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Volume #16 - 10. | |
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CHAPTER II KOREAN CONFLICT | |
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PART
1 CREATION OF UNITED NATIONS' UNIFIED COMMAND | |
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10. |
DEA/8508-40 |
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Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Heads of Divisions | |
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SECRET |
Ottawa,
June 24th, 1950 |
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UNITED NATIONS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA | |
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Mr. LePan referred to the attack of North Korean troops on South Korea and reported that as a result of a message received by the Secretary General of the United Nations early on the morning of June 25, an emergency session of the Security Council had been held on the same afternoon. A resolution introduced by the United States Delegation branded the action of North Korea as constituting a breach of the peace and called upon North Korean troops to withdraw their armies to the line of the 38th Parallel. The United States resolution was presented under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. Mr. LePan said that it was likely that the Soviets would protest the resolution alleging that it is illegal under Article 27, which requires the affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The Soviet Delegation absented itself from the meeting of June 25. Although in the past an abstention by a permanent member has not affected the capacity of the Security Council to take decisions on substantive questions, the Soviet Union may claim that its own absence on June 25 invalidates the resolution passed by the Council. Mr. LePan also commented on the attitudes of three parties to the resolution of June 25 observing that the Secretary General in his statement had gone even further than the resolution itself in condemning the action of the North Korean authorities. It is felt that in doing so the Secretary General wished to go on record against this act of aggression as a result of criticism recently levelled at him from certain quarters in the United States. Sir Benegal Rau, leader of the Indian Delegation and President of the Security Council for the month of June, who might have perhaps been expected to take a more lukewarm attitude towards the resolution did not attempt either to mitigate its severity or hold up its passage in any way. The Yugoslav Delegation played a modest role in the meeting and abstained in the voting on the United States resolution as a whole. After introducing its own resolution, the Yugoslav Delegation did not appear to press hard for its adoption. This might be interpreted as a sign that the Yugoslav Delegation recognizes the possibility of their requiring support under similar circumstances in the future. | |
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