Following for Mr. Pearson from Heeney. There have been no further developments of importance in New York in regard to Kashmir since Security Council meeting at which McNaughton tabled his proposals. Replies of both parties have been exchanged, and McNaughton has received and transmitted comments of each party on reply made by the other one. These comments have not indicated any reasonable hope of amending proposals made by McNaughton to satisfaction of both parties.

2. Security Council has not yet been called for meeting in January on Kashmir. Riddell suggested informally to Smith that, if no obvious purpose was to be served by holding a meeting immediately, it might be preferable to defer further discussion of Kashmir in Council until after Colombo Conference. This suggestion was passed on to U.K. and U.S. representatives in New York who seem mistakenly to have taken it as a proposal that discussions be transferred to Ceylon Conference. They referred it to their governments which, as might have been expected, objected to any action which seemed to be taking the subject out of the hands of the Security Council. They agreed, however, that there might be considerable advantage in postponing a further meeting of the Council on Kashmir until the Conference in Colombo had been concluded. It has been agreed that this course of action will be suggested to Tsiang. Since Tsiang will certainly have an uncomfortable time whenever the Council meets, he may well concur in the suggestion for postponement.

3. Delegation is uncertain in regard to plans of Bajpai and Zafrulla Khan. Bajpai hinted that he might soon be returning to India, adding that he thought it unlikely that he would go to Ceylon. Zafrulla Khan has gone to Washington on a visit, and it is unlikely that he will go to Ceylon unless it becomes certain that Kashmir will not be discussed in Security Council until Colombo Conference is over.

4. McNaughton and Smith believe that no further progress can be made in negotiations until there is a basic change in the attitude of one or other of the parties. They consider that India is deliberately attempting to prevent a plebiscite from being held in the hope that force of circumstance will finally lead Pakistan to accept partition. Pakistan on the other hand will continue to hold firm to original commitment that future of Kashmir as a whole shall be settled by plebiscite. They think, therefore, that before further progress can be made, position of parties must change in one of two ways. Either India must accept arrangements which will make it possible for plebiscite to be taken, without prior commitment being given in regard to partition (with possible exception of Pakistan suggestion that minor border adjustments might take place following plebiscite); or alternatively, Pakistan must agree to settlement by partition either before or after plebiscite is held. Delegation does not believe that any mere adjustment in text of resolution as it now stands will result in agreement.

5. Meanwhile, during McNaughton's absence in Newfoundland, Delegation continues to be pressed by United States and United Kingdom for agreement that he should continue to act as mediator. If McNaughton were to accept, it seems certain that some means could be found to extend his mandate. He has insisted, however, that he will not consider continuing to act unless he is specifically requested to do so by both parties and unless at the same time one or both of the parties indicates a modification of position which would make it possible for him to proceed with some chance of success.

6.1 am advising General McNaughton to hold firmly to this position. As matters now stand, therefore, I do not think it probable that he will be requested to accept further responsibilities in regard to Kashmir. Meanwhile, we have been wondering whether there is any possibility of securing a renewal of the negotiations. It has occurred to us that there might be some possibility of securing agreement between Indian and Pakistani representatives at Colombo to some formula which would make it possible for negotiations to proceed. Before you left Ottawa, you suggested that a United Nations mediator with general terms of reference might be agreed upon. It seems to us, however, that functions of such a mediator would almost certainly have to be within the framework of the provisions of UNCIP resolutions accepted by both sides. In other words, he should be instructed to secure agreement between the parties to conditions which would make it possible to demilitarize Kashmir and proceed with the plebiscite, and to formulate any other proposals for a general settlement on which the parties might agree. This last clause in his terms of reference might enable him eventually to broach the question of partition, but only as a part of the plebiscite procedures, or as a proposal arising out of the results of the plebiscite. You are aware of course that United Kingdom and United States authorities both consider that best course now would be to put pressure on India to modify its position.

7. It occurs to us that you might find that question of McNaughton's future role in the negotiations, if any, would provide the occasion for discussions with Indian and Pakistani delegations. This is one reason why we thought it preferable for next meeting of the Council on Kashmir to be postponed, at least until Colombo Conference had convened, if that is possible. Ends.

¹⁰⁴Note marginale:/Marginal note:
Text of this telegram was reviewed and approved at meeting held on Friday January] 6 attended by Mr Heeney, Mr Feaver, Mr Holmes, Mr Weld and myself. R.G. R[iddell].