December 15, 1950 (Friday)

The President asked the two of us, Rau and myself, to begin our "cease fire" work by lunching with him. Also present were General Crittenberger and Gross also seemed anxious for us to finish our work as quickly as possible and report to the First Committee, which has been called to meet on Monday. Gross was of two minds as to whether, on Monday, the First Committee should start debating Formosa, or whether we should try to postpone its meetings until we had finished our "cease fire" work. Dunes apparently wanted to give his reply to Vishinsky's charge of U.S. aggression against China, which, he says, he has been prevented from giving for some time. I argued strongly for not proceeding with the agenda of the First Committee until we had finished our work on the "cease fire". Rau supported this strongly, and Entezam not so strongly. Gross indicated that there was a division in the U.S. delegation on this point.

After lunch we met in the President's office. Gross, who did most of the speaking for the Unified Command, produced a plan for a "cease fire", which would be satisfactory to the Unified Command. (See memorandum on this subject of today's date, attached as Annex I.)† We discussed this for some time, emphasizing how important it was to keep it secret at this stage. I took the position that we would not confront the Chinese formally with an agreed plan submitted to us by the Americans, but that we should indicate to the Chinese that we had received information from the Unified Command about a plan that we thought reasonable and on which they might wish to comment; or produce some ideas of their own. The Unified Command made it clear that their plan was not submitted for bargaining. Our Committee thought it to be a very reasonable and sensible arrangement, which made a good many concessions to the opposite side, such as representation on the agency for the supervising of the plan.

I asked General Crittenberger if he would tell me, for my own information, whom we should get in touch with on the other side; who was the high command in North Korea. He said the best information on that could be got from the Chinese Nationalists, who know all about the Chinese Communist generals. There is apparently, however, a Chinese Communist general who is running the whole campaign from Manchuria.

After Crittenberger and Gross had left, we discussed our further procedure and decided that we would not rush matters. We would first examine the Unified Command plan and not contact officially the Chinese Communists until we had some indication whether an official invitation to them to appear before us would be one that they could accept, or whether it might bring forth quick and final refusal. I suggested that we first send them, formally, a copy of the United Nations resolution establishing our Committee, and Rau, who was seeing them tomorrow, would then tell them unofficially that we would be glad to see them whenever they wished. But we should not rush them or put all our eggs in that particular basket. The Chinese Communists here might, in fact, have no authority to talk to us at all.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General had joined us and he said that he had seen the Chinese Communists during the morning and that they had been very tough. They had taken up a British request, made through him, about prisoners of war, and it got a very curt and rude reception. Trygve Lie was a little depressed about all this, especially as he is not satisfied with the way in which our Committee is likely to operate. He does not think much of Benegal Rau, who, he says, does not know how to handle the Communists, or how to talk to them effectively. However, he was pleased that he had been asked to join us this afternoon, and he agreed to put at our disposal Feller and Katzin for secretarial work. He also agreed with our general line of procedure.

I suggested that after our meeting we have a press conference; that we had better let the press see us; and explain to them our difficulties. We did this and gave them a short communiqué, which I drafted. There were a good many questions, but the press, who were grateful far the conference, did not try to embarrass us.

Trygve Lie then left us to see the Chinese Communists, who had asked for an appointment at Lake Success for 5.30. Later he told me about this visit over the phone, and asked me to join Entezam and Rau at his house in Forest Hills at 9.00 p.m.

We found him excited and depressed over the afternoon meeting with the Chinese. Chino did most of the talking at that meeting and confirmed the impression that he was the No. 1 man. They told Lie that they had already informed Sir Benegal Rau that they did not recognize our Committee and were unwilling to talk about a "cease fire", except on terms already made quite clear to Rau, who should have made them quite clear to us. Unless there were negotiations about a political settlement in Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and Formosa, along lines indicated by Malik, they could not talk about any "cease fire". They used language which, according to Lie, was completely "Russian", and very much like Malik's speeches in the First Committee. They complained that they had been sitting around waiting for the question of Formosa to come up; that they had heard on the radio that the Assembly was over, so they were going home to Peking. They asked Mr. Lie, whom they thanked very warmly for all his help and courtesy, to get them "passports" and travel accommodation on a BOAC plane leaving next Tuesday, and to arrange for a press conference tomorrow, Saturday, at 3.00 o'clock, where they would make a statement. Lie said that he pleaded with them not to do this, and that he talked "very tough" with them. He told them that they were in danger of precipitating war if they broke off like this, because it would be interpreted here that the Chinese Communist Government had no interest in bringing the war in Korea to an end. He asked them to put off their press conference, and to see the Cease Fire Committee, which, he said, had been working hard all day, and which was composed of men who were doing their best to make peace. The Chinese admitted that the three men were good and trying to make peace, but said that there were other men who were not good and, therefore, there was no hope for these three! In any event, they said these great matters of peace and war would have to be decided on the highest plane. The top men should get together. Lie asked them if they meant Mao, Stalin and Truman, and they indicated that that was the kind of thing they had in mind. Lie said he kept urging them not to leave New York now, but they kept replying that they could not talk about "cease fire", as they had no instructions to discuss this resolution, which was illegal in any event. Also, their government wanted them to come back by air to Peking for the "passing over of the New Year"! They said, however, that it was very simple to go to Peking and very simple to come back if they had to. Lie was unable to make any further impression on them.

