1. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in May, established a committee of officials "to consider the constitutional development of the Commonwealth, with particular reference to the future of the smaller dependent territories, and to make an analysis, with alternative suggestions, for consideration by the Governments of the Member States of the Commonwealth." The committee is to meet in the United Kingdom for the week commencing Sunday, July 17th. You have asked me to serve on this group along with Sir Norman Brook of the United Kingdom, Sir Allen Brown of Australia, Mr. McIntosh of New Zealand, Mr. Desai of India and Mr. Adu of Ghana.

2. While the committee is not requested to recommend a course of action, we can hardly put forward and analyze alternative suggestions without implying some opinions and preferences.²⁶ I would not wish to be advancing opinions contrary to what you might wish me to put forward. Therefore I felt I should outline to you now the tentative conclusions I have reached in preliminary studies of this subject, and seek your agreement to my proceeding along these lines of your instructions as to how you would like to change them.

3. I have had considerable help from the Department of External Affairs in this matter and I believe my opinions are in general consistent with theirs, but what I am setting forth is on my own responsibility and they may differ from it in some particulars.²⁷

4. The essential problem with which we are to deal is the number and nature of the candidates that may come forward for membership in the Commonwealth in this decade and later. The U.K. paper, of which you have received a copy, lists as possible emergent candidates not only the fairly certain and substantial five (West Indies, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika) and the two small and imminent ones which pose the immediate problem (Sierra Leone and Cyprus), but also about nineteen territories which have reached or are likely to reach full internal autonomy in the foreseeable future. To these might be added Samoa, becoming independent of New Zealand next year, and perhaps some day New Guinea (Australian) and South West Africa (South African). Should all of these become fully independent and wish to join the Commonwealth separately, there would be some forty members, many of them having a population of under one million. Such a number of members, so diverse in size, would make the Commonwealth very different to what it has been and the meetings of the Commonwealth, particularly those of the Prime Ministers, might become much more cumbersome, resembling those of the United Nations or its agencies.

5. On examination, however, this prospect seems fairly unlikely or at least remote. Many of the dependent territories listed are not likely to become fully independent for many many years. Others may well federate. Some may prefer not to become members of the Commonwealth. On the whole it seems to me a reasonable probability that, given the continuation of the past practice of welcoming former dependent territories as members upon their achieving independence, the Commonwealth would grow during the 1960's from the present ten members (ex Nigeria) to perhaps twenty or even two dozen. More might come in later and it would be difficult to arrest the growth at that stage but the rate of growth would likely slacken. In any case, if we can get successfully through this difficult decade, the Commonwealth may well have completed one of its most valuable functions.

6. Given this appraisal, I see four possible courses of action, which I list in my own order of preference.

7. The first would be to let the past practice continue and welcome all those newly independent territories that wish to come in. The meetings of Prime Ministers would get larger than we would like but they could still be manageable. Some changes might be made to adapt to the greater number; only one from each country might sit "at the table;" more advance preparation might be made for the conduct of the meeting; Mr. Menzies' suggestion of dropping the communiqué might be followed. There would be differences in the nature and extent of informal discussions between members and groups of members outside the formal sessions, but that need not be harmful. Other Commonwealth meetings, such as those of the Finance Ministers, would be more formal and perhaps more lengthy but this would not pose insuperable problems.

8. This plan would have the great advantage of providing a friendly welcome, dignified status and a source of informal advice and assistance for the dozen or so new countries, mostly poor and coloured, that will emerge from dependency on the United Kingdom. It will help us older members of the Commonwealth to understand better what the newer nations are thinking about common problems and mutual relations. In a decade when the division between the rich whites and the poor coloured threatens to be one of the most serious basic issues, the main value the Commonwealth can serve may well be to assist in bridging this gap in a friendly way.²⁸

9. The second possible course of action would be to recognize that the Commonwealth meetings would lose their essential character should the membership grow beyond, say, about twenty and then hold to that limit by some arbitrary method. The best form of limit, though it is not as certain as others, might be simply a minimum size of population. The convenient figure of one million would probably suffice (two million would keep out Singapore and a possible federation of Sarawak and North Borneo).²⁹ While arbitrary, this limit could be explained and defended on grounds of practicability, without appearing to discriminate on any other grounds. Small countries that sought independence would do so in the knowledge that they could not enjoy the intangible benefits of Commonwealth membership unless they federated with others. They might, however, be granted some special relationship in regard to trade and aid.

10. There are disadvantages in this course of action; there would be criticism of this arbitrary action against little countries who might be said to be most in need of the friendly help the Commonwealth might give. It would rule out immediately not only Cyprus, but also any possibility of membership for Samoa which New Zealand has been bringing along, should Samoa opt for full independence. The operation of this limit would even reduce the geographical size of the Commonwealth, if it is taken to include dependent territories. This course should only be adopted if some limit on numbers is felt necessary.

