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DCER : Volume #13 - 911.PCO/C-20-5 : SECURITY EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE IMMIGRANTS<sup>1</sup>

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Volume #13 - 911.

CHAPTER XIV

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

PART 1

SECURITY SCREENING FOR IMMIGRANTS

911.

PCO/C-20-5

Memorandum from Vice-Chairman, Security Panel,
to Cabinet

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 4, 1947

SECURITY EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE IMMIGRANTS1

The Cabinet on January 29th approved a recommendation submitted by the Minister of Mines and Resources to amend the immigration regulations so as to permit additional classes of immigrants, and, in view of the substantial increase in applications expected therefrom, directed the Security Panel to re-examine and report upon the security screening problem involved.

In August last the Cabinet decided that the screening of prospective immigrants should he dealt with by departmental administrative action rather than by legislation. As screening could only be done effectively at the source, a procedure was adopted whereby all applications for the admission of alien immigrants were referred to the R.C.M. Police who dispatched officers to the United Kingdom to screen applications with the co-operation of the responsible agencies of the United Kingdom and United States.

These arrangements only permit the R.C.M. Police to report upon 35 cases per day or about 10000 per year. It is apparent, therefore, that a continuation of present procedures would retard immigration to an extent that would nullify the purpose of the amended regulations.

The Security Panel have assumed, therefore, that such a course is unacceptable to the Cabinet and have attempted to provide a solution to the problem which would permit immigration on an increased scale and at the same time involve the least element of risk from a security standpoint.

In respect to the general principle of screening, the Panel desire to reaffirm its importance and to point out the substantial dangers involved in permitting immigrants to enter without investigation. This is particularly true of persons coming from countries within the Soviet sphere of influence where evidence suggests that emigration can only take place with the permission of the government concerned and there seems little doubt that in any movement of persons, a proportion will be included from these areas who will be instructed to pursue the aims of their government upon taking up residence in Canada. Accordingly the Security Panel recommend against the abandonment of security screening as a highly dangerous course.

6. The most practicable solution would seem to be in some modification of present procedures, and two alternatives are suggested:

To modify present procedures to permit applicants, otherwise acceptable, to enter without screening, with the exception of those originating' in the countries of Eastern Europe — present facilities of the R.C.M. Police to be concentrated on the screening of applicants from those areas.

This is probably the more desirable procedure from a security standpoint. Its adoption, however, would retard immigration from the areas in question, and would involve notifying relatives of the consequent delays and reasons therefor. This would, in turn, be tantamount to a statement of government policy that immigration from certain specified countries would be on a restricted basis.

To continue the present system of screening, but only to the extent that it would not interfere with the entry into Canada of immigrants otherwise acceptable — the question as to who would be selected for screening being left to the discretion of the R.C.M. Police.

This would amount to a system of `spot' checking which would at the most provide for examination of 20% of the expected immigration. While this is not desirable from a security's standpoint, it would permit full implementation of the government's decision to extend immigration, and at the same time continue the frame-work of a screening service which could be expanded if thought desirable at a later date.

7. In the interests of good security, alternative (a) is to he preferred, but it is realized that there are other important considerations which might render it unsuitable for practical application and, if this is so, alternative (b) is recommended rather than abandoning security screening entirely.

8. Whichever course is followed, it is understood that the Department of Mines and Resources would continue to advise the R.C.M. Police of applications from aliens so that the latter can maintain a record of immigrants admitted without screening, and thereby assess the effectiveness of either course adopted.

9. Expansion of R.C.M. Police activities is conditioned by available co-operation from U.K. and U.S. agencies. Means to increase this co-operation should, therefore, be the subject of immediate examination by the Department of Mines and Resources and the R.C.M. Police, in consultation with External Affairs, so that security screening on an improved basis might be restrained at an early date.

E.W.T. GILL


1Voir aussi les documents 187, 193, 200./See also Documents 187, 193, 200.



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