Lie then asked Rau if the Chinese had not told him their decision that morning. Rau said "no", but that they did tell him that they could not negotiate a "cease fire" arrangement unless we were willing to negotiate other things as well. Rau had pointed out to them this morning, as Lie pointed out to them this afternoon, that the "cease fire" resolution did provide for general negotiation, but only after a "cease fire" had been worked out. They did not seem to understand this part of the resolution, which Rau tried to impress on them.

Rau then phoned to see if he could go and see the Chinese tonight. They had told Lie that they were going to be in to see Mr. Truman on the television. When Rau phoned, however, he was told that they were not in, but would let Rau know in the morning whether he could see them then. If he does see them he will tell them how shocked he was to hear they were going away so soon; that we would be glad to see them before they go. Our hope was to discuss matters with them before their press conference. We agreed that if they won't see us, we must not consider that this means the end of our work, as they are merely officials of the Chinese Government. We should write them formally expressing our interest in seeing them in respect of this resolution, as representatives of their government, but adding that we would be quite willing to establish contact with their government directly in the matter, or with the North Korean military authorities. We agreed that we should also send a message direct to the Peking Government saying we had not been able to discuss these matters with their authorities here, and that we would be glad to discuss them with representatives of the Peking and North Korean Governments at any place that was mutually satisfactory.

I asked Lie whether he thought that the Chinese delegation here had lost face, and their government were recalling them merely because they had been forced to hang about. He sari he did not think so.

Lie was very depressed. He said his discussion with the Chinese this evening, and their demand for transportation home, reminded him very much of his interview with the German Ambassador the night the Nazis descended on Norway. We all agreed, however, including Lie, that we must not let the attitude of the Chinese Communists here prevent us going right ahead and doing what we can by any method open to us.

Kenneth Younger had an hour's talk with the Chinese this afternoon, which he reported to Lie. Younger was also depressed by his contact. He brought his own interpreter with him, an Englishman, who said that the Chinese spoken by these people was the roughest kind of gutter language, bitter and crude.

Lie's view is that they are getting orders from not only Peking, but from Russia. As the Russians are leaving, they decided that they should leave too.

It has been a gloomy day, but I think that too much of this has been caused by the language and attitude of Wu and Company. After all, we shouldn't expect them to be polished and courteous and friendly. But apart from their methods, there is quite enough in the facts of the situation to warrant a good deal of pessimism about the results of our "cease fire" work. But at all costs, we must try everything before we admit failure.

December 16, 1950 (Saturday)

This was as interesting a day as yesterday, and about as discouraging. In the early morning, Ridden and I drafted a letter to send to the Chinese Communists before they held their press conference this afternoon. The communication is attached in final form (Annex II)† which is practically the same as that which we drafted here. I also worked on a draft of a communiqué (Annex III)† which could be given to the press after the Chinese conference, in case the Chinese statement seemed to make such a communiqué desirable. It would emphasize that flat rejection of any discussions by the Chinese Communists here did not necessarily mean the end of our work; that we must try to keep these negotiations going on, even if it means a trip to Peking! This is desirable, both on political and military grounds.

At 11.00 o'clock Entezam phoned me to see if I could join him and Rau at his suite at the Ritz Towers at noon. Rau had reported to him that his efforts to get in touch with the Chinese Communists had been unavailing. They claimed that they were too busy to meet him during the morning, but would see him that evening.

Younger came in to see me at 10.00 o'clock to report on his talk with Wu, and also to find out how things stood. He is very anxious that we should not submit a negative report on "cease fire" to the First Committee at once, as this might be followed by U.S. efforts to take further steps against the Chinese Communists. Such further steps should not, in his opinion, and in mine, be taken until there has been consultation between the governments chiefly concerned, so that we can find out exactly where they will lead us.

I met Entezam and Rau at the former's hotel at noon, and they agreed with my draft to the Chinese with one or two minor changes. We then had it typed and despatched by messenger to the Chinese at the Waldorf, having previously telephoned them that it was coming.

After luncheon we motored out to Lake Success and met in the President's office there with the Secretary-General. He said that there had been no indication of softening on the part of the Chinese, who would be arriving any minute for their press conference. We then listened, through a loud speaker in the office, to Wu read his statement to the press. It was not too bad and did not include any reference to their departure, or to their refusal to negotiate with the Cease Fire Committee. At the same time, he handed out to the press a long statement which he would have made in the First Committee on Formosa and U.S. aggression against China, if he had been permitted to do so. (Annex IV).† What they are trying to do is show that they have been prevented from making such a statement because of changes of procedure on the part of the First Committee. These tactics do not, however, square with the fact that the First Committee will meet on Monday, and may possibly even decide to discuss Formosa. Lie said that while Wu and his friends insist that they are going home Tuesday, they have not indicated that they will not turn up on Monday at the First Committee. He still thinks that there is some small chance that they may change their plans, especially after they read our letter.

