24. The Secretary of State for External Affairs reported that Canada was faced with an increasing number of requests to provide economic and relief assistance for other countries. To date, there had been participation in the relief for Palestine refugees,⁴ the United Nations expanded programme for technical assistance,⁵ the Colombo plan for cooperative technical assistance to South and South East Asia,>sup>6 the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund,' and the International Refugee Organization.' In each of these cases, funds had been voted by Parliament for the specific purpose indicated. However, when an emergency developed which it was considered Canada should assist in meeting, there were no funds readily available. It might be possible to vote a lump sum for international relief and economic assistance and leave some leeway concerning its specific apportionment. Probably each demand on the fund should be referred to Cabinet. It was suggested that an interdepartmental committee, composed of representatives of Finance, External Affairs, and other appropriate departments, might study the feasibility of this proposal and report to Cabinet.

At the present time there was a specific inquiry from the United States concerning the Canadian attitude towards provision of relief for Yugoslavia. The crisis there was partly due to the economic blockade by Cominform states and partly to the partial crop failure this year. Near starvation conditions threatened in many areas this winter. Yugoslavia had stated that it needed $121 million in aid, and U.S. authorities appeared to consider this a reasonable estimate. The U.S. Embassy had left with External Affairs on November 6th an Aide Mémoirei which had been delivered in almost identical terms to other N.A.T.O. members. This asked two questions, on which the United States wished a reply by that evening:

(a) whether in the view of the Canadian Government "the immediate increased ability of Yugoslavia to defend itself would contribute to the preservation of peace and the security of the North Atlantic area, keeping in mind the direct importance to the defence of the North Atlantic area of the strategic location of Yugoslavia"; and,

(b) whether the Government of Canada felt able to make a contribution of its own to meet this problem affecting the interests of all the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

(External Affairs memorandum for Minister, Nov. 7, 1950; Minister's memorandum to Cabinet, Nov. 8, 1950 Cab. Doc. 253 50)-

25. Mr. Pearson stressed the importance of a strong Yugoslavia to the maintenance of peace, as it was the first communist country to oppose the Kremlin. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had the largest and most powerful army in Europe, outside the Iron Curtain. However, while it was essential to keep Yugoslavia from breaking up, this should be considered as another incident in the cold war and one that might properly be dealt with by the United Kingdom and the United States.

26. The Prime Minister suggested that the Canadian public was not likely to regard the situation as one which created a moral obligation on this country to assist.

27. The Cabinet, after further discussion, agreed that it be indicated to the U.S. Ambassador that, while the Canadian Government realized the importance of assisting Yugoslavia and considered that the immediate increased ability of that country to defend itself would contribute to the preservation of peace and the security of the North Atlantic area, nevertheless, in view of present commitments it would not be possible for Canada to participate at this time in the provision of relief to Yugoslavia.

⁴ Voir le document 346./See Document 346. ' Voir le document 366./See Document 366. 6 Voir le document 651 ./See Document 651. ' Voir le document 355./See Document 355. 1 Voir le document 402./See Document 402.