Dear Hume [Wrong],

I was extremely interested to learn from the fourth paragraph of your message, WA-3249 of October 15th,† that Mr. Hickerson said to you that he was almost convinced that the time had come to seek to give effect to Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong's³⁰ suggestion for a grouping of the more or less like-minded countries inside the United Nations, making use of Article 51 of the Charter.

2. I wonder if Mr. Hickerson has noticed the reference to this possibility in the speech which Mr. St. Laurent made, on September 18th,³¹ at the opening of the Second Session of the General Assembly. For your convenience I enclose a copy of the speech on which I have scored in the margin the passage in question.

3. The significance of this statement was not apparently appreciated at the time by the newspapermen who were covering the Assembly. I think, however, that I am right in saying that in making this statement Mr. St. Laurent went further in the direction of Mr. Armstrong's proposal than any other head of delegation.

4. Under cover of despatch No. 2772 of October 20th, I am sending you a copy of a letter of October 17th³² from the Prime Minister to Sir Alfred Zimmern.³³ In this letter the Prime Minister has been even more specific than Mr. St. Laurent in his reference to the possibility of the states of the Western world entering into a treaty of mutual defence against the Soviet Union.

5. I had touched on this same possibility in the speech which I gave at the Couchiching Conference on August 13th³⁴ (see marked passages on pages 13 and 14 of the enclosed text of this speech).†

6. The speech was approved by Mr. Pearson before I delivered it, and subsequently Mr. St. Laurent approved of its being published in the printed proceedings of the Couchiching Conference which should be published within the next month.

7. I shall be most interested to learn more about the thinking of Mr. Hickerson and other senior officers in the State Department on this question. I am myself going to take a look at the Geneva protocol,³⁵

8. You remember that when it was rejected some one stated "the protocol is not dead; it sleepeth." It would be ironic if the resurrection of the protocol should take place in New York twenty-four years after it was buried in the tomb at Geneva.

9. A treaty of mutual defence would raise numerous problems. It would also solve some. I was, for example, interested to learn the other day from General Strong³⁶ of the United Kingdom J.I.B. that some of the Scandinavian states are reluctant to give to the United Kingdom all the information which the United Kingdom J.I.B. wants, unless they get in return a guarantee of assistance against aggression. He added that some of the people in the British Navy want to get a treaty of mutual assistance with the Scandinavian countries.

10. Such a treaty might also make easier a solution of the problem of maintaining defences in Greenland. Conceivably, it might also make it easier for us to carry on our present defence arrangements with the United States. These are all ideas which have just occurred to me but I thought I might pass them on to you for what they are worth and for your comments.

11. I am giving a copy of this letter to Mr. Pearson and to Mr. Robertson.. Yours sincerely,

ESCOTT REID

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Lettre du premier ministre
Letter from Prime Minister

Ottawa, October 17, 1947

It was good of you to write me on July 16th† sending me the address which you gave at Hartford on July 4th. Your letter reached me just at the end of the Parliamentary session. I put it aside so that I could reply after I had had an opportunity to give your suggestion careful consideration. Your letter was then unfortunately mis,laid and turned up only a few days ago.

I agree with you that the full implications of the transfer of power which has occurred during the last thirty years have not yet been sufficiently realized. The burden which these changes in the distribution of power have thrown on the United States, the United Kingdom, and the rest of the Commonwealth, is a heavy one, especially if the world is going to be divided into two mutually suspicious camps. It would seem to me that if conditions of peace are to be created and maintained, the long-run problem is to find some way by which the two worlds can learn to live together in peace as good neighbours. Meanwhile, it is vital to ensure that there is an overwhelming preponderance of power on the side of those who wish to see peace maintained.

The United Nations can be of great help in maintaining a preponderance of power on the side of peace and in upholding moral values. If the Charter could be improved, the United Nations could be an even more effective instrument.

But the possibility of reforms in the Charter of the United Nations is narrowly limited by the obvious unwillingness of the Soviet Union to agree to substantial reforms since no formal changes in the Charter can be made without Soviet consent.

Therefore, if the United Nations is to be kept in existence as a meeting ground between the two worlds and if, at the same time, a more effective system of inter,national security is desired, are we not forced to the conclusion that we shall have to get that security in some other way than by amendment of the Charter?

Perhaps those members of the United Nations who are willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security will have to consider whether they should not be prepared to agree to a treaty of mutual defence against any aggressor.

I enclose a copy of the address which the Secretary of State for External Affairs made on September 18th at the opening of the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. You will see that Mr. St. Laurent touched on this point at the end of his address.

I note that you are expecting to visit Canada this autumn to address some of the Eastern Branches of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. I had hoped that if you were visiting Ottawa, I would have had an opportunity for a talk with you. However, as you are probably aware, I shall be [illegible] with the Royal Wedding.

With my best wishes to Lady Zimmern and yourself,

W.L. MACKENZIE KING

³⁰Rédacteur en chef, Foreign Affairs.
Editor, Foreign Affairs.

³¹Voir le document 363./See Document 363.

³²Pièce jointe au document.
Enclosure, this document.

³³Professeur invité, Trinity College, Hartford (Connecticut); ancien conseiller, Commission préparatoire de l'UNESCO.
Visiting Professor, Trinity College, Hanford, Conn.; formerly Adviser, Preparatory Commission of UNESCO.

³⁴Voir :/See: Escott Reid, Time Of Fear and Hope. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977, pp. 30-2.

³⁵Protocole pour le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux (1924).
Protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes (1924).

³⁶Major-général K.W. Strong, directeur général de la Political Intelligence, Foreign Office du Royaume-Uni.
Maj.-Gen. K.W. Strong, Director-General, Political Intelligence, Foreign Office of United Kingdom.