In April last year, the State Department formally requested Canadian concurrence in certain revisions to the procedures governing the use of Canadian air space by aircraft of the Strategic Air Command carrying nuclear weapons. The United States sought three principal changes to Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council P.C. 2307 of April 17, 1952:

(a) The elimination of Category X flights. As flights in this Category would not be carrying nuclear weapons, they could be dealt with by the procedures set out in Schedule "A" of the same Order-in-Council.

(b) Clearances for Category Y flights would be requested in advance every six months at the Government level with individual flights and any modifications to the original programme cleared between the Chiefs of the Air Staff.

(c) Schedule "B" to apply to all United States military aircraft rather than merely to Strategic Air Command aircraft, except interceptors to which other procedures would apply.

2. The Cabinet Defence Committee considered these proposals on June 27. It was agreed that Category X flights might be eliminated from Schedule "B". On the other hand, the Committee did not agree to the proposal for clearances being obtained at the Government level every six months, nor did it agree that Schedule "B" should apply to all United States military aircraft. It did, however, consent to Schedule "B" being altered so as to apply to Strategic Air Command bomber and transport aircraft and, in this way, exclude naval aircraft. Ministers did not wish to appear to authorize overflights of naval aircraft prior to a satisfactory agreement being reached regarding storage of nuclear weapons at Argentina.

3. The Embassy in Washington, on instructions, left with the State Department an aide-mémoire conveying our agreement to the elimination of Category X flights, stating that we would prefer the arrangements to be confined to Strategic Air Command bombers and Strategic Air Command transport aircraft (the Embassy was asked to explain orally that the latter phrase would be interpreted as meaning USAF aircraft carrying nuclear weapons on behalf of SAC), and proposing the following language by way of indicating that Ministers would not be prepared to approve requests for training exercises extending over such a lengthy period of time as six months:

"The programme of each series of exercises will be cleared at governmental level through diplomatic channels. Details of individual flights and any modifications and contingency requirements not included in the flight programme will be cleared in advance between the Chiefs of Air Staff. Each of these flights will require to be authorized by the Minister of National Defence in accordance with the regulations laid down in Order-in-Council P.C. 2307 of April 17, 1952."

The Embassy was asked to explain orally that the Government would be prepared to receive requests for periods up to three or four months.

4. We have now received the comments of the United States authorities on these counter proposals. While our suggestions are generally acceptable, they have raised three points:

(a) The phrase "Strategic Air Command bombers and Strategic Air Command transport aircraft" would create difficulties in that it would not permit overflights of aircraft engaging in routine deployment or re-supply operations by Materiel Command or by the United States Navy on behalf of forces in Europe other than Strategic Air Command or in connection with the NATO programme. Such air transport might also be required eventually to deliver warheads for storage in Canada, both for Canadian requirements and for United States requirements. The United States authorities, therefore, suggest the phrase "Strategic Air Command bomber and United States military transport aircraft."

Comment:

The phrase "military transport aircraft," requested by the State Department, would constitute a widening of the wording "Strategic Air Command transport aircraft" which was proposed by Canada. I think that such a change would constitute an undesirable widening of the terms of the established procedures and should not, therefore, be accepted. I propose that the State Department be informed that the Canadian Government does not accept the suggested amendment and that:

(i) any nuclear flights over Canada, whether or not covered by the categories set out in the Schedule would, of course, require inter-governmental clearance;

(ii) any nuclear flights not covered by the Schedule (e.g. overflights by military transport aircraft delivering nuclear warheads to United States forces, other than Strategic Air Command, in Europe or in connection with the NATO programme) would have to be submitted as special cases for consideration by the Canadian Government as in the past.

(b) The language quoted in paragraph 3 above, which refers to "each series of exercises," does not take account of the fact that some flights in this Category are not, strictly speaking, exercises but for re-supply and stockpiling. The State Department, therefore, suggests using the phrase "each series of overflights" rather than "each series of exercises."

Comment:

This language would appear to be required to bring this Category into line with current procedures and practices.

(c) The State Department assumes that clearances for Category Y overflights not falling within a particular programme would continue to be sought at the governmental level, but does not suggest any language to make this clear.

Comment:

It is suggested that this point could be met by adding to the phrase "each series of overflights" in (b) above the words "and individual overflights not part of a series previously approved."

Recommendation:

5. I recommend:

(a) that the amendment to Schedule "B" proposed by the State Department as described in paragraph 4(a) above not be accepted and that the Canadian Embassy in Washington be authorized to inform the State Department that:

(i) any nuclear flights over Canada, whether or not covered by the categories set out in the Schedule would, of course, require inter-governmental clearance;

(ii) any nuclear flights not covered by the Schedule (e.g. overflights by military transport aircraft delivering nuclear warheads to United States forces, other than Strategic Air Command, in Europe or in connection with the NATO programme) would have to be submitted as special cases for consideration by the Canadian Government as in the past.

(b) that the amendments described in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 4 above be approved.

6. Attached as Appendix "A" is Schedule "B" incorporating the changes approved by Cabinet Defence Committee on June 27, 1959 and indicating the further changes recommended in this memorandum.

HOWARD GREEN

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]
Appendice A
Appendix A

SCHEDULE "B"

As approved by Cabinet Defence Committee on June 27, 1959, and incorporating changes recommended in the Memorandum to Cabinet to which this Appendix is attached.

(New wording is shown by underlining.)

Methods of clearing flights of Strategic Air Command bombers and Strategic Air Command transport aircraft over Canadian territory where the movement of nuclear weapons is involved.

Note:

All SAC bombers and SAC transport aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are to comply with the restrictions on routing, heights, and numbers laid down in Schedule "A", Part I, Section 1. Nothing in this Schedule relates to overflights by interceptors armed with nuclear rockets, which are covered by other arrangements.

⁸²Voir/See Volume 26, document 192.

⁸³Voir/See Volume 26, document 195.

⁸⁴Approuvé par le Cabinet le 29 mars 1960./Approved by Cabinet on March 29, 1960.