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Volume #26 - 358. | |
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CHAPTER VI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS | |
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PART
5 REPATRIATION | |
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358. |
DEA/232-K-3-40 |
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Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy in Soviet Union | |
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SECRET |
Ottawa,
December 24th, 1959 |
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Reference: Consular Division Memorandum to the Under-Secretary dated Dec. 11, 1958? and previous correspondence. DETENTION OF CANADIAN CITIZENS IN U.S.S.R. [NAME OMITTED] FAMILY423 Further consideration is being given to this case from the point of view of security and the strong exception taken by the R.C.M.P. to facilitating the return to Canada of the [name omitted] family and other repatriates like them may result in our restricting the representations to cases regarded as deserving. It may be, however, that the [name omitted] boys might be held to fall into the latter category or at least to deserve greater consideration from a humanitarian viewpoint, although, as it is noted the [name omitted] family have now been obliged to leave Moscow and settle in a village, there is no longer the same urgency as before. We shall continue to keep you informed of our thinking here and would be glad to receive any further comments you may wish to make. 2. For your confidential information, the views of the R.C.M.P. in this case are along the lines of the following: In the light of information available to them, the R.C.M.P. find it most difficult to agree with the suggestion that assistance be given the [name omitted] family. They are firmly of the opinion that Mr. and Mrs. [name omitted], in view of their political activities in Canada, merit no special assistance and therefore cannot concur that representations should be made to the Soviet Embassy here on their behalf. While they recognize that it is unfortunate that the children should suffer the same fate as their parents the Police emphasize the seriousness of the activities of the [name omitted] while they were in Canada. 3. The [name omitted] family must be considered as one of several hundred families who have returned to the U.S.S.R. as a result of the Return to the Homeland Campaign. Of these, a considerable number have lengthy communist records and it must be accepted that these records are known to the Soviet authorities. Should we assist one family with such a record to return to Canada, we should open an excellent avenue to the Soviets by which they might send trained agents to Canada. It would be simple for the Soviets to have a family, one member of which had been trained as an agent, report to you that they wished to return to Canada on the pretext that life in the Soviet Union was intolerable. Once the family made this request, the Soviet authorities could object to their return to Canada until pressure is applied by Canadian authorities for their repatriation. They could then merely yield to such pressure and allow them to leave the U.S.S.R. 4. It is appreciated that the [name omitted] family have been in the U.S.S.R. a comparatively short period of time. To intercede on their behalf however might create a precedent which could very well open the avenue described. The infiltration of agents into repatriation streams has been a long established principle of Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services, and recent evidence shows that this continues to receive high priority in recruitment methods. It is also important to appreciate that some considerable time, 2 to 5 years, may elapse between the return of the repatriate and his activation as an Intelligence agent. This poses a security problem of considerable magnitude. Based on previous experience, interrogation of such repatriates, who are dedicated communists, is unlikely to yield any clarification of their position as they would be well briefed by the R.I.S. to satisfy any form of interrogation. 5. It may be argued that we might gain by the adverse propaganda given to living conditions in Russia, once these people have returned to Canada; in practice however this is most unlikely since most of these people have close relatives in Russia and they refrain from making any adverse comments for fear of reprisals against them. Past experience shows that people who have returned to Canada from behind the Iron Curtain prefer to remain silent rather than publicly denounce life under Communism. The propaganda value gained in cases of this nature has therefore been negligible. 6. The R.C.M.P. consider therefore, that in view of the above, no further assistance should be given the [name omitted] family and it is suggested that no assistance be given, in future, to repatriates who have a substantial communist background before repatriation to the U.S.S.R. and who now wish to return to Canada. ARCHIBALD DAY 423Le nom a été omis, conformément à la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. | |
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