the following changes be made in the existing disposition:
- the withdrawal of the Military Attachés from Greece and China and the establishment of Military Attachés in the Soviet Union and Italy;
- ) the withdrawal of the assistant Air Attaché from Belgium and the establishment of an assistant Air Attaché in Yugoslavia,
- the withdrawal of the Air. Attaché from Argentina and the establishment of an Air Attaché in Poland to be reviewed in six months' time.
4. The immediate implications of the additions referred to in paragraph 3 fall within the already authorized attaché establishments of the respective services. However, if and when the appointment of an assistant military attaché is made to Czechoslovakia, it will increase by one the present authorized army attaché establishment.
5. The detailed considerations in respect of the requirements for the above additions and changes are attached as Appendix "A". The details of the present and proposed overall disposition of Service attachés are shown as Appendix "B".T
[Ottawa, April 21, 1950]
SERVICE ATTACHÉ REQUIREMENTS
1. The quantity of information emanating from the Service Attaché in Moscow is admittedly small. However, since the overall information available is comparatively scanty what is obtained from this source is relatively significant. Furthermore, the Service Attaché in Moscow acts as a member of the U.K. U.S. Canadian team and both contributes to and draws from the joint pool of information. Since the number of Service Attachés which these other countries can have in Moscow at any one time is limited, the presence of a Canadian Service Attaché is more important than would otherwise be the case.
2. The information obtained is normally the result of personal observation including such photographs of May Day and other parades as can be obtained. It is particularly important, therefore, for each Service to have its own representative in Moscow since the Air Force cannot observe satisfactorily for the Army or vice versa. Accordingly, it is proposed that a Military Attaché be appointed to Moscow in addition to the present Air Attaché.
3. Poland is significant for the following reasons:
(a) It is strategically located on the main military route of approach to Western Europe and faces Southern Sweden across the Baltic. A major change of disposition or a build up of the Soviet forces in this area may therefore be highly significant.
(b) Polish travel restrictions are not as severe as those in effect within the USSR and Service Attachés can travel about the country and observe both the Soviet and Polish Armies and the Polish Air Force.
(c) Poland assesses [sic] the largest satellite Air Force. While its present combat capabilities are meagre, it has very close ties with the Soviet Air Force and is based on the USSR model in respect of organization, tactical doctrines and equipment.
4. The Military Attaché in Poland has been successful in obtaining intelligence on the Soviet Army, of value from the U.K. and U.S. as well as from the Canadian point of view, and the post is considered to be a valuable one for the Army, It is felt that the importance of Poland warrants the addition of an Air Attaché and that this would materially increase the amount of intelligence coming from this country. However, in view of recent difficulties which have been encountered by the attaché staff in Poland as a result of the attitude of that government towards foreign attachés of the Western Powers, it is considered that the establishment of an additional air attaché should not be implemented immediately but be reviewed in six months' time.
5. Czechoslovakia is technically the most advanced and developed ally of the USSR. The organization of its forces, the extent of Soviet control and the distribution of its arms products are all important. This post not only provided useful Service intelligence on Czechoslovakia, but a considerable amount of intelligence on other satellite countries and the USSR. Security treasures are less effective than in most countries dominated by the Soviets, resulting in additional sources of information and relatively unrestricted travelling opportunities. The information received from the Air Attaché has been generally of high quality and considerable in quantity. The Czechoslovakian post is considered sufficiently important and useful to warrant an Assistant Military Attaché in addition to the present Air Attaché. However, in view of recent difficulties which have been encountered by the attaché staff in Czechoslovakia as a result of the attitude of that government towards foreign attachés of the Western Powers, it is considered that the establishment of an additional assistant military attaché should not be implemented immediately but be reviewed in six months' time.
6. The intelligence which has been produced by the Military Attaché in Yugoslavia has been of value in London and Washington as well as Ottawa. While Yugoslavia can no longer be classed as a satellite of the USSR, she has the most powerful army and air force in the Balkans and occupies an important strategic position. It is felt that Yugoslavia is an intelligence target of sufficient importance to warrant an Assistant Air Attaché in addition to the present Military Attaché.
7. This post, which has proved very useful in the past two years, is no longer of value. The Military Attaché has been withdrawn.
