Begins:

1. I have seen your telegram No. 265 in which is recorded the decision of the Canadian Government to withdraw the Canadian Army occupation force and the R.C.A.F. units engaged on occupational duties from Germany between April and the autumn of 1946.

2. I fully appreciate the reasons underlying this decision and am well aware how great will be the administrative problems resulting from your retention of forces in Europe after 1946.

3. At the same time, I would earnestly request you to reconsider this decision. The withdrawal of the Canadian forces will inevitably result in the retention of an extra number of forces from the United Kingdom. Full credit for the help we can expect to obtain from our minor Allies has already been allowed for in out planning.

4. I know that heavy demands are being made on you to demobilize, at the earliest date, every possible man from the Canadian forces. You will, I am sure, appreciate the demands that are being made on me for similar action in order to meet our tremendous task of reconstruction.

S. Your decision will also mean that we shall still have a number of men serving in Germany who will have as much as five years service when Canada will have withdrawn her last man from overseas.

6. It would seem hard that this country should be expected to bear the whole burden of occupational duties in Europe. This would, in effect, be on behalf of all of us in the British Commonwealth who have fought together in the war and are seeking in the same spirit of partnership to play our part in restoring Europe and the world in general. If I may state frankly, for your consideration, the programme which seems to us to meet our needs, it would be that you keep a Canadian division and elements of the Royal Canadian Air Force in Europe at least until after the spring of 1947. If you were then to withdraw your division in a phased six month programme, say one brigade in March 1947, the second in June 1947 and the third in September 1947, we should find the hardship caused by its withdrawal much less onerous than during 1946. Similarly, we would like to see at least two of the R.C.A.F. fighter squadrons remaining with us until March 1947.

7. I realize that this is very different from what you yourself have in mind and that it must present considerable difficulties for you, but I know that I can express my thoughts to you with complete intimacy and that you will reply in the same spirit. We are all in an extremely difficult situation and I am confident that you will do your best to help. Malcolm MacDonald has seen this telegram in draft and will be in a position to discuss the matter with you, if you wish, on his return in the middle of this week. Ends.