Dear Sir:

The result of this year's voting on the United States' moratorium resolution concerning Chinese representation at the United Nations¹⁰⁰ once again raises the question of what future Western policy in this connection should be, but the closeness of this year's vote has lent an urgency to the question which has hitherto been lacking. Naturally, the Communist Chinese are representing the decline in support for the U.S. moratorium resolution as a favourable development for Communist China and an indication of impending defeat for the United States and it must be admitted that, in terms of simple mathematics, the United States appears to be fighting a losing battle. Although the newly elected African members, for the most part, abstained on the question this year, it is unlikely that they will all do so again after finding their United Nations feet. For this reason alone — and there are other compelling reasons — it is imperative that urgent consideration be given to Western tactics over Chinese U.N. representation before the issue arises again in the General Assembly.

I do not intend to go into all the ramifications of Chinese U.N. membership or diplomatic recognition of Communist China, with all the legal and other arguments for and against which have been covered admirably in various memoranda in recent years in the Department (the latest of which on our files is dated June 11, 1958). However, it appears that there are a number of considerations which have become more valid with the passage of time and it is with these that this letter is concerned. In the first place, agreement to discuss Chinese representation at the United Nations is not the same thing as the admission of Communist China to the Chinese seat, although it must be admitted that probably most of those nations opposed to the moratorium on discussing Chinese representation would also vote for Chinese Communist admission to the U.N. Secondly, even a vote favourable to seating Communist China would be a long way from Communist Chinese acceptance. In present circumstances with the United States supporting Chiang Kai-shek and the control of Taiwan beyond the grasp of Peking, it is almost certain that Communist China would refuse to take a place at the United Nations. Thirdly, even if a majority of the United Nations voted to seat Communist China, and even if Communist China by some presently inconceivable act, were to accept a United Nations' seat, it is most unlikely that a majority of the United Nations membership would agree to the handing over of Taiwan to Communist Chinese control. The circumstances under which Communist China might accept the Chinese seat at the United Nations would be if Nationalist China withdrew from the Organization following a vote favourable to the seating of the Communist Chinese, although this is by no means certain since the United States and Chiang Kai-shek could still defy Communist China and maintain the independence of Taiwan and, thereby, the existence of two Chinas.

Bearing the above three points in mind, it appears that a number of positive advantages could be derived from inviting Communist China to take a seat at the United Nations. In the first place, as noted above, Peking would almost certainly decline such an invitation while Taiwan remains beyond its grasp and under U.S. protection. The advantage, from a Western standpoint, accruing from such a situation is that it would approximately reverse the roles of the United States and Communist China in placing the latter on the defensive over this question. Instead of the Americans being accused of unreasonableness by their stubborn attitude, the opprobrium would be transferred to the Chinese. There would be the added advantage, in the unlikely event of Communist China accepting a U.N. seat, of ipso facto throwing the Communist Chinese and the Russians together, thereby exacerbating existing Sino-Soviet differences. While the Soviet Union today has a free hand to act as it wishes in the United Nations, Communist Chinese membership would force the two Communist giants to co-ordinate their policies — a task which is likely to be at least as difficult as coordination amongst the Western powers. Furthermore, with the Communist Chinese in the United Nations, the Soviet Union in some circumstances might well exert a restraining influence upon them. An additional, but important, advantage to be derived from Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations would be the removal of one of the serious strains bedevilling relations between the Western democracies on the one hand, and most of the Afro-Asians — both neutralist and Western oriented — on the other.