While we were in one room, the Secretary-General discussed matters with the Chinese (after the press conference) in an adjoining room. He found out that they had not received, or at least read our letter, so he proceeded to read it to them from a copy which we had given him, and it was then translated into Chinese. They were very interested, but indicated that they would make no change in their plans for departure. Lie then asked them if they would like to see the Cease Fire Committee, which was meeting in the next room. They said that they had high regard for the members of the Committee personally, but that this was a political matter which they were not able to discuss with the Committee officially, as they did not recognize the resolution setting it up. They said, however, that they would like to see Mr. Entezam, as President of the Assembly, not as a member of the Committee. Entezam, therefore, had a half an hour with them, which he said was devoted largely to an exchange of courtesies, ardent assertions of Asiatic solidarity, expressions of appreciation on the part of the Chinese of the motives behind Asian intervention in the Assembly, and of fear that the Americans, however, would make peace in the Pacific impossible. Entezam claims that he gave them some good advice, but that he did not talk to them at all about the Cease Fire resolution. We will leave that to Rau who is having dinner with them tonight.

Meanwhile, we decided not to issue any press communiqué, but to tell our press officer to emphasize to the journalists that our work had not finished and that, if necessary, we would get in touch with the Peking and North Korean Governments direct. The chances of this happening are, however, very slight. It is difficult to see what can be done, but we will be a little clearer on this point tomorrow when Rau reports about his dinner with the Chinese.

In addition to sending the letter to the Chinese Communists here, we had the Secretary-General cable it to the Peking Government direct. The cable is attached as Annex V. † Wu, according to Trygve Lie, did not seem to worry about us going over his head in this manner.

We also agreed to make an interim report to the First Committee on Monday on the progress (-) of our negotiations for a "cease fire". We would emphasize that this was merely an interim, and not a final report. I suspect that some of the U.S. people would like to make it a final report.

December 17, 1950 (Sunday)

Rau phoned me this morning to see if I could meet Entezam and him this afternoon, as he would like to report on his evening with the Chinese. Accordingly, we met at Entezam's flat at 3.30, when Rau reported to us on his evening with Wu & Co.

Our Indian colleague, who is becoming more and more spiritual and ghost-like as our work proceeds (it has been a very great strain on his far-from-robust physique), spent about four hours with his Chinese friends and found them, as usual, friendly and full of talk about peace and Asian co-operation. At the same time, whenever he confronted them with the concrete questions and problems arising out of the present situation in Korea, and in the United Nations, they did not budge an inch from the stubborn position that they had previously taken; namely, that all that was required was for the American aggressors to get out of Korea and Formosa and stay out. They insisted that the "cease fire" resolution was merely a trap, and one which they would not walk into. They also indicated that no fire crackers had been set off in Peking at the possibility of our arrival there to negotiate! 1n fact, they thought we would be wasting our time in going to Peking, which, I suppose, we would. Rau was very discouraged about it all and I think that he is losing most of his illusions about negotiating with Communists. However, he was cheered up by the farewell remarks of the Chinese. They urged him not to give up hope, but keep on working with the other members of the Committee for a "cease fire" and peace. Rau seemed to think that this meant that the door was not closed, but, of course, it may only mean that we are to keep on working to get the Americans to alter their "aggressive" policy.

The three of us then discussed the procedure we should follow at the First Committee tomorrow. After making our interim report (I think Rau should do this) we can try to get the Committee to adjourn until we make our final report. Alternatively, we can (1) continue discussion of the Russian item of American aggression in China and Formosa, which would bring a long speech by Dulles or Austin, (2) discuss the 6-Power Resolution on Korea, or (3) the second Asian resolution, which provides for negotiation, through a committee, of outstanding differences in the Far East. Rau, of course, favoured this latter course, as he thought that it would help to remove the feeling which is strong in Communist minds that the first resolution was merely a trap to get a "cease fire" without any commitment to subsequent negotiation. There may be something in this, and we rather hope that the Committee would adopt this procedure, but the Americans may be bitterly opposed to it. I, therefore, suggested that we meet again at 8.30 and get Gross and Jebb to attend. I said that I would arrange the meeting. Later I telephoned Gross and Jebb and they will be on hand.

I also had a talk this afternoon with the Secretary-General who thinks that we should now call off "cease fire" negotiations altogether, admit failure, pass the 6Power Resolution, and then refer the whole question of what action, if any, should be taken against the Chinese, if they continue aggression in Korea, to the Collective Measures Committee set up in the United Action For Peace resolution. I do not know whether Lie is influenced more by his desire to spend Christmas in Norway, or to strike another blow for collective security in the United Nations. He kept warning me that we must now be very careful in the "Cease Fire" Committee not to give the impression that we are "appeasing" the Chinese. I had thought of suggesting that he should come to our meeting tonight, but after talking to him, decided that he would not be much help.

December 18, 1950 (Monday)

We met last night from 8.30 until nearly midnight at the Ritz Towers. In addition to the President, Sir Benegal and myself, there were present also Gladwyn Jebb, Ernie Gross and a colleague from his delegation, and Dayal of the Indian Delegation.

