Considerable thought has been given at the official level in Ottawa to the courses of action that would be open to us, should the United States reply to our note of April 10¹⁵⁸ on this subject, when it arrives, fail to provide the assurance we have requested of the United States Government, "that none of its agencies or departments will pass such information to any committee, body or organization in the United States over which the executive branch of the United States Government has no executive control without the express consent of the Canadian Government in each case." You will remember that our April 10 note went on to say that, were such an assurance not given, "the Canadian Government must reserve the right in future not to supply security information concerning Canadian citizens to any United States Government agency." Our problem will be twofold — what to do if the United States reply is unsatisfactory, and what to say to the Canadian public about it — because the State Department will undoubtedly publish their reply within a day or two of its delivery.

2. It is relevant to this problem that when Mr. Heeney presented this note he explained, on instructions, "that although we had found it necessary to take this step, we had no desire to upset the long-standing and friendly relations between the FBI and the RCMP, nor the new and satisfactory arrangements between the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service and the RCMP, to both of which we attached importance. Further, we considered it important in our joint interest to maintain this close co-operation in the security field, as in other fields." (I submitted a memorandum to you on July 23† on the subject of the new arrangement between the RCMP and the INS).

3. The RCMP have been passing security information about Canadian citizens to agencies of the United States Government in the following categories of cases (some Canadians, of course, are affected under more than one category):

1. Canadians applying for employment by the United States Government in sensitive positions either in the United States (information passed to the FBI) or at United States bases in Canada;
2. Canadians applying for immigration visas to enter the United States (information passed to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service);
3. Canadians with a subversive record, where United States interests are involved, e.g. Canadian Communists visiting the United States (information passed to the FBI); and
4. Canadians engaging in espionage, where United States interests are involved (information passed to the FBI).

4. In addition, of course, the RCMP when required pass security information about United States citizens resident in Canada.

5. Over the past few years the RCMP have exercised a more rigid control over the individual items of information sent to United States agencies than used to be the case. It is important to note also that in return for the information they supply the RCMP receive from the FBI an enormous amount of security information about Canadians, and about United States citizens where Canadian interests are involved, in all four categories listed in paragraph 3 above. The RCMP consider that in category (a) they get much more than they give, because there are far more Canadians with a record of residence in the United States seeking sensitive employment in Canada than there are Canadians seeking such employment in the United States or at United States bases in Canada. In category (b), again, we get at least as much as we give, and perhaps more. While it is true that more Canadians emigrate to the United States than vice versa, the return here lies in the assistance given by United States consular authorities in Europe and South America to the RCMP immigration screening programme. In categories (c) and (d) the RCMP get quite as much from the FBI as they give.

6. Should the United States note prove unsatisfactory, and should the Canadian Government decide to implement its threat to withhold security information from United States agencies, the following courses of action appear to be open to us:

1. The RCMP could be instructed to pass no information whatever in any of the categories listed in paragraph 3;
2. They could be instructed to pass information in some categories and not in others;
3. They could be instructed to pass less information in all categories, e.g. make a simple statement of fact such as "so-and-so is not clear for security," or "so-and-so is a member of the Communist party," without adding any further details of the case;
4. They could be instructed to pass information to one United States agency, e.g. to the FBI, and not to the others — the United States agency selected could be requested, and if it were the FBI it would probably comply with such a request, to keep the information for its own use;
5. Some other agency could be found or set up to screen RCMP information before it is passed to United States agencies, either by establishing suitable criteria or by actually examining each case.

7. All the foregoing courses of action, which are the only ones which have been suggested to me so far, seem dangerous or at least unhelpful. My criticisms of each course of action;

1. If the RCMP pass no information whatever we run the risk that Canadians will be denied sensitive employment in the United States and at United States bases in Canada; they will encounter serious difficulties if they wish to emigrate to the United States; subversive and espionage agents will have a field day; the interested United States agencies will seek security information about Canadians through devious and unreliable channels; United States confidence in our security arrangements will decline, and the flow of classified United States information to Canada will dwindle;
2. If they passed no information in selected categories the damage would be limited to that category initially but would have a generally bad effect before long;
3. If they passed only a bare statement in security cases, without any supporting information, in many important cases it would be as unsatisfactory to the United States agencies as if they passed no information whatever, and in those cases at least there could be the same unfortunate consequences;
4. If they passed information only to the FBI, and perhaps to the INS, the dangerous consequences of courses (a), (b) and (c) would be avoided to a great extent; it is unlikely, however, that the Canadian public would consider that this represented any tightening up at all, as the danger of leaks from the FBI and the INS could not be entirely ruled out;
5. The suggestion that some other agency could screen the flow of RCMP information, case by case, appears to reflect on the RCMP, whose experience after all makes them the best judge of what should and what should not be passed in particular cases; would impose intolerable delays in the processing of vetting and immigration cases; and would probably completely inhibit an effective co-operation between the RCMP and the FBI in operations against subversives and spies.

8. In view of the difficulties attending each of these more obvious courses of action, it seems to me that the Canadian Government would be unwise to take any immediate action affecting our relations with the United States in the security field, in the event that their note is found unsatisfactory. I recommend instead that in such a case it should refer the question to an ad hoc committee for study. I suggest that such a committee should be chaired by the Secretary to Cabinet, and that the Commissioner of the RCMP and the Legal Adviser of this Department be asked to attend, with such technical advisers as they wish to have. At this stage I could not predict what sort of recommendation such a committee would find it possible to make. It seems likely, however, that it could reexamine the criteria used by the RCMP in determining whether or not to pass information, the extent to which details should be supplied in the various categories of cases, the choice of United States agencies to which to pass information, and the conditions under which it should be passed to them. It could submit for this Government's approval a draft policy directive to the RCMP covering all those points. I understand that the RCMP would in fact welcome such general policy guidance. I should not be surprised if the committee found it necessary in this connection to recommend an increase in the RCMP establishment, if the procedure for passing security information to the United States were to be effectively tightened up.

9. If, as we expect, the State Department makes its reply public, and the Canadian Government is called upon to comment, I further recommend that it would be wise to conform any statement to the following points:

1. noting with a degree of satisfaction appropriate to whatever degree of assurance the United States note contains that Canadian interests will be protected;
2. stating that on preliminary examination the Canadian Government considers that effective improvements have in fact been made in this field in recent years, with due regard for the need to avoid hampering the proper discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the Canadian and United States security services (my memorandum to you of July 23 on the relations between the RCMP and the INS is relevant in this connection); and
3. explaining that the Government intends to give further study to the problem dealt with in the United States note.

J.W. HOLMES
for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

¹⁵⁸Voir volume 23, les documents 62 et 65./See Volume 23, Documents 62 and 65.