Dear Mr. Pearson,
You will recall that from the time of the San Francisco Conference there have been occasional references to the possibility of Canada becoming a signatory to the inter-American defence treaty which, it was agreed at Cha­pultepec, should be entered into after the war by the American Republics. I enclose a copy of an informal letter that Mr. Hickerson sent met and the attached proposals for a treaty which were sent out by the State Department in December.

We have given this some thought in the Department and have recently discussed it with the Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Section of the Perma­nent Joint Board on Defence as a problem related to the forthcoming revision of Canadian-United States defence plans. There is general agreement that at the present time the best course is to remain on the sidelines. The problem as we see it is almost entirely political. So far as our own defence is concerned, the advantages and liabilities accruing to Canada would probably be about the same, whether we were a signatory to an inter-American defence treaty or were content to concert our arrangements with the United States alone as is already planned.

In considering the political arguments, it seemed to us that a case for joining the negotiations could be made out if the United States were particularly anxious to see us come in, or if Canadian public opinion felt strongly that the cause of peace and security would be served thereby. Neither of these conditions appears to be present. Indeed, recent upheavals in Latin America have probably dampened enthusiasm for association with the affairs of the republics. While it might be argued that Canada could make a contribution to world security by broadening and strengthening a regional system in this hemisphere, we feel that it would be preferable to work out military staff agreements under the United Nations Charter first and then consider what regional supplements are required. We do not see any danger to the security of any American Nation in thus revising the Chapultepec timetable.

We think it would be particularly difficult to enter into regional treaty negotiations with the other American countries at the present time when there has been no exchange of views between British Commonwealth countries regarding-the post-war defence arrangements. The question would at once be raised, both in Canada and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, why we could sign an inter-American treaty and could not do the same with a Commonwealth agreement.

It would not be easy to explain our reluctance to the State Department or to the public, since our principal reasons for hesitation are a belief that an inter-American treaty would be largely meaningless in terms of defence advantages and liabilities, and an unwillingness to complicate the problem of Commonwealth defence relationships. It has been suggested, however, in our discussion with the Defence Departments that we should ask you to tell the State Department that, for the present, we do not intend to ask for representation at the negotiations (and would not be disposed to accept an invitation) on the grounds that we would like to tackle first the question of military staff agreements under the Charter. Indeed, we wonder whether this course would not be preferable for all the American Nations. If the United Nations Organization is to be a success, there is an advantage in having the general security arrangements take precedence over regional plans which could be completed a good deal more intelligently when the outlines of the general agreements are known. You might put this point to the State Department and try to find out how firmly they believe in the importance of driving ahead with a hemisphere treaty before the larger plans are negotiated. Our attitude towards a hemisphere treaty might be rather different if it followed rather than preceded, the military agreements contemplated under Article 43 of the Charter.

Your sincerely,
N. A. ROBERTSON