We at once tried to urge on Gross the advantages of discussing and voting on the second Asian Resolution to remove Chinese fears that we were not serious about negotiating Far Eastern issues once the "cease fire" had taken place. We pointed out that this did not involve any additional commitment, because, in fact, we were committed to this course of action by the Preamble of the Asian Resolution we had already passed. We also argued that Mr. Attlee and Mr. Truman, in their communi- from Washington, had committed themselves to the principle of negotiating with the Chinese Communists. Why, then, not proceed at once with the second Asian Resolution, which would improve the atmosphere and, therefore, help the work of the Cease Fire Group.

Jebb would have gone even further and amended the Resolution to indicate that in the negotiating committee referred to, there would be included the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and the Peking Governments. Gross could not take this at all, as it would appear to exclude the Chinese Nationalists. He did, however, toy with the idea of agreeing that the Resolution should be amended to refer to the "governments and authorities especially interested" as members of the negotiating committee. Gross thought that we were paying too much attention to Chinese Communist suspicions, and that in our preoccupation with their worries about a trap, we were losing sight of the fact that we might be making a trap for ourselves. He said that his government did not intend to back down from the Truman-Attlee communiqué, or to exclude the Chinese Communists from Korean negotiations, but that was a very different thing from specifically including them in a U.N. resolution at this stage. It is, of course, easy to understand the American position on this point, even though we may not approve of it. A resolution of this kind, which would specifically include the Chinese Communists in a negotiating committee, would, in fact, be a formal recognition of them, and almost an equally formal exclusion of the Chinese Nationalists. Gross was quite certain that Washington could not accept this.

I then tried to argue that we should leave the membership of the negotiating committee entirely open; and discuss and pass on the rest of the resolution. The President of the Assembly did not like this much, as he felt that once the resolution was passed, the names of the states would have to be filled in and we would be almost immediately up against the question of Chinese representation - the main point at issue. We had much talk but made little progress, and at the end of the evening I suggested that possibly we might reach agreement on the following course. When the committee met, the Cease Fire Group would make its interim report, and in that report emphasize that "cease fire" and negotiation were tied together, and as soon as one was arranged, the other would begin; also, that in the negotiation, the Chinese Communists would naturally be included in some appropriate form, making reference to the Truman-Attlee communiqué, to show that this was in the minds of those two governments. The U.S. and U.K. would then support this statement, thereby, it was hoped, removing Chinese Communist fears and suspicions. This suggested procedure was generally approved.

However, when I reached Lake Success this morning, I found that there was great confusion as to how we should act. Sir Benegal had overnight changed his mind on two things. First, he did not want to make the report on behalf of the Cease Fire Group, as I gathered he had received messages from New Delhi warning him against taking too active a part in our work. In fact, he indicated to me that his Prime Minister had said that if I were not on the Group, he would not be able to continue. Apparently they have some confidence that I will not allow Sir Benegal to get into too much trouble! He also did not think now that we should make a long statement as an interim report, in an effort to argue away Chinese fears. He felt that this might merely produce a debate which would not improve the atmosphere. He felt, therefore, that I should make a short interim statement, merely reading the cable we had sent to Peking, and explaining factually what we had done. After discussing the matter with Gross and finding that, in any event, the U.S. would not be able to support the longer statement along the lines indicated last night, I agreed to do this.

We then had several huddles before the meeting as to what we should do after we had made our interim report. The Americans did not seem very clear as to what they wanted, but agreed that they would not oppose a motion for adjourning until the Cease Fire Group was in a position to report again. When the committee met, therefore, I made my report, which got a friendly reception, even from Malik, and then after a considerable wrangle we adjourned.

After the meeting of the Committee, Rau, Entezam and I had a discussion. Rau now thinks that we should draft a statement for the press along the lines of the one we discussed last night, as a final effort to prove to the Chinese Communists that we were serious about negotiation after a "cease fire" took place. He said that the Asian group were very anxious that some such statement should be made, and they thought that it should come from our Committee. I agreed to try my hand at this and sent a draft over to them this evening. (Annex VI).†

Meanwhile, after a talk with the Secretary-General we decided that Rau should try to see the Chinese once again before they left, and report to us tomorrow. If there is no response from them or from Peking by Wednesday, we will then suggest to the Chairman of the Political Committee that he tell his members that there will be no meeting until January 3rd. By that time we will have our formal report ready, explaining our failure. We also will have a couple of weeks without any United Nations meetings on Korea and this may be helpful. As long as the Cease Fire Group is formally in session it will, presumably, be a little more difficult for the Chinese to begin their offensive in Korea, or certainly to justify it. It will be more difficult for the U.S. to summon the Political Committee for further and more decisive action against the Chinese. We may have to do that later, but we now have time to think things over and discuss the implications of any further action.

December 19, 1950 (Tuesday)

Rau paid his farewell visit to the Chinese this morning and he told Entezam and me about it at noon. He got nowhere, though on leaving Wu told him that they might be back again after their visit to Peiping. This is probably an attempt to befuddle and deceive us, though you never can tell with these chaps. Rau said that he did his best to persuade them that they were making a big mistake in ignoring the cease-fire discussions.

