At the 1959 December Ministerial Meeting General Norstad reviewed the progress made in implementing the 1957 NATO Heads of Government decision relating to the establishment of IRBM’s in Europe.⁴⁴ He mentioned specifically the progress which has been made in setting up such missile units in Italy and Turkey. He then went on to refer to the need for having “second generation” solid-fuelled IRBMs (henceforward referred to as Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, MRBMs) which would be lighter and more mobile and have a range between 300 and 1500 miles. He referred to a military requirement for 50-100 of these missiles by 1963 and an annual increment up to 300.

To meet this requirement the USA Secretary of Defence, Mr. Gates, made an offer at the recent Defence Ministers’ meeting in the following terms:

(a) The Polaris missiles would be available for sale to European countries who would make their own arrangements for production of the launching equipment. The USA would be willing to provide some MDAP funds for the programme. The nuclear warheads would be provided by the USA, which would retain custody of them until their release was authorized by the President in event of hostilities. The conditions imposed would be (i) that the programme be approved by the NATO Council (ii) that missiles be under SACEUR’s control (iii) that there be an advance commitment to accept storage of nuclear components (iv) there be an advance commitment to deploy the missiles to meet SACEUR’s requirements.

(b) As an alternative to (a) the USA is prepared to provide technical assistance for the establishment of a multilateral production capacity in Europe for the missile. The same conditions listed under (a) would apply.

In presenting his proposal Mr. Gates indicated that the USA would greatly prefer alternative (a). The French Minister of Defence did not react very favourably to the US proposal. He said that when the French Government had given its approval in principle to the equipment of NATO forces with such missiles they had not thought that they should be provided exclusively for SACEUR. He indicated that the proposal required “a good deal of study.” Mr. Watkinson’s preliminary view was that the purchase of the missiles would probably be the most expeditious and economical solution but he agreed that the proposal required further study. The outcome of the discussion was inconclusive but there was general support for the idea that proposals should be studied by the military authorities and the Council.

The matter was next discussed at the meeting of the Permanent Council on April 6 when the Norwegian Delegate explained at length the policy of his government in respect of the establishment of bases and the stockpiling of nuclear warheads on Norwegian territory. The discussion as reported in the attached telegram No. 1029 of April 6 from NATO Paris† reveals clearly that the USA would like to get a general blessing from the NATO Council for the acceptance of MRBM’s, leaving the details to be worked out on a bilateral basis with interested countries and avoiding any general discussion in the Council of NATO nuclear policy. M. Spaak, supported by a number of representatives, was strongly in favour of a full discussion in the Council of the fundamentals involved. The UK and French representatives gave tentative support for the US proposal but did not challenge the desirability of a full discussion as advocated by M. Spaak.

It was finally agreed that the USA proposals should be considered in the Council after the Summit meeting, some time in late May. In the meantime the Secretary General will discuss with the Standing Group in Washington next week the kind of information which they could provide for a Council discussion. He will report the results of his conversations to the Council, at which time a decision could be taken as to what questions, if any, should be put to the military authorities.

Canadian Position

Mr. Léger’s intervention in the discussion was limited to reminding the Council that one of the conditions of the USA offer was that the programme be approved by the NATO Council. He said that he had no idea at this stage what Canada’s position on this subject might be, but that he was certain that the Canadian Government would wish to be consulted throughout the negotiations if there was any question of the deployment of these missiles in or near areas occupied by the Air Division or the Brigade.

I think it would be premature to attempt to formulate a Canadian position on the US proposal until the receipt of further information and pending M. Spaak’s report to the Council following his visit to Washington. I would think it advisable, however, that Mr. Léger be instructed to lend Canadian support to a full Council discussion of the USA proposal following the Summit meeting. There are, it seems to me, a number of aspects (e.g. the question of bilateral as opposed to NATO Council control over the weapons and the question of where they will be deployed) which need to be fully discussed before giving Canadian approval to the USA proposal.

H.C. G[REEN]

⁴⁴Voir/See Volume 24, document 256.