11. The third alternative that might be considered is that outlined in the U.K. papers — to provide some form of Commonwealth status for territories which achieve not full independence but full internal self-government (while responsibility and authority for their foreign relations and defence remains with another Commonwealth member, normally the United Kingdom). This status would entitle them to participate in some Commonwealth functions and meetings but not all, and in particular, not in the Prime Ministers' meetings. The U.K. authors appear to hope that granting this status to such "Commonwealth States" might help to persuade them not to seek full independence and full membership, or at least not for some years. It is recognized, however, that this would, in the last analysis, be for these little states themselves to decide, and one could not be sure of success. There will be both internal and external influences urging them to fully sovereign status and U.N. membership.

12. This course would have some advantages, if it were successful. A number of these small countries would probably be better off if they did not endeavour to carry on their own foreign relations, and they cannot in the modern world do much about their own defence in any case. New Zealand, whose policy on these matters is enlightened and constructive, is endeavouring to persuade Samoa, after it attains full independence, to entrust its foreign relations, by agreement, to New Zealand and not seek full U.N. or Commonwealth membership. Some Commonwealth connection and status for such little states might help to persuade them to take what is probably a sensible course, and might enable them to enjoy some of the economic benefits of a Commonwealth association without bringing the number of full members to an unwieldy total.

13. On the other hand there are two serious dangers in this course. It might well appear that in creating this special status the members of the Commonwealth other than the "mother" country directly concerned, were taking some part in determining, or at least influencing the decision regarding the independence of a colonial territory. Many Commonwealth members including Canada would probably not wish to share, or even be made to appear to share, this responsibility for judging when colonies are ready for sovereignty.³⁰ We suspect the United Kingdom may have some idea of this kind in mind. The second danger in this course, which you yourself have recognized in conversation, is that of giving people in other countries some reason to suspect that the Commonwealth itself is not an association of sovereign nations. It is difficult to have other people understand fully the nature of the Commonwealth relationship and if we complicate it by giving a special status to these states that would have only internal self-government, it makes our task of international public relations that much more difficult.

14. The fourth alternative, and I think least desirable, is to have two categories of members who are fully independent nations — a secondary status for the smaller new members. Those having this secondary status would not attend Prime Ministers' meetings and perhaps not some of the other meetings, but on the other hand would enjoy the advantages of Commonwealth membership in so far as trade, aid, citizenship, etc. are concerned.³¹

15. The fundamental disadvantage of this course, which I think is conclusive, is that it would require a secondary status for new small nations who would be most sensitive about their position and dignity. It would interfere with what I believe to be the most useful role the Commonwealth can play as I have noted above. It would keep some territories from becoming members at all. In addition, it would make other full members uncomfortable and would undoubtedly upset in some degree the informal friendly relations that are possible between those equal in status even when they differ widely in size and international significance.

16. I will not try to go further into detail here about the alternative courses of action, and the arguments pro and con, which we can discuss if you wish. I feel, however, that I should be clear about the situation in regard to Cyprus which is now becoming urgent and will undoubtedly be the subject of special, if indirect, interest at our meeting. Last winter you approved a decision according to which we would oppose a half-way solution for Commonwealth membership regarding Cyprus, although we were prepared to accept either normal membership or its complete exclusion at that time. Since then the situation has changed and I assume that at present neither Canada nor the Commonwealth is committed to admitting Cyprus to membership.³²

17. If we follow the first and preferred attitude on Commonwealth membership outlined above, I think Cyprus could be admitted without becoming a difficult precedent. It may be possible to find other special grounds on which it could be excluded if it is desired to exclude it, although there will be some difficulties in basing this solely on its treaty relationships with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. Personally, I would rather favour excluding Cyprus in any case but I would think the U.K. arguments ought to be seriously considered if the latter feel that the membership of Cyprus in the Commonwealth is important. I find it hard to say why I have a preference for excluding Cyprus; possibly it is because of the somewhat ambiguous status that it will have in international affairs even though it becomes a U.N. member; partly it is because it is inevitably more of a European than an overseas state and seems to involve the Commonwealth even further into the complexities of Eastern European problems. Should the other members of the Commonwealth feel none of this uneasiness, I would not think Canada should take a special position on the matter.

   R.B. B[ryce]

²⁶Note marginale :/Marginal note:
This is essential. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

²⁷Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Criteria Population + 1M but not area. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

²⁸Note marginale :/Marginal note:
This is. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

²⁹Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Best. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

³⁰Note marginale :/Marginal note:
Canada is in no position to make such a determination. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

³¹Note marginale :/Marginal note:
No second stage or class of Commonwealth countries. [J.G. Diefenbaker]

³²Note marginale :/Marginal note:
As to Cyprus Canada's attitude is unchanged. [J.G. Diefenbaker]