We then talked about the issue of a communiqué along the lines of that worked out yesterday. Entezam and I had doubts of the wisdom of this in view of the uncompromising attitude of Peiping. So we agreed to abandon our press statement and, instead, send a further telegram to Peiping in an effort to remove the misunderstanding and fears that Wu had expressed to Rau. I agreed to alter the draft press communiqué accordingly. We also agreed to send a final message to Peiping Thursday, (if we had not heard from them) indicating that we would go ahead next week with our final report, not waiting any longer for their views. I said that I would draft that. (See Annexes VII and VIII).

In the afternoon I put these two documents together - and told the U.S. and U.K. what we were doing. The former won't like it.

We met at Entezam's at 5.30 and I read them the messages. Rau thought our telegram to Peiping should be more positive in its assurances that if a cease-lire could be arranged, the Chinese Communists could expect negotiations to begin at once and to be included as members of any U.N. Committee for that purpose. But I didn't think that we should go too far. After all, we couldn't bind the U.N., though we could commit ourselves, and also the Asian sponsors of the Resolution who, earlier in the afternoon, had been consulted by Rau.

Our telegram went off tonight, and I am going to Ottawa tomorrow. Wu & Co. left this afternoon issuing a final statement which did not help - though it might have been worse.

Their mission was certainly a failure and possibly worse, as it may have hardened them in their position, without giving them any understanding whatever of the United Nations or of the United States.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General had joined us and he said that he had seen the Chinese Communists during the morning and that they had been very tough. They had taken up a British request, made through him, about prisoners of war, and it got a very curt and rude reception. Trygve Lie was a little depressed about all this, especially as he is not satisfied with the way in which our Committee is likely to operate. He does not think much of Benegal Rau, who, he says, does not know how to handle the Communists, or how to talk to them effectively. However, he was pleased that he had been asked to join us this afternoon, and he agreed to put at our disposal Feller and Katzin for secretarial work. He also agreed with our general line of procedure.

I suggested that after our meeting we have a press conference; that we had better let the press see us; and explain to them our difficulties. We did this and gave them a short communiqué, which I drafted. There were a good many questions, but the press, who were grateful far the conference, did not try to embarrass us.

Trygve Lie then left us to see the Chinese Communists, who had asked for an appointment at Lake Success for 5.30. Later he told me about this visit over the phone, and asked me to join Entezam and Rau at his house in Forest Hills at 9.00 p.m.

We found him excited and depressed over the afternoon meeting with the Chinese. Chino did most of the talking at that meeting and confirmed the impression that he was the No. 1 man. They told Lie that they had already informed Sir Benegal Rau that they did not recognize our Committee and were unwilling to talk about a "cease fire", except on terms already made quite clear to Rau, who should have made them quite clear to us. Unless there were negotiations about a political settlement in Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and Formosa, along lines indicated by Malik, they could not talk about any "cease fire". They used language which, according to Lie, was completely "Russian", and very much like Malik's speeches in the First Committee. They complained that they had been sitting around waiting for the question of Formosa to come up; that they had heard on the radio that the Assembly was over, so they were going home to Peking. They asked Mr. Lie, whom they thanked very warmly for all his help and courtesy, to get them "passports" and travel accommodation on a BOAC plane leaving next Tuesday, and to arrange for a press conference tomorrow, Saturday, at 3.00 o'clock, where they would make a statement. Lie said that he pleaded with them not to do this, and that he talked "very tough" with them. He told them that they were in danger of precipitating war if they broke off like this, because it would be interpreted here that the Chinese Communist Government had no interest in bringing the war in Korea to an end. He asked them to put off their press conference, and to see the Cease Fire Committee, which, he said, had been working hard all day, and which was composed of men who were doing their best to make peace. The Chinese admitted that the three men were good and trying to make peace, but said that there were other men who were not good and, therefore, there was no hope for these three! In any event, they said these great matters of peace and war would have to be decided on the highest plane. The top men should get together. Lie asked them if they meant Mao, Stalin and Truman, and they indicated that that was the kind of thing they had in mind. Lie said he kept urging them not to leave New York now, but they kept replying that they could not talk about "cease fire", as they had no instructions to discuss this resolution, which was illegal in any event. Also, their government wanted them to come back by air to Peking for the "passing over of the New Year"! They said, however, that it was very simple to go to Peking and very simple to come back if they had to. Lie was unable to make any further impression on them.

Lie then asked Rau if the Chinese had not told him their decision that morning. Rau said "no", but that they did tell him that they could not negotiate a "cease fire" arrangement unless we were willing to negotiate other things as well. Rau had pointed out to them this morning, as Lie pointed out to them this afternoon, that the "cease fire" resolution did provide for general negotiation, but only after a "cease fire" had been worked out. They did not seem to understand this part of the resolution, which Rau tried to impress on them.

Rau then phoned to see if he could go and see the Chinese tonight. They had told Lie that they were going to be in to see Mr. Truman on the television. When Rau phoned, however, he was told that they were not in, but would let Rau know in the morning whether he could see them then. If he does see them he will tell them how shocked he was to hear they were going away so soon; that we would be glad to see them before they go. Our hope was to discuss matters with them before their press conference. We agreed that if they won't see us, we must not consider that this means the end of our work, as they are merely officials of the Chinese Government. We should write them formally expressing our interest in seeing them in respect of this resolution, as representatives of their government, but adding that we would be quite willing to establish contact with their government directly in the matter, or with the North Korean military authorities. We agreed that we should also send a message direct to the Peking Government saying we had not been able to discuss these matters with their authorities here, and that we would be glad to discuss them with representatives of the Peking and North Korean Governments at any place that was mutually satisfactory.

