1. The problem of Germany is no longer-if it ever was-a problem of how to prevent future German aggression. It is a problem of how to get a settlement which will lessen the chances of war between the Soviet world and the Western world. Thus, the most significant test of any proposed settlement of Germany is its probable effect on the relations between the two worlds.

2. The ideal peace with Germany would be the one which was best calculated to result in a German state not so anti-Soviet as to arouse the fears of the U.S.S.R. or so pro-Soviet as to arouse the fears of the Western world. This means that what we want is a moderate and democratic government in a united and relatively prosperous Germany. Democracy and moderation are in part the result of the absence of terra irredenta and economic distress. The more embittered and impoverished Germany becomes the more likely it is to embrace extremist political doctrines.

3. It is probable that Russia desires a continuance of political and economic instability and insecurity in Germany. In order to combat that policy our aim should be the creation as rapidly as possible of a unified administration of Germany, the treatment of Germany as a political and economic unit, and the drastic reduction of all the armies of occupation. If Russia will not consent to this, then we should at least aim at a unified administration for the Western zones and every effort should be made by the Western powers to bring the standard of living in the Western zones well above that in the Soviet zone.

4. Our main interest is to prevent the extension of Russian influence to the Rhine. This would endanger our strategic interests. It would threaten our economic interests since it would further impoverish Great Britain by reducing still further the standards of living in Britain's European markets and by cutting Great Britain off from many of those markets. It would greatly increase international tension by intensifying Anglo-American fear of Russia.

5. If there is to be a unified administration of Germany and eventually a central German federal government, the Rhineland should remain part of Germany. This would tend to offset the influence in the federal German government of the Sovietized eastern section; it would also increase the chances of Germany becoming economically stable. If Germany is to be split between a Soviet-controlled zone and a western zone, the Rhineland should remain part of that western zone since without it the rest of the western zone would be difficult to maintain and the chances of it falling into the hands of Russia would be increased. The separation of the Rhineland is a sensible policy only on the assumption that the whole of the rest of Germany is going to be dominated by Russia.

6. Opposition to the separation of the Rhineland does not entail opposition to a special regime for heavy industry in the Rhineland, or the creation of a Rhineland state within the German federation. The most practicable policy yet put forward is that of the United Kingdom which is that the heavy industries in the Rhineland should be socialized with ownership vested in the Rhinoland state and with control shared with Allied authorities. Socialization, especially if done without compensation or accompanied by a drastic capital levy, would have the added advantage that it would destroy the industrialist class of the Rhineland which with the Junkers (whose economic basis has been destroyed by Soviet land policy) have constituted the two chief enemies of liberalism in Germany.

7. The United States will probably propose that as part of the terms of peace Germany should include in its new constitution a bill of rights of the citizen which would make illegal all the principal crimes which the Nazi government perpetrated against the non-Nazi element in the German community; racial and religious discrimination and defamation; imprisonment and execution without trial; denial of the rights of democratic self-government; torture, beatings and other barbarous punishments. This would serve a useful purpose.

8. One of the reasons why Hitlerism became popular in Germany was that it gave to a large number of Germans what the liberal republic had been unable to give-relief from insecurity, poverty and humiliation. Next time the beneficiary of an unsuccessful liberal republic may be Stalinism. The peace settlement will in the long-run fail unless it offers to the German people the hope that in the not too distant future they will have a chance to find purpose, value and dignity in their lives.

E. R[EID]