SWEDEN AND FINLAND
8. Being situated on the periphery of Soviet controlled territory, these countries have proved to be a most fruitful source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Travel is unrestricted and intelligence unobtainable from other sources is often acquired.
9. The fact that Sweden is still not committed to the Soviet or Western Bloc, together with her strategic location and her possession of significant war industry, air, land and sea forces, combine to make her a target of unusual intelligence interest. Furthermore, many of the operating problems of all services parallel those found in Canada; hence knowledge of Swedish development is useful.
10. The present Air Attaché has provided much valuable information. In view of Sweden's all round importance, however; it is considered that the Air Attaché's efforts should be supplemented by those of Naval and Military Attachés.
11. A Naval Attaché accredited to The Hague would be able to acquire not only intelligence regarding the forces of the Netherlands themselves but a certain amount of Far Eastern intelligence as well, as the Indonesian Navy is at present being run by officers of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
12. During the recent tour of the Minister of National Defence to European countries the Canadian Ambassador to The Hague informed the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff that he considered a Naval Attaché should be appointed to his staff.
13. It is considered that the importance of the Royal Netherlands Navy warrants a Naval Attaché being appointed to The Hague in addition to the present Military Attaché.
14. Proportionate to the size and importance of the Belgian Air Force, the flow of information from this post leas been adequate. However, the effectiveness of the Belgian Air Force is slight, the aircraft industry small and unable to meet the requirements of the Air Force. When information is required on Belgium, it can usually be obtained through other channels, in particular the North Atlantic Pact (Western Union) organization. It is, therefore, proposed to withdraw the Air Attaché, but to accredit the Military Attaché in The Hague to Belgium as well as to the Netherlands.
15. The Military and Air Attaché posts in France have been established for a period of over three years, during which time the flow of information has been steady and timely. Since the status of France as the key to the defence of Western Europe is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, these Attaché positions are considered to be of continuing importance.
16. The centre of military importance in the Central Mediterranean has shifted from Greece to Italy. The inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Treaty has meant that allied plans for defence in Europe will have to provide protection for her as well. The military restrictions of the Peace Treaty will have to be lifted and military aid provided to her. It will be of considerable advantage to Canadian military planners to have firsthand intelligence on the capabilities of the Italian Army when the allocation of forces for the defence of Europe is being made. It is recommended that a military attaché post be established in Rome without delay.
17. The Military Attaché post in Greece, which was established in September 1947, has produced a considerable volume of useful intelligence on this focal point of both Soviet and American policy in the Balkans. Very detailed and accurate information on Soviet sponsored activities and on the progress of the civil war has been reported by the Military Attaché. However, the importance of Greece from the military intelligence point of view, has diminished. Although our Attaché has succeeded in obtaining a good deal of information from the Greek General Staff and on the Balkan Satellites, it has proved to be quite unreliable and hence of little value in Ottawa. It is proposed to discontinue this post when the tour of duty of the present Attaché is concluded.
18. The Turkish Army of over 300,000 men, in the process of being re equipped and mechanized by U.S. aid, is the only significant ground force between the USSR and the Suez Canal. Our Attaché in Ankara has been given unusual opportunities to observe the Turkish Army and certain of the more important fortified lines on which the Army will fight if attacked. It is suggested that the coverage provided by the Attaché should be continued.
19. Since the appointment of an Air Attaché to Argentina, air information on the country has been received well in advance of similar intelligence from the U.S. and U.K. In particular, reports on the reorganization of the Argentine Armed Forces, notes on the employment of foreign nationals in the services and research units, and reports on aircraft acquisitions and maintenance problems have been received. However, it is undeniable that Argentina ranks low on the list of nations representing targets of intelligence interest. It is therefore proposed to withdraw this attaché and utilize this position elsewhere.
20. The Department of External Affairs has decided to establish a mission at Bonn and accordingly are moving some of the staff of the present Berlin military mission there. However, it is felt that it is imperative for political and psychological reasons that a mission in Berlin should be kept open. Although the amount of political reporting which can be done is limited, it is considered that Berlin is an extremely useful source of information concerning Soviet military activity and
matters relating to the Soviet control of Germany's armament industry. In view of this, it is considered that a senior military officer should be accredited to the Canadian mission at Bonn, to be located in Berlin in order to look after the affairs of the military mission and act as military observer in Germany.