I asked Lie whether he thought that the Chinese delegation here had lost face, and their government were recalling them merely because they had been forced to hang about. He sari he did not think so.

Lie was very depressed. He said his discussion with the Chinese this evening, and their demand for transportation home, reminded him very much of his interview with the German Ambassador the night the Nazis descended on Norway. We all agreed, however, including Lie, that we must not let the attitude of the Chinese Communists here prevent us going right ahead and doing what we can by any method open to us.

Kenneth Younger had an hour's talk with the Chinese this afternoon, which he reported to Lie. Younger was also depressed by his contact. He brought his own interpreter with him, an Englishman, who said that the Chinese spoken by these people was the roughest kind of gutter language, bitter and crude.

Lie's view is that they are getting orders from not only Peking, but from Russia. As the Russians are leaving, they decided that they should leave too.

It has been a gloomy day, but I think that too much of this has been caused by the language and attitude of Wu and Company. After all, we shouldn't expect them to be polished and courteous and friendly. But apart from their methods, there is quite enough in the facts of the situation to warrant a good deal of pessimism about the results of our "cease fire" work. But at all costs, we must try everything before we admit failure.

December 16, 1950 (Saturday)

This was as interesting a day as yesterday, and about as discouraging. In the early morning, Ridden and I drafted a letter to send to the Chinese Communists before they held their press conference this afternoon. The communication is attached in final form (Annex II)† which is practically the same as that which we drafted here. I also worked on a draft of a communiqué (Annex III)† which could be given to the press after the Chinese conference, in case the Chinese statement seemed to make such a communiqué desirable. It would emphasize that flat rejection of any discussions by the Chinese Communists here did not necessarily mean the end of our work; that we must try to keep these negotiations going on, even if it means a trip to Peking! This is desirable, both on political and military grounds.

At 11.00 o'clock Entezam phoned me to see if I could join him and Rau at his suite at the Ritz Towers at noon. Rau had reported to him that his efforts to get in touch with the Chinese Communists had been unavailing. They claimed that they were too busy to meet him during the morning, but would see him that evening.

Younger came in to see me at 10.00 o'clock to report on his talk with Wu, and also to find out how things stood. He is very anxious that we should not submit a negative report on "cease fire" to the First Committee at once, as this might be followed by U.S. efforts to take further steps against the Chinese Communists. Such further steps should not, in his opinion, and in mine, be taken until there has been consultation between the governments chiefly concerned, so that we can find out exactly where they will lead us.

I met Entezam and Rau at the former's hotel at noon, and they agreed with my draft to the Chinese with one or two minor changes. We then had it typed and despatched by messenger to the Chinese at the Waldorf, having previously telephoned them that it was coming.

After luncheon we motored out to Lake Success and met in the President's office there with the Secretary-General. He said that there had been no indication of softening on the part of the Chinese, who would be arriving any minute for their press conference. We then listened, through a loud speaker in the office, to Wu read his statement to the press. It was not too bad and did not include any reference to their departure, or to their refusal to negotiate with the Cease Fire Committee. At the same time, he handed out to the press a long statement which he would have made in the First Committee on Formosa and U.S. aggression against China, if he had been permitted to do so. (Annex IV).† What they are trying to do is show that they have been prevented from making such a statement because of changes of procedure on the part of the First Committee. These tactics do not, however, square with the fact that the First Committee will meet on Monday, and may possibly even decide to discuss Formosa. Lie said that while Wu and his friends insist that they are going home Tuesday, they have not indicated that they will not turn up on Monday at the First Committee. He still thinks that there is some small chance that they may change their plans, especially after they read our letter.

While we were in one room, the Secretary-General discussed matters with the Chinese (after the press conference) in an adjoining room. He found out that they had not received, or at least read our letter, so he proceeded to read it to them from a copy which we had given him, and it was then translated into Chinese. They were very interested, but indicated that they would make no change in their plans for departure. Lie then asked them if they would like to see the Cease Fire Committee, which was meeting in the next room. They said that they had high regard for the members of the Committee personally, but that this was a political matter which they were not able to discuss with the Committee officially, as they did not recognize the resolution setting it up. They said, however, that they would like to see Mr. Entezam, as President of the Assembly, not as a member of the Committee. Entezam, therefore, had a half an hour with them, which he said was devoted largely to an exchange of courtesies, ardent assertions of Asiatic solidarity, expressions of appreciation on the part of the Chinese of the motives behind Asian intervention in the Assembly, and of fear that the Americans, however, would make peace in the Pacific impossible. Entezam claims that he gave them some good advice, but that he did not talk to them at all about the Cease Fire resolution. We will leave that to Rau who is having dinner with them tonight.

Meanwhile, we decided not to issue any press communiqué, but to tell our press officer to emphasize to the journalists that our work had not finished and that, if necessary, we would get in touch with the Peking and North Korean Governments direct. The chances of this happening are, however, very slight. It is difficult to see what can be done, but we will be a little clearer on this point tomorrow when Rau reports about his dinner with the Chinese.

