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Volume #26 - 218. | |
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CHAPTER IV RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES | |
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PART
1 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES | |
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SECTION
D NORAD | |
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SUB-SECTION
II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE | |
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218. |
PCO/C-20-9(a)-M |
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Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee464 | |
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TOP SECRET |
Ottawa,
August 4th, 1959 |
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II. ORGANIZATION FOR THE AIR DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA | |
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7. The Minister of National Defence said that CINCNORAD had now determined the subor-dinate organizations he considered necessary to accomplish his mission, and had requested national authorities to provide the necessary personnel for manning. The introduction of semi-automatic ground environment had necessitated the re-adjustment of the locations and sizes of the various air defence regions in North America to provide the best operational control within contiguous radar coverage and the most economical use of the improved SAGE. Engineering studies had revealed the need for ten SAGE NORAD regions to cover the United States and Canada, each of which would be subdivided into two or more sectors. Each sector would have its own Direction Centre and associated radars, and its own headquarters to control air defence operations within the sector. Five of the SAGE NORAD regions were wholly within the United States and would contain only U.S. forces. The other five regions included territory of both countries; of the 30 sectors within these five regions, 17 were wholly within the United States (including Alaska), one wholly within Canada, and 13 in areas including territory of both countries. The two countries had agreed upon certain principles for developing the NORAD control organization. In those geographical areas (regions or sectors) lying wholly within one country and containing only forces of that country, the commander and staff should be from that coun-try; however, if current tactical concepts involved the employment and tactical control of forces of the other country in the air space of the geographical area in question, adequate staff and operational personnel should be provided to the commander to ensure effective employ-ment of those forces. In geographical areas including territory of both countries and/or forces of both countries, the commander and his deputy should not normally be from the same country unless the forces or territory of the other country were very small. Also, in these areas, the commander's staff should be a joint staff composed of officers of both countries. National representation should generally be based on the composition of forces and the territory involved. In accordance with these principles it was suggested that Canada should provide the Deputy Commander for the 25th and 31st NORAD regions, the Commander in the 35th region and joint staff officers for the regional and sector staffs within the 25th, 29th, 31st and 35th regions. Only the regional staff and the Syracuse sector staff in the 26th region and only the Detroit sector staff in the 30th region should be joint staffs of Canadian as well as U.S. officers. By participating in the NORAD control organization as requested by CINCNORAD, Canadian personnel would be directly involved in the control of U.S. weapons operating in Canadian airspace, and they would be immediately available to the commanders of subordinate organizations to advise on matters affecting Canada. CINCNORAD had requested participation by U.S. personnel, including that of a U.S. Deputy Commander, in the control of forces which would be operating within the 35th region, which included the 64th NORAD division and would eventually include U.S. forces in the Bangor Sector. It was considered that Canada should participate in those regional headquarters which would have control of aircraft and weapons operating in Canadian air space and that United States personnel should be permitted to participate in regional headquarters located in Canada which would have control of U.S. forces and weapons operating over U.S. territory. 8. The Minister of National Defence, on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, recommended: (a) that approval in principle be given to: (i) Canadian participation in those subordinate headquarters referred to above to the extent of approximately 247 officers, 408 other ranks and 16 civilians; (ii) U.S. participation in the 35th NORAD Region Headquarters, presently referred to as Northern NORAD Region Headquarters, to the extent of approximately 31 officers and 49 other ranks; (b) that subject to the foregoing approval in principle, the Minister of National Defence be authorized to implement the manning in annual increments as necessary. An explanatory memorandum had been circulated. (Minister's memorandum, undated, Document D9-59).? 9. Mr. Pearkes said that if Canada were to accept a U.S. officer as Deputy Commander in the 35th region, there was a strong argument for obtaining the acceptance of a Canadian as Deputy Commander in the 29th region, even though there were not substantial Canadian air defence forces within that area. Because of a scarcity of senior officers to fill these positions, however, it was doubtful that we should ask for them. An alternative would be to have no Deputy Commanders at all, but just joint staffs in regions and sectors including territory of both countries. 10. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that if Deputy Commanders were not provided, there would be no senior Canadian representation at all in the regions covering Western Canada. Canada should provide the Deputy Commander for the 29th and 31st regions, and probably should provide the Commander for the 25th region. 11. During the discussion the following points emerged: (a) An important consideration in drawing up the list of command positions was to obtain an element of Canadian representation in each sector which included Canadian airspace, but to keep down the commitment of personnel. In addition, it was an accepted practice in NATO that command positions should go to an officer of the country which provided most of the forces to the command. (b) There was a strong argument for placing a Canadian as Deputy Commander in the Detroit sector of the 30th region, as was the situation in the Syracuse sector of the 26th region. Both sectors would have control over vital areas of Canada. (c) It was anticipated that the Canadian appointments recommended, and those which had been suggested during the discussion, could be made within the total R.C.A.F. manpower ceiling, but there might have to be a revision upwards of the rank structure. Commanders of regions would be of the rank of Air Vice Marshal, Deputy Commanders of regions of the rank of Air Commodore. Deputy Commanders of sectors would be of Group Captain rank. 12. The Committee agreed: (a) that, in principle, Canada should participate in those subordinate headquarters recommended by the Minister to the extent of approximately 247 officers, 408 other ranks and 16 civilians; (b) that, in addition, an attempt should be made to have Canadian officers appointed to the following positions: (i) Commander of the 25th NORAD Region (instead of Deputy Commander); (ii) Deputy Commander of the 29th NORAD Region; (iii) Deputy Commander in sectors which include Canadian air space, and are within NORAD Regions where neither the Regional Commander nor the Deputy Commander are Canadians, particularly the Detroit sector. (c) that, in principle, the United States should be allowed to participate in the 35th NORAD Region Headquarters, presently referred to as the Northern NORAD Region Headquarters, to the extent of approximately 31 officers and 49 other ranks; (d) that subject to the foregoing approval in principle, the Minister of National Defence should implement the manning in manual increments as necessary. . . . 464Pour la liste des participants à la rencontre, voir le document 176. | |
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