I called on Mr. Spaak and some of his immediate advisers to try and get a better insight of the pessimistic mood of this otherwise comfortable and energetic man. The following analysis may have some relevancy:

(a) As a Belgian Spaak agrees with de Staerckes' view (paragraph 5 our telegram 1561 June 9)† that in present circumstances Belgium might find more profit in a policy of neutrality than in continuing to be an active member of the Alliance with little say in its decisions but full responsibilities for its actions. He recalls that before the Second World War - and he was intimately connected with these developments Belgium was led to neutrality because of lack of leadership and decision from its more powerful friendly neighbours. This experience has profoundly marked Mr. Spaak and he detects in the present situation certain elements which he found in the mid-30s. He told me that any Belgian political leader could sweep the country with a neutralist platform;

(b) As a European and an [architect] of the Treaty of Rome the Secretary-General cannot repeat not submit to the type of leadership which is now given to Little Europe by President de Gaulle and echoed by Chancellor Adenauer. While fully in favour of a Franco-German rapprochement, it is his considered view that too continental a lead from Paris and Bonn is not repeat not in the best interest of nor is it acceptable to countries like Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands. He also points out that left on its own, this bloc cannot repeat not and will never be able to resist Soviet pressures. This leads him to be critical of the UK, whose policies on the one hand have led continental Europeans to build up a truncated Europe, while attempting on the other to maintain a privileged position in Washington which in itself does not repeat not add much weight to the defence of Europe as a whole. He is naturally bitter over the line taken by de Gaulle on most NATO issues and is concerned lest if de Gaulle continues to be strongly supported by Washington on prestige matters the Alliance will be weakened considerably;

(c) As Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Spaak feels that the Alliance may be rapidly slipping into its pre-Suez position when political consultation among the major and smaller allies was very meagre. He is particularly wroth at foreign ministers of the USA, UK and France who in Washington a fortnight ago met together to discuss problems affecting NATO. He is clear in his mind - and is aware of the strong line taken by Canada on this issue - that any type of political directorate institutionalized or unavowed would likely spell the end of political consultation in NATO. Here he feels that in practice if not repeat not in theory Washington is giving in to the French. He does not repeat not understand how it is possible for Washington on the one hand to get closer and closer to de Gaulle's views on a directorate and on the other fairly passively to submit to de Gaulle's lack of cooperation on nuclear developments and generally in the field of military integration in NATO. This he partly attributes to a failure of American leadership since the death of Mr. Dulles and is aware that such leadership cannot repeat not be expected for another several months. Meantime in his view the Soviet are making progress on several fronts, mainly in the field of propaganda as reflected in Belgium (see "A" above.) Thus the Secretary-General finds himself in the uncomfortable position - a position of which he is well aware - of being highly critical of the three leading powers in the Alliance. He also knows that for a variety of reasons he cannot repeat not rely on Bonn.

2. Spaak is also aware that at the root of the matter lies the atomic policy of the Alliance. At present there is no repeat no coordinated policy, nor does he see his way clear - at least for the time being - to formulating one that might prove acceptable to all including the USA, UK and France. He is disturbed about developments in the field of MRBMs as a result of Mr. Gates' proposal of April 1. He is satisfied in his own mind that the military requirements for the setting up of a considerable number of Polaris in continental Europe must be met in order to face the Soviet threat. On the other hand, he cannot repeat not reconcile himself to a formula whereby those weapons would be distributed by SACEUR on a bilateral basis to those countries of the Alliance willing to accept them, thus further pushing France in its atomic nationalistic isolation and upsetting the atomic equilibrium in continental Europe.

3. These seem to be the main preoccupations of the Secretary-General at present. Whether or not repeat not he will raise them all in Washington during his visit there is difficult to say. He told me that he felt very strongly about the directorate and the Gates proposal and that he would discuss them with the State Department.

4. Most of my colleagues believe that the Secretary-General is overly pessimistic. Before giving my own interpretation I think a distinction must be made: if NATO powers are satisfied with developments in the military and political fields during the last 12 months or so, including preparations for the Summit meetings, then I agree with by colleagues that Mr. Spaak is in the dumps. If however an attempt is to be made "to build higher on strong foundations," as the Prime Minister suggested at Depauw University, then the Alliance will need a very serious shot in the arm. I can only see this coming about as a result of a better understanding in the field of atomic weapons. The stakes are so high, particularly as between the USA, UK and France but indeed among all of us, that they can only be considered in the end at Heads of Government level. Hence the importance of the Prime Minister's proposal.

[JULES] LÉGER

⁵²Voir/See document 186.

⁵³Voir/See Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches 1959-60, No. 60/21.