In addition to sending the letter to the Chinese Communists here, we had the Secretary-General cable it to the Peking Government direct. The cable is attached as Annex V. t Wu, according to Trygve Lie, did not seem to worry about us going over his head in this manner.

We also agreed to make an interim report to the First Committee on Monday on the progress (-) of our negotiations for a "cease fire". We would emphasize that this was merely an interim, and not a final report. I suspect that some of the U.S. people would like to make it a final report.

December 17, 1950 (Sunday)

Rau phoned me this morning to see if I could meet Entezam and him this afternoon, as he would like to report on his evening with the Chinese. Accordingly, we met at Entezam's flat at 3.30, when Rau reported to us on his evening with Wu & Co.

Our Indian colleague, who is becoming more and more spiritual and ghost-like as our work proceeds (it has been a very great strain on his far-from-robust physique), spent about four hours with his Chinese friends and found them, as usual, friendly and full of talk about peace and Asian co-operation. At the same time, whenever he confronted them with the concrete questions and problems arising out of the present situation in Korea, and in the United Nations, they did not budge an inch from the stubborn position that they had previously taken; namely, that all that was required was for the American aggressors to get out of Korea and Formosa and stay out. They insisted that the "cease fire" resolution was merely a trap, and one which they would not walk into. They also indicated that no fire crackers had been set off in Peking at the possibility of our arrival there to negotiate! 1n fact, they thought we would be wasting our time in going to Peking, which, I suppose, we would. Rau was very discouraged about it all and I think that he is losing most of his illusions about negotiating with Communists. However, he was cheered up by the farewell remarks of the Chinese. They urged him not to give up hope, but keep on working with the other members of the Committee for a "cease fire" and peace. Rau seemed to think that this meant that the door was not closed, but, of course, it may only mean that we are to keep on working to get the Americans to alter their "aggressive" policy.

The three of us then discussed the procedure we should follow at the First Committee tomorrow. After making our interim report (I think Rau should do this) we can try to get the Committee to adjourn until we make our final report. Alternatively, we can (1) continue discussion of the Russian item of American aggression in China and Formosa, which would bring a long speech by Dulles or Austin, (2) discuss the 6-Power Resolution on Korea, or (3) the second Asian resolution, which provides for negotiation, through a committee, of outstanding differences in the Far East. Rau, of course, favoured this latter course, as he thought that it would help to remove the feeling which is strong in Communist minds that the first resolution was merely a trap to get a "cease fire" without any commitment to subsequent negotiation. There may be something in this, and we rather hope that the Committee would adopt this procedure, but the Americans may be bitterly opposed to it. I, therefore, suggested that we meet again at 8.30 and get Gross and Jebb to attend. I said that I would arrange the meeting. Later I telephoned Gross and Jebb and they will be on hand.

I also had a talk this afternoon with the Secretary-General who thinks that we should now call off "cease fire" negotiations altogether, admit failure, pass the 6Power Resolution, and then refer the whole question of what action, if any, should be taken against the Chinese, if they continue aggression in Korea, to the Collective Measures Committee set up in the United Action For Peace resolution. I do not know whether Lie is influenced more by his desire to spend Christmas in Norway, or to strike another blow for collective security in the United Nations. He kept warning me that we must now be very careful in the "Cease Fire" Committee not to give the impression that we are "appeasing" the Chinese. I had thought of suggesting that he should come to our meeting tonight, but after talking to him, decided that he would not be much help.

December 18, 1950 (Monday)

We met last night from 8.30 until nearly midnight at the Ritz Towers. In addition to the President, Sir Benegal and myself, there were present also Gladwyn Jebb, Ernie Gross and a colleague from his delegation, and Dayal of the Indian Delegation.

We at once tried to urge on Gross the advantages of discussing and voting on the second Asian Resolution to remove Chinese fears that we were not serious about negotiating Far Eastern issues once the "cease fire" had taken place. We pointed out that this did not involve any additional commitment, because, in fact, we were committed to this course of action by the Preamble of the Asian Resolution we had already passed. We also argued that Mr. Attlee and Mr. Truman, in their communi- from Washington, had committed themselves to the principle of negotiating with the Chinese Communists. Why, then, not proceed at once with the second Asian Resolution, which would improve the atmosphere and, therefore, help the work of the Cease Fire Group.

Jebb would have gone even further and amended the Resolution to indicate that in the negotiating committee referred to, there would be included the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and the Peking Governments. Gross could not take this at all, as it would appear to exclude the Chinese Nationalists. He did, however, toy with the idea of agreeing that the Resolution should be amended to refer to the "governments and authorities especially interested" as members of the negotiating committee. Gross thought that we were paying too much attention to Chinese Communist suspicions, and that in our preoccupation with their worries about a trap, we were losing sight of the fact that we might be making a trap for ourselves. He said that his government did not intend to back down from the Truman-Attlee communiqué, or to exclude the Chinese Communists from Korean negotiations, but that was a very different thing from specifically including them in a U.N. resolution at this stage. It is, of course, easy to understand the American position on this point, even though we may not approve of it. A resolution of this kind, which would specifically include the Chinese Communists in a negotiating committee, would, in fact, be a formal recognition of them, and almost an equally formal exclusion of the Chinese Nationalists. Gross was quite certain that Washington could not accept this.

