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Volume #12 - 812.

CHAPTER X

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

PART 2

INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

SECTION A

GREAT BRITAIN

SUB-SECTION 4

FOOD CRISIS

812.

DEA/215

Dominions Secretary
to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 27

IMPORTANT. SECRET AND PERSONAL

London, February 4th, 1946

Following personal from Mr. Attlee for Mr. Mackenzie King, Begins: We are very gravely concerned over the critical world shortage of wheat and rice. The allocations drawn up during Sir Ben Smith's recent visit to Washington were based on the estimate that during the first half of 1946 world import requirements would exceed by about five and a half million tons the total export available from the four main exporting countries. That was a grim prospect, but since then the situation has become even worse owing to decreased estimates of exports and increased demands especially from India.

To bridge the gap it will be necessary to cut demands to an extent which will cause real suffering in many countries, and famine in some. Our own allocation here will fall short of our requirements by at least 215,000 tons. The consequences of this will be very serious for us. We shall have to reduce our stocks far below the safety level, and run the risk of interference with internal distribution of flour and bread if there is any irregularity in the arrival of imports. We shall have to increase our extraction rate from 80% to 85% and return to the darker bread which we accepted as a wartime necessity but hoped we had discarded with the end of hostilities. We shall also have to reduce our fats ration from 8 ounces to 7 ounces a week, which is lower than at any time during the war. This last is a direct consequence of the wheat shortage; India fears a recurrence of famine worse than the Bengal famine of 1943 and is unable to rely on the imports of wheat and rice which she needs. Consequently she will have to use for food in India ground nuts which she would otherwise have exported to us for fats manufacture.

The decision to increase our flour extraction rate, coupled with the decision taken at Washington to divert coarse grains from animal to human use, will substantially reduce our supplies of meat, bacon and eggs. Our plans for re establishing our livestock herds will suffer a heavy setback and a considerable slaughter of pigs and poultry will be inevitable. Finally, we shall launch a vigorous publicity campaign to economize to the utmost all food and particularly bread.

These further sacrifices will be a severe strain on our people, who have been looking forward to some relaxation of the standards of austerity which they have cheerfully accepted throughout the war.

Moreover, when we look further ahead the outlook is little better. Even after the next harvest, European production will be far below pre war figures and the demand from Far Eastern countries will not be reduced, and export-able world stocks will have been exhausted by our efforts to meet the crisis in 1946. It follows, therefore, that everything possible must be done, not only to economize in consumption, but also to increase world production of cereals. We, here, shall take immediate steps to encourage increased sowings this spring of crops to be harvested this summer. But the world must look mainly to the big producing countries for substantial increases in supplies.

I am sending a personal telegram to Mr. Truman and Mr. Chifley urging them to take all possible measures to increase the output of wheat. I know that both have already set on foot a number of measures with this object. I am asking Mr. Truman to consider, in particular, whether he can increase the flour extraction rate in the United States, the wheat acreage for the next harvest and restrict rice consumption. I should be grateful if you would consider whether Canada, who has done so much throughout these difficult years, could help still further by taking similar steps to increase the quantity avail-able to meet the world's needs.

An increase in the extraction rate in all exporting countries would pro-vide a major increase in supplies. Our own rate, as I have said, will have to be raised to 85% and all countries in Europe will have to adopt a figure of at least 80% and in many cases higher.

An increase in acreage would reduce the anxiety for next year. Carry-over stocks will be small and I can see no possible chance of farmers finding themselves left next year with an unsaleable surplus.

As to rice, the wheat and rice situations are, of course, inter related. It is certain that there will be a grave rice shortage this summer. We have decided to continue our policy of not issuing rice for the civil population in this country and we are urging European countries to do the same. If you could make some contribution, it would be of great assistance.

The world will pass through a period of great strain and hardship before we see the next harvest. I fear that thousands may die of starvation and many more thousands may suffer severely from hunger. It is for these reasons that I make this earnest appeal for your continued help in mitigating the disasters which threaten the world. Ends.



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