels, but it is expected that a similar approach will be made momentarily by the State Department.

Since it seems likely that there will be an increase in international tension, in the event the West is denied access to West Berlin, the placing of NORAD's forces in a state of increased operational readiness would be a normal and reasonable precaution in such circumstances. It is our understanding that "increased operational readiness" is the lowest degree of preparedness beyond normal readiness and does not involve measures affecting the civilian population. Moreover, since the measures relate to forces which are strictly defensive in character, they could hardly be regarded by the USSR as provocative or conducive to a further deterioration in the international atmosphere.

Our main objection to the United States proposal is that it appears to leave it to CINCNORAD to decide when and in what circumstances there has been an increase in international tension resulting from denial of access to Berlin, which would warrant an increased state of preparedness in North America. While it would seem reasonable for CINCNORAD to take such precautionary measures in the event of increased tension, the assessment as to what constitutes "increased international tension resulting from denial of access" should be a matter of political decision by the governments concerned.

We are also of the opinion that if the United States authorities contemplate that similar action will eventually be taken by SACEUR in Europe, it might be desirable to have the increased measures of readiness in North America coincide with those taken in the NATO context.

In view of the considerations outlined above, I would recommend that we advise the United States that:

(a) The placing of NORAD's forces in a state of increased operational readiness would be a reasonable and necessary precautionary measure in the event of an increase in international tension arising out of denial of Western access to Berlin;

(b) the question of determining when the conditions warranted such action by CINCNORAD would be a matter for the decision of the two governments, in the light of all the information available at the time;

(c) instructions to NORAD be prepared by both governments for immediate despatch, once a joint decision is taken regarding the existence of "increased international tension resulting from denial of access to Berlin;"

(d) we would be interested to learn whether they have given any thought as to what measures might be instituted in the NATO context and whether such measures would coincide with the increased preparedness in North America. ⁴⁶¹

N.A. R[OBERTSON]

⁴⁶¹Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Note Prime Minister said he entirely agreed H.B. R[obinson] April 28, 1959.