I then tried to argue that we should leave the membership of the negotiating committee entirely open; and discuss and pass on the rest of the resolution. The President of the Assembly did not like this much, as he felt that once the resolution was passed, the names of the states would have to be filled in and we would be almost immediately up against the question of Chinese representation - the main point at issue. We had much talk but made little progress, and at the end of the evening I suggested that possibly we might reach agreement on the following course. When the committee met, the Cease Fire Group would make its interim report, and in that report emphasize that "cease fire" and negotiation were tied together, and as soon as one was arranged, the other would begin; also, that in the negotiation, the Chinese Communists would naturally be included in some appropriate form, making reference to the Truman-Attlee communiqué, to show that this was in the minds of those two governments. The U.S. and U.K. would then support this statement, thereby, it was hoped, removing Chinese Communist fears and suspicions. This suggested procedure was generally approved.

However, when I reached Lake Success this morning, I found that there was great confusion as to how we should act. Sir Benegal had overnight changed his mind on two things. First, he did not want to make the report on behalf of the Cease Fire Group, as I gathered he had received messages from New Delhi warning him against taking too active a part in our work. In fact, he indicated to me that his Prime Minister had said that if I were not on the Group, he would not be able to continue. Apparently they have some confidence that I will not allow Sir Benegal to get into too much trouble! He also did not think now that we should make a long statement as an interim report, in an effort to argue away Chinese fears. He felt that this might merely produce a debate which would not improve the atmosphere. He felt, therefore, that I should make a short interim statement, merely reading the cable we had sent to Peking, and explaining factually what we had done. After discussing the matter with Gross and finding that, in any event, the U.S. would not be able to support the longer statement along the lines indicated last night, I agreed to do this.

We then had several huddles before the meeting as to what we should do after we had made our interim report. The Americans did not seem very clear as to what they wanted, but agreed that they would not oppose a motion for adjourning until the Cease Fire Group was in a position to report again. When the committee met, therefore, I made my report, which got a friendly reception, even from Malik, and then after a considerable wrangle we adjourned.

After the meeting of the Committee, Rau, Entezam and I had a discussion. Rau now thinks that we should draft a statement for the press along the lines of the one we discussed last night, as a final effort to prove to the Chinese Communists that we were serious about negotiation after a "cease fire" took place. He said that the Asian group were very anxious that some such statement should be made, and they thought that it should come from our Committee. I agreed to try my hand at this and sent a draft over to them this evening. (Annex VI).†

Meanwhile, after a talk with the Secretary-General we decided that Rau should try to see the Chinese once again before they left, and report to us tomorrow. If there is no response from them or from Peking by Wednesday, we will then suggest to the Chairman of the Political Committee that he tell his members that there will be no meeting until January 3rd. By that time we will have our formal report ready, explaining our failure. We also will have a couple of weeks without any United Nations meetings on Korea and this may be helpful. As long as the Cease Fire Group is formally in session it will, presumably, be a little more difficult for the Chinese to begin their offensive in Korea, or certainly to justify it. It will be more difficult for the U.S. to summon the Political Committee for further and more decisive action against the Chinese. We may have to do that later, but we now have time to think things over and discuss the implications of any further action.

December 19, 1950 (Tuesday)

Rau paid his farewell visit to the Chinese this morning and he told Entezam and me about it at noon. He got nowhere, though on leaving Wu told him that they might be back again after their visit to Peiping. This is probably an attempt to befuddle and deceive us, though you never can tell with these chaps. Rau said that he did his best to persuade them that they were making a big mistake in ignoring the cease-fire discussions.

We then talked about the issue of a communiqué along the lines of that worked out yesterday. Entezam and I had doubts of the wisdom of this in view of the uncompromising attitude of Peiping. So we agreed to abandon our press statement and, instead, send a further telegram to Peiping in an effort to remove the misunderstanding and fears that Wu had expressed to Rau. I agreed to alter the draft press communiqué accordingly. We also agreed to send a final message to Peiping Thursday, (if we had not heard from them) indicating that we would go ahead next week with our final report, not waiting any longer for their views. I said that I would draft that. (See Annexes VII and VIII).

In the afternoon I put these two documents together - and told the U.S. and U.K. what we were doing. The former won't like it.

We met at Entezam's at 5.30 and I read them the messages. Rau thought our telegram to Peiping should be more positive in its assurances that if a cease-lire could be arranged, the Chinese Communists could expect negotiations to begin at once and to be included as members of any U.N. Committee for that purpose. But I didn't think that we should go too far. After all, we couldn't bind the U.N., though we could commit ourselves, and also the Asian sponsors of the Resolution who, earlier in the afternoon, had been consulted by Rau.

Our telegram went off tonight, and I am going to Ottawa tomorrow. Wu & Co. left this afternoon issuing a final statement which did not help - though it might have been worse.

Their mission was certainly a failure and possibly worse, as it may have hardened them in their position, without giving them any understanding whatever of the United Nations or of the United States.