The long-term trend in Africa is unmistakably towards autonomy in all areas, with the ultimate establishment of régimes which will be at least dominated by the preponderant racial group in each. A pattern of broader associations (in some cases probably federations) will be established between African states. Some states or groups may, in turn, retain links - but only on a basis of sovereign equality - with extra-African powers or associations. There are a few areas where the supremacy of metropolitan authorities or of local minority régimes is very strictly maintained and where the transition will be long and quite possibly bloody, but the end result even in these is in no real doubt.

2. In the short term, the picture is far more uncertain. Pace is all-important and a fundamental conflict exists, as in all colonial areas, between the champions of haste and the champions of gradualness. The forces of African nationalism, on the one hand, tend to believe that all subject peoples are ready and able to take control of their own affairs immediately or almost immedia-tely. The metropolitan powers tend to believe that gradual and orderly progress, with growing experience in the procedures and problems of government, will make for a more successful transfer of sovereignty in the end. There is, of course, right on both sides. Neither side, how-ever, acts wholly from a disinterested and unemotional weighing of all the factors.

3. On the African nationalist side, the most important factor is simply the feeling of humilia-tion at having an inferior status and the desire to end it as soon as possible, at whatever cost. This is usually coupled with a tendency, born of political inexperience, to under-estimate the difficulties involved. There may also be a desire to make the metropolitan power suffer for past humiliations and injustices. There is a tendency for nationalist groups in different areas to make common cause with one another and this may encourage all of them to take more extreme posi-tions. Still another factor is the influence of political leaders who see extremism as a means of self-advancement. Finally (although this list is by no means exhaustive) there is the influence of outside powers, such as the Soviet Union, which espouse nationalist causes as a means of gaining a foothold in Africa.

4. On the side of those who advocate delay, there are also factors other than a simple assess-ment of what is in the best long-term interests of the subject peoples. At one extreme, there is refusal - as in the case of the South Africans, for example - to admit the inevitability of the eventual outcome, or the acceptability of any step which may tend towards it. In much less extreme cases there is still some element of national pride and prestige, and reluctance to see colonial possessions break away. There are motives of national economic interest. Policies of delay may be followed in deference to the wishes of an entrenched and privileged minority on the spot. Finally (and again the list is not exhaustive) there is the natural tendency for colonial powers to maintain a common front against the pressures of anti-colonialism, and this may lead some of them to go more slowly than they would otherwise do.

5. None of these motives enters directly into Canadian calculations, simply because Canada is neither in Africa nor a colonial power. This does not mean, however, that Canada is in a posi-tion to make an absolutely impartial assessment of African questions, although it is obviously much better able to do so than the protagonists of either side. Canada has no cause to stand out against the broad trend towards independence of African territories. On the contrary, the degree of sympathy Canada may show towards African aspirations in the coming months and years will largely determine the relations this country may eventually enjoy with the African powers which emerge - and these states and groups of states will be of major economic and political importance to the world. In a narrower field of self interest, Canada does have immediate economic interests in Africa which may affect its stand on some African questions. A much more important influence on Canadian policy, however, is its relation, apart entirely from Africa, with some of the most important powers which are directly involved in the continent. Canada's close ties with the United Kingdom and with France, for example, have an obvious bearing on Canadian policy, as do its associations with other countries of the Commonwealth holding such divergent views as those of India and South Africa.

6. Thus, there are in essence three types of motivation for Canadian policy on African ques-tions, and it is useful to consider which are predominant in any given policy decision:

(a) self interest, e.g. matters of obvious and immediate economic concern to Canada or Cana-dian interests, or the long-term motive of wishing to be on good terms with powers of ultimate world importance;

(b) disinterested calculation of what is best for the continent itself, e.g. sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of subject peoples, on the one hand, and opposition to violent or hasty and ill-considered change on the other;

(c) the desire to meet the immediate wishes of our friends, e.g. support of the colonial policies of NATO or Commonwealth associates. In this last case, the Canadian position is based not on African considerations but on Canada's other international links and commitments. It is useful, therefore, to go a step further and examine the policies of the powers Canada seeks to oblige, since these policies may be based either on disinterested assessment of the situation, or on any of a much wider range of matters of self interest than Canada, with its limited involvement, need take into account.

7. There are three main ways in which Canada may be called upon to formulate policies on African questions:

(a) The United Nations. If it were not for the United Nations it would not be necessary for Canada to have a policy or to take a public stand on most African issues which do not directly affect our interests. In the Fourth Committee particularly, however, and in the perennial examination of South African items, Canada cannot avoid taking a stand on most of the funda-mental and contentious issues of colonialism and African political advancement. It is in this forum, too, that Canada's attitudes are most critically appraised by the emerging African states and by anti-colonial powers generally; it is also in this forum that Canadian support is solicited by some of our closest associates in the international field;

(b) Representation. The rapid evolution of African states and groupings has led to a need for increased Canadian representation in Africa, both as a desirable gesture of interest in and soli-darity with newly-emerging states, and also because of the growing need to be informed on and to form an independent Canadian assessment of trends and developments. With its limited resources, Canada has been forced to be satisfied with much less representation on the spot than is desirable, and has been subject to a variety of pressures in deciding where its limited resources should be concentrated. To date, the force of the Commonwealth incentive has been decisive, and south of the Sahara Canada has diplomatic missions only in two Commonwealth states, the Union of South Africa and Ghana, and plans for establishing missions in two more, Nigeria and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Other independent states, particularly Guinea and Liberia, and the North African states of Morocco and Tunisia, have been ignored, together with the important groupings of former French colonies in West Africa and Equatorial Africa, the rapidly evolving Belgian Congo and the British territories in East Africa. For the moment, no further expansion of Canadian representation in Africa is planned, but it is none-theless useful to consider what pattern of representation would be most desirable for the future.

(c) Economic and Technical Aid. Canada's programme in this respect for the whole of Africa is very modest indeed, although it is perhaps of a potential significance out of proportion to present or contemplated outlays. Here again the tendency has been to concentrate on Commonwealth areas, and in an even more restricted way than in the case of representation. Ghana has been the principal beneficiary to date, and Nigeria will almost certainly be the next area for concentrated attention. Again, the rest of Africa has been largely ignored, and it might be useful to consider whether economic or technical assistance in other areas would be possible or desirable.