One major problem, of course, regardless of any action on Communist Chinese recognition or U.N. representation by other countries, remains that of getting the Americans off the hook on which they have impaled themselves and, to a lesser extent, their allies and friends. This problem may be slightly more susceptible to solution by virtue of the recent China vote in the United Nations than it has been in the past, if the Western powers are willing to go to work on it. Over the next twelve months it would seem worthwhile for the allies of the United States to exert whatever influence they may have, to bring about a change in American China policy insofar as the United Nations is concerned. It is doubtful if even a new United States president and government will be willing to depart very far from the present American policy on China. Perhaps the best that could be hoped for — and should be worked for — next year is that the Americans be persuaded to forego their annual moratorium resolution, thereby permitting a United Nations debate on the Chinese representational question. This would remove one of the serious complaints of many Afro-Asians who deplore U.S. efforts to prevent even a discussion on the subject but who might not take such umbrage at mere U.S. opposition to Communist Chinese representation during a debate on it. Furthermore, a defeat for the moratorium policy in the General Assembly — which seems inevitable before long — would be more damaging to American prestige and influence than the minor climb down that the abandonment of the moratorium policy would represent. No one could expect the United States in the next year to reverse its established stand on opposition to Communist Chinese U.N. membership. However, if the Americans could be persuaded to agree to drop their moratorium resolution and to participate in a debate on the question, then whatever remaining influence their allies have would be required to persuade the United States to accept with reasonable grace a vote which could well favour seating the Communist Chinese in the United Nations. While the Americans could not be expected to approve of such action, if they could be brought to accept it gracefully as the will of the majority arrived at democratically, honour would be satisfied and they would be off the Chinese representational hook.

In the course of the process described above, there would be no need to persuade the United States to stop supporting Chiang Kai-shek and, therefore, there could be no charges in South East Asia concerning an American double-cross. The Americans might still, in fact, have their way because the Communist Chinese are so deeply committed to the recovery of Taiwan and to an anti "two Chinas" policy that they could be counted upon to reject the offer of a U.N. seat prior to a settlement of the Formosa question to their satisfaction. This solution would also have the advantage of releasing those allies of the United States from the increasingly awkward position in which they find themselves in lending their support to the U.S. moratorium resolution. In particular, the position of the United Kingdom in this respect has been most difficult and, in many respects, inconsistent. British support for the American position on Chinese U.N. representation has persistently bedevilled Sino-U.K. relations and will continue to do so while the present situation exists. While other allies of the United States are not in such an unhappy position as the United Kingdom, the situation has been an uncomfortable one and requires a solution in the not too distant future, possibly along the lines suggested above.

Even if the Communists did accept a seat in the United Nations and the Nationalists withdrew in protest, the United States could not be accused of deserting either its principles or its allies. I am aware that Mr. Wadsworth, only a week or so ago, uttered a scarcely veiled threat that the United States might withdraw from the United Nations in the event of a defeat over the Chinese representational question and, here again, it would be the task of the United States' allies and friends to dissuade it from such a drastic and foolish course. All the great powers have, at one time or another, been defeated in the United Nations on important issues - the Soviet Union regularly, the United Kingdom and France on occasion - but all have accepted their lumps and retained their membership. In fact, the election of Communist China to the United Nations - whether accompanied by U.S. acceptance (not necessarily approval) under allied encouragement as advocated above or by direct defeat - appears to be the only way of loosening the straight-jacket in which U.S.-China policy has been clamped in recent years.

I am fully conscious that there is nothing new in the foregoing analysis or in the proposals made; that many of the American leaders still approach this question from an emotional standpoint; further, that I have touched on only one aspect of a complex problem which will require much time and effort to resolve. Nevertheless, it is the most urgent aspect of the China question and requires immediate and continuing attention. While most of the new African states are unlikely to go over to Communism lock, stock and barrel, they are also unlikely to be impressed by American arguments on China. Furthermore, in seeking a fair share of the aid pie, which in its present Western form alone is far too small to go round, they may conclude that their best interests will be served by recognizing Peking and voting for its presence in the United Nations - in the hope of remaining outside the East-West tug-of-war and of obtaining aid from both sides. Another consideration that may well affect their decision in this direction is that in their newly independent state they may wish to start with a clean slate and avoid the appearance of simply taking over the policies of their former masters - regardless of the reasonableness, or otherwise, of such policies and it is doubtful, in any case, if they will consider the American or Western stand generally, as being reasonable where Communist China is concerned.

Yours very truly,
C.J. SMALL

¹⁰⁰ Voir/See Yearbook of the United Nations 1960 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1961), pp. 170-73