Volume #16 - 575.|
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
RTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 15 26, 1950
DEFENCE COMMITTEE MEETINGS, OCTOBER 28-31, 1950
Draft Memorandum, for Chiefs of Staff Committee72|
TOP SECRET ||
October 20th, 1950|
NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE|
The U.S. Defence Department, with the assistance of the Department of State, have prepared a draft recommendation from the North Atlantic Defence Committee to the Council, in answer to the Council's resolution C5 D/11 asking the Defence Committee how Western Germany could make its most useful contribution to the defence of Western Europe. The U.S. paper is intended to serve as a draft reply for consideration by Ministers when the Defence Committee meets on October 28. It has been circulated to the Preparatory Group of the personal representatives of Ministers which met in Washington on October 18 and 19 and is to meet again on October 23 when the U.S. Delegation have indicated that they would like informal comments from the representatives of other countries. It is understood that any comments which other representatives may wish to make would be taken as their personal comments and not as those of their Governments whose views would be given by their Defence Ministers, on October 28.
2. Although Mr. Drury, as the representative of Mr. Claxton in the Preparatory Group, will not have to speak for his Minister, it is desirable that on October 23 he should be in a position to indicate, generally speaking, any Canadian views or misgivings on the U.S. paper so that a better paper can, if possible, be prepared before the meeting of Ministers.
3. Our comments may be divided between (A) those bearing on the paper itself and (B) those that have to do with what might be said about the paper in the Defence Committee or in the Preparatory Group.
4. In the first place, then, we have the following comments on the paper itself:
(a) The recommendations advanced by the United States as regards the most effective way in which Western Germany could participate in the defence of the West, and as regards the most effective safeguards, appear technically sound.
(b) The wording of the paper could, in several places, be improved and clarified; small changes of phrasing, as distinct from changes of substance, should be suggested by the members of the Canadian Delegation who could perhaps take up such points informally with the U.S. Delegation during the Preparatory Group meetings next week.
(c) As an additional safeguard, it might perhaps be suggested that the length of service in German units should be fixed so that German units could not be used, as they were by the Weimar Republic, for training a large number of men brought into the forces for short periods of service. (This argument could be based on purely military considerations: the length of service required by the Supremo for units of the integrated force.)
(d) The safeguard contained in sub-paragraph (c) of the U.S. paper is considered unrealistic and unnecessary, as it might be difficult to find an appropriate civilian who had not served in the German Forces during the past 10 years.
(e) On the other hand, sub-paragraph (d) of the U.S. paper might be strengthened by saying that "There should be established ..." an Inspector General, rather than "Consideration should be given to the establishment ...".
(f) In the last sentence of sub-paragraph (f) of the U.S. paper, it might be made clearer that the defence costs of which the German Government must bear its share are those of defence production, as it has already been stated at the bottom of the first page of the U.S. paper that the German Government should pay for the recruitment, uniform, pay and accommodation of German units.
5. As regards what might be said in Committee about the U.S. paper, our comments are a good deal more general. Perhaps the chief point to make is that, in the Preparatory Group, the representatives of Defence Ministers will not be asked to make comments on the political assumptions of the paper but only on its technical aspects. However, it seems impossible to divorce the two considerations and we have, therefore, tried to put on paper some tentative views as to the political setting in which the U.S. paper will have to be discussed at the meeting of the Defence Ministers.
6. Our first proposition is that safeguards, however carefully framed, may not endure much longer than the establishment of a fully independent West German Government. From this reasonable expectation it follows that, in the final analysis, only the integration of Western Germany in the Western community can ultimately protect the other nations of Western Europe from a resurgence of German militarism.
7. Second, it would be desirable (if it is politically feasible) for the French and others to be given some assurance, even an informal one, that the Americans are thinking in longer terms in their planning for the establishment of an integrated force in Western Europe. Plans calling for the creation of an integrated force by 1954 leave open the question of how long U.S. forces will continue to remain in Europe. On the other hand, the French themselves must realize that Western Europe has little chance of surviving in the face of Russian power in anything like its present form unless the Americans remain in Europe, so they have, in effect, no option but to plan on the assumption that the United States will not build up German units and then withdraw from the Continent.
8. Our final proposition is that we should not be led by the logic of the purely military argument into pressing the French too hard for an immediate agreement on a programme that has immense political difficulties for them and, in any case, cannot be implemented immediately. As the timing of military planning is basic to some of the French misgivings, it might be helpful if more attention were given either in the paper itself or in the discussion of the paper by Ministers, to the probable timetable. For example, we do not have authoritative military answers to the following questions:
(a) When can we expect the establishment of an integrated force in Europe? (That is, when will the first United States divisions under SHAPE probably arrive in Europe-)
(b) How long would it take for present and planned production programmes in North Atlantic countries to turn out enough equipment for not only North Atlantic units which are to be formed but also for German units to participate in the integrated force?
(c) How long are we planning to have an integrated force in Europe - for a set number of years or indefinitely?
(d) When are Governments expected to commit themselves to the establishment of an integrated force and the participation of German units in it (Mr. Acheson's "single package" proposal) - at the next meeting of the Council, probably in December?
72Le comité des chefs d'état-major ne s'est pas réuni pour étudier ce document, qui semble avoir été rattrapé par les événements.